Re Thomas Quade; Mary Quade; Shawn Thomas Quade and Gerard William Quade v the Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1991] FCA 26; (1991) 13 Atpr 41-093; 99 ALR 567 27 FCR (14 February 1991)
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Re: THOMAS QUADE; MARY QUADE; SHAWN THOMAS QUADE and GERARD WILLIAM QUADEAnd: THE COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
No. N G734 of 1989
FED No. 24
Appeal and New Trial - Section 52 of Trade Practices Act and Negligence
(1991) 13 ATPR 41-093
[1991] FCA 26; 99 ALR 567
[1991] FCA 26;
27 FCR 569
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIANEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Neaves(1), Burchett(2) and Einfeld(3) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Appeal and New Trial - fresh evidence, being documents which ought to have been, but were not, disclosed (under a formal order for discovery) by the respondent who was successful at the trial - whether the ordinary rules concerning the use of fresh evidence upon an appeal apply in these circumstances - whether it is sufficient the appellants lost "a fair prospect of success" by the respondent's failure to comply with the order for discovery.Section 52 of Trade Practices Act and Negligence - claim against a bank arising out of a foreign currency loan - sufficiency of evidence - relationship of bank and customer - whether bank was in the circumstances under a duty to advise customers - conflict of interest between bank and customer - whether bank should have recommended that customer seek independent advice on whether to take foreign currency loan - whether bank should have advised re precautions required for monitoring foreign currency loan after it was entered into.
Trade Practices Act 1974, s.52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976,
s.27
Federal Court Rules, Order 52 r.36
HEARING
SYDNEY14:2:1991
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M.L.D. Einfeld QC with
Mr J. ChippindallSolicitors for the Appellants: Messrs Ferrier and Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J.R. Sackar QC with
Mr J. MarshallSolicitor for the Respondent: Mr L.E. Taylor
ORDER
The Court receive the fresh evidence tendered on the hearing of the appeal.The appeal be allowed; the orders of the learned trial judge made 12 October 1989 be set aside; and a new trial of the action be granted.
The respondent pay the appellants' costs of the trial, of the motion to
receive fresh evidence, and of the appeal.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
DECISION
The circumstances which gave rise to the claim by the appellants against the respondent for damages for negligent mis-statements and for relief under s.52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (N.S.W.) are fully set out in the judgment of the learned primary judge and are outlined in the judgment to be delivered by Burchett J. There is, therefore, no necessity to repeat them in this judgment.2. I am satisfied that there was ample evidence before the primary judge justifying the conclusions of fact at which he arrived. No basis has been established upon which this Court would be justified in interfering with those findings. Nor has it been demonstrated that his Honour fell into any error of law in concluding that the claim should be dismissed.
3. The appellants, however, also seek a new trial based on additional documentary material which was not produced by the respondent on discovery but was made available to the appellants after the matter had been heard and determined by the primary judge. I have had the advantage of reading and considering what has been written by Burchett J. on this aspect of the matter. I am persuaded, though not without considerable hesitation, that the additional material is such as to warrant the granting of a new trial. I, therefore, agree in the orders proposed by Burchett J.
This is an appeal at the hearing of which the appellants also moved the
court to receive further evidence pursuant to
s.27
of the Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 and Order 52 r.36 of the Rules. It is convenient to
commence these reasons by outlining the nature of the case, and then to look
at the question of fresh evidence. The appellants, by their action, sought
damages for negligent mis-statements, and sought also
relief under s. 52 of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 and under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).
These claims arose out of a foreign currency borrowing, drawn down on 6
February 1985, of the equivalent in Swiss francs of
$600,000. The loan was
negotiated during the latter half of 1984; offered by the bank and accepted by
the appellants at the end of
October 1984; and made the subject of a formal
agreement of loan executed on 15 January 1985. Because of the virtual collapse
of
the Australian currency against the Swiss franc between February 1985 and
February 1988, when the loan was brought back on-shore,
the appellants now
face financial ruin, the amount of their debt, as measured in Australian
dollars, having more than doubled.
2. The foreign currency loan was negotiated in order to enable the appellants, who were successful farmers and graziers in the West Wyalong area, to acquire an additional property at a price of $410,000, together with additional farming equipment, while making a contingency provision in respect of increases of interest and other payments which might be incurred by reason of movements in the exchange rate. The contingency provision built into the borrowing was in the sum of $100,000. The appellant Thomas Quade, who is the husband of Mary Quade and the father of the other appellants, was the moving force in the arranging of the loan. He knew his own financial position to be such that a borrowing at the then domestic rate of interest of perhaps 15% per annum would be very difficult to service. He went to his bank manager to seek information about borrowing overseas. He was given to understand that there was some element of risk associated with a borrowing in a foreign currency, and was probably told that such a borrowing was "a punt on the foreign exchange". That was on 23 July 1984.
3. On 14 September 1984, Mr Quade met the new manager of the bank's West Wyalong branch, a Mr Plumb, who said he knew nothing about foreign currency loans. It was at that time that the suggestion was made of a borrowing of an additional $100,000 to cover currency fluctuations, particularly in respect of interest payments. Also, Mr Quade then arranged to go to Sydney to talk to the bank's experts. In the meantime, Mr Plumb gave Mr Quade a copy of a document entitled "Foreign Currency Borrowing", to assist his thinking and provide some basis of information on which he could build in Sydney. The document warned that "there is always the risk that the currency concerned will be stronger against the Australian dollar at the time of repayment than at the time of drawdown. As discussed, in such circumstances you will need more Australian dollars than were initially borrowed to purchase the required foreign currency amount to repay the loan." It also stated that this risk could be eliminated or quantified by hedging, although the mechanism of hedging was not really explained. The document then reiterated: "It is more important that you fully understand the potential risks involved in borrowing in a foreign currency on an unhedged basis." There were other warnings to similar effect. Although Mr Quade may not have fully understood each statement, the trial Judge held "he must have had a general appreciation, if he had read it, that there were risks in borrowing in a foreign currency."
4. On 16 October 1984 Mr Quade, with four of his neighbours, Messrs Connell, M. Staniforth, K. Staniforth and Tull, conferred in Sydney with two officers of the bank, Messrs Herden and Bennett. Mr Quade's account of this conference makes it plain that the bank officers indicated there was a risk of currency fluctuations; but his case was his attention was not drawn to any risk that the Australian dollar could fall in value by a significant amount, nor to the catastrophic effect such a fall could have on interest payments and on the principal of the loan. It was not suggested he should hedge the loan, and it was pointed out that hedging would take away any advantage of borrowing off-shore, by increasing the costs of the loan to the equivalent of domestic interest rates. He said he was led to believe there was no great risk involved. There was a suggestion that the exchange rate might vary by about 5% or 10%, "but", it was said, "it recovers over a period". This evidence was confirmed by Mr M. Staniforth, who recalled they were told the Swiss franc "varies a few cents either way but it moves back". According to him, one of the bank officers said it was a "good proposition". Mr Connell and Mr Tull also confirmed Mr Quade's account.
5. The learned trial judge rejected this evidence in the following terms: "I
am confident that neither Herden nor Bennett stated
that the (variations in)
exchange rates were as limited as the applicants' witnesses claim they said
they were." His Honour did not
suggest there was anything about the witnesses,
or the manner of their giving their evidence, to lead to this conclusion;
rather,
he based it on his own analysis of documents which appear to have been
available at the meeting. Properly understood, those documents
did show that
"borrowing in Swiss francs was a risky exercise". It seems to me, with
respect, that the trial judge's approach to
the question whether the bank
officers had in fact made the statements alleged was unexceptionable. The
documents should have led
the bank officers to be cautious, and in the absence
of sufficient evidence to the contrary, it was appropriate to decide the
question,
on the probabilities, on the footing that the bank officers had
expressed the natural conclusions to which their documents led, or,
at least,
had not expressed plainly contradictory conclusions. His Honour said:
"I am satisfied on the whole of the evidence that6. In the absence of anything of the nature of fraud (which was never suggested), to have reached a different conclusion would have involved taking the view that the bank officers were blinded by optimism or by the unconscious influence of some strong motivation to endeavour to sell foreign currency loans to customers such as Mr Quade. There was simply no evidence before his Honour to justify either of these conclusions.
neither Herden nor Bennett conveyed to those
attending the meeting on 16 October that currency
fluctuations in the future would be as limited as is
suggested by the applicants' witnesses. The written
material, which was produced at the meeting, showed
quite plainly that currency fluctuations might be
quite considerable. Neither Herden nor Bennett had
any reason to represent that future currency
movements would not be great. The fact that an
example was given of an effective interest rate of
50% per annum, admittedly over a short period, is
quite inconsistent with the bank officers
representing that a borrower could safely assume
that future currency variations would not be great.
I do not accept that the officers led Quade to
believe that there was no great risk in foreign
currency loans."
7. But it now appears that there is evidence to suggest the bank was, at the time, actively promoting foreign currency loans as a matter of policy, so that its officers would in fact have had strong conscious and subconscious motivation to put the best complexion on the exchange situation. Furthermore, the bank seems to have been promoting such loans to customers who were inadequately informed on the subject, so that its own senior management had expressed a number of concerns, including concern about the level of understanding of the complex issues involved shown by loans officers and bank managers. In particular, it is plain that the appellants did not nearly meet the criteria set by the bank itself for borrowers who could safely venture into the foreign exchange market. Only extreme optimism could have thought otherwise. Even assuming the appellants had met those criteria, the bank's own expert assessment was that it would have been necessary for them to have had the loan constantly monitored, so that at any time it could have been promptly "hedged" in order to anticipate or contain any adverse movement of the exchange rate. If this material had been before the court, in the wealth of detail that is now available, it would not have been possible for his Honour to have said that "neither Herden nor Bennett had any reason to represent that future currency movements would not be great". They had the reason that the bank was actively marketing this particular type of loan, and the fact was that some of their colleagues did appear to have succumbed to the temptation involved of promoting loans inappropriately. Had the evidence been considered free of any a priori presumption of the unlikelihood of the bank officers mis-stating the position, Mr Quade's evidence, supported as it was by a number of relatively independent witnesses, might have carried the day.
8. Some brief (not at all exhaustive) examination should be made of the
documents now available (which I shall call "the new documents").
They are
bank documents produced, after the conclusion of the hearing, in recognition
of the fact that they had been wrongly omitted
from the bank's affidavit of
documents filed and served in purported compliance with an order for
discovery. A fairly small proportion
of them consists of documents that were
also produced after the hearing in David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth
Bank of Australia
[1990] FCA 148; (1990) 93 ALR 271, although there no formal discovery had
taken place. The documents comprise a somewhat heterogeneous collection, from
which the following
points may be noted:
. A memorandum for the general manager, stamped with the
date 16 March 1982 and headed "FOREIGN CURRENCY LENDING. A document dated 17 March 1982, headed "CHIEF MANAGER'S
TO AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMERS", speaks of the "considerable
difficulty" of the bank in meeting borrowing requirements
from domestic funds, which gave importance to lending not
similarly constrained. It also speaks of the importance
of "match(ing) the competition". It discusses the
desirability of the bank making more use of its own
overseas assets, and of directing "to the small and
medium size business area" foreign exchange loans which
would be very profitable for the bank. It makes fairly
scant mention of the foreign exchange risk, commenting
"it is now possible to use the hedge market to cover the
risk which should mean that all-up costs should broadly
match the cost of AUD finance." The conclusion is
reached: "There should be greater consideration given to
this source of finance (i.e. foreign currency lending) as
a means of satisfying customers' requirements."
COMMENTS", appears to deal with the subject of the last. A memorandum dated 2 April 1982, signed by the bank's
mentioned memorandum. It describes as "urgent" the
taking of a number of steps "to make several moves now to
try and promote the full range of foreign currency
lending". It recommends that "now (this week)", among
other things, there be "a spirited promotion" of foreign
currency lending as a way of beating lending quota
restrictions. It speaks of the bank's "critical
liquidity position" as making such action urgent.
assistant general manager, headed "FOREIGN CURRENCY. A further memorandum on the subject of foreign currency
FACILITIES FOR AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMERS", speaks of thought
being given to "how the CTB can make greater use of
foreign currency facilities to satisfy the needs of its
customers". It describes foreign currency lending as "an
underdeveloped segment of the CTB's lending services" and
concludes: "(T)here would seem to be considerable
advantage in present circumstances in giving this type of
business more emphasis."
loans to Australian borrowers, dated 15 April 1982, sets. A head office memorandum for the general manager dated 6
out an objective as follows:
"In a total foreign currency asset book of some
AUD 1,700m, a reasonable objective for loans to
Australian borrowers (other than large
corporates, project finance and
semi-government) would be AUD 100m. This should be
capable of achievement within a 12 month period."
Specific State by State target figures, aiming at this
total, are then set out.
May 1982, a signatory to which was a Mr Knezevic, who. A letter to state managers of the bank dated 12 May 1982
played some part personally in the present matter, refers
to "the promotional drive" in respect of foreign currency
facilities for Australian customers and suggests an
object "to expose as many people as possible to this type
of lending". It points out that foreign currency loans
provided "a way of meeting domestic loans which may
otherwise be declined because of A$ lending constraints".
It notes that
"it is highly unlikely clients would readily
accept foreign currency loans ... unless they
and the CTB are prepared to allow the facility
to proceed on an unhedged basis. The statement
is regularly made that the cost of hedged
foreign currency loans is approximately equal
to the cost of borrowing funds in Australia.
... However, there would be occasions where a
client would be prepared to accept foreign
currency loans on an unhedged basis ... and
applications of this type should not
necessarily be discouraged."
The memorandum suggests in some cases requiring clients
to take a foreign currency loan, acknowledging that they
might be "reluctant to accept such an arrangement," but
adding "they would have no alternative if that was the
only way the CTB would provide the accommodation."
However, under the heading "HEDGING", the memorandum
states:
"While the CTB does not have a published policy
on hedging when providing foreign currency
facilities to customers, it would be safe to
say that the majority of management consider
hedging to be an essential ingredient to any
foreign currency proposal. There are obviously
moral considerations at issue as well as the
safety of the CTB's security position.
On the moral issue, it is felt that the CTB
would protect its banker/customer relationship
by fully explaining the inherent risks in
borrowing in a foreign currency on an unhedged
basis. If after hearing of the risks involved
a client wishes to borrow on an unhedged basis
then it is not necessarily the CTB's right to
dictate otherwise. ...
This leaves the CTB's security question.
Foreign exchange rates can move sharply at
little notice and therefore regardless of the
level of allowances made for this risk, the
allowance may be insufficient."
A document bearing the same date is headed "SENIOR
MANAGERS (sic) COMMENTS". It refers to "the reasons why
CTB is keen to develop more foreign currency lending".
contains the following:. A report, dated June 1983, on "THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
"The present high level of domestic interest
rates is creating an awareness of the
availability of foreign currency loans, which
is being exploited by merchant banks and
foreign banks. It is important that the CTB
fully exploits this area of business,
particularly at a time when lending in
traditional areas is being contained.
Accordingly I would like you to ensure that
loans officers in your capital office, and
selected branch managers are aware that the CTB
is keen to develop more foreign currency
lending. This thrust will have application,
not only to new proposals, but to existing
business, particularly at time of annual
review."
The letter refers particularly to loans of the size of
that involved in the present case, and adds that special
considerations include "whether the borrower should or
should not take advantage of forward cover/hedging as
protection against volatile movement in overseas exchange
rates". The letter again refers to Mr Knezevic as a
source of head office expert guidance.
OUTLOOK - 1983 TO 1986", prepared by the Investment and9. While, as I have said, the foregoing summary statement of matters raised in the new documents is by no means exhaustive, I think it is sufficient to show that a great deal of material existed, which ought to have been discovered by the bank, bearing on vital issues in the case. Most importantly, that material cuts away the foundation of a major part of the trial judge's reasoning in rejecting the evidence of Mr Quade and his neighbours. But it also suggests that further aspects of the appellants' case might have been elaborated with success, particularly in relation to the adequacy of the information supplied to Mr Quade on the subject of hedging; in relation to the adequacy of the warning concerning the possibility of exchange rate movements (even on the bank's own case, having regard to its expectation that there would, not might, be volatility over the ensuing few years in the value of the Australian dollar); and in relation to the implied representation that Mr Quade was a suitable candidate for a foreign currency loan if he himself chose to take the risk of possible movements in the exchange rate, notwithstanding his extremely marginal income position, and notwithstanding the bank's view that these loans were suitable only for persons with access to foreign exchange, or of substance sufficient to meet losses, or with capacity to monitor exchange movements constantly and react to them appropriately.
Economic Research Department of the bank, projected some
fall in the value of the United States dollar, an
appreciation of the Jananese yen against the US dollar
and an appreciation of the West German mark against the
US dollar. It concluded:
"On these assumptions, the Australian dollar
will record diverse movements against the major
currencies. Over the period to 1986 it is
expected to appreciate noticeably against a
declining US dollar and pound sterling, but to
fall substantially against the yen and Deutschmark.
Exchange rates are expected to continue to
exhibit a high degree of volatility."
The conclusion of this report provokes the comment that
it is one thing for bank officers to warn a customer of a
risk that exchange rates may move adversely; it is quite
another to say that they are expected to do so. An
expectation of volatility involves an expectation that at
unpredictable times in the future the rates will be
adverse. The loan might fall due for repayment at just
such a time. It was not suggested in the bank's evidence
in this case that Mr Quade was warned in these terms.
Nor was he told, when considering a loan in Swiss francs,
that the Australian dollar was expected to fall
substantially against the neighbouring West German mark.
Indeed, when Mr Quade, on the occasion of the first
roll-over of the loan, "requested that (the bank) arrange
forward exchange cover for the loan", which would in fact
have avoided a great part of the loss, Mr Knezevic
"advised", as the branch manager noted, "that such a move
would be madness", and Mr Quade was persuaded against his
own better judgment to leave the loan off-shore and
unhedged. In the light of the new documents, Mr
Knezevic's emphatic advice is intelligible, and only
intelligible, on the footing he really thought, to use
the expression Mr M. Staniforth attributed to one of his
colleagues, that the exchange rate "moves back" after a
fluctuation.
. An internal memorandum to the head office of the bank
from its International Division, dated 18 April 1984,
deals with the subject of "NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN CURRENCY BORROWINGS". It refers to
a stepping up of the activity of the bank's International
Division in respect of advice concerning foreign currency
lending, and notes "considerable scope exists for the
generation of a range of corporate business out of this
initiative". It says "the level of knowledge amongst the
commercial sector generally is poor." It refers to the
International Division's "initial aim ... to generate
additional foreign exchange activity for the CTB."
. A memorandum from the bank's Corporate Banking Division
dated July 1984, on the subject of simulated currency
loans, contains the statement:
"As with the management of an actual foreign
currency borrowing, the exchange risk factor
should be continuously monitored and remedial
action taken when necessary e.g. when there are
strong expectations of the exchange rate moving
against the borrower consideration should be
given by the borrower to closing out (part or
all of) the oversold forward position and at
the appropriate time re-establishing the
original position."
It is also noted:
"The forward/hedge contract should be dealt
with in terms of C/I's although it is
emphasised that the bank needs to be satisfied
(as with an actual foreign currency loan) that
the borrower has the capacity to meet any
likely foreign exchange losses that may be
incurred."
. A memorandum dated 17 July 1984, concerned with "FOREIGN
CURRENCY LOANS TO AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMERS", refers to the
bank's effort to achieve "an increase in the
smaller/higher yielding F/C/L's to Australian customers".
It indicates that from 1982 to mid 1984 foreign currency
loans by the bank grew from about $5m US to about $100m
US - a huge increase. The memorandum states its own
object as to set "some direction for the future for the
smaller category of F/C loans (non-trade)". It refers to
recent market interest in foreign currency loans and to
the bank's need of expertise in the area. It concludes
that "a reasonable CBA attitude to F/C Loans and a plan
for handling this product in the immediate future" would
include the following:
"Foreign currency loans to be available as
a product to service those customers/non-customers
of the necessary credit standing
which have foreign currency receivables or the
capacity to manage the foreign currency exposure.
F/C Loans and simulated loans should not
be aggressively marketed. Rather they should
be used to meet the genuine needs of
customers/non-customers, particularly in the
face of competition from other lenders.
Group Treasury to have responsibility for
providing information/advice to borrowers on a
regular basis to assist borrowers manage exposure."
. A further memorandum dated 7 August 1984 suggests
"(t)he main reason for the lift in awareness of
F/C/Ls by our lending staff in the branches is the
activity of our competitors. The other trading
banks and the merchants are pushing F/C/Ls in the
profitable small to medium end of the market as are
brokers and accountants. Unless we take a more
positive approach we will lose sound opportunities."
There is then a reference to doubts "about the
desirability of lending to the small end of the market",
and to the need "to ensure that the inexperienced are not
assisted or encouraged into a situation they cannot
handle". There is a comment "we were not instructed to
hold back from F/C/Ls but merely to lend judiciously."
The memorandum refers to the urgency of the need "to
familiarise staff with F/C/Ls at the present". It
comments that they "may be marketed to those clients who
it is considered may utilise them and who would have the
capacity to manage their exposures or meet exchange
losses which may occur. F/C/Ls are not a facility for
weaker clients."
. A memorandum on the Chief General Manager's letterhead,
addressed to the managers of all branches, dated 6
September 1984, refers specifically to "FOREIGN CURRENCY
RELATED FACILITIES". It mentions "a growing interest" in
foreign currency lending and aggressive marketing by
competitors. It continues:
"With this increase in interest I consider it
imperative that CBA be in a position where it
can provide facilities to customers on a
competitive and responsible basis. It is vital
that the major aspects of these facilities be
understood by managers and appropriate CBA
lending staff.
In explaining the facilities to customers care
should be taken to ensure there is no
misunderstanding as to the inherent currency
exchange risks if unhedged (uncovered) exposure
is involved. However, notwithstanding the
exchange risks that may be involved, there are
customers of sufficient standing for whom an
unhedged foreign currency related facility can
be justified. Generally these customers would
have demonstrable capacity to meet any losses
resulting from currency exchange rate movement.
It would also be necessary for the customers to
have capacity to manage that risk."
. A memorandum dated 8 October 1984, for the General
Manager International of the bank, refers to a growing
awareness of foreign currency lending, and to a plan to
conduct, as soon as practicable, seminars dealing with
foreign currency lending techniques. Notes endorsed on
it indicate a poor opinion was held of the knowledge of
bank managers concerning foreign currency lending, and
there is also the comment: "A major (fresh) push into
this business demands an improved service to borrowers
particularly at or just before rollovers/maturities. I
understand group treasury has been looking at this but is
anything concrete happening?"
. An address by the bank's senior economist delivered on 21
February 1985, just after the drawdown of the loan
involved in the present case, emphasizes the complexity
of the matters which influence movements in exchange
rates. It also says of the banking industry: "There is a
tremendous surge towards more innovative products. ...
At the same time, international expansion has become
attractive for the Australian banks due to the increased
integration of domestic and offshore markets."
. On27
February 1985 a memorandum from the Assistant
Manager International of the bank, written some three
weeks after the loan was drawn down, refers to "the
extent of the AUD depreciation which has occurred - ...
6% over 12 months for SFR". It seems remarkable there is
no suggestion, in the present case, that depreciation of
this extent was drawn to the attention of the appellants,
who were borrowing in Swiss francs, at about the end of
that very period of 12 months.
10. The bank's first response to the appellants' motion to adduce the new
documents was a submission that, if they had been disclosed,
their disclosure
would have made no difference to the result of the hearing. It was not
disputed that the bank had failed in its
duty to make proper discovery,
fulfilment of which would have involved the disclosure of these documents. But
it was said that the
new documents are not different in kind from the
documents belatedly disclosed in David Securities (supra), which are included
among
them. In that case, the joint judgment of Lockhart, Beaumont and Gummow
JJ. (at 293) contains the statement:
"Although the trial judge did not have them, we are11. There is more than one answer to this argument. In the first place, evidence may have a cumulative effect, and the opinion of the full court in David Securities that some of these documents would have been insufficient to change the balance of the evidence does not demonstrate that the great quantity of documents now available might not have done so. Furthermore, the standard their Honours set for the documents was that of establishing the liability of the bank. In the light of the authorities concerning the reception of fresh evidence, and with respect, I do not suggest that was an inappropriate standard to set in the particular circumstances of that case. One of those circumstances was the absence of any formal order for discovery, an absence which the full court regarded as actually responsible for the unavailability of the documents at the trial. It stated: "(B)ecause discovery had proceeded in an informal way, the documents had not been discovered." In the present case, in which formal discovery occurred, I think a different standard is appropriate.
not persuaded that these documents, of themselves,
or taken in conjunction with the evidence before his
Honour, establish that the bank should be held
liable for the losses suffered by the appellants."
12. However, before I turn to an examination of the authorities bearing upon that question, which is in itself an interesting and difficult question of law, I should point out that there is yet another reason why the view taken in David Securities is irrelevant to the present case. In David Securities, the claim against the bank failed on the quite fundamental basis that the relevant advice and information were supplied, not by the bank, but by an independent accountant consulted by the disappointed borrowers, who was said to be "well versed in the intricacies of foreign loans" (at 275), and whose duty it was "to hold (their) hands" in relation to the borrowing "and generally to look after the loan" (276). Obviously, a finding of fact that the borrowers were not looking to the bank, for the relevant advice and information, precluded any rational reliance by them on documents having only the effect of the new documents. The primary ground on which the appellants in David Securities failed in their case against the bank in negligence, on the appeal, was stated by the court (at 292) as being the absence of any reliance or dependence on the bank by the appellants or any assumption of responsibility on its part. The bank had recommended they consult an accountant well versed in the intricacies of foreign loans, and they had done so. It was made clear (at 293) that the case under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act failed on substantially the same basis. The joint judgment (at 292-293) does add that the bank, if it owed a relevant duty, was not in breach. But the question of breach was inevitably tied up with the extent of the duty owed, and thus raised the same considerations, as is made clear by the court's reference to the bank's indication, not only that there were risks and that hedging was available at a price, but also that "independent expert assistance should be sought".
13. David Securities is thus quite unlike the other full court decisions,
Westpac Banking Corporation v. Spice (1990) ATPR 41-024 and Westpac Banking
Corporation v. Chiarabaglio (Sheppard, Neaves and Burchett JJ., unreported, 24
August 1990), and the decision
of Rogers C.J. Comm D, of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, in Mehta v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (unreported,
27
June 1990),
all of which were concerned with the consequences of a bank
undertaking to give some advice or information to a customer concerning
the
suitability and incidents of a foreign currency loan. The evidence in
Chiarabaglio raised the very same questions of principle
as are raised by the
evidence of Mr Quade, the vital difference between the cases being that Mr
Chiarabaglio and his witnesses were
accepted, whereas Mr Quade and his
witnesses, at a trial at which the new documents were unavailable, were not
accepted.
14. The general rule concerning the basis on which a new trial may be
granted, upon an appellant's claim to have discovered fresh
evidence, was
stated by Dixon J. in Orr v. Holmes [1948] HCA 16; (1948) 76 CLR 632 at 640:
"If a trial has been regularly conducted and the15. In the present case, there is of course no difficulty about the question of diligence; the appellants required the respondent to make discovery of documents, and it was entirely the respondent's default which rendered the evidence unavailable to the appellants. The outstanding problem, in applying the rule laid down in Orr v. Holmes, is the effect which the evidence would have had if available, but there is an anterior question - does the rule, in all its strictness, govern such a case as this? The rule is formulated in general terms, and covers situations where third parties withhold, and subsequently reveal, evidence; or where a party's original ignorance and subsequent knowledge of evidence occurs through circumstances beyond anyone's control. Here, the evidence was withheld from the appellants by the default of the respondent in the performance of its obligation to comply with an order relating to the discovery of documents. It seems to me the rule was not formulated to cover such a case. Indeed, the opening words of the passage I have cited from the judgment of Dixon J. in Orr v. Holmes may be wide enough to exclude it. His Honour said: "If a trial has been regularly conducted ... ." (Similarly, in Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v. Cowan [1955] HCA 16; (1955) 93 CLR 435 at 444 Dixon C.J. put to one side (inter alia) cases of miscarriage through "error" and cases of "surprise" and "malpractice".) It is only in the narrowest sense that a trial can be said to have been regularly conducted when a vital procedural step involved in the preparation for it has been stultified by one party's default. Certainly, the proceeding of which the trial was the culmination was not regularly conducted.
party against whom the verdict has passed cannot
complain that evidence has been wrongly received or
rejected or that there has been a misdirection or
that he has not been fully heard or has been taken
by surprise or that the result is not warranted by
the evidence, the successful party is not to be
deprived of the verdict he has obtained except to
fulfil an imperative demand of justice. The
discovery of fresh evidence makes no such demand
upon justice unless it is almost certain that, if
the evidence had been available and had been
adduced, an opposite result would have been reached
and unless no reasonable diligence upon the part of
the defeated party would have enabled him to procure
the evidence."
16. I do not think it can be right to treat the rule, which necessarily sets so stringent a standard for the ordinary cases to which it applies, as applicable to the extraordinary case where a respondent has seriously failed in the performance of its own obligation, and has thereby created the appellant's difficulty. In my opinion, in such a case, the principle on which the general rule is really founded - "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" - must be modified by its collision with the equally important principle that a party should not be permitted to mock the orders of the court, which would surely be mocked if the opponent could be deprived permanently of a fair prospect of success by a party's failure to comply with the obligation of an order so important in the conduct of litigation as an order for discovery. That the general rule is subject to exceptions was suggested in Totterdell v. Nelson (Morling, Burchett and Lee JJ., unreported, 6 November 1990), and in the authorities there cited. To revert to the language of Dixon J., in such a situation as this, an appellant is entitled to claim there is an imperative demand of justice to be fulfilled. The case is not different in character from a case of surprise, to which Dixon C.J. expressly referred: there, the need of evidence is concealed by the other party; here, the existence of the evidence was concealed.
17. In the joint judgment of Dixon C.J., Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ. in
McCann v. Parsons [1954] HCA 70; (1954) 93 CLR 418 at 430-431, the High Court recognised that
there are cases in which broad considerations of justice require the grant of
a new trial.
Their Honours said, of the jurisdiction to yield to those
considerations:
"But however it (the grant of a new trial) began it18. Counsel cited no case which squarely raised the point I am presently discussing. Counsel for the appellants did refer to Skone v. Skone (1971) 1 WLR 812, where vital documents had been withheld by a party, but there no order for discovery had been obtained. (Cf. Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v. Cowan (supra) at 445, 447.) A respondent's solicitor had stated in writing that he had no documents to discover, and the House of Lords treated this as an exculpation of the appellant from any charge of lack of diligence in relation to the fresh evidence he sought to adduce. That, of course, is a different question. Furthermore, the test for the reception of fresh evidence is, in any case, not so stringent in England as it is in Australia; it is sufficient that the evidence "would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive" (as Denning L.J. put it in a passage cited by Lord Hodson in Skone v. Skone at 815).
came to be regarded as a remedy used by the court in
banc to relieve against a verdict when it would be
unjust to allow it to stand as a determination of
liability. The grounds upon which the court
proceeds in granting the remedy have been settled by
practice, but they have never become completely
stereotyped; they have always possessed some
flexibility and have been governed by the overriding
purpose of reconciling the demands of justice with
the policy in the public interest of bringing suits
to a final end."
19. In my opinion, if the appellants fail in their other grounds of appeal, they are entitled to have the decision against them set aside, and to be granted a new trial, on the ground of fresh evidence, being evidence which ought to have been made available to them, but was not, pursuant to the bank's obligation to make proper discovery of documents. As the trial has been aborted by virtue of the default of the bank, for which the appellants are in no way responsible, I think they should have their costs of the trial and of the appeal. It is important that this court should not shrink from insisting on the seriousness of a party's duty to comply fully with an order for discovery.
20. As to the other twenty-odd grounds of appeal, I can be brief. The appellants' case on these grounds was dressed up in a number of different ways, but, however it was put, it almost always came down to an attack on the trial judge's conclusions of fact. Without the fresh evidence, this attack cannot succeed; for the findings were well open on the evidence presented at the hearing. The full court, which has not heard or seen the witnesses, is in no position, in a case of this kind, to reconsider those findings for itself: cf. Abalos v. Australian Postal Commission [1990] HCA 47; (1990) 65 ALJR 11 at 16; Westpac Banking Corporation v. Spice (supra).
21. A point of law was, indeed, raised by an argument that a foreign currency loan is inherently dangerous, so as to bring into existence a special duty. But this argument is refuted by David Securities (supra, at 291).
22. There was some discussion concerning what was or ought to have been gleaned by the appellants from certain graphs produced by the bank. If the trial judge had accepted the account given by the appellants' witnesses of what the bank officers said, I do not think anything in the graphs could have compelled a different conclusion; for the appellants, if they studied them, might easily have misunderstood material of that kind. When experts spoke, they would, indeed, have been well advised to listen rather than attempt their own interpretation. But the trial judge did not accept their account. The graphs cannot resurrect the claim in the absence of any finding that they were read in a particular sense favourable to the appellants. Nor is there any other basis on which the appellants can be held to have been misled, so long as their version of what they were told and understood remains rejected. In my opinion, the conclusions of fact upon which the case was dismissed are impregnable, except at a new trial at which the fresh evidence is adduced.
23. However, the motion to adduce fresh evidence upon the appeal should be allowed with costs, and the orders I have already foreshadowed should be made.
Introduction
Thomas Quade and members of his immediate family (the appellants) brought
proceedings in this Court against the Commonwealth Bank
of Australia (the
respondent) claiming damages for breach of section 52 of the Trade Practices
Act, of the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), and of its common law duty not to
give negligent advice. A breach of a special duty not to subject the
appellants to the "dangerous
product" of a foreign currency loan was also
suggested. The claim arose from significant financial losses suffered by the
appellants
following a Swiss franc loan to them by the respondent made in
January 1985. The appellants conceded that if they failed on one of
the three
bases, they would also fail on the other two. A judge of the Court (Morling J)
dismissed the appellants' claims. They now
appeal from that judgment.
Facts
2. In recent times, this Court has dealt with several cases involving foreign currency loans. In each of them, the particular facts regarding what was said and done by both the customer and the bank have been crucial in determining the outcome. This case is no exception. The facts here are lengthy and have been set out in detail by Morling J. As his Honour's findings of fact are not specifically challenged on appeal, it is not necessary to set them out in detail again. It will suffice to summarise that the appellants were farmers from the West Wyalong area of New South Wales who were borrowing the equivalent in Swiss francs of $A600,000 for the purpose of purchasing a property adjoining their farm. Part of the loan was to cover interest liabilities, currency fluctuations and other contingencies. The appellants had no prior experience of borrowing sums of this magnitude, especially not in foreign currency. Their commercial and entrepreneurial skills were substantially limited to their pastoral activities.
3. Thomas Quade was the only one of the appellants who communicated with the
respondent. On two occasions he spoke to the manager
of the respondent's West
Wyalong branch, Neville Plumb, seeking information as to overseas borrowing.
At one of these meetings Mr
Quade spoke on the telephone to someone from head
office. At the branch manager's suggestion, Mr Quade went to Sydney in early
October
1984 and spoke to two of the bank's foreign currency experts at head
office. The branch manager also presented a document entitled
"Foreign
Currency Borrowing" to Mr Quade for his information. It was apparently
custom-made but appears to have been largely taken
from a standard letter
probably prepared elsewhere in the bank than at the West Wyalong branch. It is
not dated but was given to
Mr Quade just before his trip to Sydney. Relevant
parts of this document (the Advice) include the following:
Many Australian corporates, including a number of....
clients of the CTB (mainly exporters with foreign
currency income) actively utilise the foreign
currency market as an alternative to Australian
Dollar borrowings.
They are usually encouraged to do so when -
* there are lending constraints within Australia
and their borrowing demands cannot be met; and
* they can arrange foreign currency loans at
lower all-up costs than Australia dollar loans.
In addition to the normal security considerations,....
due recognition needs to be given by you to
potential "foreign currency exchange risk" attached
to offshore loans. Because the loan is denominated
in a foreign currency, all repayments of principal
and interest need to be effected in that currency.
If you have no offshore income in the borrowed
foreign currency you are exposed to fluctuations in
exchange rates between the Australian and foreign
currency (this is commonly known as exchange risk).
Consequently there is always the risk that the
currency concerned will be stronger against the
Australian dollar at the time of repayment than at
the time of drawdown. As discussed, in such
circumstances you will need more Australian dollars
than were initially borrowed to purchase the
required foreign currency amount to repay the loan.
The currency exchange risk can be hedged for capital
transactions, through the facilities of the CTB.
Hedge contracts may be taken out at any time during
the currency of the loan.
By entering into a foreign currency hedge contract
you can determine the amount of Australian dollars
you will eventually required to repay the borrowing.
In this way you eliminate/quantify your foreign
exchange risk and the CTB is in a better position to
assess more accurately the adequacy of the security
offered.
In some instances such as yours borrowers do not
wish to hedge their foreign exchange risk. While
the CTB has no basic objection to providing foreign
currency loans on an unhedged basis, it is most
important that you fully understand the potential
risks involved in borrowing in a foreign currency on
an unhedged basis. In particular you must
understand that you will be required to make a cash
adjustment (parity adjustment) at the end of each
interest period to meet any adverse exchange rate
movements; thereby ensuring that the value of the
loan is brought back to the approved AUD amount.
I advise you to seek advice on taxation4. The words "Plus any exchange fluctuations" were in the hand writing of Mr Plumb. CTB stands for Commonwealth Trading Bank. The use of expressions like "... Australian corporates ... (mainly exporters with foreign currency income) ..." and the apparent gaps in the bank's knowledge of the appellants' personal circumstances, including whether they had "offshore income in the borrowed foreign currency" to enable them to cover currency fluctuations, are significant.
considerations as there are several aspects of
foreign currency loans (eg interest, hedging,
exchange losses/gains) which are assessed
differently for taxation purposes and these could
have a bearing on whether or not the proposal is
viable for the customer concerned.
This withholding tax could make the total interest
cost significantly dearer than an Australian funded
loan. Assuming the following:-
$ Amount
Interest Rate of borrowing 6.00% 30,000
Usage and Facility Fee 1.75% 8,750
Withholding Tax 10% of
Interest Amount 0.60% 3,000
8.35% $41,750
Plus any exchange fluctuations
Please have a good Accountant check my figures
because I am not sure what other tax implications
there may be.
5. Further information was provided by the bank in its letter of offer of a
foreign currency loan dated 24 October 1984. Again the
letter appears to
contain material created for customers other than the appellants, although
some of it is obviously personal to
them. The principal part of this letter
(the Offer) was as follows:
Dear Mr Quade6. Provision was then made for various requirements such as 'fees', 'security', 'repayment arrangements', 'front end fee', 'stamp duties' and 'draw down'. The Offer went on:
APPLICATION FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY LOAN WITH BILLS
DISCOUNT OPTION
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia is pleased to
offer you a foreign currency loan with a bills
discount option for AUD600,000 to assist with the
purchase of a 604ha farm property "Euronga".
Approval of this accommodation is on the Bank's
usual terms and conditions applicable to this type
of facility and will afford you the option of
raising funds locally by way of a bills discount
facility or in a foreign currency by way of a
foreign currency loan.
The principal terms and conditions of the facilities
are:
....
FOREIGN CURRENCY LOAN
The loan may be raised in any freely convertible and
readily available major foreign currency (eg United
States dollar, Japanese Yen, Swiss Francs, Sterling
and Deutschmarks). Provision will exist for the
loan currency to be switched at the end of each
interest period.
....
EXCHANGE RISK7. Again the bank's apparent lack of knowledge of the appellants' capacity to meet periodic currency losses and their ability and arrangements to cover adverse exchange exposure, matters which it emphasised in the Offer, is instructive and of concern. Moreover, the very first paragraph under the heading "EXCHANGE RISK' reveals a significant flaw in the bank's approach to the loan. How could the bank for its part have the "understanding" that the appellants "fully recognised" the exchange risks if the bank did not know, as was apparently the case, that the appellants had read and comprehended the Advice and other documents shown to them and understood the discussions they had held with the bank's officers, and what actions and decisions they had taken on them?
On the understanding that the exchange risks
associated with borrowings in foreign currencies are
fully recognised and that any adverse exchange rate
movements are for the borrower's account, the Bank
is prepared to allow the loan to proceed on an
unhedged basis.
However, in these circumstances, it is the Bank's
normal practice to require the borrower to regularly
meet any sizeable increases in the Australian dollar
value of the loan resulting from exchange rate
movements in order to maintain a satisfactory
security/debt ratio. In this regard, the Bank will
require you to meet any increase in excess of 5% in
the Australian dollar value of the loan. These
adjustments will take place at the end of each
interest period or at the expiry of twelve months
from drawdown at the Bank's option should the
interest period arranged for you exceed twelve
months.
As you are aware exchange risks may be eliminated at
any time during the life of the loan by entering
into a hedge contract and the Bank would be happy to
provide information in this regard on request.
WITHHOLDING TAX
Withholding tax must be met by you unless a Section
128H Exemption Certificate is produced to the Bank
before the first interest payment is made.
Such a certificate must be obtained after each
drawdown/renewal and it is your responsibility to
produce this certificate to the Bank in order to be
exempted from 10% withholding tax on the interest payment.
However, we make the observation that in the light
of recent tax law changes, it is now unlikely that
an exemption will be available to you. We suggest
you contact your Accountant, once drawdown has been
effected, in order that he may put the application
in train.
We again point out the potential risk involved in
borrowing in a foreign currency without covering
your foreign currency exchange exposure and would
like to remind you that any adverse exchange rate
movements are for your account. As you are aware,
your foreign currency exchange exposure may be
eliminated at any time during the life of the loan
and in this regard we suggest you make regular
enquiries about foreign currency movements and the
price for hedging the loan amount outstanding.
Similarly, we stress the importance of your
thoroughly investigating with your accountant (tax
consultant) the ramifications of foreign currency
borrowings particularly the tax treatment of any
exchange rate profits/losses.
The judgment at first instance
8. Justice Morling accepted that the respondent assumed the responsibility of
giving advice to the appellants in relation to foreign
currency loans, and
agreed with a submission of the appellants that it "extended to fully and
properly explaining the risks involved"
(p 35 of the judgment). However, his
Honour held that the appellants had a "real and sufficient appreciation of the
risk he was
undertaking in borrowing in Swiss francs" (p 33), and concluded
that the respondent "sufficiently advised the applicants of the
nature of the
proposed transaction and the risks involved" (p 35). The print of the
judgment below appears to have a typographical
error of some relevant dates
relating to the loan.
Appellants' Case
9. In the first place, the appellants sought a reversal of the trial result by challenging various of the trial Judge's conclusions of fact. Standing alone on the evidence at trial, this request must fail. It is not to the point that an appellate court might have taken a different view to the trial Judge on some of the evidence as it appears in the transcript.
10. In my view an appellate court ought not to substitute alternative conclusions or findings of fact made at first instance when, as here, it has not seen or heard the witnesses, and the conclusions of the trial Judge were open on the evidence and were based on assessments of credibility requiring at least the weighing of oral and written evidence on important factual issues: Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; (1979) 142 CLR 531; S.S. Hontestroom v S.S. Sagaporack (1927) AC 37 at 47 (Lord Sumner) approved in Abalos v Australian Postal Commission High Court 15 November 1990 (McHugh J at page 14) as yet generally unreported except for [2000] HCA 57; (1990) 21 Leg Rep 6 at 9.
11. However, the result at trial was placed under more significant pressure
by the production by the respondent, on the appeal before
this Court, of a
large number of documents which by oversight or negligence were not discovered
by the respondent at the time of
the trial despite an order for discovery.
They were referred to as the `G' documents and largely consist of internal
memoranda of
the respondent. The appellants moved the Court on notice in this
appeal to introduce these documents as further evidence under
section 27
of
the Federal Court of Australia Act.
12. The appellants submitted that the `G' documents portray the respondent as vigorously promoting foreign currency loans at the time it was advising the appellants, to the extent and with the result that they establish deception within the meaning of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act, and a failure to take adequate care in its advice to the appellants as its customers. The appellants said that the documents emphasise only the selling of the concept, not the erection of any safeguards. The respondent conceded, as is clearly the case, that the `G' documents certainly evidence an enthusiasm at the relevant time to expand the bank's commercial opportunities by promotion of this type of loan.
13. The appellants further argued that the `G' documents indicate the respondent's knowledge, at the time it was advising the appellants about and offering them the loan, that foreign currency loans required 'hedging', i.e. insurance against undue falls in the value of the local as against the borrowed currency, and constant monitoring by an expert. Furthermore, these documents were said to show that the respondent knew the dangers of foreign currency borrowing by people such as the appellants and that it should have made itself much more aware of the appellants' financial circumstances and have told the appellants considerably more than it did.
14. As Morling J. was denied the opportunity of doing so, we have been asked to assess the Advice and the Offer, and the rest of the evidence at trial, in the light of these documents. On the basis of these and other suggested features of the 'G' documents, the appellants submitted that Justice Morling would have come to the opposite conclusion.
15. The 'G' documents were not subjected to any testing before us, and of course none of the existing witnesses and none of the documents' authors or readers have been subjected to examination or cross-examination on them. The documents have not been weighed against the evidence presented at trial. Although the respondent did not use the opportunity given by Order 52 rule 36(7) of the Court's rules to address the conclusions to which the documents ex facie appear to lead and did not suggest before us that any evidence was available to refute these conclusions, it did suggest that in their context, alternative interpretations were appropriate.
16. Thus the appellants did not submit that this Court should order a verdict
in their favour, but said that on the basis of the
'G' documents, a new trial
should be ordered. They suggested that the relevant test to be employed in
determining whether the introduction
of new evidence warrants the granting of
a new trial is whether the new evidence is likely to have produced a different
result. The
appellants described the respondent's suggested test of a "high
degree of probability" of a different result as inappropriate in
this case
because the absence of the documents at the time of the trial was due to the
fault of the respondent. They said that any
test employed should be flexible
enough to permit the overriding criterion of doing justice. Neither party
seemed to suggest that
the former onerous test of a virtual certainty of a
different result was applicable here: see for example Orr v Holmes [1948] HCA 16; (1948) 76
CLR 632 at 640-2; Wollongong Corporation v Cowan [1955] HCA 16; (1955) 93 CLR 435 at 444.
The 'G' documents
17. The 'G' documents appear to establish that from the early 1980s, the respondent decided to seek foreign currency loans to retain its competitive position in Australian banking and because of the extra profits they generated in comparison with onshore lending. There was considerable concern about the bank's lack of liquidity at the time and this area of business was thought likely to contribute urgently to alleviating that problem. The respondent determined on a major marketing of this aspect of its services.
18. The purpose of an unsigned memorandum of 16 March 1982 to the general manager of the respondent was "to suggest action that will promote greater use of the facility" of offshore lending. One of the reasons was stated to be: "... we need to have as wide a range of the facilities as possible to match the competition". In a further undated memorandum of the same year the respondent prepares for a "promotional drive" to "expose as many people as possible to this type of lending" (my underlining).
19. While the documents discuss the issue of 'hedging' such loans, they point out that fully hedged foreign currency loans cost about the same as onshore loans. The obvious conclusion that this may well serve to dissuade several borrowers from such loans and therefore deprive the bank of the profits it hoped to make from them, did not lead the bank actually to advise against hedging. At the same time, the risks in not hedging, especially in the case of commercially unsophisticated borrowers, did not deflect the bank from its aggressive marketing intentions for this type of loan with such persons amongst others.
20. It seems to me that this type of situation may well give rise, in an appropriate case, to an analysis of whether the true legal relationship between at least many banks and many customers involves some element of trust. I shall return to this briefly later but to me the inescapable inference of the 'G' documents is that the loans were to be marketed primarily for the bank's benefit, not the client's advantage, at least wherever these two interests were or may be in competition.
21. It is true that the documents do emphasise the need for detailed information and explanations to be given to the clients concerning the risks of unhedged loans due to unpredictable and unexpected exchange rate fluctuations. In fact they expressly and impliedly encouraged bank officers and employees to give advice to clients about various aspects of such loans. No doubt the Advice in this case and the discussions held by bank officers with these appellants arose from such encouragement. However, the strong if not overwhelming flavour of the documents was in firmly advantaging the bank through charging fees, and in fully protecting it by ensuring that adequate security, at whatever risk to the clients, was in place. The obvious clash of interests between the bank and its clients was strongly skewed towards the bank. There was no suggestion in any of the documents that this major conflict should itself be declared and explained to clients as a most important reason for the bank to decline to give any advice at all and to recommend and encourage them to seek and obtain competent independent advice.
22. Many of the relevant documents to these effects are set out in some detail in the reasons for judgment of Justice Bruchett which I have found most helpful in finalising my own conclusions. While with his customary completeness and assiduity, his Honour points out that even his selection is not exhaustive of the documents that are influential here, he has to my mind chosen a very fair and representative selection of the material for present purposes. There is therefore no point in my repeating them here.
23. The 'G' documents show, as is well known, that in December 1983, the Australian Government released the Australian dollar from exchange rate controls and allowed it to "float" on international money markets. The documents reveal that in the ensuing 12 months, the value of the Australian dollar remained relatively steady against most foreign currencies. However, in early 1985, the dollar's value dropped sharply against all major overseas currencies. It subsequently continued, if a little more sporadically, to fall even further. The documents show that one view in the bank near the end of 1985 was that while the Australian dollar would be devalued further against the Swiss franc in the near future, some degree of recovery could be expected in the medium to longer term. Although this written view post-dates the appellants' loan, it accords with and may well corroborate evidence given at the trial by or on behalf of the appellants that the respondent's officers had often expressed confidence in 1984 that any losses due to currency movements from time to time would soon be made up.
24. The documents also seem clearly to demonstrate a realisation that not only did many of its customers not appreciate the risks involved in unhedging loans, but the bank's own officers were ill equipped to advise potential borrowers about these risks. The content and context of the documents again permit some which came into existence after the appellant's loan to have relevance here, inter alia because they are speaking cumulatively of the experience of several years of marketing the loans.
25. For example, on 7 November 1985 the respondent's Chief General Manager
wrote to the managers of all branches:
It is of concern that customers may be entering26. A "Group Treasury Memorandum" of 4 October 1985 contains the stark admission of:
these arrangements without a full appreciation of
the risks involved.
... the lack of experience in foreign exchange
markets of the vast majority of our staff involved
in dealing with applications from customers and the
level of reliance placed on the bank's advice by a
large number of F/C/L applicants.
27
. Three months later, absolutely no progress could be reported. A Mr
Hamilton from Sydney Head Office wrote on 6 February 1986:
... it is now apparent that many of our staff do not28. The use of the word "now" signifies or infers that throughout or for the majority of its 1982-6 campaign to sell foreign currency loans, the bank had apparently been content to allow its clients to encumber or put at serious risk their assets, perhaps their life savings, as security for the bank without the slightest sense of urgency about remedying this most unsatisfactory approach to its obligations under the Trade Practices Act and the general law. In terms of risk, the emphasis was heavily on the bank's exposure and profits rather than the clients'. The clients' capacities to fund the consequences of adverse currency movements other than by the sale of basic assets were not even mentioned.
have an adequate understanding of the risks involved
and were not well placed to advise potential F/C/L
borrowers.
29. Although new procedures were eventually introduced, long after the
appellants' loan was in place, to assist bank staff to advise
clients
adequately and to help borrowers to manage the loans they undertook, it should
be noted that an internal memorandum of 8
October 1984, about the time Mr
Quade was given the Advice, had stated:
It is ... planned to conduct as soon as practical30. The words in parentheses are instructive. They convey a disturbing tendency to prefer administrative economies to statutory and legal obligations to provide competent advice and information to clients.
(subject to resources) short term seminars on
foreign currency related lending techniques.
31. The evidence before Morling J. concerning the complexities of dealing in foreign currency, supplemented by the 'G' documents on their face, shows that the risks to which the bank was subjecting its customers for these loans required considerably more education and training than could have been embraced in "short term seminars". Moreover, perhaps due to "resources" being scarce or applied to other activities, there is little evidence that even these procedures had been implemented and, if implemented, that they had had the intended results, at least sufficiently so in the case of the officers of the respondent who dealt with Mr Quade.
32. In summary, then, the 'G' documents appear to me to give a radically
different underpinning and content to the evidence at the
trial concerning the
state of knowledge of this area of borrowing bot at West Wylong and in Sydney,
and the respondent's responsibilities
under section 52 and under the general
law. If nothing else, the absence of the `G' documents at the trial appears to
have robbed the appellants of
the opportunity to cross-examine bank officers
about all these matters and more, backed as the cross examiner would have been
by
materials which essentially represented admissions of matters which at the
actual trial had had to be largely the subject of speculation,
implication and
inference. They also deprived the appellants of what would have been a
powerful criticism of the bank's reluctance
to admit its failures in this
regard and to call evidence on these subjects at the trial. It is difficult to
overstate the forensic
and evidentiary effects of this change of atmosphere,
even at a trial before a judge alone.
The case of David Securities
33. A Full Court of this Court (Lockhart, Beaumont, Gummow JJ) in David Securities Pty Ltd and Ors v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1990] FCA 148; (1990) 93 ALR 271 dealt with a similar issue. It too was a case regarding claims made in relation to foreign currency loan transactions, where the same respondent also failed to produce the 'G' documents at the time of the trial. The bundle of 'G' documents in this case is significantly larger than in David Securities but a few of the documents are the same.
34. The Full Court in that case held that the presence of the 'G' documents
on appeal did not warrant the overturning of the first
instance decision or
the granting of a new trial. Their Honours stated (at 293):
Although the trial judge did not have them, we are35. The appellants submitted that this case is distinguishable from David Securities not only because there are many more documents in the 'G' bundle before the Court in this instance but also because the facts in the two cases are very different. Particularly, in David Securities according to the facts found at trial, the respondent did not assume any responsibility to advise nor did the appellants rely on anything said by the respondent. In fact those appellants were specifically advised to seek outside expert advice, and the bank expressly declined to advise them at all.
not persuaded that these documents, of themselves,
or taken in conjunction with the evidence before his
Honour, establish that the bank should be held
liable for the losses suffered by the appellants.
36. In the present case by comparison, Morling J agreed with the appellants' submission that this is a case in which the bank assumed the responsibility of explaining foreign currency borrowing (p 35 of the judgment). The appellants suggested that the Full Court in David Securities discounted the effect of the 'G' documents not because their content had no bearing on the advice the respondent should have provided, but because the respondent in that case did not have a duty to advise.
37. The appellants also sought to distinguish David Securities on the basis that the decision turned in part on the rejection of a submission that the obligation in tort to advise of and protect from 'dangerous products' extended to the provision of financial services and that a general caution of risks is not sufficient to discharge the duty of care. The appellants submitted that the Full Court was wrong in so deciding, but in my opinion, because of the views expressed by that Court, this Court should not entertain this issue. In any event it is not necessary to do so because a sufficient duty for the present case is established by virtue of Morling J's finding that the respondent assumed responsibility to advise and knew of the appellants' reliance on whatever it said.
38. Furthermore, unlike in David Securities, these appellants were, to the bank's knowledge as their bankers for many years, financially unsophisticated. The appellants submitted that this fact is particularly relevant to the question of what level of advice was required of the respondent. They argue that the obligation of the respondent in this case was to give accurate and complete advice, whereas in the light of the 'G' documents and to the contrary of Morling J's finding, it in fact gave incomplete and misleading advice.
39. The thrust of the appellants' submission was that on the basis of these
factual differences, the duty of care in this case should
be more onerously
stated than in David Securities, where it was said (at 293):
The most that the bank could reasonably be expected40. It is significant in this respect that Morling J was not able to find that the appellants were told that independent expert assistance should be sought. His Honour held that the appellants "were aware of the risk" but the appellants submitted that the questions to be determined are whether the respondent directly misled or gave negligent advice to the appellants, or did so indirectly by not directing them to an independent adviser, and how its failings in these regards increased or manifested the true risk.
to do was to indicate to the appellants, in a
general way, that there were risks, that hedging was
available at a price and that independent expert
assistance should be sought.
41. It is also useful to compare the views expressed in David Securities with
that of another Full Court in relation to similar documentation
of another
bank expressed by Sheppard J in Westpac Banking Corporation v Spice 1990 ATPR
41-024 at p 51,394:
A reading of these various letters and memoranda and42. See also the observations of Foster J at first instance in that case at page 73 (unreported 1 September 1989). In Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking Corporation 1989 ATPR 40-971, the same Judge had held that the duty was heavier at the threshold of entry upon a foreign currency loan than later, when for example the issue of taking out a short-term hedge arose. In general, I agree with respect with the views of yet another Full Court in National Australia Bank Ltd v Nobile (1988) ATPR 40-856 per Davies J at pp 49,239 and 49,244, Neaves J. at p 49,251 and Spender J at p 49,253 that the best way for a bank to avoid liability was to suggest, perhaps 'require' or 'insist on' might be more appropriate alternative formulations for this case, obtaining independent advice. See also, in the context of a banker's duty to a guarantor, Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447 per Gibbs C.J. at 455 and Mason J at 462 and 464-467.
of some others written within the same period
discloses a tension between the desire of the Bank
to take advantage of what it saw as profitable
business and its concern that borrowers might find
themselves in financial difficulty, particularly if
their foreign exchange loans were not adequately
monitored and managed. There are also to be found
in some of the documents indications that the bank
thought that the form of its warnings of risk to
potential borrowers in foreign currencies should be
made clearer and more emphatic than had been the
case especially as many of the borrowers were quite
unsophisticated.
The negligent advice
43. The appellants suggested the following incomplete and misleading advice:
. the respondent told the appellants that they could reduce44. It is now well established that silence, that is the failure to advise on a significant matter when the task of advising has been embraced and undertaken, or there is a duty to advise, may demonstrate a breach of section 52 in the right circumstances: see Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA and Anor v VIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd and Anor (1986) 12 FCR 477, 68 ALR 77 per Bowen CJ at FCR 489, ALR 85; Davkot Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corporation, NSW Supreme Court, Wood J. unreported 10 May 1988 at p 118; Mehta and Anor v Commonwealth Bank of Australia NSW Supreme Court, Rogers C.J. Comm D unreported
the risks inherent in foreign currency loans by 'hedging'
but it did not tell them how they could do this nor that,
if it was to be done effectively, it would require
constant monitoring of exchange rates by an expert in
foreign currency
. the respondent advised the appellants to see an
accountant about the taxation implications of a foreign
currency loan, implying that no independent advice
regarding any other aspect of the proposed loan was
necessary. In fact the respondent's advice should have
been that the appellants seek and obtain comprehensive
advice from an expert on all aspects of such a
transaction, and consult this expert frequently during
the course of the loan
. the respondent told the appellants that it would indicate
which of four types of loans was suitable to their
financial situation, but instead of doing so, offered a
foreign currency loan. This implied that such a loan was
suitable and appropriate to the appellants' needs
. the respondent failed to tell the appellants that a
foreign currency loan was potentially ruinous and
effectively impossible for people like them to undertake
because of their inability to monitor the loan regularly
. a document headed "Example of Exchange Rate Fluctuations"
which reviewed the dollar's movements over several past
six monthly periods, was misleading, despite Justice
Morling's conclusion that it correctly pointed to the
nature of the risk in foreign currency loans. The
appellants submitted that his Honour failed to look at
the document as a whole and that properly construed, the
document suggests that over the long term any risk was minimal.
27
June
1990 and the cases cited by his Honour at pp 46-48. If
the appellants'
submissions are correct, the bank's failure to advise the appellants
comprehensively would fall for consideration
under the principles developed in
those cases.
The respondent's submissions - discussion
45. The respondent said that Morling J's conclusion that the appellants were
aware of the risks represented a correct basis for his
Honour's conclusion
that there was no breach of section 52 or of the common law duty of care,
because it is implicit in his Honour's reasoning that the respondent informed
the appellants of
the nature and extent of the risk. The respondent made the
following submissions in regard to the alleged illustrations of misleading
conduct:
. The respondent did not merely make an offer of a foreign46. As a single bland if a little simplistic submission, this probably ought to be accepted.
currency loan. Instead it told the appellants that they
could borrow on four different bases and it was up to
them to decide which one they wanted to use.
. At the trial the appellants said that they had not relied47. Likewise, taken in isolation, I believe that this is generally a correct assertion, although currency activities and movements in some of the earlier periods pre-dated deregulation and were thus of no relevance to this problem. As well, the unfamiliarity of the Australian dollar to flotation and international currency movements and other factors affecting rates of exchange from time to time needed to be considered in determining the value and weight of the document.
on the document headed "Example of Exchange Rate
Fluctuations". They can therefore not now submit that
the document is misleading and that they did rely on it.
In addition, Justice Morling did not misconstrue the
document as the appellants allege, but correctly found
that the document is not misleading. The fact that it
only dealt with six month periods is not misleading. In
fact the appellants' own expert stated that six months is
probably the most relevant period.
. The advice or comment that the appellants should see48. I reject these two submissions as somewhat semantic. There can be no doubt that the documents in evidence at the trial as supplemented by the 'G' documents laid emphasis on the desirability of and need for the appellants to seek tax advice from their accountant whom the bank described alternatively as a "tax consultant", especially on the specific incidence of withholding tax and the tax treatment of profits or losses on exchange rate dealings. Many people are able to structure their affairs so that they pay little tax. Experienced farmers often pay little tax because their assessable income is low and primary industry generally has larger numbers of allowable deductions. They may even ignore altogether their possible liability for withholding tax because they do not understand it or regard it as irrelevant to them, or because they know or believe that if and when it becomes relevant, their accountant will raise it with them. For such people to be told to seek tax advice is much less significant than to be informed that independent expert advice regarding the utility and safety of a foreign currency loan is needed. This type of 'general' information would be considerably more weighty and important than 'tax' information.
their accountant regarding tax implications is not
misleading. To tell them to enquire about tax does not
mean that the consultation with the accountant only had
to be about tax. In fact the respondent used the word
"particularly" and not the word "only".
. The appellants did not, in fact, see their accountant
about the tax implications. In these circumstances it
should be concluded that they would not have seen him/her
about the general question of whether to take the foreign
currency loan even if advice to do so had been given.
Therefore, there is no causative link between any failure
to advise the appellants to seek general advice and the
loss suffered by virtue of their entry into the foreign
currency loan.
49. Further, there was no evidence, and it is not particularly likely, that
the appellants' tax accountant, who may well have been
an expert in handling
their tax affairs and those of other people involved in primary industry, and
presumably had sufficient knowledge
to deal with the possible implications of
foreign currency loans on withholding tax and profits/losses treatment to
which the bank
drew such specific attention, would have been able to advise
them on the general wisdom of undertaking a foreign currency loan, of
the
risks if they did, and of the precautions they should take as a consequence.
Because of the limited evidence at the trial, Morling
J was not asked to find
whether the appellants would have sought independent advice on a foreign
currency loan if it had been made
clear to them that they should do so, and
that they should not proceed with such a loan without doing so, because the
bank lacked
the expertise necessary to advise them and the bank's interests
were in serious conflict with theirs. It is not difficult to speculate
on the
conclusions his Honour would have reached if he had needed to do so, but
speculation it would nonetheless appear to be for
this Court.
. In any event, the respondent told the appellants to see50. In my opinion, this argument is logically flawed. His Honour made no finding that the appellants were told to seek advice, merely that they did not do so. More importantly, I cannot read the information given by the bank so clinically. As I have already shown, the thrust of what the Quades were told was that they should consider and seek any necessary professional advice on the tax implications, especially as to withholding tax and profits/losses. The bank was held out to be the expert on foreign currency loans but it could know nothing about the taxation consequences of the proposed loan for the appellants because it had little or no knowledge of the appellants' taxation affairs.
their accountant about the loan generally. The basis of
this submission is that Morling J. concluded that the
appellants did not seek advice as to the wisdom of
entering into a foreign currency loan. This, the
respondent submitted, implies a prior finding by his
Honour that the appellants had been told by them to seek
such advice.
51. The respondent further submitted that if the appellants were given the
relevant information, the duty of the respondent was discharged.
The
respondent also relies on the finding that there were many opportunities for
the appellants to inform themselves. For example,
in the Offer the respondent
had stated:
Please do not hesitate to contact us should you52. The respondent says that from this invitation, although not taken up, the conclusion should be drawn that it had done everything required of it by the law.
require further clarification of any of the matters
raised above.
53. I am unable to accept these arguments or approaches. There is no dispute
that the bank took it upon itself to speak to the appellants
about this loan.
It is obviously not adequate to give an explanation of the elements of a loan
in bland terms, and to be vague, imprecise
or technical about the risks and
potential disasters for the clients if the loan is accepted. This applies no
less in a case where
the language is so complex or inexact that the person
being spoken to could not possibly understand it without assistance, than in
the extreme case of the information actually being given in a foreign tongue.
The respondent on the 'G' documents
54. The respondent submitted that because some of the 'G' documents now relied on are the same as in David Securities, the view formed of them there should be followed here. The respondent said that, in fact, the 'G' documents add nothing new to the appellants' case. It is agreed that the documents indicate the bank's awareness of the complexity of foreign currency transactions and that they disclose a policy of active promotion of such loans, but the respondent said that both complexity and promotion were argued at the trial. There was even expert evidence before Morling J to establish complexity. In other words, to the respondent the 'G' documents do nothing but repeat, even if they perhaps underline and emphasise, what was litigated without them.
55. Again I do not agree. In my view, it is not important that an expert knew that the loans were complex; what mattered (and what the 'G' documents appear to show) is that the bank not only knew their complexity at the time it undertook the task of advising the appellants but, at least partly due to the lack of training and experience of its staff, in a very real sense failed to convey the nature and extent of the complexity to them and failed to appreciate or acknowledge their basic inability to comprehend it, at any rate without expensive outside aid. The documents also indicate that the bank knew that its officers were in truth not competent to provide the advice or quality of advice they purported to proffer. Their offer to these appellants of an unhedged loan may even have been reckless; it at least manifested a general lack of care in the advice given.
56. It is of course true that the trial included assertions that the bank's promotion of this loan was incomplete, and that the bank was therefore negligent and deceptive. But the 'G' documents appear to provide specifics where only generalities were previously possible. The respondent submitted that even if it was found that it had a policy of promoting foreign currency loans, this would not have altered the decision of Morling J. It submitted that such a finding is only relevant to the question of the credit of the respondent's West Wyalong branch manager, Mr Plumb, with whom the appellants dealt. The respondent submitted that the 'G' documents are not relevant to Mr Plumb's credibility because they were not his documents and he did not know about the policy. However, in my opinion, this is no answer to the cogency of the criticism of the bank's clearly established policy as evidenced in the documents. The bank is the respondent. The state of knowledge of its policy by individual officers is not relevant on the question of its failure to provide adequate and comprehensive advice, and of its misleading and deceptive conduct in this regard.
57. The respondent put other reasons for the irrelevance of the new evidence. The 'G' documents could indicate the forseeability of loss. The respondent said that this goes only to the question whether there was a duty of care, and since Morling J. found that a duty existed, the 'G' documents are not relevant in this respect. In my opinion, for the reasons previously given, this argument is not valid.
58. Second, the 'G' documents may indicate the nature and extent of the risk. This information would go to the question of the nature of the respondent's duty of care. As Morling J found the duty to be not to make a negligent mistake and to explain fully, the respondent said that the 'G' documents would not have led to a different result. The respondent pointed to two sources of information at the trial regarding the nature and the extent of the risk - viz. other bank documents and the expert evidence. I have already referred to the irrelevance of the expert evidence to this aspect of the case. The general bank documents at trial post-dated the appellants' loan whereas, as Burchett J has pointed out in his judgment here, many of the important documents here pre-dated the loan, and the attitudes and policy they reflect were apparently influential at the time of its negotiation and execution. Thus the material and evidence at trial were understandably entitled to significantly less and perhaps no weight on the relevant issues. The trial Judge clearly so treated them. I doubt that he would have given as scant treatment to some of the 'G' documents.
59. The respondent also made some specific submissions as to the meaning of
the 'G' documents:
. They do not say that a borrower "should not hedge".60. In my view, these arguments should all be rejected as at best too legalistic and selective for the present factual circumstances. I think that the correct conclusion is that the documents appear to create an atmosphere or aura of promotion which did not draw distinctions between what advice should be given where the proposed borrowers were sophisticated entrepreneurs and what should be told to inexperienced dabblers in this type of commerce. These appellants, quite dissimilarly to the borrowers in David Securities, were the victims of this unselective approach. The appellants' failure to raise at trial the issue of external advice, monitoring and management does not assist the respondent as they did not have the documents on which these arguments could evidentially have been based. Presumably if they had been available, the appellants would have pleaded this contention as well. At least they would have had the choice of doing so.
Instead, they say that hedging should be an available
option to someone who has a foreign currency loan.
. They do not say that the bank vigorously promoted them
with people the bank recognised as being unsuited. The
appellants were not encouraged to take the loan.
. The appellants' submission that the 'G' documents show
that the bank should have told the appellants to have the
loan managed by an expert is contrary to the appellants'
approach at the trial and can thus not be pursued on this
appeal.
61. Although the result of such an undertaking seems to me clear, and so long
after these catastrophic events for the appellants,
this Court should be
hesitant in providing a prescritpion for further delay, we are apparently
bound not to speculate what the fate
of this argument would have been. In my
view, it certainly provides a cogent reason for a new trial at which the
documents would
all be available for testing and consideration alongside the
rest of the evidence. The only question with which I have found some
difficulty was whether the necessary certainty was supplied, and the power
existed, to reverse the trial result. As the appellants
did not argue that we
should do so, the matter does not have to be determined in this case.
The Issues
62. As I see it, the various issues raised in the appeal pose certain
specific questions for resolution.
1. Attack on the conclusions of the trial Judge
63. We were not asked to hold that the trial Judge erred in his factual
findings themselves. In my view we should not upset the conclusions
he drew
from them in a case which significantly depended on assessing witnesses and
counterbalancing their evidence with the documents
then available. I agree
with Burchett J. that the graphs produced in evidence at the trial cannot lead
to a reversal of the verdict
but may very well be assessed differently when
considered alongside the 'G' documents.
2. Dangerous product principle
64. Having regard to the views of the Full Court in David Securities at 291,
this interesting argument is not available for review
here but will have to
await another day and place.
3. Negligence
65. What is in issue is the nature of the duty. Neither party clearly stated
how it should here be defined. Relevant factors are
that the respondent
assumed the responsibility of advising, knowing that the appellants would rely
on that advice and that the appellants
were financially unsophisticated. In my
view there are three potential aspects of the duty to advise in this case:
(a) to identify the nature of the risk66. David Securities seems to require all of these, but the Full Court there was satisfied that the facts answered the tests. However, as in Spice, I think the factual criteria here require a different, perhaps more onerous or rigorous, application. I am unable to accept that it was sufficient to satisfy these three requirements merely to give the appellants the opportunity or a reminder to inform themselves and to take tax advice. Although the trial Judge found that they were aware of the risk as the evidence before him defined it, the 'G' documents powerfully admit of a finding that in fact they had a patent lack of appreciation and understanding of the true risk to which they were being exposed and the inadequacy of the advice which the respondent had given them.
(b) to explain the extent of the risk. This in turn has two
elements: (i) the likelihood of an adverse currency
fluctuation either permanently or at the time of
rollover; (ii) the gravity of the consequences of such
fluctuation depending on its size
(c) to identify quite specifically what needed to be done to
monitor and manage the loan so that the appellants could
be in a position to make the best decision on whether to
take the loan at all and on how to minimise the risk, on
a continuing basis, once a loan was taken out
67. In Lam v Austintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd 1990 ATPR 40-990,
Gleeson CJ of the NSW Supreme Court said (at p 50,880) in a somewhat different
but logically related context:
Where parties are dealing at arm's length in a68. The most obvious case of this kind is where the parties are in an unequal bargaining situation or where, as here, they have unequal knowledge and understanding of the facts and problems. Another would be where there is a statutory obligation to advise or not to mislead either directly or by silence.
commercial situation in which they have conflicting
interests it will often be the case that one party
will be aware of information which, if known to the
other, would or might cause that other party to take
a different negotiating stance. This does not in
itself impose any obligation on the first party to
bring the information to the attention of the other
party, and failure to do so would not, without more,
ordinarily be regarded as dishonesty or even sharp
practice. It would normally only be if there were
an obligation of full disclosure that a different
result would follow. That could occur, for example,
by reason of some feature of the relationship
between the parties, or because previous
communications between them gave rise to a duty to
add to or to correct earlier information.
69. There has even been discussion of something akin to fiduciary duties being imposed on a bank in some situations: Catt v Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 9 NSWLR 639. Cf James v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1986] FCA 41; (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 391 per Toohey J. Many relationships between bank customers and bank managers are not truly or solely arm's length transactions between independent financial and commercial entities or enterprises. Many bankers, especially in rural areas, are or become family advisers and "father confessors" to their clients. Bank managers or senior staff of this kind share personal friendships and joint social, philanthropic, communal, church or sporting pursuits with their clients, during and by reason of which the client becomes even more susceptible to trust and rely upon the bank and its advice.
70. Despite Mr Quade's single visit to head office in Sydney in October 1984, the West Wyalong branch manager was the face of the bank to these appellants. He was the person they trusted and looked to for direction and guidance. People with the background, experiences and skills of the appellants undoubtedly recognised the gap in knowledge and understanding of the relevant subject matter between themselves and the bank. The fact that the bank considered that an unhedged foreign currency loan was even feasible for them would undoubtedly carry considerable weight. They would naturally put their trust in its opinion on such a matter and the bank would undoubtedly be aware of its influence on, and the vulnerabilities of, its clients in this area. Their rural remoteness added to this reliance.
71. Although minds can differ as to precisely how far the evidence here goes
in that direction, and the precise legal definition
of such a relationship may
need further thought, in my opinion it was plainly insufficient for the bank
to have invited these appellants
not to 'hesitate to ask questions' or to have
told them that they could hedge the loan whenever they wanted to. A bank which
has
undertaken the task of advising an intending borrower on such matters is
under a duty to provide a prior full, honest and clear explanation
of the
nature and effect of the transaction being negotiated: Cornish v Midland Bank
(1985) 3 ALL ER 513 at 520 and 521; Perry v Midland Bank (1987) FLR 237. The
standard of care increases with the seriousness of the risk if the duty is
breached: Northwest Utilities Ltd v London Guarantee
and Accident Co Ltd
(1936) AC 108 at 186; Swinton v The China Mutual Steam Navigation Co Ltd
[1951] HCA 54; (1951) 83 CLR 553 at 556 and 567. In a completely different context, Kirby P
dissenting in Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 said,
with evident correctness:
The bigger the devastation of the possible risk, the72. Statements made and not made are to be viewed in the total context of the negotiations: Pappas v Soulac Pty Ltd [1983] FCA 3; (1983) 50 ALR 231; Elders Trustees and Executors Co Ltd v E.G. Reeves Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 332; (1987) 78 ALR 193 at 242; Foti and Ors v Banque Nationale de Paris (1990) Australian Torts Reports 81-025 (p 67,835), a decision of a Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court. In the total context of the present case, the extent of the risk being undertaken by the appellants when contracting this loan can hardly be overemphasised.
greater is the obligation to lay it before the
patient so that he or she can make an informed decision.
73. In a lecture entitled "Developments in Foreign Currency Loan Litigation" delivered to the Banking Law and Practice Conference in Melbourne on 24 May 1990, the respected Chief Judge of the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Justice Andrew Rogers, drew a distinction between the responsibilities of banks in transactions permeated by a risk element where there is a fully informed client, and the conclusions which pertain when "those who should be making the risk known to the customer and therefore obtaining the customer's consent are insufficiently equipped to do so".
74. His Honour summarised the factual setting that had arisen in many cases
as follows:
1. The bank knew that such a borrowing was75. Virtually all of these factual criteria apply in this case. As if speaking on some of the problems which existed at the time the appellants' loan was being negotiated and in contemplation, Justice Rogers sought a definition of the bank's duty to advise in the light of this common set of circumstances that existed in many of these loans at the time:
pregnant with the danger of large capital loss
unless precautions were taken.
2. The bank knew that its staff was ill-equipped
to explain the risk to the borrower.
3. The bank knew that its staff was ill-equipped
to explain the nature of the available
precautions to be taken.
4. The bank was unwilling to accept the task of
management even at a fee, and thereby undertake
the task of implementing appropriate safety
precautions as and when required.
5. The customer was unaware of the extent of the
possible risk and of the available precautions
which could be taken and the techniques for
implementing such precautions.
6. The bank was aware of this lack of knowledge on
the part of the customer.
7. The customer relied on the fact that the bank
gave no warning of any of the foregoing
matters. By reason of the omission to warn of
the extent of the risk the customer relied on
the belief that any risk was limited or slight.
First, the risk of depreciation of the Australian76. I agree with respect with his Honour that these matters are all distinctly relevant to the definition and delineation of the general duty of care. In my view, the respondent having undertaken to advise the appellants, what was required in this case was:
dollar against the foreign currency in which the
liability of the borrower had to be repaid.
Second, the inability and, therefore, unwillingness
of the banks to manage customers' exposures to
foreign currency fluctuations. That meant that
customers were left to their own devices in meeting
the admitted risk.
Third, the bank's front-line staff up to and
including branch managers were substantially
innocent of any real knowledge of the difficulties
attaching to foreign currency borrowings. Whilst
charged by higher management with the task of
promoting such loans they were not equipped to
explain to borrowers either the risks attaching to
such loans, or the measures that were available and
required to contain the risk. Experience has shown
that even when bank managers called in "experts"
from regional offices the difficulties continued.
Higher management was advised that true expertise
was restricted to staff of the bank's International Branches.
. for the appellants to be advised in plain language77. The 'G' documents lend support to the bank's understanding of what was required, and the consequences for unsophisticated borrowers if certain fundamental precautions were not taken. In other words, the risk not being explained and the means of its minimisation by stated precautions not having been identified, the 'G' documents permit a finding, not open at the trial because the documents were not available then, that the appellants were put in the completely deceived and false position of being effectively required to accept the risk of loss. They may be used to show that the bank embarked on and undertook a presentation which was manifestly incomplete, with the consequence for the appellants that they entered the loan agreement under false sense of security or direction. If, as the respondent suggests here, there was no call for further explanation, it may be found that the incomplete information proffered may well have been worse than no information at all. In the absence of full and complete information and advice of this kind, the conclusion is manifestly open that what was imparted significantly failed to fulfil the obligation to advise which the respondent had willingly undertaken and volunteered to perform.
of the magnitude of the risks and consequences they faced
. for the appellants to be informed what was needed to
protect them from the risks and to remove or
minimise the possible damage they might suffer,
including a detailed explanation of how total or
selective hedging works and how it may have such
effects on the cost of the money being borrowed as
to undermine the financial feasibility of the loan
in the first place
. for the bank to acquaint itself with all the
personal and financial circumstances of the
appellants relevant to their capacity to withstand
or meet currency losses
. for the bank to reveal its own commercial interest
in the loan and its lack of real knowledge and
experience in this area
. for the bank to make clear what type of professional
expertise was needed, at what times and intervals
and on what subjects, and where it could be obtained
. for the bank to advise the appellants that they were
not really geared or suitable for a foreign currency
loan, and should not contemplate it if they did not
have access to and were unwilling to take and
continue with the required outside advice
. for the bank to satisfy itself that this advice was
clearly understood before the loan was undertaken
4. Trade Practices Act
78. As often occurs, there is considerable overlap between the question of breach of section 52 and the question of negligence. Although, as I said earlier, it was conceded that if the appellants fail on one, they will fail on the other, it is useful to examine them separately. Was it misleading or deceptive not to have undertaken the three objectives listed under the previous heading of negligence?
79. Of course intent and knowledge are unnecessary: Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 44; (1982) 149 CLR 191 per Gibbs C.J. at 197. But with the 'G' documents accepted into evidence as they appear, this question must be assessed in the context of the bank's policy to promote these loans, their purpose for the bank of urgently improving its liquidity, its own lack of the requisite knowledge and expertise, and the fact that it stood to make considerable profits from their successful marketing. If the 'G' documents are not successfully attacked or weakened, the bank's conduct will also fall to be evaluated in the context of its patent and stark conflict of interest with the appellants which was not even revealed let alone explained, and of the chasm in knowledge between the bank and the appellants.
80. The appellants did not even prepare their own loan application form, which was done by a bank officer. This and other facts found by Morling J. establish the bank's knowledge that the appellants were placing their trust in its advice on the possibility of taking out such a loan. It seems clear that the bank knew that the appellants were unlikely to have ready access to sources other than itself for expert advice. No doubt because a floating currency was so new to Australia, few independent people outside the banks appear to have been readily available in Australia at the time for private consultation who even had the level of knowledge or access to the facts possessed by the bank. If there were such people, they are unlikely to have lived in West Wyalong or conducted a home visiting service to rural areas, and the capital city yellow pages may not readily have provided their names and telephone numbers. In relation to these appellants, who else besides the bank would know who and where these people were? If from their own efforts the appellants had found a person who claimed to be able to advise, how would they know that he/she possessed the necessary skills? What effect would the fees payable to such a person and the costs of carrying out their advice have on their loan costs and outgoings, and therefore its feasibility? It is quite understandable that the appellants would simply choose to trust their own banker, especially this respondent with its statutory accountability to the Australian people: see Commonwealth Banks Act 1959 esp.ss. 9(2), 11(2), 32 and 121, and what they may well have viewed as its special even historical role in the nation.
81. In my opinion, the evidence at the trial, if supplemented by the
unsullied or unqualified 'G' documents, manifests a clear case
of misleading
and deceptive conduct inducing the appellants to accept and enter the loan. It
does not seem to be disputed that their
subsequent losses flowed from what
would then be a contravention of section 52.
Did Morling J. ask the right question?
82. His Honour found that the appellants were aware of the risks and that
there was accordingly no breach by the respondent of section
52 or of the
common law duty of care. However, his Honour did not specifically find that
the appellants were informed of the true
nature and extent of the risks and
then advised to manage the risk continuously with the benefit of qualified
expert outside assistance
to ensure the best possible decisions throughout the
loan. This is where, with very great respect, I believe the trial was caused
to miscarry by the absence of the 'G' documents. They constitute these as the
true matters in issue and the questions to be addressed
and answered. In my
view, there is only one answer provided for them by the evidence on appeal. It
is that if the 'G' documents are
accepted as they appear on their face to be,
the respondent, having entered upon the task of giving advice to these
appellants, failed
to ensure that the advice it gave was comprehensive,
adequate and accurate in the respects I have earlier outlined.
Conclusion
83. I have read with care the views of Burchett J, and although in my view there are grounds for concluding that the 'G' documents justify a finding that the respondent's liability has been established, I have, like his Honour, decided that a new trial is the appropriate result.
84. In view of the conclusions reached on the other heads of claim, it is not necessary to pass on any special effects wrought on these facts by the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). I agree with the orders proposed by Burchett J. including those his Honour suggests as appropriate on the question of costs.