Taylor v Commissioner of Police NSW [2024] NSWCA 285 (29 November 2024)

Last Updated: 29 November 2024

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

Mr Taylor was convicted of using a carriage service to transmit communications which contained indecent material to a recipient whom he believed to be under 16 years of age, a federal offence under s 474.27A(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). Pursuant to s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Jeffreys DCJ, without passing sentence, ordered that he be released upon giving security on condition that he be of good behaviour for two years. Subsequently, the second respondent, the District Court of New South Wales, issued a notice under s 4 of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (CPOR Act) and the first respondent, the NSW Commissioner of Police, entered Mr Taylor’s details on the Child Protection Register.

Mr Taylor sought a judicial review of the decisions of the first and second respondent. The validity of those decisions depended on Mr Taylor being a “registrable person”. Section 3A(1) of the CPOR Act defines a “registrable person” as “a person whom a court has ... sentenced in respect of a registrable offence”, subject to the exceptions in subs (2). An offence under s 474.27A of the Criminal Code is a “registrable offence”. As such, the critical question was whether Mr Taylor had been “sentenced” in respect of that offence.

Section 3 of the CPOR Act, a definitional provision, relevantly provides that a “sentence” includes any action taken under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 1999 (NSW) (CSP Act) (par (c)) and any sentence or equivalent order or undertaking imposed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction (par (e)). A “foreign jurisdiction” includes the Commonwealth.

The primary judge (Wright J) considered that an order made under s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 fell within the scope of par (e) of the above definition and was not excluded under s 3A(2), meaning Mr Taylor was a “registrable person” for the purposes of the CPOR Act. Accordingly, his Honour dismissed Mr Taylor’s application for judicial review. He now seeks leave to appeal from that judgment.

The Court (Griffiths AJA, Ward P and Adamson JA agreeing) granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, holding:

(1) Leave to appeal should be granted because the matter raises an important question as to the proper construction of s 3A(1) of the CPOR Act, with implications for the Commissioner’s ability to register persons on the Child Protection Register who have been convicted of federal offences and dealt with under s 20(1) of the Crimes Act 1914: at [7].

Kassam v Hazzard (2021) 106 NSWLR 520; [2021] NSWCA 299, referred to.

(2) For the purposes of par (e) of the statutory definition of “sentence” in s 3 of the CPOR Act, the relevant equivalence is not between a “sentence” and an “order” or “undertaking”. Rather, the federal “order” or “undertaking” must be equivalent, as a matter of substance, to an order or undertaking capable of being imposed under NSW legislation which would fall within the extended statutory definition of “sentence”, four examples of which are provided in pars (a)-(d), bearing in mind that these are only examples and that the definition is not exhaustive: at [17]-[20].

Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; [2004] HCA 12, referred to.

(3) The fact that an offender who is convicted without any further penalty under s 10A of the CSP Act is a “registrable person” under s 3A of the CPOR Act by reason of par (c) of the definition of “sentence” requires that an offender who is convicted and placed on a conditional release order under s 9(1)(a) of the CSP Act (which is more serious than a s 10A order) also be a “registrable person”. Any other outcome would be incongruous, including with the protective objects of the CPOR Act. Because an order made under s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 is substantively similar to an order made under s 9(1)(a) of the CSP Act, a federal offender dealt with under s 20(1)(a) is a “registrable person” under the CPOR Act: at [22]-[27].

JUDGMENT

1. WARD P: I agree with Griffiths AJA.
2. ADAMSON JA: I agree with Griffiths AJA.
3. GRIFFITHS AJA: Mr Taylor seeks leave to appeal from the orders of Wright J, who, on 12 July 2024, dismissed his application for judicial review of separate decisions of the second respondent, the District Court of New South Wales (which filed a submitting appearance), and the first respondent, the NSW Commissioner of Police (Taylor v Commissioner of Police of NSW [2024] NSWSC 839 (PJ)).
4. The facts can be shortly stated. On 11 October 2023, Mr Taylor was convicted by Jeffreys DCJ of using a carriage service to transmit communications which contained indecent material to a recipient whom he believed to be under 16 years of age, a federal offence under s 474.27A(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). Pursuant to s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Jeffreys DCJ, without passing sentence, ordered that Mr Taylor be released upon giving security of $500 on condition that he be of good behaviour for two years. Later that day, a Registrar of the District Court issued and served on Mr Taylor a notice under s 4 of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (CPOR Act). Such a notice is required to be given as soon as practicable after a “registrable person is sentenced” (s 4(1)). Within the next seven days, a delegate of the Commissioner entered Mr Taylor’s details on the Child Protection Register. Under s 19(1) of the CPOR Act, the Commissioner is required to maintain the Child Protection Register, and subs (2) provides that it “is to” contain various information in respect of each “registrable person”.
5. Mr Taylor’s argument below, effectively reagitated on appeal, is that the decisions of the District Court to issue a notice to him and of the Commissioner to include him on the Child Protection Register were in error because he was not a “registrable person”. That term is defined by s 3A of the CPOR Act as follows (emphasis added):

3A Registrable persons

(1) A registrable person is a person whom a court has at any time (whether before, on or after the commencement of this section) sentenced in respect of a registrable offence, and includes a corresponding registrable person.

(2) Unless a person is a corresponding registrable person, a person is not a registrable person merely because the person—

(a) is a person in respect of whom a court has made an order under section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 or section 33(1)(a) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (or an equivalent order under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction) in respect of a Class 1 or Class 2 offence, or

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6. It is not controversial that Mr Taylor has been convicted of a “registrable offence”, an offence under s 474.27A being a “Class 2 offence” (see CPOR Act, s 3). The sole issue is whether the orders made by Jeffreys DCJ under s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 mean that Mr Taylor has, for the purpose of s 3A(1), been “sentenced” in respect of that registrable offence. That is a matter of statutory construction.
7. Mr Taylor requires leave to appeal to this Court (Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 101(2)(r)). The application for leave was filed late but consent orders were made by the Registrar on 24 October 2024 granting an extension of time. Although contested by the Commissioner, it is appropriate that leave to appeal be granted: the matter raises an important question as to the proper construction of s 3A(1) of the CPOR Act, with implications for the Commissioner’s ability to register persons on the Child Protection Register who have been convicted of federal offences and dealt with under s 20(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (see, eg, Kassam v Hazzard (2021) 106 NSWLR 520; [2021] NSWCA 299 at [34] (Bell P) and [141] (Leeming JA)).
8. I turn now to address the statutory scheme and the primary judge’s approach to the construction of s 3A of the CPOR Act.
9. Part 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 provides for the “sentencing, imprisonment and release of federal offenders”, which description includes the appellant. Subdivision 5D, headed “Discharge without conviction, conditional release and sentencing alternatives”, empowers a court to make various orders in respect of a federal offender instead of imposing a term of imprisonment. Most relevant are the orders which can be made under ss 19B and 20. The former provides for the discharge of a federal offender without proceeding to conviction, with or without the imposition of conditions such as that the offender be of good behaviour for a certain period. In contrast, s 20 provides for the conditional release of offenders who have been convicted (as was the appellant). Relevantly, it provides:

20 Conditional release of offenders after conviction

(1) Where a person is convicted of a federal offence or federal offences, the court before which he or she is convicted may, if it thinks fit:

(a) by order, release the person, without passing sentence on him or her, upon his or her giving security, with or without sureties, by recognizance or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the court, that he or she will comply with the following conditions:

(i) that he or she will be of good behaviour for such period, not exceeding 5 years, as the court specifies in the order;

...

(iv) that he or she will, during a period, not exceeding 2 years, that is specified in the order, comply with such other conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit to specify in the order; or

(b) sentence the person to imprisonment in respect of the offence or each offence but direct, by order, that the person be released, upon giving security of the kind referred to in paragraph (a)...

...

10. As noted above, the appellant was convicted of an offence under s 474.27A(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) and Jeffreys DCJ made orders under s 20(1)(a) for his conditional release. In seeking to argue that, for the purposes of s 3A(1) of the CPOR Act, he was not “sentenced” for any offence, the appellant emphasises that an order under s 20(1)(a) is made “without passing sentence”, with the imposition of a “sentence” separately provided for in s 20(1)(b).
11. “Sentence” is non-exhaustively defined in s 3 of the CPOR Act as follows:

sentence includes the following—

(a) any order under section 65(2) of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 that causes a person to be kept in custody or an order of detention under section 33(1) or 61(2) of that Act,

(b) any order under section 33 (1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987,

(c) any action taken under section 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999,

(d) any undertaking under section 23 of the Pre-Trial Diversion of Offenders Act 1985,

(e) any sentence or equivalent order or undertaking imposed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction.

12. Each of pars (a)-(d) of that definition relates to New South Wales legislation and is therefore only relevant by analogy. On the other hand, par (e) is capable of direct application, noting that the Commonwealth falls within the meaning of a “foreign jurisdiction” for the purposes of the CPOR Act (see s 3).
13. The primary judge observed at PJ[31] that par (e) brings three outcomes of federal criminal proceedings within the statutory definition of “sentence”, being any “sentence”, “equivalent order” or “equivalent ... undertaking” imposed under a Commonwealth law. Because the use of “sentence” in par (e) must be narrower than the statutory definition of “sentence”, lest the reference to an equivalent “order” or “undertaking” be mere surplusage, his Honour considered that “sentence” as used in par (e) refers to “the ordinary meaning of that word in the context of the criminal law”: namely, “an order that definitively disposes of the consequences of conviction or a definitive decision on the punishment or absence of it which is to be the consequence of conviction” (PJ[32]-[33], citing R v Warfield (1994) 34 NSWLR 200 at 205-206, in turn citing Barwick CJ in Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 at 304 and 307; [1977] HCA 44). His Honour then noted that the orders made by Jeffreys DCJ under s 20(1)(a) would not meet that common law definition because they may “lack the quality of definitiveness” (PJ[36]).
14. Instead, the primary judge held that an order under s 20(1)(a) falls within the scope of the words “equivalent order” in par (e). His Honour reasoned at PJ[38] as follows (emphasis added):

The words “equivalent order” in par (e), on their natural meaning, appear to refer to an order, which is not a “sentence”, but which serves an equivalent purpose or function to a sentence in dealing with the consequences of a conviction. This would include the types of orders, as opposed to sentences, referred to in s 16A(1) and elsewhere in the Crimes Act 1914. Furthermore, by way of context and as noted above, pars (a) to (d) of the definition of “sentence” provide illustrations of orders and undertakings under New South Wales law that may not be “sentences” in the ordinary meaning of that word but are equivalent in the sense of being other options available to a court when a person had been found to have committed an offence. In addition, the use of the words “equivalent order” in s 3A(2)(a), which is considered in more detail below, also indicates that that expression was intended to refer an order which is available to a court as an alternative to imposing a “sentence”. Finally, there is nothing in the scope or purpose of the CPOR Act which would suggest that “equivalent order” in par (e) should have a different meaning from the natural meaning referred to above.

15. Finally, it was necessary for the primary judge to consider whether the appellant fell within the exception in s 3A(2)(a). That depended on whether an order under s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 was “an equivalent order” to one made under s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (CSP Act). His Honour considered it did not: s 10 of the CSP Act provided for the making of orders “without proceeding to conviction” and therefore was more analogous to s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (see above at [9]). Section 20(1)(a) operates in a similar fashion to s 9(1)(a) of the CSP Act, which permits a court to make conditional release orders after convicting an offender. His Honour considered it significant that, under par (c) of the statutory definition of “sentence”, an order under s 10A of the CSP Act (which empowers a court to dispose of proceedings without further penalty where a person is convicted) would be captured by s 3A(1), observing at PJ[50]:

It would be incongruous if a person who was convicted of a registrable offence but no other penalty was imposed under s 10A would be taken to be a “registrable person” by virtue of par (c) of the definition of “sentence” but a person who was convicted and subjected to a conditional release order under s 20(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 or s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act would not be a registrable person.

16. The appellant takes issue with the primary judge’s conclusion at PJ[38]ff that an order under s 20(1)(a) is a “sentence” because it is an order equivalent to a “sentence” within the meaning of par (e) of the statutory definition. He contends that an order made under s 20(1)(a) is conditional – here, it was conditional upon his good behaviour – and therefore lacks the necessary quality of finality to be considered equivalent to a sentence.
17. The premise of that argument is flawed. The relevant equivalence contemplated by par (e) is not between a “sentence”, on the one hand, and an “order” or “undertaking” on the other. What the “order” or “undertaking” must be “equivalent” to is an order or undertaking capable of being imposed under NSW legislation which would fall within the extended statutory definition of “sentence”, four examples of which are provided in pars (a)-(d). It should be emphasised that these are only examples and that the definition in s 3 is not exhaustive.
18. The definitions of “Class 1 offence” and “Class 2 offence” in s 3 of the CPOR Act include offences under both state legislation such as the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and federal legislation such as the Criminal Code (Cth). Any Class 1 or Class 2 offence will be a “registrable offence”, regardless of whether it is a state or federal offence. It would therefore be expected that whether a particular type of order or undertaking constitutes a “sentence” for the purposes of determining whether an offender is a “registrable person” would not vary depending on the jurisdiction of the offence; rather it would turn on the true nature or character, as a matter of substance, of the order or undertaking. The plain legislative intention in including par (e) in the extended statutory definition of “sentence” is to ensure uniformity between the types of orders or undertakings which will, for the purposes of s 3A(1) of the CPOR Act, be deemed a “sentence”.
19. The central question is whether an order under s 20(1)(a) is “equivalent” to an order or undertaking identified in pars (a)-(d) of the statutory definition of “sentence”, noting again that the definition is non-exhaustive and may therefore extend to types of orders or undertakings not specifically identified but sufficiently similar to the examples identified.
20. As the Commissioner pointed out, the appellant’s approach involved an invitation for the Court to construe s 3 of CPOR Act, a definitional provision, as though it were a substantive provision. This is contrary to the well-known observations of McHugh J in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; [2004] HCA 12 at [84] and [103] which, for convenience, are now relevantly extracted (footnotes omitted):

[84] However, a legislative definition is not or, at all events, should not be framed as a substantive enactment. In Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Taylor JJ stated:

“The function of a definition clause in a statute is merely to indicate that when particular words or expressions the subject of definition, are found in the substantive part of the statute under consideration, they are to be understood in the defined sense — or are to be taken to include certain things which, but for the definition, they would not include ... [Definition] clauses are ... no more than an aid to the construction of the statute and do not operate in any other way.” (Emphasis added.)

...

...

[103] As I earlier pointed out, the function of a definition is not to enact substantive law. It is to provide aid in construing the statute. Nothing is more likely to defeat the intention of the legislature than to give a definition a narrow, literal meaning and then use that meaning to negate the evident policy or purpose of a substantive enactment. There is, of course, always a question whether the definition is expressly or impliedly excluded. But once it is clear that the definition applies, the better — I think the only proper — course is to read the words of the definition into the substantive enactment and then construe the substantive enactment — in its extended or confined sense — in its context and bearing in mind its purpose and the mischief that it was designed to overcome. To construe the definition before its text has been inserted into the fabric of the substantive enactment invites error as to the meaning of the substantive enactment. ...

21. The appellant’s alternative contention is that none of pars (a)-(d) can be considered equivalent to an order under s 20(1)(a). Moreover, in his written submissions, the appellant describes a s 20(1)(a) order as being “at the lower end of the hierarchy of options for dealing with the conviction of a sex offence”. He contends that the CPOR Act does not “automatically require all offenders charged or found guilty of a registrable offence to be entered onto the register”, citing the exception in s 3A(2)(a) where an offender is dealt with under s 10 of the CSP Act.
22. These submissions fail to engage with the primary judge’s analysis, particularly at PJ[42]-[53], as to the analogies between the alternative sentencing regime under ss 9, 10 and 10A of the CSP Act and ss 19B and 20 of the Crimes Act 1914. The effect of that analysis can be shortly stated. Under s 10A of the CSP Act, a court can convict a person without ordering any further penalty. A person dealt with in this manner, having been convicted of a “registrable offence”, will be a “registrable person” because of par (c) of the statutory definition of “sentence”. Naturally, it would follow that where a person is convicted and subject to a conditional release order under s 9(1)(a) of the CSP Act, that person would also be a “registrable person” under the CPOR Act, despite a s 9(1)(a) order not being explicitly referred to in the statutory definition of “sentence”.
23. On the other hand, due to the exception in s 3A(2)(a), where a person is subject to a conditional release order but the court does not proceed to conviction, they will not be a “registrable person” under the CPOR Act.
24. The following ‘hierarchy’ of outcomes is thus established in respect of a person found guilty of a registrable offence:

(1) The court does not proceed to conviction, with or without conditions on their release being imposed (CSP Act, s 10). The offender is not a “registrable person” due to s 3A(2)(a) of the CPOR Act.

(2) The court proceeds to conviction but disposes of the proceedings without imposing any other penalty (CSP Act, s 10A). This falls within the definition of “sentence” and, accordingly, the offender is a “registrable person” under s 3A(1) of the CPOR Act.

(3) The court proceeds to conviction and imposes conditions on the offender’s release (CSP Act, s 9(1)(a)). Although this outcome is not explicitly provided for in the definition of “sentence”, it would be incongruent with the above if a person who is convicted but not subject to additional conditions is treated more harshly than a person who is convicted subject to conditions. As such, the offender will be a “registrable person” under s 3A(1) of the CPOR Act.

25. A similar regime is established by the Crimes Act 1914. In particular, s 19B provides for the discharge of offenders without proceeding to conviction, and with or without the imposition of conditions. Although unnecessary to decide here, an order made under this section would seem to be “equivalent” to an order made under s 10 of the CSP Act, meaning such an offender would not be a “registrable person” under the CPOR Act.
26. Conversely, s 20(1)(a) provides for the conditional release of convicted offenders and thus operates in a substantively similar manner to s 9(1)(a) of the CSP Act. It follows that such an order would amount to a “sentence” for the purposes of the CPOR Act because it is an “equivalent order or undertaking” to a conditional release order made under s 9(1)(a) of the CSP Act, which order for the reasons explained at [24] above falls within the extended definition of “sentence”.
27. Finally, there is another reason why the appellant’s construction should not be accepted. As the Commissioner correctly pointed out, its acceptance would defeat the protective objects of the CPOR Act because offenders convicted with no penalty under s 10A of the CSP Act would be registrable persons within the meaning of s 3A, but offenders who have been convicted and placed on a conditional release order under s 9(1)(a) of CSP Act (which is more serious than a s 10A order) would not. I respectfully agree with Wright J’s observation at PJ[50] that this outcome would be “incongruous”.
28. For these reasons I propose the following orders:

(1) Grant leave to appeal.

(2) Dismiss the appeal.

(3) The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

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