Zagor, Matthew --- "Uncertainty and Exclusion: Detention of Aliens and The High Court" [2006] FedLawRw 5; (2006) 34(1) Federal Law Review 127
[∗] Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Australian National University. Thanks to Adrienne Stone, John Williams and James Stellios for helpful discussions and comments, to the anonymous referees and the excellent Federal Law Review editors.
[1] There is a potential dispute as to whether the detention should be described as 'indefinite' given the Court's finding that it cannot be said that detention will never end. As most judges use the term uncritically, I have adopted it for the sake of clarity.
[2] Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 ('Lim').
[3] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562 ('Al-Kateb').
[4] [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664 ('Al Khafaji').
[5] [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486 ('Behrooz').
[6] (2004) 210 ALR 369 ('Woolley').
[7] Al Masri v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1009; (2002) 192 ALR 609.
[8] See, eg, WAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1625 [56] (French J); Daniel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 20; (2003) 196 ALR 52, 63 [34]–[37] (Whitlam J); Al Khafaji v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1369 [27] (Mansfield J).
[9] Al Masri v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 70; (2003) 126 FCR 54 ('Al Masri').
[10] Although the language of qualification used by Callinan J in describing the facts in Al-Kateb throws doubt on their accepted status.
[11] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 602 [102] (Gummow J).
[12] Ibid 653 [277] (Callinan J).
[13] Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664, 668–9 [7]–[8] (Gummow J).
[14] Ibid 672 [18]–[19] (Gummow J).
[15] Ibid 671 [16] (Gummow J).
[16] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 196(1)(a).
[17] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 196(1)(b).
[18] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 196(1)(c).
[19] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 580–1 [31] (McHugh J).
[20] Ibid 581 [33] (McHugh J).
[21] Ibid 662-3 [303] (Heydon J).
[22] Ibid 636 [217] (Hayne J).
[23] Ibid 637 [218].
[24] Ibid.
[25] His Honour used different words to describe the same provision. Thus removal is a 'purpose', 'event' or 'duty'.
[26] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 640 [231] (Hayne J).
[27] Ibid 638–9 [226] (Hayne J). See also ibid 639 [227] (Hayne J): 'the duty does not pass until it is reasonably practicable to remove the non-citizen in question'. For a briefer account, see 581 [33] (McHugh J).
[28] As the Solicitor-General noted in oral argument with respect to the eventual creation of a Palestinian state, 'you can never say, in any case, "These events will never occur"': see Transcript of Proceedings, Behrooz v Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCATrans 456 (12 November 2003).
[29] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 640 [231] (Hayne J).
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid 662 [299] (Callinan J).
[32] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 394–5 [89], 407 [134] (McHugh J).
[33] Uncertainty also had a role to play in the interpretation of Ch III.
[34] Koon Wing Lau v Calwell [1949] HCA 65; (1949) 80 CLR 533 ('Calwell').
[35] Ibid 581, cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 638 [224] (Hayne J) (emphasis added by Hayne J).
[36] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 638 [224].
[37] Ibid 638-9 [225], 640 [231]–[232] (Hayne J).
[38] Ibid 657–8 [288] (Callinan J).
[39] Ibid 662 [299] (Callinan J). See also Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 435 [262] (Callinan J).
[40] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR'), opened for signature 16 December 1966, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976; entered into force for Australia 13 November 1980 except art 41 which entered into force on 28 January 1993).
[41] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 661 [298] (Callinan J): 'Nor is a presumption, assuming it should be made …' (emphasis added).
[42] Ibid 590 [65] (McHugh J).
[43] [1945] HCA 3; (1945) 70 CLR 60.
[44] [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273.
[45] [1998] HCA 22; (1998) 195 CLR 337.
[46] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 402-3 [114] (McHugh J).
[47] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 571 [1] (Gleeson CJ) (emphasis added).
[48] Ibid 576 (Gleeson CJ) (emphasis added).
[49] Ibid 572 [1] (Gleeson CJ).
[50] Ibid 576 [18] (Gleeson CJ).
[51] Ibid 575 [13] (Gleeson CJ).
[52] Ibid 576 [18] (Gleeson CJ).
[53] Ibid 577 [21] (Gleeson CJ). See also 575 [13] (Gleeson CJ): 'the provisions … do not address … and do not expressly provide for it'; 575 [14]: 'The Act does not in terms provide for a person to be kept …'; 577 [21]: 'The Act does not say what is to happen if, through no fault of his own or of the authorities, he cannot be removed. It does not, in its terms, deal with that possibility.'
[54] Ibid 577 [19] (Gleeson CJ).
[55] Ibid 577–8 [21] (Gleeson CJ).
[56] Ibid 578 [22] (Gleeson CJ).
[57] Ibid 604 [108] (Gummow J).
[58] Ibid 599 [88] (Gummow J).
[59] Ibid 607 [117] (Gummow J).
[60] Ibid 608 [121] (Gummow J). Note that his Honour also interpreted the word 'purpose' as having a temporal character; however, the word does not appear in the relevant provisions.
[61] Ibid 608 [122] (Gummow J) (emphasis added).
[62] Ibid 609 [125] (Gummow J).
[63] See above, text accompanying n 28.
[64] The Chief Justice in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 576 [17] similarly linked the purposive nature of detention to a conclusion that detention is qualified by an objective test. Indirectly addressing Callinan J (at 662 [299]), his Honour noted that the primary purpose of detention (to facilitate removal) is 'objective', and not dependent upon the subjective intentions of the Minister or an officer of the Department.
[65] See also Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664, 674–5 [28] (Kirby J).
[66] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 622 [167] (Kirby J).
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] While other constitutional questions arose, these two categories cover the main issues.
[70] Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).
[71] Ibid 28–9 (emphasis added).
[72] Ibid 33. Other tests in Lim included McHugh J's 'reasonably necessary' test, ibid 65.
[73] [1906] HCA 58; (1906) 4 CLR 395.
[74] Ibid 404.
[75] Ibid, cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 632–3 [203] (Hayne J) (emphasis added). His Honour similarly found support in Calwell: see Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 644 [245] (Hayne J).
[76] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 645 [247] (Hayne J). The closest to an authority which his Honour cited was Robtelmes, which he noted at 639 [227] supports the view that the power of removal is a 'corollary to ... the power of exclusion'.
[77] Ibid 648 [255].
[78] Ibid 583 [41] (McHugh J). And it perhaps goes without saying that a law providing 'the power to detain aliens … is a law with respect to the subject matter of that power': at 583 [42].
[79] This issue was discussed in Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70; (2003) 126 FCR 54, 74 [76], and argued before the High Court. The test is often seen as deriving from Mason CJ in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1, 33.
[80] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 582–3 [38]-[39] (McHugh J).
[81] Ibid 583 [42] (McHugh J).
[82] Ibid 648 [256] (Hayne J).
[83] Ibid 584 [44] (McHugh J).
[84] Ibid (emphasis added).
[85] Ibid 584 [45] (McHugh J).
[86] [1949] HCA 6; (1949) 77 CLR 261, 278. Cited by McHugh J, Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 584 [45].
[87] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 584 [46] (McHugh J). See below for discussion of his Honour's misuse of the term 'deportation'.
[88] Ibid 647 [251] (Hayne J).
[89] [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1 ('Kruger').
[90] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 648 [258] (Hayne J).
[91] Ibid 648–9 [258] (Hayne J) (emphasis in original).
[92] Ibid 586 [49] (McHugh J): 'Neither passage was directed to a case where indefinite detention is necessary to prevent a person from entering Australia or the Australian community.'
[93] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 384 [58] (McHugh J).
[94] Ibid. See also Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 646 [251] (Hayne J), who cites Gaudron J in Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 110.
[95] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 385 [60] (McHugh J).
[96] Ibid 385 [59] (McHugh J). See also his statement at 384 [57] that the test 'cannot stand'. That McHugh J may have been somewhat premature in announcing the demise of the Lim test is noted in the Commentary below.
[97] Ibid 390 [76] (McHugh J). Cf Callinan J's endorsement of the Lim test at 434 [260].
[98] Ibid 391 [78] (McHugh J).
[99] HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968).
[100] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 650 [265] (Hayne J).
[101] Ibid: 'That is not to say, of course, that it may not be appropriate to identify treatment of persons as punitive where those persons are not offenders.'
[102] Ibid 650 [266] (Hayne J). As he noted at 633–4 [207]–[208], the term 'unlawful' does not refer to a breach of a law.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid 651 [267] (Hayne J).
[105] Ibid 651 [268] (Hayne J).
[106] Ibid 647 [254] (Hayne J): '[N]othing about the decision making that must precede detention ... bespeaks an exercise of the judicial power'. See also Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 427 [224] (Hayne J) in which his Honour emphasised the mandatory nature of detention.
[107] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 389 [72] (McHugh J).
[108] Ibid 393 [82] (McHugh J). See also 396 [98], where his Honour cited with approval the full Federal Court in NAMU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 401; (2002) 124 FCR 589, 597.
[109] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 414 [165] (Gummow J): 'The effects of detention will be relevant only to the extent that they are indicative of the purpose for which detention is authorised'.
[110] Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 559 [218] (Callinan J).
[111] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 376–7 [29] (Gleeson CJ).
[112] Ibid 419 [184] (Kirby J).
[113] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 609 [126], 610 [131], 613 [140] (Gummow J). As Kirby J noted at 615 [144]: 'in giving meaning to the Act, certain constitutional fundamentals must be kept in mind'.
[114] Ibid 609 [126], 610 [131], 613 [140] (Gummow J).
[115] Ibid 610 [132], 611 [133] (Gummow J).
[116] Ibid 612 [136]–[137] (Gummow J).
[117] Ibid: 'Once it is accepted that many forms of detention involve some non-punitive purpose, it follows that a punitive/non-punitive distinction cannot be the basis upon which the Ch III limitations respecting administrative detention are enlivened. … It is primarily with the deprivation of liberty that the law is concerned, not with whether that deprivation is for a punitive purpose.'
[118] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 476, cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 612 [136] (Gummow J).
[119] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 612 [137] (Gummow J).
[120] Ibid 613 [139] (Gummow J).
[121] Ibid 609 [126] (Gummow J), restated at 613 [140].
[122] Ibid 613 [140] (Gummow J).
[123] Ibid 609 [126] (Gummow J).
[124] Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1 ('Communist Party Case').
[125] Ibid 613 [140] (Gummow J).
[126] Ibid 614–5 [144] (Kirby J).
[127] Ibid 616 [150] (Kirby J).
[128] Ibid 616 [148]–[150] (Kirby J).
[129] Ibid 617 [153] (Kirby J).
[130] Justice Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive As Well As Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235.
[131] [1988] HCA 18; (1988) 165 CLR 360, 407–409.
[132] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 419 [184] (Kirby J) (emphasis in original).
[133] Ibid 420 [189] (Kirby J).
[134] Notably, see Kirby J in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 658.
[135] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 616 [150] (Kirby J). For Kirby J, the common law 'presumption in favour of liberty … informs this Court's approach to elucidating the meaning of the Constitution necessary to support the validity of such provisions'.
[136] For more on these 'sharp exchanges', see Justice Michael Kirby, 'International Law: the Impact on National Constitutions' (Speech delivered at the Grotius Lecture Series, Washington DC, 30 March 2005) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/ kirbyj_30mar05.html> at 19 February 2006.
[137] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 573 [4] (Gleeson CJ).
[138] Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 499 [20] (Gleeson CJ): '[A]n alien does not have a right without permission to enter Australia or to become part of the community'.
[139] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 571 [1] (Gleeson CJ).
[140] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 376 [29] (Gleeson CJ).
[141] Ibid 373 [13] (Gleeson CJ).
[142] Ibid 377 [29] (Gleeson CJ).
[143] Ibid 374 [16]–[17], 375 [24] (Gleeson CJ).
[144] Ibid 375 [21], [25] (Gleeson CJ).
[145] Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 499 [20] (Gleeson CJ). See, albeit not as forcefully, Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 374 [17] (Gleeson CJ).
[146] [2001] USSC 16; 533 US 678 (2001) ('Zadvydas').
[147] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 654 [284] (Callinan J).
[148] Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70; (2003) 126 FCR 54, 71 [61].
[149] Zadvydas[2001] USSC 16; , 533 US 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy J), cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 656 (Callinan J).
[150] Ibid 712 (Kennedy J), cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 657 (Callinan J)
[151] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 661–2 [298] (Callinan J).
[152] Ibid 616 [149] (Kirby J) and 618 [155] (Kirby J) (on the Communist Party Case). See also Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664, 674 [28] (Kirby J); Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 599 [88], 613 [140] (Gummow J) (on the applicability of the Communist Party Case), and 600 [92], 612 [137] and 613 [140] (Gummow J) (on indefinite detention at the will of the executive).
[153] Ibid 616 [149] (Kirby J).
[154] Notably, R v Governor of Durham Prison; Ex parte Hardial Singh [1983] EWHC 1; [1984] 1 WLR 704, [1984] 1 All ER 983; Tan Te Lam v Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1996] UKPC 5; [1997] AC 97.
[155] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 619 [157] (Kirby J).
[156] Ibid 620 [161] (Kirby J).
[157] Ibid 615 [146] (Kirby J).
[158] War Precautions Regulations 1915 (Cth); National Security (General) Regulations 1939 (Cth).
[159] [1915] HCA 60; (1915) 20 CLR 299.
[161] [1947] HCA 24; (1947) 75 CLR 94.
[162] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 588–9 [57], [60]–[61] (McHugh J).
[163] Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 28 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ): 'It is unnecessary to consider whether the defence power in times of war will support an executive power to make detention orders such as that considered in Little v The Commonwealth.' Cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 614 [140] (Gummow J).
[164] Korematsu v United States, [1945] USSC 43; 323 US 214 (1944), cited in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 621 [164] (Kirby J).
[165] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 621 [165] (Kirby J).
[166] Ibid 622 [166] (Kirby J).
[167] See George Winterton's discussion of this aspect of the case in H P Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 128–129.
[168] [2001] USSC 16; 533 US 678, 712 (2001) (Kennedy J).
[169] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 657 [285] (Callinan J).
[170] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 584–5 [46] (McHugh J). Note that McHugh J set out several consequentialist arguments, including a 'form over substance' argument of doubtful merit. See the short response of Gummow J at 611 [134].
[171] Ibid 580 [31] (McHugh J); Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664, 668 [4] (McHugh J).
[172] See Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543, especially 562–3 [43] (McHugh J); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [30] (Gleeson CJ).
[173] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [30] (Gleeson CJ). See also Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2004] HCA 40; (2004) 209 ALR 116, 123–4 [21], citing with approval Lord Steyn's description of the presumption in R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37; [1998] AC 539, 587, 589 as governing the relations between Parliament, the executive and the courts.
[174] See, eg, Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, 'Legality — Spirit and Principle' (Speech delivered at The Second Magna Carta Lecture, Sydney, 20 November 2003) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_20nov.html> at 7 March 2006 in which his Honour argues that the principle of legality 'extends to the effective limitation of power'. Cf use of the term by Kirby J in Daniels Corporation v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543, 582 [106], and by French J in his excellent decision in NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228; (2002) 123 FCR 298, 417 [448].
[175] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [19]–[20] (Gleeson CJ), citing with approval R v Secretary of State for Home Department; Ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33; [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord Hoffman).
[176] See, eg, Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (2003) 98–9; TRS Allan 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First Principles' in Cheryl Saunders (ed), Courts of Final Jurisdiction — The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 148 (who notes that English courts no longer view individual liberty as 'solely residual', and that '[t]he common law … has its own set of constitutional rights, even if these are not formally entrenched against legislative repeal'). See also Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (2004), ch 4 who rejects the substantivist approach of Allan; George Winterton 'Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights: Sacrificing Means to Ends?' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions, (1996) 121.
[177] Although note Sir Owen Dixon's view that the Constitution is informed by the 'anterior operation' of the common law: see Sir Owen Dixon, 'Sources of Legal Authority' in Judge Severin Woinarski (ed), Jesting Pilate (1965) 198, 199; see also Michael Wait, 'The Slumbering Sovereign: Sir Owen Dixon's Common Law Constitution Revisited' [2001] FedLawRw 3; (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 57, 68–70; Winterton, above n 176.
[178] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 616 [150], 620 [161] (Kirby J).
[179] See, eg, ibid 607 [117] (Gummow J).
[180] See, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, Woolworths Ltd v Fels (High Court of Australia, Callinan J, 18 June 2002): To apply the principle of legality, the Court would 'suffer the opprobrium of obstructing the regulator. That is the legislative approach, is it not?'.
[181] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 632–3 [203] (Hayne J).
[182] Ibid 640 [231]–[232] (Hayne J).
[183] McHugh J recognises that this was the purpose of the relevant provisions: ibid 581 [34] (McHugh J).
[184] Ibid 590 [63] (McHugh J).
[185] Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill [1991] HCA 28; (1991) 172 CLR 319, 346 (McHugh J). Kirby J has also been a vocal critic of the fiction. See, eg, State of New South Wales v Taylor [2001] HCA 15; (2001) 204 CLR 461, 484 [74] (Kirby J). See also Byrnes v The Queen; Hopwood v The Queen [1999] HCA 38; (1999) 199 CLR 1, 34 [80] (Kirby J): 'subjective intentions, even those that may reasonably be imputed to the makers of legislation, are irrelevant. The purposes of a legislature must be ascertained from the language of the legislation which it enacts. This is a cardinal rule.' On the status of legal fictions more generally, see Justice P W Young, 'Current Issues: Legal Fictions' (2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 795, 796–7 where it is argued that despite sustained judicial criticism, legal fictions are alive and well, and arguably growing in judicial discourse.
[186] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 648 [258] (Hayne J). A position he maintained in Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 428 [227] (Hayne J).
[187] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 110 (Gaudron J).
[188] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 383–4 [56] (McHugh J).
[189] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 110 (Gaudron J), cited in Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 385 [59] (McHugh J).
[190] For instance, the Solicitor-General intimated that the 'huge variety of exceptions' could conceivably include children at boarding school: Transcript of Proceedings, Woolley [2004] HCATrans 2 (3 February 2004).
[191] European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
[192] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 384 [58] (McHugh J).
[193] A (FC) and others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56.
[194] See, eg, Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 386 [62] (McHugh J): 'the purpose of a law that authorises or requires the detention of a person by the Executive is determinative.'
[195] Ibid 389 [71] (McHugh J).
[196] See, eg, ibid 434 [260] (Callinan J).
[197] See Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' [1999] MelbULawRw 26; (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668.
[198] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 391 [78] (McHugh J); see also 384 [58]: 'Whether detention is penal or punitive must depend on all the circumstances of the case.'
[199] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 583 [42] (McHugh J).
[200] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 376 [29] (Gleeson CJ).
[201] Ibid 414–5 [165]–[166] (Gummow J).
[202] Ibid 419 [184] (Kirby J) (emphasis omitted).
[203] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 651 [268] (Hayne J).
[204] See Leo Zaibert, 'Prolegomenon to a Theory of Punishment' (2005) 1(2) Law, Culture and the Humanities 221.
[205] HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968) 5.
[206] A parallel example of the Court accepting a simplistic version of Hart as authority for a jurisprudential point, with equally disastrous results, is Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58; (2002) 214 CLR 422, 442 [41] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
[207] Al Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 647 [254] (Hayne J): '[N]othing about the decision making that must precede detention ... bespeaks an exercise of the judicial power.'
[208] This view of the separation of powers doctrine is a relatively new development in the Australian context. See Fiona Wheeler 'Original Intent and the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Australia' (1996) 7(2) Public Law Review 96.
[209] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 651 [268] (Hayne J).
[210] Ibid 661–2 [298], [301] (Callinan J). His Honour's reference to Mr Al-Kateb's 'litigious endeavours' (at 653 [277]) similarly echoes the negative stereotype of asylum-seekers abusing the legal system by clogging the court with unmeritorious claims.
[211] Ibid 584–5 [45]–[47] (McHugh J): 'to enact legislation that requires the detention of a person who unlawfully enters Australia … is not an exercise by the Parliament of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.'
[212] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 427 [223] (Hayne J): 'it is their status of alienage which provides the critical connection with constitutional power'.
[213] Callinan J's fears about devious litigants creating the circumstances which would lead to their own release was addressed by the Al Masri test: see Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70; (2003) 126 FCR 54, 88 [137], 97 [176].
[214] Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (2001) 7–8. For McHugh J's statement that using the description 'indefinite detention' is a half-truth, see Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 394 [89] (McHugh J).
[215] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 662 [301] (Callinan J). Such denial was also apparent in the eventual refusal by McHugh J in Woolley to endorse the term 'indefinite', despite its common sense usage: see above n 32.
[216] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 651 [269] (Hayne J); 662 [301] (Callinan J); see also Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664, 678–9 [49] (Callinan J).
[217] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 385 [61], 403 [115] (McHugh J).
[218] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 647 [253], 648 [256], 649 [259] (Hayne J).
[219] Ibid 648 [255] (Hayne J) (emphasis added), although these words are not used when the same purposes are formulated again at 650–1 [267] (Hayne J).
[220] Ibid 645 [247]; see also 650 [266] (Hayne J).
[221] See, eg, ibid 650 [48] (McHugh J).
[222] Ibid 586 [49] (McHugh J). See also above n 92.
[223] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 600 [92] (Gummow J); Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 407 [136] (Gummow J).
[224] Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369, 407 [136] (Gummow J).
[225] Ibid 407 [137] (Gummow J).
[226] His Honour noted in Woolley (2004) 210 ALR 369 that the phrase has been used judicially to refer to the self-governing communities within the British Empire, concluding at 409 [146]: 'Here is a political idea whose time has come and gone. Still less is it sound constitutional doctrine to construe the aliens' power by reference to notions of "protection" of the "Australian community" by excluding aliens from "membership" of that community.'
[227] See, eg, Zadvydas[2001] USSC 16; , 533 US 678, 693 (2001) (Breyer J), in which the Court drew a distinction between the legal position of a migrant who had passed into US territory and one who had yet to enter. This is a distinction which Callinan J rejected, preferring to follow Scalia J's view that an alien who has 'totally extinguished' any right of presence in the country is in no different position than an 'inadmissible alien at the threshold of entry' — neither have a right to be released into the country: see Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 654–5 [284] (Callinan J).
[228] See Kim Rubenstein, 'Citizenship in the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere Legal Inference' (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 295.
[229] See, eg, Helen Irving, To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia's Constitution (revised ed, 1999) ch 9.
[230] For an analysis of contemporary trends and how they may affect legal reasoning, see Hilary Charlesworth et al, 'Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order' [2003] SydLawRw 21; (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 423, 425.
[231] For the view that the purpose can be in 'suspense', see Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 576 [18], 578 [22]–[23] (Gleeson CJ).
[232] Ibid 576 [17] (Gleeson CJ).
[233] Ibid 599 [88], 600 [92], 609 [125], 613 [140] (Gummow J); 615 [146], 616 [149], 622 [167] (Kirby J). Cf McHugh J's retort at 588 [55].
[234] Ibid 662 [299], [301] (Callinan J).
[235] This marries neatly with his Honour's view that an indefinite detention law could not be justified if it fell within the incidental power (see above n 81), and his apparent amenability to a constitutional bill of rights: Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 594 [73] (McHugh J).
[236] See Alfred Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (first published 1926, 1946 ed) 13: 'the essence of dramatic tragedy … resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things.'