Wheeler, Fiona --- "Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court" [2004] FedLawRw 9; (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 205
[*] Faculty of Law, ANU.
[1] [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501 ('Polyukhovich'), 607 (Deane J), 685, 689 (Toohey J), 703–4 (Gaudron J).
[2] (1992) 174 CLR 455 ('Leeth'), 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ), 486–7 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 502 (Gaudron J).
[3] (1992) 176 CLR 1 ('Lim's Case'), 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).
[4] But see also, eg, Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 22 (Gaudron J); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51 ('Kable'), 98 (Toohey J), 108 (Gaudron J). See generally, Christine Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional Principle' [1994] AdelLawRw 13; (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341; Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' [1994] SydLawRw 14; (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166; George Winterton, 'The Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 185; Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' [1997] MonashULawRw 18; (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248.
[5] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (footnote omitted).
[6] Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ), 487 (Deane and Toohey JJ) referring to 'the obligation to act judicially'; Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116 (McHugh J).
[7] Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J); Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326 (Deane J) and 362 (Gaudron J).
[8] See generally, Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia', above n 4, 263–79. See also Wendy Lacey, 'Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of the Constitution' [2003] FedLawRw 2; (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57.
[9] Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 612–14 (Deane J), 704–8 (Gaudron J). See also at 689 (Toohey J).
[10] Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 487 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 502–3 (Gaudron J); Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107 (Gaudron J).
[11] Cf the judgments of Mason CJ, Dawson J and McHugh J in Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501 and the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ in Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455.
[12] See, eg, Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 201–4.
[13] [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168 CLR 461.
[14] [1992] HCA 45; (1992) 177 CLR 106.
[15] George Williams, 'Implied Rights under the Gleeson Court' (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 44.
[16] In relation to the implied freedom of political communication, see Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520. On the implied guarantee of equality recognised by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, see Kruger v Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1 ('Kruger'), 63–8 (Dawson J), 112–13 (Gaudron J), 142 (McHugh J), 153–5 (Gummow J).
[17] (1999) 198 CLR 511.
[18] See Leslie Zines, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional Law' (2002) 5 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 21, especially 26–9 (referring to Chief Justice Gleeson's extra-judicial observations); Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Centenary of the High Court of Australia' (2003) 5 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 41, 45. See also Justice J D Heydon, 'Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law' (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 1 (noting, however, that this paper does not deal directly with constitutional and statutory interpretation: at 4).
[19] Zines, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric', above n 18, 26.
[20] Sir Anthony Mason, 'Trends in Constitutional Interpretation' [1995] UNSWLawJl 13; (1995) 18 University of New South Wales Law Journal 237, 245.
[21] Zines, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric', above n 18, 28.
[22] Ibid 26.
[23] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 ('Ebner').
[24] New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Wheat Case') [1915] HCA 17; (1915) 20 CLR 54 and Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd [1918] HCA 56; (1918) 25 CLR 434. In relation to the 'first' and 'second' 'limbs' of the separation doctrine, see Cheryl Saunders, 'The Separation of Powers' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 3, 11.
[25] R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('Boilermakers' Case') affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in A-G (Cth) v The Queen [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529.
[26] For a constitution that adopted an express doctrine of separation of powers, see the discussion of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 in M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 119.
[27] This has been repeatedly recognised by commentators. See, eg, Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 169–70, 212–18.
[28] Justice Michael Kirby, 'Australia' in Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschênes (eds), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985) 8, 12.
[29] [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193.
[30] Fiona Wheeler, 'The Boilermakers Case' in H P Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 160, 168.
[31] George Winterton, 'Judges as Royal Commissioners' [1987] UNSWLawJl 8; (1987) 10 University of New South Wales Law Journal 108, 124.
[32] See generally Wheeler, 'The Boilermakers Case', above n 30. See also Fiona Wheeler, 'The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: A Decade in Overview' (2001) 20 Australian Bar Review 283, 284.
[33] Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 381–5 (Isaacs J).
[34] There were signs in the 1970s and 1980s that the High Court might overturn the second limb of the separation doctrine, but subsequent developments have affirmed it: see Wheeler, 'The Boilermakers Case', above n 30, 172–3.
[35] [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1.
[36] (1999) 198 CLR 511.
[37] See, eg, Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 382–3 (Isaacs J); Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd [1918] HCA 56; (1918) 25 CLR 434, 469–70 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); R v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353, 380–2 (Kitto J); Boilermakers' Case [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 267–8 and 275–6 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) and in the Privy Council A-G (Cth) v The Queen [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540–1; R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 8; (1970) 123 CLR 361, 390–3 (Windeyer J); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 10–13 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[38] Stephen Parker, 'The Independence of the Judiciary' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 62, 67–71; Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 382–3 (Isaacs J discussing the views of Sir William Blackstone).
[39] Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 212.
[40] [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[41] I have previously discussed Deane J's approach to derivation of the due process principle in Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 250–1, 254.
[42] Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (footnote omitted).
[43] Ibid. To the same effect, see Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486–7 (Deane and Toohey JJ).
[44] Cf Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 354. See also Russell Blackford, 'Judicial Power, Political Liberty and the Post-Industrial State' (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 267, 283.
[45] Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703–4 (Gaudron J); Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 501–3 (Gaudron J); Ebner [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362–3 (Gaudron J). See also Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 22 (Gaudron J).
[46] Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v Thornton [1953] HCA 11; (1953) 87 CLR 144.
[47] See Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 346–7, 354–5.
[48] [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173 ('Nicholas').
[49] Ibid 208 (footnote omitted).
[50] [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357.
[51] Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 171–2.
[52] Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 347, 354–5.
[53] Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 173. See also E D Elliott, 'Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so Abysmal' (1989) 57 George Washington Law Review 506, 527.
[54] Adapting Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 354.
[55] See R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation [1974] HCA 8; (1974) 130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick CJ), 102 (Mason J); Hilton v Wells [1985] HCA 16; (1985) 157 CLR 57.
[56] Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 202 n 117.
[57] [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 314–15 (referred to in Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', ibid).
[58] [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51. See also Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703 (Gaudron J).
[59] For a brief comparison of the Australian and United States doctrines, see George Williams, 'Due Process' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 226–7.
[60] Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J), 704 (Gaudron J). See also, eg, Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496–7 (Gaudron J).
[61] See the authorities above n 6. See also Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348, 394–5 (Gummow J); Nicholas [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 (Brennan CJ), 208 (Gaudron J); Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334 ('Bass'), 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82, 101 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Ebner [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362–3 (Gaudron J), 372–3 (Kirby J); Justice Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as Well as Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235, 238–9.
[62] Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 253–4.
[63] The finding in Lim's Case that s 54R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was invalid is best regarded as an application of the principle that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot interfere with the exercise of federal judicial power: see Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 193–4. This is the same principle that was applied by the Privy Council in Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259.
[64] McHugh, above n 61, 237 and 238–9. See also at 241.
[65] [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173.
[66] [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334.
[67] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337.
[68] (2002) 209 CLR 339 ('Cameron').
[69] [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ), 202 (Toohey J), 207–9 (Gaudron J), 232 (Gummow J). Hayne J, also in the majority, was silent on the issue. Kirby J, one of the dissentients in Nicholas, has also recognised the generalised due process principle: see, eg, Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510, 592 and Ebner [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 372–3.
[70] [1995] HCA 66; (1995) 184 CLR 19 ('Ridgeway').
[71] [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 191, 193 (Brennan CJ), 202 (Toohey J), 208, 210–11 (Gaudron J), 236, 238–9 (Gummow J), 276–9 (Hayne J). McHugh J dissented finding that s 15X infringed Chapter III by interfering to an unacceptable extent with the capacity of a Chapter III court 'to protect the integrity of its processes' (at 222–6). Kirby J dissented on a similar basis (at 264–6).
[72] Ibid 208–9.
[73] Ibid 209.
[74] [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334.
[75] Ibid 359 (footnotes omitted).
[76] Above, text accompanying n 72.
[77] [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334, 357.
[78] Ibid 359.
[79] Ibid 363–71.
[80] [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 189–91 (Brennan CJ), 202–3 (Toohey J), 234–6 (Gummow J), 273–4 (Hayne J). See also, albeit in dissent, at 225 (McHugh J).
[81] See generally Enid Campbell, 'Rules of Evidence and the Constitution' [2000] MonashULawRw 12; (2000) 26 Monash University Law Review 312.
[82] See also ibid 315.
[83] [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359.
[84] See generally Mark Aronson and Bruce Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd ed, 2000) 435–6, 438–41.
[85] [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82.
[86] Ibid 101. See also Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 63 (Dawson J).
[87] Nicholas [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208. See also Justice Douglas Drummond, 'Towards a More Compliant Judiciary? – Part I' (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 304, 306.
[88] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337.
[89] Ibid 344, 350.
[90] Ibid 356.
[91] Ibid 396.
[92] Ibid 366–7.
[93] Ibid 390 quoting Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41, 75 (Deane J) (footnote omitted).
[94] Ebner [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 368.
[95] Ibid 362–3.
[96] Ibid 363.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid 363–4.
[100] Ibid 368. Cf at 359 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
[101] Ibid 373.
[102] Ibid (footnote omitted). See also Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488, 500 (Kirby J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka [2001] HCA 10; (2001) 206 CLR 128, 147 (Kirby J); Roberts v Bass [2002] HCA 57; (2002) 212 CLR 1, 55 n 196 (Kirby J); Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 195 ALR 321, 392, 401, 409 (Kirby J).
[103] See also Enid Campbell, 'Waiver of Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias — A Constitutional Issue' (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 41; Enid Campbell and H P Lee, The Australian Judiciary (2001) 144–5, 151.
[104] In addition to the authorities collected above n 61, see also R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein [1938] HCA 10; (1938) 59 CLR 556, 588–9 (Dixon and Evatt JJ).
[105] See, eg, Parker, 'The Independence of the Judiciary', above n 38, especially 88–92.
[106] [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348.
[107] Ibid 394 (footnote omitted).
[108] Ibid.
[109] A-G (Cth) v The Queen [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529, 542. See also McHugh, above n 61, 240.
[110] [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520.
[111] See also the discussion in Campbell, 'Rules of Evidence and the Constitution', above n 81, 328–9.
[112] Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57; (1999) 200 CLR 386, 395 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J) describing the power of the High Court to deal with contempts as deriving from s 71 of the Constitution.
[113] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363.
[114] Ibid 364.
[115] For a good example, see the joint judgment of Dixon CJ and McTiernan J in R v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353. See also, eg, Nicholas [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ); Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57; (1999) 200 CLR 386, 395 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).
[116] Campbell, 'Waiver of Judicial Disqualification for Bias', above n 103, 42.
[117] Ibid 42. See also Campbell and Lee, above n 103, 146, 151.
[118] [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363, 364, 368.
[119] Ibid 368.
[120] See also ibid 393 (Kirby J).
[121] [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116 (McHugh J).
[122] Ibid 103 (Gaudron J), 116 (McHugh J).
[123] Ibid 103 (Gaudron J).
[124] Ibid 103, 106 (Gaudron J), 116, 118–19 (McHugh J), 126, 128 (Gummow J).
[125] Ibid 106–8 (Gaudron J), 121–4 (McHugh J), 132–4 (Gummow J). The reasoning of the fourth member of the Kable majority, Toohey J, was somewhat narrower than the others. For a summary of his approach, see Leslie Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (3rd ed, 2002) 244–5.
[126] See the view of Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 125, 245 ('It is clear that Kable would restrict State legislative power to control the judicial process so as to impair the principles of natural justice and due process'). See also Enid Campbell, 'Constitutional Protection of State Courts and Judges' [1997] MonashULawRw 24; (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 397, 416–17; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW) [2000] NSWCA 198; (2000) 181 ALR 694, 701 (Spigelman CJ); Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2003] QCA 249; [2004] 1 Qd R 40.
[127] The scope of the Kable doctrine is currently before the High Court in the appeal in Fardon v A-G (Qld) (B104/2003 and B105/2003, judgment reserved 2 March 2004).
[128] The present state of the law in this regard is discussed in Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 125, 172–86. There appears to be a growing acceptance that territory courts exercise some federal jurisdiction, however: see, eg, Putland v The Queen [2004] HCA 8; (2004) 204 ALR 455, 456 (Gleeson CJ), 472, 473–4 (Kirby J).
[129] Cf North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2002] FCAFC 297; (2002) 192 ALR 701, 724–9 (Black CJ and Hely J), 732 (Drummond J) rejecting an argument that Kable applies to territory courts. This was because Spratt v Hermes [1965] HCA 66; (1965) 114 CLR 226 and Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer [1971] HCA 10; (1971) 125 CLR 591 established that territory courts do not exercise federal jurisdiction. The Federal Court noted it was bound by these decisions, despite recent suggestions from some High Court judges that territory courts may exercise federal jurisdiction.
[130] Ebner [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363 (Gaudron J).
[131] Parker, 'The Independence of the Judiciary', above n 38, 76–9, 89–90. Of course, s 72 of the Constitution protects the tenure and remuneration of judges of federal courts. Whether Chapter III of the Constitution impliedly protects the tenure and remuneration of state judges is discussed in Peter Johnston and Rohan Hardcastle, 'State Courts: The Limits of Kable' [1998] SydLawRw 10; (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 216, 236–42. See also Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 195 ALR 321, 390 (Kirby J).
[132] Parker, 'The Independence of the Judiciary', above n 38, 79–81, 91.
[133] Ibid 91.
[134] Ibid 90.
[135] A number of judges have indicated that 'open justice' is a requirement of the due process principle. However, the reasons for courts being open to the public are wider than the need to safeguard the appearance of impartiality in judicial proceedings. Thus, 'open justice' is probably a freestanding aspect of due process. See the authorities collected in Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia', above n 4, 261–3. See also McHugh, above n 61, 239; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW) [2000] NSWCA 198; (2000) 181 ALR 694, 707 (Spigelman CJ), 721 (Priestley JA).
[136] See, eg, Justice Michael Kirby, 'Acting Judges — A Non-theoretical Danger' (1998) 8 Journal of Judicial Administration 69, 72; Drummond, above n 87, 313.
[137] Kirby, 'Acting Judges', above n 136, 72–5.
[138] [2002] FCAFC 297; (2002) 192 ALR 701.
[139] Ibid 729–31 (Black CJ and Hely J), 732 (Drummond J).
[140] (1999) 200 CLR 322 ('Eastman').
[141] Ibid 333 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ), 340 (Gaudron J), 348–50 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Cf at 356, 383–4 (Kirby J) (dissenting).
[142] Ibid 340. See also at 353 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 364–5 (Kirby J).
[143] On this principle see Zines, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia, above n 125, 204–9, 242–3. See also Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 102 (Gaudron J), 110, 115 (McHugh J) and the expressio unius argument based on s 72 of the Constitution discussed in Johnston and Hardcastle, above n 131, 241. This expressio unius argument seems to have been accepted by the Federal Court in North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2002] FCAFC 297; (2002) 192 ALR 701, 730 (Black CJ and Hely J), 732 (Drummond J).
[144] D2/2003 (judgment reserved 8 October 2003).
[145] See, eg, Drummond, above n 87, for a discussion of whether the movement towards externally imposed 'judicial performance' standards offends core aspects of the due process principle, especially the natural justice requirement.
[146] Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 263–70.
[147] McHugh, above n 61, 240–1. See also KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221, 227 (McHugh J).
[148] See, eg, Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443, 483; Crampton v The Queen [2000] HCA 60; (2000) 206 CLR 161, 208; KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221, 254; Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 370; Ng v The Queen [2003] HCA 20; (2003) 197 ALR 10, 27.
[149] On the retroactivity aspect of the due process principle, see the judgments of Mason CJ, Dawson J and McHugh J in Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501. On Gaudron J's view that 'equal justice ... is fundamental to the judicial process', see Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469–70 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ), 502 (Gaudron J).
[150] Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 343 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ) (footnote omitted).
[151] Ibid 343–4 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), 350–1 (McHugh J), 358–61 (Kirby J).
[152] Ibid 343–4 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), 350–4 (McHugh J).
[153] Ibid 352–3 (emphasis in third and fourth sentences added).
[154] At the end of the quoted passage, he referred to Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584, 608 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
[155] Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 368.
[156] Ibid 369.
[157] Ibid 353.
[158] See also Milat v The Queen [2004] HCA 17; (2004) 205 ALR 338, 342–3 (McHugh J).
[159] (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486–8, 490–3.
[160] Ibid 493.
[161] Ibid 487.
[162] Ibid 502–3.
[163] Ibid 467–71. See Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 281–2; Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 353; Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 203; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 205–6.
[164] (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469–70; Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 281–2; Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process', above n 4, 353; Winterton, 'Implied Bill of Rights', above n 4, 203; McHugh, above n 61, 251; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 27, 205–6.
[165] [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 63–8 (Dawson J), 112–13 (Gaudron J), 142 (McHugh J), 153–5 (Gummow J).
[166] Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ said in Leeth that even assuming the existence of Gaudron J's equal justice due process requirement, the legislation in question was not relevantly discriminatory: (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470–1. See also at 493 (Deane and Toohey JJ). Speaking extra-judicially, Justice McHugh seems to have expressed at least some support for Gaudron J's equal justice due process guarantee (see McHugh, above n 61, 251: 'the more limited Ch III doctrine proposed by Gaudron J, and at least partially endorsed in Kruger by Dawson J and myself, appears to be still open'). The judgments of Dawson J and McHugh J in Kruger support a procedural due process guarantee, but reject a doctrine of substantive due process. It may be then that McHugh J supports a guarantee of procedural equality in the exercise of federal judicial power. As he has acknowledged, however, the distinction between procedure and substance is far from clear: McHugh, above n 61, 237.
[167] Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107–8 (Gaudron J); Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 112 (Gaudron J); Nicholas [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 (Gaudron J).
[168]/a> See his comment in the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ngoc Tri Chau v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1995) 132 ALR 430, 445. See also Putland v The Queen [2004] HCA 8; (2004) 204 ALR 455, 484–5 (Kirby J) and, for a more specific commitment, Muir v The Queen [2004] HCA 21 (Unreported, McHugh, Hayne and Kirby JJ, 2 April 2004) [28] (Kirby J). Cf, however, Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339, 369 (Kirby J).
[169] [2004] HCA 8; (2004) 204 ALR 455.
[170] Ibid 462 (Gleeson CJ), 470–1 (Gummow and Heydon JJ), 486 (Callinan J). Cf at 483–5 (Kirby J) (dissenting). The case arose from the trial by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Gleeson CJ said that the Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction here (at 456). Kirby J said that 'the existence of federal jurisdiction was not challenged by either party to this appeal' (at 474). The other members of the High Court did not directly comment on whether federal jurisdiction was attracted.
[171] However, Gleeson CJ observed that '[s]ection 68 of the Judiciary Act reflects a permissible legislative choice, and one which, for a century, has resulted in some differences in the sentencing of federal offenders according to where they are sentenced': ibid 462 (footnote omitted).
[172] Wheeler, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process', above n 4, 282–3. See also Geoffrey Kennett, 'Individual Rights, the High Court and the Constitution' [1994] MelbULawRw 4; (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 581, 603 where a similar argument is made; Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' [2001] MelbULawRw 2; (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 39; Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 66 (Dawson J), 155 (Gummow J); Muir v The Queen [2004] HCA 21 (Unreported, McHugh, Hayne and Kirby JJ, 2 April 2004) [23]–[28] (Kirby J).
[173] [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 112 (footnote omitted). See also Kennett, above n 172, 594; Melissa Castan and Sarah Joseph, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2001) 159.
[174] See Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 68 (Dawson J). Cf Kennett, above n 172, 604 commenting on the application of the broader equality guarantee recognised by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth.
[175] [2002] HCA 57; (2002) 212 CLR 1.
[176] Ibid 55 (footnote omitted).
[177] Ibid (footnote omitted).