(1)  Subject to the provisions of this section on the death of any person after the commencement of this section all causes of action–

(a) subsisting against him shall survive against his estate; and

(b) vested in him shall survive for the benefit of his estate.

(2)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  

(3)  Where a cause of action survives under this section for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of that estate –

(a) shall not include exemplary damages;

(b) in the case of a breach of promise to marry, shall be limited to such damage (if any) to that estate as flows from the breach of promise to marry; and

(c) where the death of that person has been caused by the act or omission which gives rise to the cause of action –

(i) shall be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to that estate consequent on his death, except that a sum in respect of funeral expenses may be included;

(ii) shall not include damages for pain or suffering, for any bodily or mental harm suffered by him or for the curtailment of his expectation of life; and

(iii) shall be calculated without reference to the future probable earnings of the deceased if he had survived the consequences of the act or omission and without any allowance being made for the loss of his earning capacity that relates to a period after his death.

(3A)  Notwithstanding subsection (3)(c) , damages for pain and suffering, for any bodily or mental harm or for curtailment of expectation of life, may be recovered if –

(a) the cause of action related to a dust-related condition; and

(b) the deceased person commenced a proceeding in relation to the cause of action before the deceased person died; and

(c) the deceased person died as a result of the dust-related condition or the dust-related condition was a contributing factor to the deceased person's death.

(3B)  For the purposes of subsection (3A)  –

dust-related condition means –

(a) any of the following diseases:

(i) aluminosis;

(ii) asbestosis;

(iii) asbestos-induced carcinoma;

(iv) asbestos-related pleural diseases;

(v) bagassosis;

(vi) berylliosis;

(vii) byssinosis;

(viii) coal dust pneumoconiosis;

(ix) farmers' lung;

(x) hard metal pneumoconiosis;

(xi) mesothelioma;

(xii) silicosis;

(xiii) silico-tuberculosis;

(xiv) talcosis; or

(b) any other pathological condition of the lung, pleura or peritoneum that is attributable to dust.

(3C)  Subsection (3A) applies in relation to a proceeding, in respect of an action that survives for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, whether the proceeding commenced before or after the commencement of that subsection unless –

(a) judgment has been given in relation to the proceeding; or

(b) the proceeding has been settled or withdrawn.

(4)  Where damage has been suffered by reason of any act or omission in respect of which a cause of action would have subsisted against any person if that person had not died before, or at the same time as, the damage was suffered, the cause of action which would have subsisted against him if he had died after the damage was suffered, shall be deemed to have subsisted against him before he died.

(5)  No proceedings shall be maintainable in respect of a cause of action in tort which by virtue of this section has survived against the estate of a deceased person unless –

(a) proceedings against him in respect of that cause of action were pending at the date of his death; or

(b) the cause of action arose not earlier than 12 months before the date of his death and proceedings are taken not later than 6 months, or such extended time as a judge may allow, after the date of the grant of probate of his will, or letters of administration, to his personal representative.

(6)  A judge, on application, may extend the period of 6 months prescribed by paragraph (b) of subsection (5) for such further period as the justice of the case may require, and such application may be made although the said period of 6 months has expired.

(7)  A personal representative may distrain for arrears of a rent-charge due or accruing to the deceased in his lifetime on the land affected or charged therewith, so long as the land remains in the possession of the person liable to pay the rent-charge or of the persons deriving title under him, and in like manner as the deceased might have done had he been living.

(8)  A personal representative may distrain upon land for arrears of rent due or accruing to the deceased in like manner as the deceased might have done had he been living, and such arrears may be distrained for after the termination of the lease or tenancy as if the term or interest had not determined, if the distress is made –

(a) within 6 months after the termination of the lease or tenancy; and

(b) during the continuance of the possession of the lessee or tenant from whom the arrears were due –

and the statutory enactments relating to distress for rent shall apply to any distress made pursuant to this subsection.

(9)  The rights conferred by this Act for the benefit of the estates of deceased persons shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the dependants of deceased persons by the Fatal Accidents Act 1934 , and so much of this Act as relates to causes of action against the estates of deceased persons shall apply in relation to causes of action under the said Act as it applies in relation to other causes of action not expressly excepted from the operation of subsection (1) .