Hill, Lisa --- "Compulsory Voting in Australia: A Basis For A 'Best Practice' Regime" [2004] FedLawRw 22; (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 479
[*] Senior Research Fellow, Politics Discipline, School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide. The author wishes to thank Graeme Orr, George Williams and the anonymous referees for their many helpful suggestions in preparing this paper. She also thanks her able research assistants, Jonathon Louth and Luke Trenwith, for their invaluable assistance.
[1] This was actually a small improvement on the previous election in 1996 of 49.0 per cent. But it was probably a function of the unusual closeness of the race (Voter Turnout and Mobilization (2002) The Center for Voting and Democracy <http://www.fairvote.org/turnout/ index.html#international> at 6 March 2003. The story in congressional elections is even worse: turnout for the 1998 elections was only 36.4 per cent, down from 38.78 per cent in 1994 (the previous off-year congressional election) (International Voter Turnout, 1991–2000 (2002) The Center for Voting and Democracy <http://www.fairvote.org/turnout/ intturnout.htm> at 6 March 2003).
[2] A number of American-based social scientists have also considered compulsory voting as a solution. Among them are: Arend Lijphart, Richard Hasen, Martin Wattenberg and Tom Mann.
[3] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout from 1945 to Date: A Global Report on Political Participation, IDEA <http://www.idea.int/Voter_turnout/westeurope/uk.html> at 17 November 2004.
[4] The Electoral Commission of 2001, Press Release, History Learning Site <http://www. historylearningsite.co.uk/electoral_commission_of_2001.htm> at 26 June 2002.
[5] Other countries to use compulsory voting systematically (and with enforcement) include: Argentina, Australia, Austria (two Länder only), Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cyprus, Fiji, Greece, Luxembourg, Nauru, Singapore, Switzerland (one canton only), Uruguay, and until 1970, The Netherlands. Regimes without enforcement (such as Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Thailand) have been excluded from this list as have those with weak enforcement (Austria — two regions, Tyrol and Vorarlberg — Ecuador, Italy, Mexico and Turkey). The author gratefully acknowledges the considerable efforts of Gillian Evans (Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University) and Jonathon Louth (Politics, University of Adelaide) in compiling and verifying this list.
[6] Compulsory enrolment for federal elections was introduced in 1911 but voting itself did not become mandatory until 1924. And it was not until 1984 that it became compulsory for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders to register and vote (Australian Electoral Commission, 'The Franchise "Right to Vote" Timetable' (Press Release, 2 November 2001)).
[7] In 1903 the federal election turnout had only been 46.86 per cent but by 1925, after compulsory voting had been introduced, the turnout had reached 91.31 per cent: ibid.
[8] Except in South Australia where registration is not compulsory and only registered voters are required to vote.
[9] See further discussion below in text accompanying nn 88-9. For a fuller discussion of this point see: Graeme Orr, 'The Choice Not to Choose: Commonwealth Electoral Law and the Withholding of Preferences' [1997] MonashULawRw 19; (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 285; John McCarthy, 'General Principles of Australian Electoral Law' (2000) 19 Australian Bar Review 109; Anne Twomey, 'Free to Choose or Compelled to Lie?: The Rights of Voters After Langer v the Commonwealth' [1996] FedLawRw 7; (1996) 24 Federal Law Review 201; Lisa Hill, 'Compulsory Voting: Residual Problems and Potential Solutions' (2002) 37 Australian Journal of Political Science 437.
[10] This right is not explicit in the Commonwealth Constitution but has been implied. As Anne Twomey notes, this 'implied constitutional protection for the right to vote is to be discerned in s 24 of the Constitution. The phrase "directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth" has been interpreted by a number of Justices of the High Court as implying the application of a universal franchise' (Anne Twomey, 'The Federal Constitutional Right to Vote in Australia' [2000] FedLawRw 6; (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 125, 126). See also George Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (1999) ch 7.
[11] Roger Mortimore and Jessica Elgood, What Does the Election Tell Us About Consumers (2001) Market and Opinion Research International <http:// www.mori.com/ pubinfo/rmm-res2001.shtml> at 2 July 2002.
[12] Market and Opinion Research International, Survey of Attitudes During the 2001 General Election Campaign (2001) Market and Opinion Research International <http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/elec_comm_rep.shtml> at 1 July 2002.
[13] Wilma Smeenk, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Wout Ultee, 'Thuisblijven bij Verkiezingen in Nederland en de Verenigde Staten (Non-Voting in the Netherlands and the United States)' (1995) 70 Mens en Maatschappij 220, 220. See also Survey of Attitudes During the 2001 General Election Campaign (2001) Market and Opinion Research International <http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/elec_comm_rep. shtml> at 1 July 2002.
[14] See, eg, Lisa Hill, 'On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to "Vote": The Australian Case' (2002) 50 Political Studies 80; Martin Harrop and William Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction (1987); Arend Lijphart, 'Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma' (1997) 19 American Political Science Review 1.
[15] Munroe Eagles and Stephen Erfle, 'Community Cohesion and Voter Turnout in English Parliamentary Elections' (1989) 19 British Journal of Political Science 115.
[16] Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote (1988); Walter Burnham, 'The Turnout Problem' in James Reichley (ed), Elections American Style (1987) 97.
[17] Anthony Heath and Bridget Taylor, 'New Sources of Abstention' in Pippa Norris (ed), Critical Elections (1999) 164.
[18] Jack Vowles, 'Dealignment and Demobilisation?: Nonvoting in New Zealand 1938-1990' (1994) 29 Australian Journal of Political Science 96, 109.
[19] Shelagh Diplock (ed), None of the Above: Non-Voters and the 2001 Election: A Hansard Society Briefing (2001) The Hansard Society <http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/pdf/hansard2.pdf> at 1 December 2004.
[20] Hill, 'On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to "Vote"', above n 14.
[21] Political efficacy refers to a 'person's belief that political and social change can be effected or retarded and that [her/]his efforts, alone or in concert with others can produce desired behaviour on the part of political authorities' (Kenneth Prewitt, 'Political Efficacy' (1968) 12 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 225). Efficacy has two components: 'internal efficacy', which refers to a subject's sense of political competence, and 'external efficacy', which refers to the belief that the government is responsive to 'attempted influence'. (Steven Finkel, 'Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis' (1985) 29 American Journal of Political Science 891, 893). In his study of the 1989 election in São Paulo, José Alvaro Moisés found that exposure to the political campaign and the act of voting itself increased by 50 per cent the number of citizens with some degree of efficacy (José Alvaro Moisés, 'Elections, Political Parties and Political Culture in Brazil: Changes and Continuities' (1993) 25 Journal of Latin American Studies 575).
[22] Richard Hasen, 'Voting Without Law?' (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2135, 2167.
[23] Ibid 2167–8.
[24] Pub L No 103–31, §§ 2–12, 107 Stat 77.
[25] For a detailed account of the history and effects of the Motor Voter Act see Raymond Wolfinger and Jonathan Hoffman, 'Registering and Voting with Motor Voter' (2001) 34 PS: Political Science and Politics 85.
[26] According to a study conducted by Mark Franklin countries which conduct elections on a weekend or holiday have six per cent higher turnout than would otherwise be expected (Mark Franklin, 'Electoral Participation' in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds), Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective (1996) 216).
[27] Arend Lijphart, 'Compulsory Voting is the Best Way to Keep Democracy Strong' in Robert DiClerico and Allan Hammock (eds), Points of View (2001) 74.
[28] Bernard Grofman, 'Questions and Answers About Motor Voter: An Important Reform That Is Not Just for Democrats' in Voting and Democracy Report: 1995 (1995) The Center for Voting and Democracy <http://fairvote.org/reports/ 1995/chp6/grofman.html> at 20 May 2002.
[29] Lijphart, 'Compulsory Voting', above n 27, 74. Because many of these conditions hold in Malta, turnout there consistently hovers around the 90-5 per cent mark (Wolfgang Hirczy, 'Explaining Near-Universal Turnout: The Case of Malta' (1995) 27 European Journal of Political Research 255. Malta does not have compulsory voting yet it enjoys very high turnout rates, a fact partly attributable to the small size of the electorate and the relative intimacy of the political culture.
[30] Lijphart, 'Compulsory Voting', above n 27, 74.
[31] 'Properly' or 'systematically' administered denotes regimes where attendance is actively encouraged and facilitated, avoidance is systematically pursued and penalties are applied. For further discussion, see below.
[32] Simon Jackman, Non-Compulsory Voting in Australia?: What Surveys Can (and Can't) Tell Us (1997) The Society for Political Methodology <http://polmeth. wustl.edu/workingpapers.php?year=1997&how=alpha> at 14 July 2002.
[33] Galen Irwin, 'Compulsory Voting Legislation: Impact on Voter Turnout in the Netherlands' (1974) 7 Comparative Political Studies 292.
[34] See, eg, Jean Blondel, Richard Sinnot and Palle Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, Democracy, and Legitimacy (1998) 248.
[35] Johan Aekaert, and Lieven De Winter, 'Electoral Absenteeism and Potential Absenteeism in Belgium' (Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 29 August – 1 September 1996); Marc Hooghe and Koen Pelleriaux, 'Research Note: Compulsory Voting in Belgium: An Application of the Lijphart Thesis' (1998) 17 Electoral Studies 419.
[36] Irwin, above n 33; Smeenk, de Graaf and Ultee, above n 13.
[37] Malcolm Mackerras and Ian McAllister, 'Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia' (1999) 18 Electoral Studies 217; Jackman, above n 32.
[38] Tom Watson and Mark Tami, Second Term Thinking: Votes for All: Compulsory Participation in Elections (2000) 8.
[39] See further discussion below in text accompanying nn 60-4.
[40] Pippa Norris, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (2002) 82 .
[41] Timothy Power and J Timmons Roberts, 'Compulsory Voting, Invalid Ballots, and Abstention in Brazil' (1995) 48 Political Research Quarterly 795, 819.
[42] Most of these conditions are met by Australian electoral commissions. Here they 'are staffed with expert public servants' who '[a]s a rule … have traditionally been exceptionally apolitical'. Nevertheless, because executive governments have the power to appoint the heads of commissions 'bi-partisanship over appointments' can 'deteriorat[e], as occurred recently at the Federal level' (Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio and George Williams, 'Australian Electoral Law: A Stocktake' (2003) 2 Election Law Journal 400).
[43] In the last election, for example, police arrested 16 people among a crowd who had 'gathered along a road and waved flags in support of the opposition Singapore Democratic Alliance'. Those arrested were charged with rioting, which is punishable 'by caning and up to five years'' gaol. In the parliamentary election of 2001, 55 of the 84 parliamentary seats were uncontested. ('Riot' Mars Singapore's One-sided Poll (2001) CNN.com/World <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/11/03/singapore.vote.riot/index.html> at 3 November 2001).
[44] Only '675,000 of the 2.03 million registered voters' were required to vote in contested seats: ibid.
[45] Jeffrey A Blomberg, 'Protecting the Right Not to Vote from Voter Purge Statutes' (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 1017, n 18.
[46] Hoffman v Maryland, [1991] USCA4 554; 928 F 2d 646, 648-9 (4th Cir, 1991): Hasen, above n 22. Even in Australia, only a few have insisted on the 'right' not to vote. Some rare examples include: Senator Nick Minchin who has asserted that '[c]ompulsory voting is a fundamental breach of ... civil liberties' (Nick Minchin, 'Compulsory Voting: A Denial of Rights, A Detriment to Democracy' (1996) 77 The Parliamentarian 244, 248) and Professor Joan Rydon who claims that: 'Genuine democracy requires that citizens be free to vote or not vote' (Joan Rydon, 'Compulsory Voting and Compulsory Preferences' in Charles Copeman and Amy McGrath (eds), Corrupt Elections: Ballot Rigging in Australia (1997) 175, 177).
[47] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, CETS No 5, art 9 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
[48] 'X against Austria' (1972) 15 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 468, 472-4. Thanks to Lewis Baston for drawing my attention to this case.
[49] Norris, Democratic Phoenix, above n 40, 75, 82; Power and Roberts, above n 41, 819.
[50] Only about a quarter of Brazilians finish the fourth grade (Power and Roberts, above n 41, 800. In 1985, illiterates were enfranchised for the first time since 1881, expanding the potential electorate by 30 per cent. Though voting is optional for those who are illiterate most do vote: at 800).
[51] In fact, it is the world's largest electorate subject to compulsory voting: ibid 798. It is not uncommon to hear of voters who have paddled by canoe for two days in order to cast a ballot: at 819.
[52] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997: A Global Report on Political Participation (2nd ed, 1997).
[53] Zachary Elkins, 'Institutionalising Equality: The Compulsory Vote in Brazil' in Wolfgang Hirczy (ed), Mandatory Voting Project: An International Collaboration and Special Collection of Abstracts and Research Papers (1996) 23.
[54] Mackerras and McAllister, above n 37, 223.
[55] Comparable regimes include The Netherlands, which had an effective system before compulsion was abandoned in 1970, and Belgium where, traditionally, compulsion has been well tolerated, though less so in recent times. Polling indicates that 'two of every five Belgian electors would not vote if it were no longer required by law' (William Downs, 'Federalism Achieved: The Belgian Elections of May 1995' (1996) 19 West European Politics 168, 171). This lessening of tolerance is probably not directly related to the compulsion but is thought to be a consequence of a series of political scandals and therefore a more generalised disaffection with politics.
[56] Voting should not be restricted as in Egypt, for example, where voting is compulsory only for men: further, undischarged bankrupts are prohibited from voting. In Greece and Brazil voting is not compulsory for people over 70 while in Ecuador voting is voluntary for illiterates and over 65s.
[57] Further, opportunity costs are lowered in a compulsory setting because voting has more value. When a poor African-American shut in with a disability abstains from voting in US elections she is behaving both rationally and irrationally. Of course it would be rational in one sense for her to vote since doing so would likely protect her interests and those of others like her. At the same time, she can't be sure that everyone else in her predicament will have the same idea (in fact, she knows they probably won't). Since the voluntary system evokes irrationality (ie the mass abstention of those most in need of the protection voting can afford), it will be rational for her to stay at home and preserve her scarce resources, knowing as she does that others like her will most likely make the same calculation. Thus, within the rational choice tradition choosing not to vote is referred to as 'rational abstention'. But under a system of universal participation, it is (both long and short-term) rational for such a person to vote. Informational certainty about the voting or non-voting intentions of others with similar interests means that foregoing a day relaxing at home will be worthwhile (for a fuller discussion of this argument see Hill, 'On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to "Vote"', above n 14).
[58] Orr, Mercurio and Williams, above n 42, 390.
[59] Which means they are able to vote. Their details are later checked in order to determine 'why their name does not appear on the roll in the division for which the voter believes they should be included' (Yvonne Goudie, Characteristics of a Fair Electoral System (2000) Victorian Association of Social Studies Teachers <http://www.vasst.asn.au/vce/fairelect.html> at 18 October 2002).
[60] In Singapore, where voting is compulsory, older and disabled citizens are given special assistance at polling places (for example, being allowed to jump the queue and receiving assistance from polling staff) but no special provisions such as postal voting or mobile polling are available to them. Neither are those living abroad entitled to postal votes.
[61] Scott Bennett and Kate Bunker Proof of Identity of Electors at Enrolment (2003) Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn07.pdf> at 11 August 2003.
[62] Ibid 48.
[63] Many thanks to Marian Sawer and Jonathon Louth for clarification on this point.
[64] Even stricter measures that are sometimes proposed, such as mandating enrolment in person, photographic identification, or the provision of '100 points' of identification through, for example, bank, lease, Medicare documents etc, will disproportionately disenfranchise some groups over others. These could include the young and elderly, especially if they do not drive, are not economically active and so on. Strict measures are also likely to impact more heavily on the already marginalised, for example, the homeless.
(Graeme Orr, Australian Electoral Systems: How Well Do They Serve Political Equality? (2004) 16).
[65] According to Meg Mundell:
taking into account that 88, 000 homeless Australians are of voting age, the Public Interest Law Clearing House has used the above figures to estimate the number of homeless people who may have been eligible to vote in the last federal election, but did not do so, as ranging from 29, 000 to 80, 000.
(Meg Mundell, 'Giving Voice to the Voiceless: Improving Access to the Vote for People Experiencing Homelessness' (2003) 28 Alternative Law Journal 269, 269).
[66] See also Graeme Orr, 'Ballotless and Behind Bars: The Denial of the Franchise to Prisoners' [1998] FedLawRw 3; (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 55; Jennifer Fitzgerald and George Zdenkowski, 'Voting Rights of Convicted Persons' (1987) 11 Criminal Law Journal 11; Lisa Hill, 'Precarious Persons: Disenfranchising Australian Prisoners' (2000) 35 Australian Journal of Social Issues 203.
[67] Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton, Citizenship: Critical Concepts (1994) i.
[68] This exclusion is aggravated by its particularism because it does not extend to British subjects 'who have remained on the roll since 1984' (Orr, Australian Electoral Systems, above n 64, 7–8).
[69] For example, in Egypt where there is no penalty, turnout hovers at around 28 per cent. Likewise the sanction of a fine is not enforced in Liechtenstein where turnout is approximately 54 per cent (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, above n 52).
[70] Lijphart, 'Compulsory Voting', above n 27, 74; Wolfgang Hirczy, 'The Impact of Mandatory Voting Laws on Turnout: A Quasi-Experimental Approach' (1994) 13 Electoral Studies 64.
[71] In Greece, prison sentences can vary from one month to one year. It should be noted here that there have been Australian cases where failure to vote has culminated in a prison sentence. In 1999, a Victorian woman, Melissa Manson, was sentenced to one day in prison for failing to cast votes in the 1993 and 1996 federal elections and then subsequently failing to pay the imposed fines. Her rationale for refusing to vote was that 'there were no candidates worth voting for' and she indicated that she was unwilling to 'pay the fines on principle' (Frank Cassidy, 'Mother-of-Four Faces Time In Jail', The Canberra Times, (Canberra), 15 May 1999, 4).
[72] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, above n 52.
[73] Personal correspondence with Gay Young, information officer at the Australian Electoral Office, 17 May 2002.
[74] 'Valid and sufficient' reasons may include:
Physical obstruction, whether of sickness or outside prevention, or of natural events, or accident of any kind … One might also imagine cases where an intending voter on his way to the poll was diverted to save life, or to prevent crime, or to assist at some great disaster, such as a fire: in all of which cases, in my opinion, the law would recognise the competitive claims of public duty.
(Australian Electoral Commission, Compulsory Voting, Electoral Backgrounder No 17 (2004), 4 <http://www.aec.gov.au/_content/how/backgrounders/17/EB_17_Compulsory_ Voting.pdf> at 17 November 2004). Initially, the Electoral Commission sends the absentee a 'please explain' letter with the option of paying a $20 fine to settle the matter. If a satisfactory reason for abstention is provided, the matter is dropped, but if there is a dispute about the reasonableness of the explanation the non-voter may be taken to court and a slightly heavier fine imposed ($50) in addition to legal costs.
[75] Mackerras and McAllister, above n 37, 224.
[76] Lijphart, 'Compulsory Voting', above n 27, 75; Hasen, above n 22, 2170.
[77] Hasen, above n 22, 2168.
[78] Thomas H Reed, 'Compulsory Voting in Belgium' (1925) 14 National Municipal Review 355–6.
[79] At the Commonwealth level penalties for both non-enrolment and failure to vote range from $20 to $50 and at the state level from $25 to $100.
[80] Hill, 'On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to "Vote"', above n 14.
[81] 'Only 577 of a potential 400 000 non-voters were even brought to court in 1966' (Irwin, above n 33, 292–3).
[82] In the most recent provincial and European parliamentary elections, turnout was 50 per cent and 36 per cent respectively (Lijphart, 'Compulsory Voting', above n 27, 76).
[83] Irwin, above n 33, 292–3.
[84] Hasen, above n 22, 2170; Hill, 'On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to "Vote"', above n 14.
[85] Hirczy, 'The Impact of Mandatory Voting Laws on Turnout', above n 70, 64–5.
[86] One indication that many voters would not bother to go to this much trouble is that most voters prefer to keep their voting style as perfunctory and simple as possible. When given a choice between voting above or below the line, the overwhelming majority of Australians, for example, (usually between 85 per cent and 95 per cent) choose to vote above the line.
[87] As Rydon notes with respect to Australian arrangements: '[o]fficials constantly reiterate that "voting is compulsory" but "voting" is not defined. They reluctantly concede that it is not illegal to vote informally or return blank ballot papers, but they do their best to discourage such practices' (Joan Rydon, 'Should Voting be Compulsory? Against' in R Giles (ed), For and Against: An Anthology of Public Issues in Australia (1989) 97.
[88] Thanks to Arend Lijphart for drawing my attention to this practice.
[89] See n 2 in Anne Twomey, '"Expansion or Contraction": A Comment' [1998] AdelLawRw 12; (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 147, 147. Ballot papers for the South Australian Lower House remind voters of this option.
[90] If the law were clarified … to the effect that it is compulsory to formally mark the paper, then in order for this to be properly enforced the secret ballot would have to be overturned. If the law were clarified to the effect that marking the ballot in any way were compulsory, then electoral officials would need to observe the activities of voters in booths and then apprehend and compel to mark the paper anyone who failed to comply.
(Hill, 'Compulsory Voting', above n 9, 449). Obviously, such a practice would be highly objectionable and would undoubtedly undermine the legitimacy of compulsory voting. For a more technical and complete discussion of this option see: at 449.
[91] Under an 'optional preferential' voting system, an elector shows by numbers his/her preference for individual candidates, but does not need to show a preference for all candidates listed for the vote to be formal.
[92] New South Wales uses optional preferential for its lower house and optional preferential proportional representation for its upper house. Queensland uses optional preferential for its only house, the Legislative Assembly. In the New South Wales Upper House 15 numbers are needed if you vote below the line. In the Australian Capital Territory, at least as many squares as there are candidates to be elected in a district must be numbered (Electoral Council of Australia, 'Proportional Representation Voting Systems of Australia's Parliaments', Melbourne, July 2001 and 'Preferential Voting Systems in Single Member Electorates of Australia's Parliaments' August 2000).
[93] Twomey, '"Expansion or Contraction"', above n 89, 148. For a fuller discussion of this point, including a detailed analysis of the Albert Langer case, see: Anne Twomey, 'Free to Choose or Compelled to Lie?', above n 9, 201; Chris Field, 'Tweedledum and Tweedledee 1, 2, 3, 3: The Albert Langer Story', Parliamentary Research Service, Commonwealth Parliament, Current Issues Brief No 14, (1995-1996) 14.
[94] Robert Hedley, Labour MPs Press For Compulsory Voting (2001) LGCnet <http://melbourne. butterworths.co.uk/dataitem.asp?ID=9373 & tid=7> at 28 November 2001.
[95] As also previously argued by Orr, Australian Electoral Systems, above n 64, 14; Hill, 'On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to "Vote"', above n 14.
[96] RFE/RL Newsline, None of the Above Finishes Sixth… (2000) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/20000/04/060400.asp> at 6 April 2000.
[97] The Electoral Commission of 2001, above n 4.