Mcdonald, Stephen --- "Territory Courts and Federal Jurisdiction" [2005] FedLawRw 3; (2005) 33(1) Federal Law Review 57
[∗] B Com, LLB (Hons) (Adelaide). This article is based on a dissertation submitted for the Honours degree of Bachelor of Laws at the University of Adelaide.
[1] Section 122 provides:
Government of territories
122. The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms which it thinks fit.
[2] Buchanan v The Commonwealth [1913] HCA 29; (1913) 16 CLR 315; R v Bernasconi [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629; Mitchell v Barker [1918] HCA 13; (1918) 24 CLR 365; Waters v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 9; (1951) 82 CLR 188.
[3] Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee [1926] HCA 9; (1926) 37 CLR 432.
[4] Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132; Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [1992] HCA 51; (1992) 177 CLR 248; Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1; Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513; Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553.
[5] Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 175. (Footnotes omitted.)
[6] [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629.
[7] [1913] HCA 29; (1913) 16 CLR 315.
[8] Section 55 requires that laws imposing taxation deal only with the imposition of taxation, and with only one subject of taxation.
[9] [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629, 635.
[10] Mitchell v Barker [1918] HCA 13; (1918) 24 CLR 365; Federal Capital Commission v Laristan Building and Investment Co Pty Ltd [1929] HCA 36; (1929) 42 CLR 582, 585 (Dixon J) (accepting but distinguishing Bernasconi); Edie Creek Pty Ltd v Symes [1929] HCA 37; (1929) 43 CLR 53, 56–7 (Knox CJ); Waters v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 9; (1951) 82 CLR 188; Re Ballard; Ex parte Wright (1960) 1 FLR 473; cf Mainka v Custodian of Expropriated Property (1922) 34 CLR 297, 301 (Isaacs J).
[11] Attorney-General (Cth) v The Queen ('Boilermakers' Case') [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529, 545; [1957] AC 288, 320 (Viscount Simonds, for the Judicial Committee). For further discussion of the early cases on s 122, see Christopher Horan, 'Section 122 of the Constitution: A Disparate and Non-Federal Power?' [1997] FedLawRw 3; (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 97.
[12] Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132. Dixon CJ had earlier indicated his preference for a more inclusive approach to s 122: Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 41; (1945) 71 CLR 29, 84–5.
[13] Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226; Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591; Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [1992] HCA 51; (1992) 177 CLR 248; Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1; Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513.
[14] See Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 618 [172] (McHugh and Callinan JJ); cf 651 [257] (Hayne J).
[15] The expression has been used on many occasions to describe the ampleness of s 122: Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 273 (Windeyer J); Berwick Ltd v Gray [1976] HCA 12; (1976) 133 CLR 603, 611 (Jacobs J); Teori Tau v The Commonwealth [1969] HCA 62; (1969) 119 CLR 564, 570 (Barwick CJ). But cf Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 605 (Gummow J), criticising the use of the term as obscuring the limitations which nevertheless confine the power, and Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 379 [145] (Kirby J).
[16] Section 52(iii) gives the Commonwealth Parliament 'exclusive power to make laws … with respect to … Other matters declared by this Constitution to be within the exclusive power of the Parliament'.
[17] Cf Ffrost v Stevenson [1937] HCA 41; (1937) 58 CLR 528, 558 (Latham CJ); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 603–4 (Gummow J). If accepted, this would negate any argument that the placement of the territories power in Ch VI should be accorded significance.
[18] [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 246, referring to ss 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 64.
[19] See Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 143 (Dixon CJ; Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ agreeing).
[20] Section 125 of the Constitution. But cf Svikart v Stewart [1994] HCA 62; (1994) 181 CLR 548, holding that a 'Commonwealth place' could not be located in a territory.
[21] [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 243, 245–6 (Barwick CJ).
[22] Section 75(v) of the Constitution.
[23] Cf Waters v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 9; (1951) 82 CLR 188, 191–2 (Fullagar J).
[24] Section 75(iii) of the Constitution, which abolishes the Commonwealth's immunity from suit. See The Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471.
[25] Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 606 (Gummow J; Gaudron J agreeing), see also 653 (Kirby J); Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 154 (Kitto J); Spratt v Hernes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 277–8 (Windeyer J); Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 167, 171 (Gummow J), 653 (Kirby J). This accords with usual approaches to statutory and constitutional interpretation: see, for example, Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth ('Bank Nationalisation Case') [1948] HCA 7; (1948) 76 CLR 1, 184–5 (Latham CJ); Ross v The Queen [1979] HCA 29; (1979) 141 CLR 432, 440 (Gibbs J); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B [2004] HCA 20; (2004) 206 ALR 130, 183 [213] (Callinan J).
[26] See Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [1992] HCA 51; (1992) 177 CLR 248: the purpose of s 90 is to create a free trade area covering (at least) the geographical area of the Original States.
[27] Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 142 (Dixon CJ; Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ agreeing).
[28] See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, s 5; Capital Television and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591, 605 (Menzies J).
[29] Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 28 January 1898, Vol I, 257, quoted in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 604 (Gummow J).
[30] Indeed, it seems most likely that the first new State to be admitted to the Commonwealth will be the Northern Territory.
[31] Section 52(i) gives the Commonwealth Parliament power 'to make laws for the … government of the Commonwealth with respect to … the seat of government of the Commonwealth'. (Emphasis added.)
[32] [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226.
[33] It appears that this fallacy was first introduced in R v Bernasconi [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629. Cf Buchanan v The Commonwealth [1913] HCA 29; (1913) 16 CLR 315, 326 (Barton J): 'We must be satisfied that sec 55 is intended to apply to federal laws made in exercise of the power given by sec 122'. (Emphasis added.) The territories power was not unaffected by s 55 because it was regarded as 'non-federal'. Rather, s 55 was understood as particularly reflecting the interests of the States, so that taxation for the territories lay outside the mischief which was addressed by s 55.
[34] Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 242 (Barwick CJ).
[35] Capital TV and Appliances Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591, 599 (Barwick CJ).
[36] Sir John Quick and Sir Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901) 333ff.
[37] Buchanan v The Commonwealth [1913] HCA 29; (1913) 16 CLR 315, 335 (Isaacs J); R v Bernasconi [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629, 637 (Isaacs J); Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee [1926] HCA 9; (1926) 37 CLR 432, 441 (Isaacs J).
[38] Consider ss 75(iii) and (v) and ss 76(i) and (ii).
[39] Interestingly, Kitto J appears to have considered that this proved that the territories were non-federal: Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 252–3. Cf Michael Detmold, The Australian Commonwealth: A Fundamental Analysis of its Constitution (1985) 21–2.
[40] It will be necessary to return to the meaning of 'federal' later, and to add to what has been said here, when investigating whether the courts of the territories ought to be considered 'federal courts'. See text accompanying below nn 211–213.
[41] Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168 CLR 461, 485 (Mason J). This has been expressed in a variety of ways. See James v The Commonwealth [1936] HCA 32; (1936) 55 CLR 1, 58 (Lord Wright MR for the Judicial Committee); Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 246–7 (Barwick CJ); Victoria v The Commonwealth ('Payroll Tax Case') [1971] HCA 16; (1971) 122 CLR 353, 396 (Windeyer J); Pearce v Florenca [1976] HCA 26; (1976) 135 CLR 507, 527 (Jacobs J); Breavington v Godleman [1988] HCA 40; (1988) 169 CLR 41, 78 (Mason CJ); Stevens v Head [1993] HCA 19; (1992) 176 CLR 433, 461 (Deane J); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 656 (Kirby J).
[42] Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 270.
[43] The constitutionality of territorial senators was confirmed in Western Australia v The Commonwealth [1975] HCA 46; (1975) 134 CLR 201 and Queensland v The Commonwealth [1977] HCA 60; (1977) 139 CLR 585.
[44] Section 128 was amended by the Constitutional Alteration (Referendums) Act 1977 (Cth) so as to allow the residents of territories for whom there is a law in force providing for that territory's representation in the House of Representatives to vote on proposed laws to alter the Constitution. It should, however, be noted that the votes of territory residents are counted only in the national vote whereas the votes of State residents are counted in both State and national votes.
[45] Mitchell v Barker [1918] HCA 13; (1918) 24 CLR 365, 367 (the Court); Waters v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 9; (1951) 82 CLR 188, 192 (Fullagar J); Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Television [1992] HCA 51; (1992) 177 CLR 248, 274–5 (Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ).
[46] Jurisdiction, in this sense, is used to refer to the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of the Commonwealth: Svikart v Stewart [1994] HCA 62; (1994) 181 CLR 548, 566 (Brennan J).
[47] [1992] HCA 51; (1992) 177 CLR 248, 274.
[48] See David Mossop, 'Time to Reconsider Capital Duplicators' 5 Canberra Law Review 143. An approach to s 51(iii) which saw it as qualifying any power to provide duties of excise contained in s 122 would be sufficient to reach the conclusion of the majority in Capital Duplicators, that the legislature of a self-governing territory cannot impose duties of excise: cf Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, where s 51(xxxi) was held to qualify s 122.
[49] See s 121 of the Constitution; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), s 6.
[50] Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 151 (Williams J).
[51] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 331 [7] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ).
[52] [1976] HCA 12; (1976) 133 CLR 603.
[53] Indeed, it has been argued that these territories should have been regarded as falling under s 51(xxix) rather than s 122. See Jolley v Mainka [1933] HCA 43; (1933) 49 CLR 242, 278–9 (Evatt J); Ffrost v Stevenson [1937] HCA 41; (1937) 58 CLR 528, 579–93 (Evatt J); but cf 555 (Latham CJ), 566 (Dixon J); Fishwick v Cleland [1960] HCA 55; (1960) 106 CLR 186, 197 (Dixon CJ). See also Blackshield and Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 273–4.
[54] Berwick Ltd v Gray [1976] HCA 12; (1976) 133 CLR 603, 608 (Mason J; Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Jacobs and Murphy JJ agreeing). See also Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 247 (Barwick CJ), 270 (Menzies J).
[55] Berwick Ltd v Gray [1976] HCA 12; (1976) 133 CLR 603, 608–9 (Mason J; Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Jacobs and Murphy JJ agreeing). See J Q Ewans, 'Norfolk Island as Part of the Commonwealth' (1980) 54 Australian Law Journal 68. It is noteworthy that, of the current external territories, Norfolk Island is in many respects the most independent. For example, it has been granted self-government and has its own immigration laws: see Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth); Immigration Act 1980 (NI).
[56] Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 102 (Gaudron J).
[57] Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 556, 562–6 (the Court); Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485, 500 [24] (Gleeson CJ), 505–10 [43]–[57] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 551–2 [167] (Kirby J); cf [230]–[262] 574–585 (Callinan J) and the position in the United States: Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co v Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co [1928] USSC 59; 276 US 518, 533–4 (1928); Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins [1938] USSC 94; 304 US 64, 78–9 (1938). For earlier references to the common law of Australia, see R v Darby [1982] HCA 32; (1982) 148 CLR 668, 671 (Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ); Breavington v Godleman [1988] HCA 40; (1988) 169 CLR 41, 123 (Deane J); Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 15 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 57–8, 69 (Brennan J); Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292, 297–8, 306–7, 311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 316 (Brennan J), 327 (Deane J); Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd [1993] HCA 74; (1993) 178 CLR 477, 508 (Mason CJ and Toohey J), 556 (McHugh J); Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd [1994] HCA 13; (1994) 179 CLR 520, 556 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 84 (Dawson J), 113–14 (McHugh J), 138 (Gummow J); See also Murray Gleeson, The Rule of Law and the Constitution (2000) 112.
[58] Sir Owen Dixon, 'The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation' in Jesting Pilate (1965) 203, 204.
[59] Sir Owen Dixon, 'Sources of Legal Authority' in Jesting Pilate (1965) 198, 199. See also Sir Owen Dixon, 'The Law and the Constitution' in Jesting Pilate (1965) 38, 45.
[60] Sir Owen Dixon, 'Two Constitutions Compared' in Jesting Pilate (1965) 100, 104–5; Sir Owen Dixon, 'Concerning Judicial Method' in Jesting Pilate (1965) 152, 152. See also Parker v The Queen [1963] HCA 14; (1963) 111 CLR 610, 632–3 (Dixon CJ); Skelton v Collins [1966] HCA 14; (1966) 115 CLR 94, 104 (Kitto J), 133–6 (Menzies J), 137–9 (Owen J); cf Piro v W Foster & Co Ltd [1943] HCA 32; (1943) 68 CLR 313.
[61] (1999) 200 CLR 485, 505–6 [44]–[46], referring also to Favelle Mort Ltd v Murray [1976] HCA 13; (1976) 133 CLR 580, 591 (Barwick CJ).
[62] See also Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574 [110] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 138 (Gummow J).
[63] Dixon, above n 58, 205: 'Of course it [State-specific common law] is inconsistent with the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court'. See also Quick and Garran, above n 36, 785. Quick and Garran clearly thought that a single common law represented the status quo and that s 73 would facilitate the maintenance of this position.
[64] Although that is the position for which this article argues. See, in particular, text accompanying below nn 192–202.
[65] Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591.
[66] (1999) 200 CLR 485, 551 [167]. (Emphasis added.) Cf Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57; (1999) 200 CLR 386, 415–16 [79] (Kirby J).
[67] Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J).
[68] Cf, in relation to the rule of law, Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ): s 75(v) constitutes a 'textual reinforcement' of the underlying assumption of the rule of law.
[69] This seems consonant with comments in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 84 (Dawson J), 113–4 (McHugh J).
[71] Breavington v Godleman [1988] HCA 40; (1988) 169 CLR 41, 123, referring to Dixon, above n 59.
[72] It is not clear that Australian sovereignty is necessarily to be viewed in this way. See Michael Wait 'The Slumbering Sovereign: Sir Owen Dixon's Common Law Constitution Revisited' [2001] FedLawRw 3; (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 57; Simon Evans 'Why is the Constitution Binding? Authority, Obligation and the Role of the People' [2004] AdelLawRw 6; (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 103.
[73] See Dixon, above n 58, 212–13.
[74] This has been achieved by the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth), Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth), and the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).
[75] In fact, the prospect of the common law of Australia diverging from that of England was recognised before appeals to the Privy Council were finally limited: see Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1967] UKPCHCA 2; (1967) 117 CLR 221, 238–9 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest for the Judicial Committee).
[76] Gleeson, above n 57, 80. Indeed, Australia's own national character may itself reveal the need to depart from the common law of England. An obvious example is the unique demands of federalism upon common law choice of law rules: see John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36; (2000) 203 CLR 503, 549–51 [119]–[124] (Kirby J).
[77] If confirmation for this point is necessary, it can be found in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36; (2000) 203 CLR 503, 514–15 [2]–[3] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 568 [176] (Callinan J). That case involved the development of the common law rules for choice of law for the whole of Australia, and arose in the Australian Capital Territory.
[78] [1926] HCA 9; (1926) 37 CLR 432.
[79] [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629.
[80] Ibid 637 (Isaacs J).
[81] [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257.
[82] Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee [1926] HCA 9; (1926) 37 CLR 432, 446–7. This approach is discussed in Leslie Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (3rd ed, 2002) 187–8. Professor Zines concludes that Higgins J's reasoning is unconvincing.
[83] [1926] HCA 9; (1926) 37 CLR 432, 438–40.
[84] [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257. The different reasons of Higgins J for upholding the appeal in Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee meant that three of the six Justices in Porter accepted that the principle in In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts extended to matters arising in the territories.
[85] R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 270 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). (Footnotes omitted.) See also Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 541–4 [8]–[19] (Gleeson CJ), 558–9 [57]–[61] (McHugh J; Callinan J agreeing), 575 [111] (Gummow and Hayne JJ; Gaudron J agreeing); Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 420 [117] (McHugh J), 440–1 [178] (Gummow J).
[86] [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 290 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). The understanding of the territories as 'non-federal' has already been challenged. See text accompanying above nn 32–44.
[87] Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth), s 5.
[88] Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler [1984] HCA 48; (1984) 154 CLR 627 and Amoe v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) [1991] HCA 46; (1991) 103 ALR 595. Although the Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth) itself and Article 57(2) of the Constitution of Nauru both use the language of 'appeal', it may be that the jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to Nauru is to be regarded as 'original jurisdiction', in which case difficulties arising from s 73 of the Commonwealth Constitution might be avoided. See Transcript of Proceedings, Ruhani v Director of Police (High Court of Australia, 10 November 2004).
[89] The general view of the High Court has been that an 'advisory opinion' is an exercise of the judicial power, even though not constituting a 'matter' and thus not part of the 'judicial power of the Commonwealth': In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257, 264 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ); R v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353, 380 (Kitto J); The Commonwealth v Queensland [1975] HCA 43; (1975) 134 CLR 298, 325 (Jacobs J); Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 420–1 [118] (McHugh J), 440 [178] (Gummow J); Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 542 [10] (Gleeson CJ); cf the well-known descriptions of judicial power in Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1908) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ); Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v John East Iron Works Ltd [1949] AC 134, 149 (Lord Simonds); R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries [1970] HCA 8; (1969) 123 CLR 361, 374–5 (Kitto J).
[90] The extent of the Commonwealth's power to legislate in this respect might be limited to opinions upon a subject matter with respect to which the Commonwealth has power to make laws.
[91] Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q) [1991] HCA 53; (1991) 173 CLR 289, 299–306 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 311–319 (Brennan J); Saffron v The Queen [1953] HCA 51; (1953) 88 CLR 523, 527–8 (Dixon CJ); Fisher v Fisher [1986] HCA 61; (1986) 161 CLR 438, 450 (Gibbs CJ; Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ agreeing).
[92] See text accompanying below nn 147–173.
[93] This approach would leave jurisdiction vested by laws made under ss 51(xxix) or 51(xxx), pursuant to international agreement, as a limited category.
[94] This may be contrasted with the appellate jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court, which is purely statutory. See Barry v Mercein, 46 US (5 How) 103, 119 (Taney CJ, for the Court) (1847); United States v Young 94 US (4 Otto) 258, 259 (Waite CJ, for the Court) (1876).
[95] Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510, 558–9 [129] (Gaudron J). See also Breavington v Godleman [1988] HCA 40; (1988) 169 CLR 41, 125 (Deane J); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114 (McHugh J).
[96] See text accompanying below nn 127–133.
[97] Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510, 586 [220] (Kirby J).
[98] I reproduce the section here for convenience:
Appellate jurisdiction of High Court
73. The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences--
(i) Of any Justice or Justices exercising the original jurisdiction of the High Court:
(ii) Of any other federal court, or court exercising federal jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any State, or of any other court of any State from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council:
(iii) of the Interstate Commission, but as to questions of law only:
and the judgment of the High Court in all such cases shall be final and conclusive.
But no exception or regulation prescribed by the Parliament shall prevent the High Court from hearing and determining any appeal from the Supreme Court of a State in any matter in which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court to the Queen in Council.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the conditions of and restrictions on appeals to the Queen in Council from the Supreme Courts of the several States shall be applicable to appeals from them to the High Court.
[99] (1999) 200 CLR 322, reaffirming Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226 and Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591. See text accompanying below nn 203–219.
[100] The bases upon which territory courts may exercise federal jurisdiction are discussed in the text accompanying below nn 177–202.
[101] As is illustrated by the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s 20(3), which makes provision for appeals direct to the High Court by grant of special leave in the event that s 20(1), excepting appeals direct to the High Court, is invalid. Appeals are available to the Family Court (Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 94AAA) and the Federal Court (Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)), and from those courts to the High Court by s 73 of the Constitution.
[102] The Parliament has exercised its power to prescribe regulations by requiring a grant of special leave from the High Court in most cases, before an appeal can be brought. For example, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 35(2); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33(3); Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s 20(2). The validity of this legislation was upheld in Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1991] HCA 43; (1991) 173 CLR 194. The imposition of a special leave requirement does not prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction and is thus a regulation, rather than an exception: Parkin v James [1905] HCA 64; (1905) 2 CLR 315, 335 (the Court); but cf Fisher v Fisher [1986] HCA 61; (1986) 161 CLR 438, 450 (Gibbs CJ), referring to Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 95.
[103] Parkin v James [1905] HCA 64; (1905) 2 CLR 315, 332–3 (the Court). Cf Quick and Garran, above n 36, 739–40; Collins v Charles Marshall [1955] HCA 44; (1955) 92 CLR 529, 543–4 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ); it was assumed that 'appeal' referred to an appeal as of right, but this assumption was rejected in Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1991] HCA 43; (1991) 173 CLR 194, 216. See Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 82, 136, n 125.
[104] The jurisdiction extends only to 'matters' within the judicial power: Mellifont v Attorney-General (Q) [1991] HCA 53; (1991) 173 CLR 289, 300 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 312 (Brennan J).
[105] At federation, appeals were available to the Privy Council, as of right or by special leave, from decisions of all State Supreme Courts. See Quick and Garran, above n 36, 739–40; cf P H Lane, Commentary on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed, 1996) 545, n 65; see also Parkin v James [1905] HCA 64; (1905) 2 CLR 315, 335.
[106] Quick and Garran, above n 36, 738.
[107] Ibid 740 (quoting from John Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (1891) 331.
[108] Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association of Australasia v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd ('Engine Drivers' Case') [1916] HCA 55; (1916) 22 CLR 103, 117–18 (Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ), 122–3 (Powers J); cf 123–4 (Griffith CJ). See also R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and Australian Tramways Employees Association; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd ('Tramways Case No 1') [1914] HCA 15; (1914) 18 CLR 54, 76 (Isaacs J).
[109] [1916] HCA 58; (1916) 22 CLR 437.
[110] It is arguable that a time limitation is in fact a 'regulation' rather than an 'exception' for the purposes of s 73; see also High Court Rules 1952, O 69A r 3 and O 70 r 3.
[111] [1953] HCA 98; (1953) 87 CLR 353, 371–2 ('Watson').
[112] Ibid 372.
[113] [1955] HCA 44; (1955) 92 CLR 529, 544 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). Taylor J, 558–9, took an even narrower view of the meaning of 'exceptions', but in Cockle v Isaksen [1957] HCA 85; (1957) 99 CLR 155 he retreated from this position, adopting that of the majority.
[114] [1957] HCA 85; (1957) 99 CLR 155, 165. See also Re McJannet; Ex parte Minister for Employment, Training and Industrial Relations (Q) (1995) 184 CLR 620, 651 (Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[115] Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), s 113(3).
[116] [1957] HCA 85; (1957) 99 CLR 155, 166.
[117] Alternatively, the validity of certain exceptions might depend upon the availability of the remedies of certiorari and injunction to quash non-jurisdictional errors of law made by inferior courts.
[118] [1916] HCA 55; (1916) 22 CLR 103.
[119] Cf Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 537–8 [173]–[176] (Callinan J).
[120] The validity of such a limitation was upheld in R v Murray and Cormie; Ex parte the Commonwealth [1916] HCA 58; (1916) 22 CLR 437.
[121] [1953] HCA 98; (1953) 87 CLR 353. See text accompanying above nn 111–112.
[122] Section 79 of the Constitution provides that the federal jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by such number of judges as Parliament prescribes. The Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 15 provides that the jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised by one or more Justices, and s 23 provides that a Full Court consisting of less than all the Justices shall not give a decision on a question affecting the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth unless at least three Justices concur in the decision. Under s 18, any matter may be referred by a Justice sitting alone to a Full Court. The original jurisdiction of the High Court is thus regularly exercised by five, six or seven Justices.
[123] Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 18.
[124] Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 175 (Gummow J); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 600 [117] (Gaudron J); Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 375 [136] (Kirby J); Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 514 [104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
[125] (1998) 193 CLR 346, 384 [24].
[126] [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114. See also 139 (Gummow J).
[127] Quick and Garran, above n 36, 725; Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) [1907] HCA 76; (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1133 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ); Victoria v The Commonwealth and Connor [1975] HCA 39; (1975) 134 CLR 81, 118, 119 (Barwick CJ), 182 (Mason J); Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 175 (Gummow J). See also Alfred Deakin's second reading speech for the Judiciary Bill 1903: Hansard, 18 March 1902, 10966–10967. The special role of the High Court in constitutional cases is also recognised in s 74 of the Constitution.
[128] See, eg, Leslie Zines, 'Federal, Associated and Accrued Jurisdiction', in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 265. The Constitution itself grants the High Court original jurisdiction over the matters listed in s 75, whereas the Parliament is given power to provide that the High Court may exercise original jurisdiction over those matters in s 76.
[130] In other words, on the correct interpretation of the legislation, the existence of a constitutional corporation was a jurisdictional fact. But cf the analysis in Zines, above n 128, 271–2.
[131] (1979) 143 CLR 190, 228 (Jacobs J agreeing).
[132] Cf Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 177–9 (the Court); R v Local Government Board [1902] 2 IR 349, 373-4 (Palles CB). A court generally may determine conclusively a question of law within its jurisdiction. Unless the judicial power of the Commonwealth exercised by the High Court admits of a different nature than that exercised by lower courts, the Parliament should be free to grant another court jurisdiction to determine conclusively the meaning of the Constitution and the existence of constitutional facts. The federal jurisdiction vested in lower courts is the same as that given to the High Court by s 75 and pursuant to s 76; the judicial power involved must be the same, regardless of which court is called upon to exercise it.
[133] Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000) 200 CLR 629, 657–8 [69]–[71] (Kirby J); cf 638–40 [8]–[14] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
[134] Bank Nationalisation Case [1948] HCA 7; (1948) 76 CLR 1, 332–3 (Dixon J); Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen [1982] HCA 27; (1982) 153 CLR 168, 227 (Mason J); Commonwealth v Tasmania ('Tasmanian Dam Case') [1983] HCA 21; (1983) 158 CLR 1, 99 (Gibbs CJ), 128 (Mason J), 220 (Brennan J), 302 (Dawson J). On the other hand, a grant of jurisdiction to a court should also be broadly construed: Knight v F P Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178, 205 (Gaudron J); Re McBain; Ex parte Catholic Bishop's Conference [2002] HCA 16; (2002) 209 CLR 372, 444 [189] (Kirby J).
[135] Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 368 (O'Connor J).
[136] Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 112 (McHugh J), 134 (Gummow J); cf 102–3 (Gaudron J); Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 175 (Gummow J); Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510, 558–9 [129] (Gaudron J).
[137] In relation to s 51(xxxi) (guarantee of just terms for acquisition of property under Commonwealth laws), which is expressed as a grant of power but operates as a guarantee, see, for example, Minister for the Army v Dalziel [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 CLR 261, 276 (Latham CJ), 285–6 (Rich J), 290 (Starke J), 295 (McTiernan J), 301–2 (Williams J); Bank Nationalisation Case [1948] HCA 7; (1948) 76 CLR 1, 349 (Dixon J); Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth [1984] HCA 65; (1984) 155 CLR 193, 201–202 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); Trade Practices Commission v Tooth & Co Ltd [1979] HCA 47; (1979) 142 CLR 397, 403 (Barwick CJ); Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993) 179 CLR 297, 320 (Toohey J). In relation to s 117 (rights of out-of-State residents) see Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168 CLR 461, 527 (Deane J), 554 (Toohey J). In relation to s 116 (freedom of religion), the concept of religion has been given a broad interpretation: see, for example, Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v The Commonwealth [1943] HCA 12; (1943) 67 CLR 116, 123 (Latham CJ); Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 123 (Gaudron J).
[138] Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 134 (Gummow J).
[139] See Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 376 (Kirby J); Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Victoria [2002] HCA 27; (2002) 211 CLR 1, 45 [87] (Kirby J).
[140] By definition, the Supreme Court is the highest court in a State, and there can be no appeal from a State Supreme Court to any federal court other than the High Court: Collins v Charles Marshall Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 44; (1955) 92 CLR 529, 543 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ); Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 420 [116] (McHugh J), 440 [178], 447 [196] (Gummow J; Gaudron J agreeing).
[141] The exception is obviously appeals from the High Court's original jurisdiction. This jurisdiction has already been discussed: see text accompanying above nn 121–123.
[142] As it clearly was in Cockle v Isaksen [1957] HCA 85; (1957) 99 CLR 155.
[143] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 331–3 [7]–[9] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ).
[144] (1999) 200 CLR 485, 574–585 [230]–[262]. See particularly 574 [231].
[145] The words of s 111 of the Constitution.
[146] See text accompanying above nn 78–97.
[147] [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226.
[148] [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591.
[149] Ibid 599. See also Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 621 [177]–[178] (McHugh and Callinan JJ, dissenting).
[150] Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth [1947] HCA 26; (1947) 74 CLR 31, 79 (Dixon J); Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1, 22 (Mason J); Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 23; (1982) 150 CLR 169, 192–4 (Stephen J); State Chamber of Commerce and Industry v The Commonwealth (Second Fringe Benefits Tax Case) [1987] HCA 38; (1987) 163 CLR 329, 353–4 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Leask v The Commonwealth [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR 579, 621–2 (Gummow J), 633 (Kirby J).
[151] Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 143 (Dixon CJ); Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 278 (Windeyer J); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1997) 190 CLR 513, 560–61 (Toohey J), 566 (Gaudron J), 614 (Gummow J), 661–2 (Kirby J).
[152] See text accompanying above nn 32–44.
[153] Capital TV and Appliances Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591, 600; the expression was originally used in Attorney-General (Cth) v The Queen ('Boilermakers' Case') [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529, 545; [1957] AC 288, 320 (Viscount Simonds, for the Judicial Committee).
[154] Capital TV and Appliances Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591, 599–600.
[155] [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591.
[156] Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 604–5 [128]–[133]. See also Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 339–40 [33] (Gaudron J).
[157] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 348–9 [63]–[67].
[158] O'Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1180; (2000) 101 FCR 160, 164–5 [10]–[18] (Finn J), holding that the Northern Territory Supreme Court exercised federal jurisdiction; cf North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2001] FCA 1728; (2001) 192 ALR 625, 689–690 [408]–[410], [414]–[416] (Weinberg J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2002] FCAFC 297; (2002) 122 FCR 204, 232–4 [117]–[133] (Black CJ and Hely J; Drummond J agreeing on this point), holding that territory courts could not exercise federal jurisdiction.
[159] John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36; (2000) 203 CLR 503, 518–19 [18]–[19], 530 [51]–[54], 532 [58] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Putland v The Queen [2004] HCA 8; (2004) 204 ALR 455, 456–7 [4] (Gleeson CJ), 464 [33] (Gummow and Heydon JJ; Callinan J agreeing), 473–4 [73] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2004] HCA 31; (2004) 206 ALR 315, 326 [28] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). If territory courts exercised only 'non-federal' jurisdiction, it is not clear that they would have jurisdiction to grant constitutional writs to restrain an officer of the Commonwealth. See Ex parte Goldring [1903] NSWStRp 53; (1903) 3 SR(NSW) 260; cf Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 67(b).
[160] R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).
[161] Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39(2).
[162] (1999) 198 CLR 511, 561–2 [67]–[68] (McHugh J), 578–82 [114]–[127] (Gummow and Hayne JJ; Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J agreeing).
[163] For most of the twentieth century there existed no general federal court. Even the Federal Court of Australia, when established, was not intended as a court of general jurisdiction: see Zines, above n 82, 111–4.
[164] Cf Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 605–6 [201] (Kirby J).
[165] For example, Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), s 5; Constitution Act 1867 (Q), s 2; cf Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), s 16. See also Constitution Act 1889 (WA), s 2.
[166] Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 163 (Gummow J); cf 55–6 (Dawson J). See also Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 41; (1945) 71 CLR 29, 84–85 (Dixon J); Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 153 (Kitto J).
[167] Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 242 (Barwick CJ).
[168] In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257; R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254; Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, especially 558 [59] (McHugh J); see text accompanying above nn 84–86.
[169] Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 604 (Gaudron J).
[170] Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 402–3 [64]–[65]; Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 604–5. See also the comments of Gummow J in argument in North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley; Transcript of Proceedings, North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (High Court of Australia, 8 October 2003) 38. It should be noted, however, that counsel appears to have been submitting the contrary proposition, viz, that s 122 provided the power.
[171] Zines, above n 82, 177; cf Wall v The King; Ex parte King Won and Wah On [1927] HCA 4; (1927) 39 CLR 245, 261–2 (Higgins J).
[172] (1999) 200 CLR 322.
[173] See text accompanying below nn 203–219.
[174] The exercise of the two distinct powers can be seen in the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), ss 3(1) and 20(1).
[175] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 339–40 [31] –[33] (Gaudron J).
[176] For example, a suit between two residents of a territory or between residents of two different territories would seem to have a sufficient connection.
[177] For example, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 67B, 67C and s 68. Cf Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), s 4(1)(d).
[178] (1999) 196 CLR 553.
[179] Sections 51(xxi) and 51(xxii) of the Constitution.
[180] Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 589–92 (Gleeson and Gummow JJ), 605 (Gaudron J), 650–1 (Hayne J). (Kirby J dissented on a different ground.)
[181] Ibid 621–3 [177]–[181]. They considered that the 'federal jurisdiction' referred to in s 77(iii) would not include matters arising under ss 75(i), 75(ii), 75(iv), 76(iii) or 76(iv). This is difficult to reconcile with the words of s 77 which allow the Parliament to invest State courts with federal jurisdiction with respect to any of the matters in ss 75 and 76. It would also follow from this construction that s 79, allowing the Parliament to prescribe the number of judges which may exercise the federal jurisdiction of any court, leaves a lacuna: could the Parliament prescribe the number of judges to exercise 'non-federal' jurisdiction over the matters in ss 75 and 76? The lacuna might be filled by s 51(xxxix), but if s 51(xxxix) provided such a power generally, s 79 would be superfluous. See also Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 171 (Gummow J), pointing out that the s 76(i) federal jurisdiction includes matters involving the interpretation of s 122 itself. But cf Grace Bros Pty Ltd v Magistrates, Local Courts of NSW (1998) 84 ALR 492, 498 (Gummow J).
[182] See, for example, Ah Yick v Lehmert [1905] HCA 22; (1903) 2 CLR 593, 603–4 (Griffith CJ; Barton J agreeing); Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) [1907] HCA 76; (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1113 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ); The Commonwealth v Limerick Steamship Co Ltd and Kidman [1924] HCA 50; (1924) 35 CLR 69, 90 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); Collins v Charles Marshall Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 44; (1955) 92 CLR 529, 562 (Taylor J); John Robertson & Co Ltd v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd [1973] HCA 21; (1973) 129 CLR 65, 93–4 (Mason J); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 115 (McHugh J); Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 379 [15] (Brennan CJ and Toohey J); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 575 [35] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow JJ), 650 [255] (Hayne J).
[183] Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, s 5 provides that the Constitution, and laws of the Parliament made under it, 'shall be binding on the courts, judges and people of every State and every part of the Commonwealth'. See Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio & TV Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 61; (1965) 114 CLR 20, 45 (Windeyer J)
[184] Ffrost v Stevenson [1937] HCA 41; (1937) 58 CLR 528, 573 (Dixon J); Felton v Mulligan [1971] HCA 39; (1971) 124 CLR 367, 393 (Windeyer J), 412–13 (Walsh J; Barwick CJ agreeing). Cf Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 82, 237–8.
[185] Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) [1907] HCA 76; (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1113 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ), 1142 (Isaacs J); Lorenzo v Carey [1921] HCA 58; (1921) 29 CLR 243, 252 (the Court); Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485, 516–17 [78] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); ASIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559, 570 [3] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Solomons v District Court (NSW) [2002] HCA 47; (2002) 211 CLR 119, 144 [53] (McHugh J).
[186] Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) [1907] HCA 76; (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1142 (Isaacs J).
[187] (1999) 196 CLR 553. See text accompanying above nn 178–182.
[188] R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett [1945] HCA 50; (1945) 70 CLR 141, 145 (Latham CJ); LNC Industries Ltd v BMW (Australia) Ltd [1983] HCA 31; (1983) 151 CLR 575, 581 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Toohey JJ; Murphy J agreeing); Re McJannet; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union of Employees (Q) [No 2] [1997] HCA 40; (1997) 189 CLR 654, 656–7 (the Court); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 591 [90] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J), 605 [133] (Gaudron J), 650–1 [256] (Hayne J).
[189] As was suggested in Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [1992] HCA 51; (1992) 177 CLR 248, 270–1 (Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ). But see above n 48.
[190] See Zines, above n 82, 201–4, discussing the power in s 77(iii) to invest State courts with federal jurisdiction. Cf Wall v The King; Ex parte King Won and Wah On [1927] HCA 4; (1927) 39 CLR 245, 262 (Higgins J).
[191] Cf Lamshed v Lake [1958] HCA 14; (1958) 99 CLR 132, 142 (Dixon CJ), and, in the context of creating territory courts, Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 379–80 [147] (Kirby J).
[192] Eastman v The Queen [2000] HCA 29; (2000) 203 CLR 1, n 193. (Citation omitted.)
[193] This legislation either applies the law in force from time to time in another State or territory, or continues the law previously in force in the territory: Northern Territory Acceptance Act 1910 (Cth), s 7; Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915 (Cth), s 4A; Ashmore and Cartier Islands Acceptance Act 1933 (Cth), s 6; Heard Island and McDonald Islands Act 1953 (Cth), s 5; Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth), s 6; Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act 1955 (Cth), ss 7A(d) and 8A; Christmas Island Act 1958 (Cth), ss 7(d) and 8A; Coral Sea Islands Act 1969 (Cth), s 4; Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth), s 16.
[194] [2000] FCA 1180; 101 FCR 160, 168 [27]–[28]. See above n 158.
[195] Federal Capital Commission v Laristan Building and Investment Co Pty Ltd [1929] HCA 36; (1929) 42 CLR 582, 585. See also Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 168–9 (Gummow J); Zines, above n 82, 183.
[196] For matters 'cross-vested' from State courts, the potential for the matter to be decided in the territory court would owe its existence to the law of the territory consenting to the cross-vesting of jurisdiction.
[197] See the discussion in Buchanan v The Commonwealth [1913] HCA 29; (1913) 16 CLR 315, 333–4 (Isaacs J).
[198] Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 605; Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 341 [39]–[40]. Even if some territory courts should now be considered as having been created by the legislature of a self-governing territory, the authority of that legislature to create or sustain the court must necessarily derive from a law made pursuant to s 122. See s 34(2) and Sch 2 of the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth); Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 199 CLR 322, 341 [39]–[40] (Gaudron J), 349–352 [71]–[78] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
[199] Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511.
[200] Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cth); Northern Territory Acceptance Act 1910 (Cth); Norfolk Island Act 1913 (Cth); Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915 (Cth); Nauru Island Agreement Act 1919 (Cth); Ashmore and Cartier Islands Acceptance Act 1933 (Cth); Papua Act 1905 (Cth); New Guinea Act 1920 (Cth); Heard Island and McDonald Islands Act 1953 (Cth); Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933 (Cth); Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Request and Consent) Act 1954 (Cth); Christmas Island Act 1958 (Cth); Coral Sea Islands Act 1969 (Cth).
[201] For example, Agreement regarding Nauru, opened for signature 30th May 1923, ATS 1923 No 11, entered into force 30th May 1923; Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea, opened for signature 13th December 1946, ATS 1946 No. 1, entered into force 13th December 1946; Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru, opened for signature 1st November 1947, ATS 1947 No 8, entered into force 1st November 1947; Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the transfer of Heard and MacDonald Islands from the United Kingdom to Australia, opened for signature 19th December 1950, ATS 1951 No 3, retrospectively entered into force 26th December 1947.
[202] Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 38 provides that the High Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any matter arising directly under any treaty. Section 39 would appear to vest State and territory courts with all remaining treaty jurisdiction.
[203] (1999) 200 CLR 322, 377–8 [141].
[204] See the criticisms of Kirby J: ibid 381–2 [150]–[151].
[205] Section 72 of the Constitution was amended in 1977 to replace the requirement of life tenure with a retirement age of 70 years for Justices of the High Court and an age set by Parliament, not more than 70 years, for Justices of other federal courts.
[206] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 332 [8] and n 61 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ).
[207] Quick and Garran, above n 36, 972–3; Berwick Ltd v Gray [1976] HCA 12; (1976) 133 CLR 603, 607 (Mason CJ); cf Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 380 [148] (Kirby J).
[208] The answer, given by Kirby J, that the executive of the territory would probably be consulted, does not overcome this objection: Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 380 [148].
[209] (1999) 200 CLR 322, 333 [12].
[210] Ibid 333 [9].
[211] Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591, 599 (Barwick CJ): 'not always used with precision or with uniformity'. It should be noted that the construction of 'federal' for which Barwick CJ contended in that case is not the same as Gaudron J's, which is advocated here.
[212] Quick and Garran, above n 36, 333ff. See passage accompanying above n 36.
[213] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 338–9 [30].
[214] Ibid 349–53 [71]–[81]. See also 332–3 [9] (Gleeson, McHugh and Callinan JJ), 334–5 [19] (Gaudron J).
[215] Ibid 347–9 [61]–[67].
[216] Ibid 354 [85] (Kirby J); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 598 [113] (Gaudron J).
[217] Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 333 [9] (Gleeson, McHugh and Callinan JJ).
[218] (1999) 196 CLR 553.
[219] Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 402–3 [64] (Gaudron J); Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1996) 190 CLR 1, 109 (Gaudron J). See also Tom Pauling, 'The Constitutional Differences Between Territories and States' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 187.
[220] Collins v Charles Marshall Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 44; (1955) 92 CLR 529, 543 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ); Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511.
[221] Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 557 [56] (McHugh J).
[222] State Parliaments lack the power to vest jurisdiction in the courts of another State without the permission of that second State: see, for example, Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (NSW), s 9(b).
[223] For example, the law of Western Australia applies in the territory of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands by virtue of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands Act 1955 (Cth), s 8A.
[224] Such an arrangement is in place with respect to the territories of Christmas Island and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the judicial power of which is exercised by the Western Australian Supreme Court. Western Australia has consented to the vesting of this jurisdiction by way of the Indian Ocean Territories (Administration of Laws) Act 1992 (WA), ss 5, 11 and 13.
[225] Except that they may not exercise functions which are incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. See text accompanying below n 230.
[226] (1999) 198 CLR 511.
[227] Attorney-General (WA); Ex rel Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian National Airlines Commission [1976] HCA 66; (1976) 138 CLR 492, 527 (Mason J). See text accompanying above nn 174–176.
[228] Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), s 5(2).
[229] R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 270. See text accompanying nn 84–86.
[230] [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51.
[231] For example, Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). See also Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth), s 29; Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth), s 28; cf Attorney-General (NT) v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 90 ALR 59, 75 (Lockhart J).
[232] The Commonwealth Parliament (or territory legislature) is free to abolish Territory Supreme Courts and, indeed, all territory courts, and to vest the judicial power in relation to the territories in State or federal courts. Cf Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 103 (Gaudron J), 112 (McHugh J), 139, (Gummow J); cf Kruger v The Commonwealth (1996) 1, 165 (Gummow J): the statement that 'covering cl 5 of the Constitution assumes the existence of courts and judges of every part of the Commonwealth' should not be taken to suggest that covering cl 5 requires the continued existence of a court for every territory.
[233] Cf Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 143–4 (Gummow J). The same argument might be made in relation to inferior State courts.
[234] See, for example, Seamen's Union of Australia v Matthews [1957] HCA 53; (1957) 96 CLR 529, 534 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ) considering the validity of the establishment of the Commonwealth Industrial Court, which had been invested with non-judicial as well as judicial powers.
[235] Ibid 534–5.
[236] See text accompanying above nn 203–219.
[237] [1915] HCA 13; (1915) 19 CLR 629.
[238] Ffrost v Stevenson [1937] HCA 41; (1937) 58 CLR 528, 592 (Evatt J).
[239] On 6 August 2004, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ refused an application for special leave to appeal which raised this question. However, the Court acknowledged that, in an appropriate case, 'the decision in Bernasconi might be reconsidered and the effect of the decisions in Capital Duplicators and Svikart v Stewart might also be considered': Transcript of Proceedings, Tipiloura v The Queen (High Court of Australia, McHugh J, 6 August 2004).
[240] [2003] HCA 19; (2003) 197 ALR 1, 3 [8]–[9] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ), 5 [21] (McHugh J), 7 [32]–[33] (Kirby J). See also Ng v The Queen [2003] HCA 20; (2003) 197 ALR 10.
[241] This has been suggested in a number of cases: Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 41; (1945) 71 CLR 29, 85 (Dixon J); Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226, 244 (Barwick CJ); Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591, 605–6 (Menzies J); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 591 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).
[242] This was the approach which was submitted by the Northern Territory in Fittock v The Queen: [2003] HCA 19; (2003) 197 ALR 1, 3 [7].
[243] See Transcript of Proceedings, Fittock v The Queen (High Court of Australia, Pauling, 13 February 2003) 42–3. The application of the rules for choice of law might resolve apparent conflicts between the laws of a State and the laws of a self-governing territory in the same way as between two States. See Breavington v Godleman [1988] HCA 40; (1988) 169 CLR 41, 137–8 (Deane J); cf 84, 93–4 (Wilson and Gaudron JJ).