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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PROTECTION ORDERS BILL 2008
2008
LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY FOR THE
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL
TERRITORY
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
PROTECTION ORDERS BILL 2008
EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT
Presented
by
Simon Corbell
MLA
Attorney General
Domestic Violence and
Protection Orders Bill 2008
Outline
The Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Bill
2008 introduces a range of amendments to address matters that have evolved in
recent years as a consequence of the Supreme Court decision of SI bhnf CC v
KS bhnf IS [2005] ACTSC 125 (I v S) regarding the lawfulness of
section 51A of the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001. In
addition the Bill restructures the Act, including some substantive content
changes. The Bill reflects consultation process undertaken by the Department of
Justice and Community Safety. It is the Government’s view that these
changes will substantially improve the use and understanding of the Act by the
ACT community.
A major focus of these
amendments is to address the incompatibility issues with the Human Rights Act
2004 (HRA) raised in the Supreme Court decision of I v S. The
amendments clarify the circumstances in which an interim order can become a
final order. The Bill also provides for a review mechanism at Magistrates Court
level, for an order that has become final as a consequence of the interim order
process. A detailed explanation regarding interim orders becoming final is
contained in the detail section of this Explanatory Statement at clause
36.
Legal practitioners and the community
sector identified a range of practical difficulties in using the Domestic
Violence and Protection Orders Act, since the introduction of amendments to it
in 2005. The 2005 consolidation of the provisions in the Magistrates Court
Act 1930 relating to restraining orders and the Domestic Violence Act
provisions dealing with protection orders resulted in an awkward mixture of the
procedural and substantive elements within the Act. The amendments in this Bill
incorporate a substantial restructure of the 2001 Act to improve its ease of use
and understanding.
The Bill responds to
community concerns regarding the need to ensure all types of domestic
relationships are contemplated by the Act. This Bill extends the category of
relationship within the Act and now includes intimate heterosexual and
homosexual relationships in circumstances where the parties do not reside
together. It has long been recognised that intimate relationships such as
boyfriend/girlfriend and same sex relationships of this type, share similar
dynamics to those relationships already contemplated by the
Act.
The Bill also clarifies that children
under the age of criminal responsibility are not intended to be respondents to a
protection order.
The Bill will enable interim
orders to be amended and provides for short-term amendments to final orders in
certain circumstances. These amendments will ensure that the Court has the
capacity to be flexible, in being able to make temporary changes to accommodate
for circumstances not contemplated by the parties at the time of making the
order.
The Bill extends protection to children
in a number of ways. Firstly, it authorises the Department of Disability,
Housing and Community Services to access information from the Courts regarding
the existence and content of an order when child protection officers are
investigating a child protection
matter.
Secondly, the Bill strengthens
provisions relating to the safety of children, by including an expanded
definition of domestic violence to incorporate the psychological abuse of a
child or young person. The Bill also prevents children under the age of 10
years from being named as respondents on an
order.
The Bill responds to stakeholders’
concerns about the reach of the provisions to workers who provide letters of
support to clients under the provision dealing with the restriction of the
publication of reports about proceedings. The Bill clarifies that a person is
not restricted from writing a letter of support for a client to assist in
organising their personal affairs, in circumstances where the client has
consented to this process.
The Bill provides
additional procedural powers to Court Registrars to assist in the identification
of relevant issues during the conferencing stage of an order. The purpose of
these provisions is to facilitate a matter that has not been resolved at the
conference stage of proceedings and is subsequently set down for a
hearing.
These additional powers are intended
to improve decision-making by identifying what the parties would agree to and
narrow the issues that are in contention.
The
Bill adds the offence of trespass to the schedule of offences that are defined
as domestic violence offences in the context of a domestic
relationship.
This Explanatory Statement
contains references that link the Bill’s clauses to previous sections of
the Act. For example, clauses 6 and 7 remake existing sections 5 and 6 so the
explanatory statement notes that clause 6 was “(previously s
5)”.
Domestic Violence and
Protection Orders Bill 2008
Detail
Part 1 —
Preliminary
Clause 1 — Name of
Act
This is a technical clause that names the
short title of the Act. The name of the Act would be the Domestic Violence
and Protection Orders Act 2008.
Clause 2 —
Commencement
This clause enables the Act to
commence by 30 March 2009. The Minister may commence the foreshadowed Act at an
earlier time by notice.
Clause 3 —
Dictionary
This is a technical clause
identifying the dictionary and includes two notes explaining conventions used to
define words and terms.
Clause 4 —
Notes
This is a technical clause explaining the
status of notes to the Act.
Clause 5 — Offences against Act —
application of Criminal Code etc
This clause
makes it clear that the Criminal Code 2002 applies to the Act. This Act
should also be read in conjunction with the Legislation Act 2001, which
provides for interpretation, common definitions, and legislative machinery for
the ACT.
Part 2 — Main principles and
concepts
This part sets out the objects and
principles of the Act and how the Act is to be used.
Clause 6 — Objects of
Act
Clause 6 comprises two provisions. The
first provision states the object of the Act in relation to domestic violence,
and the second provision states the object of the Act relating to other forms of
personal violence not considered to be domestic violence.
The object of the Act is to facilitate the
safety and protection of people who fear or experience violence through
providing a legally enforceable mechanism (namely a protection order) to prevent
violent conduct, and to allow for the resolution of conflict without the need to
resort to adjudication.
Clause 7 — Principles for making protection
orders
Clause 7 (previously s 6) retains that
the paramount consideration of the Act is to provide a legally enforceable
mechanism to protect aggrieved persons and any children at risk of exposure to
domestic violence or other forms of violence from domestic or personal violence.
It maintains that a protection order made under
this Act must place the least restriction on the personal rights and liberties
of the respondent as is possible provided that the order must still achieve the
objects of the Act and give effect to the principles set out in clause
7(1).
Clause 8 — Principle about
procedures
Clause 8 (previously s 7) provides
that procedures under the Act are to be simple, quick and inexpensive as
possible while remaining consistent with achieving justice.
Clause 9 — What may someone do under this
Act?
Clause 9 (previously s 8) provides that a
person may apply under this Act for an order to protect an aggrieved person from
domestic or personal violence. Two types of orders are available, domestic
violence orders (s 10) and personal protection orders (s 11).
Clause 10 — What conduct do domestic violence
orders restrain?
Clause 10 (previously ss 8 and
20) provides that there are three types of domestic violence orders available
under the Act (final, interim or emergency). It describes the type of conduct a
domestic order restrains and states that an order may include a prohibition
mentioned in clause 48.
Clause 11 — What conduct do personal protection
orders restrain?
Clause 11 (previously ss 8 and
20) provides that three types of personal protection orders are available under
the Act (final, interim and workplace). It explains the type of conduct a
personal protection order restrains and states that an order may contain a
prohibition mentioned in clause 48.
Clause 12 — Do protection orders cover conduct
outside ACT?
Clause 12 (previously s 21)
confirms that a protection order has extraterritorial effect and will include
conduct that occurs both within and outside the ACT. An example demonstrating
the reach of this provision is if a respondent breaches the order in NSW
(outside the ACT jurisdiction) the breach would still constitute an offence
under this Act.
Clause 13 — What is domestic violence
etc?
Clause 13 (previously s 9) defines when a
person’s conduct is domestic violence for the purposes of this Act. The
only substantive change to this section is the inclusion of the offence of
trespass as a domestic violence offence. The inclusion of trespass as a
domestic violence offence in this Act, is in response to concern raised in the
community that its exclusion can potentially have implications for a
victim’s safety. Police identified circumstances where they have been
obliged to grant bail to a person who has been apprehended for trespass in a
domestic violence context. As trespass is currently not included as a domestic
violence offence, the offender is released back into the community within a
short period of time. The inclusion of trespass as a domestic violence offence
gives police an option to remand an offender in custody when the offender
trespasses in a domestic violence context. Its inclusion will enhance the
intention of the Act to raise a presumption against bail for domestic violence
offences on the basis of protecting victims from further offences.
Clause 14 — What is personal
violence?
Clause 14 (previously s 10)
defines when a person’s conduct is considered to be personal
violence.
Clause 15 — Who is a relevant person
etc?
Clause 15 (previously s 10A) defines
(not exhaustively), who is a relevant person for the purpose of this
Act.
This clause introduces a new category of
relevant person for the purpose of the Act by providing for personal
relationships such as boyfriend/girlfriend and same sex relationships of this
type, where people have shared an intimate relationship but have not resided
together.
This category of relationship is introduced through s
15(1)(c): someone who is in a domestic relationship with the original
person. A ‘domestic relationship’ is defined by reference to
the Domestic Relationships Act 1994, which provides for this type
of relationship by stipulating that a personal relationship may exist between
people although they are not members of the same household.
Clause 16 — Level of satisfaction is required
for this Act
Clause 16 (previously s 19)
provides that the level of satisfaction required by the Magistrates Court or
judicial officer in determining something under this Act is satisfied on the
balance of probability.
Clause 17 — This Act and Children and Young
People Act
Clause 17 (previously s 32) provides
that a protection order made by the Childrens Court under the Children and
Young People Act 2008 is taken to have been made by the Magistrates Court
and may be amended, revoked or appealed under the Act.
Part 3 —
Applications generally
This Part of the Bill sets out who may apply for a
protection order and what the registrar must do with an
application.
Clause 18 — Who may apply for certain
non-emergency orders?
Clause 18 (previously s
11) specifies who may apply for certain non-emergency orders and includes an
aggrieved person, police officer and any other person, for example, a parent or
guardian of a child or an agent on behalf of the aggrieved person.
Regarding the agent category in this
provision, the relationship between the aggrieved person and the person applying
for the order is expected to be that of a close relative or a person who might
be expected to have a legal responsibility for the aggrieved person. However, a
person who falls into this category will also need to have the capacity to
perform the function of support and advocacy, effectively. The Court, in
determining if a person has sufficient nexus with the aggrieved person, must
consider the ability and capacity of that person to make the application as a
‘next friend’ of the aggrieved
person.
This clause excludes applications for
emergency orders (Part 9) and applications to amend or revoke an order (Part
7).
Clause 19 — Party with legal
disability
Clause 19 (previously s 12) provides
that an application by a person with a legal disability may be made by either a
litigation guardian, or in the person’s own right with the leave of the
Magistrates Court.
If the respondent to a
non-emergency protection order has a legal disability, then the respondent must
have a litigation guardian.
The right of a child to make an application for a
domestic violence is preserved in their own right, notwithstanding that they
would not otherwise have legal capacity to do so.
Clause 20 — Certain children not
respondents
Clause 20 introduces a new
provision to exclude a child who is less than 10 years of age as being named as
a respondent on an order. The prior reach of the legislation to children under
the age of criminal responsibility is considered inappropriate due to the
potential incapacity of that child to understand an order or the consequences of
any breach of the order. It is not intended that this provision exclude
children from being named on orders when they require protection. It relates
only to children under the age of 10 named on orders as
respondents.
Clause 21 — Application forms that require
aggrieved person’s address
Clause 21
(previously s 14) allows the address details of the aggrieved person to be
suppressed in certain circumstances to preserve the safety of that
person.
Clause 22 — Registrar sets return
date
Clause 22 (previously s 15) sets out the
basic procedural steps to be followed by a registrar once an application for a
non-emergency protection order has been received.
Clause 23 — Registrar may adjourn proceedings
etc
Clause 23 (previously s 17) provides that a
registrar may adjourn proceedings if, on the date set for the return of the
application before the Magistrates Court, the respondent has not been served
with a copy of the application. The registrar may not adjourn proceedings under
this provision on more than two occasions. This restriction is included to
ensure that in the event that repeated attempts to serve the application
personally on the respondent are unsuccessful, there is a trigger for the
Magistrates Court to consider making an order for alternative service under
clause 66 (where service is impracticable or impossible).
Clause 24 — Preliminary
conferences
Clause 24 (previously s 18)
provides that a registrar must hold a preliminary conference in relation to an
application for a non-emergency protection
order.
It also provides that a regulation may
be made to guide a registrar in the following: whether the registrar is required
to hold a preliminary conference; prescribing the objects of a preliminary
conference; prescribing the powers to be exercised by the registrar during that
preliminary conference; and determining the admissibility of any evidence in a
preliminary conference.
The failure to hold
the preliminary conference does not affect the validity of any subsequent
order.
Clause 25 — Referrals to
mediation
Clause 25 (previously s 18A) provides
a power for the registrar to recommend a matter to mediation when the registrar
believes that the matter is more likely to be effectively resolved through a
mediation process. In addition, this clause outlines what a registrar must do
in circumstances where they are referring the parties involved to
mediation.
Clause 26 — Preparation for
hearings in Magistrates Court
Clause 26
introduces a new provision. It provides that a registrar will have additional
procedural powers during the conference stage of proceedings for the purpose of
collating and preparing information to facilitate a future hearing at court.
This provision will be utilised by registrars in circumstances where a
conference for an order has not resulted in consent orders being made. It
stipulates that a registrar must prepare the following documents for the hearing
of the application: a statement about who will give evidence at a hearing; a
statement about how long that hearing might be; and a summary of the issues that
were agreed to, or not agreed to, at the conference.
The provisions mentioned in the above
paragraph do not confine either party from adducing additional information
outside of the particulars obtained during the conferencing process at the
hearing. The reasoning for not confining the substance of the information at
the hearing stage is on the basis that applications are often drafted in a short
time frame and in periods of stress, where details can be easily
missed.
The clause provides that the registrar
is required to give the respondent a statement to the effect that if they do not
attend the hearing, the Magistrates Court may decide the application in the
respondent’s absence. It is intended that this process will assist a
Magistrate to finalise an order in the absence of a respondent on the hearing
date.
The clause also provides that the
registrar may do anything they consider appropriate in relation to the
application on, or before, the return date. In addition it provides that
regulations may prescribe other powers of the registrar to enable them to
exercise a power under this function.
Clause 27 — What if applications are made for
the wrong order?
Clause 27 (previously s 22)
provides that if an application is made for the wrong order, eg an application
for a domestic violence order where the relationship of the parties is such that
the application should be for a personal protection order, the Magistrates Court
is not prevented from making the correct order on the
application.
Clause 28 — What if applications for the wrong
order are decided?
Clause 28 (previously s 23)
provides that if an application is decided before it becomes apparent that the
applicant should have applied for the other type of order, then the operation of
the order is not affected by the fact that the order could not have been made on
the application.
Part 4 — Interim
orders
This part of the Bill sets out the
processes and rules for interim orders. The purpose of an interim order is to
provide protection to the applicant until the application can be heard in more
detail at the hearing stage.
Clause 29 — Grounds for making interim
order
Clause 29 (previously s 49) provides the
grounds for making an interim order. The Magistrates Court must be satisfied
that it is necessary to make the order in the following circumstances: to ensure
the safety of the aggrieved person or a child; to ensure the safety of an
aggrieved person at the workplace or an employee of the aggrieved person at the
workplace; and to prevent substantial damage to the property of the aggrieved
person or a child of the aggrieved person, pending the hearing of the
application for the final order.
Interim orders
only exist until the application for a final order is decided. If a final order
is considered as the result of an interim order, and the final order not made
the interim order is inherently revoked.
Clause 30 — When can interim orders be
made?
Clause 30 (previously s 48) clarifies
that an interim order can only be made on an application for a final order. It
also stipulates that an interim order may be made with respect to an application
for a final order, unless clause 41 applies.
A
final order must be applied for because the interim order only exists up until a
final order is decided.
Clause 31 — What must a court
consider?
Clause 31 (previously s 50) provides
that the Magistrates Court must consider whether contact between the aggrieved
person or the respondent and any child of either party, is relevant to the
making of the order and to any relevant family contact order that the court is
aware of. However, a failure to take these matters into consideration does not
affect the validity of the order.
Clause 32
— Interim orders and respondents with legal
disability
Clause 32 introduces a new provision
for when the court is aware that the respondent to the order may have a legal
disability and the court is considering making an interim order. In these
circumstances, the court must inform the public advocate of the following: about
the respondent, including the respondent’s contact details; the fact that
the respondent may be in need of a litigation guardian for the purpose of the
proceedings; and the return date for the interim order.
This section is intended to provide adequate
support and assistance to a person who has or may have a legal disability, i.e.
a child, in circumstances where they are being named as a respondent to an
order. It is not expected that the public advocate will need to personally
represent every person that falls into this category. However, it enables the
public advocate to make an assessment of the respondent’s circumstances
and to assist in identifying a suitable person to act as a litigation guardian
for the benefit of the respondent who has a legal disability. The assistance
provided by a litigation in these circumstances will include: interpreting the
requirements regarding the endorsement copy of the order outlined in section 36;
and to assist the respondent and to provide support at the time of the hearing.
Clause 33 — Service of applications for interim
orders unnecessary
Clause 33 (previously s 56)
provides that it is not necessary that the application be served on the
respondent before the Court can make an interim order.
Note that section 90 provides that the
respondent would need to have been served with the interim order before the
offence of contravention of an order can be established.
Clause 34 — Return date for final orders on
making of interim order
Clause 34 (previously s
48(4)) provides that if the court makes an interim order and the return date is
less than 21 days after that interim order is made then the court must change
the return date to be at least 21 days after the day the interim order was made.
Clause 35 — What interim orders may
contain
Clause 35(1) (previously s 51)
specifies the conditions that may be included on an interim order.
Clause 35(2) stipulates that in circumstances
where the respondent is a child and the interim order proposes to prohibit that
child from being on premises where the child may normally receive care
(including education) or protection, the Magistrates Court must first be
satisfied that adequate arrangements have been made for that child’s care,
prior to making an order.
Clause 36 — When interim orders become final
orders
Background to the Introduction of Section 51A
Provisions
Section 51A of the Domestic
Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001 was adopted from the national Model
Domestic Violence Law Report and allowed for the crystallisation of an interim
order into a final order, in circumstances where the respondent did not respond
to the court by a specified date.
The
Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Amendment Act 2005 introduced
section 51A to enable interim orders to automatically become final orders in
circumstances where the respondent was served with a endorsement copy of the
order and either consented to the final order being made, or did not return the
appropriate copy of the interim order within the required timeframe. The
Government’s intention in introducing these amendments was to obviate
unnecessary court appearances and consequent trauma for victims of domestic
violence.
The provisions found in section 51A
of the Act allowed for the crystallisation of an interim protection order into a
final order when the respondent was served 21 days or more before the date
scheduled for hearing the protection application. If the respondent failed to
respond within the nominated period or responded by consenting to the order
becoming final, the process would continue and the order became final. The
respondent was equally at liberty to prevent a final order by lodging an
objection and opposing the protection application at the subsequent hearing.
The requirement that the respondent must complete and return the endorsement
copy at least seven days before the hearing day was designed to allow the
applicant an appropriate period to prepare for a contested hearing.
I v S
Decision
I v S raised the issue of
whether section 51A is compatible with the right to fair trial found in section
21 of the Human Rights Act 2004. The case considered circumstances in
which a respondent who had an identifiable legal disability (a minor), did not
have the legal standing to respond to the requirements set out under section 51A
regarding the return of the endorsement copy of the
order.
Clause 36 remakes section 51A with
appropriate changes. The purpose behind the introduction of section 51A (as is
explained in the background) is retained in this section. However, the clause
accounts for all the circumstances in which an interim order can become a final
order. This clause must be read in conjunction with clause 94, which provides a
review mechanism for orders that have become final under this section.
Section 36(1) provides for circumstances when
a respondent objects to an interim order made when they are not present at
court.
Section 36 (2) provides for
circumstances in which a respondent can indicate their consent to a final order.
A respondent may consent to a final order by filling out the endorsement copy of
the interim order in accordance with the instructions on the copy; indicating on
the endorsement copy that the respondent does not object to the interim order
becoming a final order; and by returning the copy of the endorsement copy to the
Magistrates Court before the return date. (See part 8 below for an explanation
of ‘endorsement copy’.)
Section
36(3) provides that when a respondent acts under subsection (2), the interim
order will become a final order on the day that the Magistrates Court receives
the endorsement copy.
Section 36(4) provides
for circumstances in which a respondent can indicate their objection to the
interim order becoming a final order. A respondent may indicate their objection
by filling out the endorsement copy of the order; indicating on the endorsement
copy that they object to the order becoming a final order; and returning the
endorsement copy of the order to the Magistrates Court at least 7 days before
the return date for the application for the final order to which the interim
order relates.
Section 36(5) provides that if
the respondent acts under subsection (4), then the Magistrates Court may decide
the application.
Section 36(6) provides for circumstances when a
respondent wishes to object to an interim order becoming a final order, but
fails to act under subsection (4).
This
provision gives a Magistrate the discretion to decide an application for a final
order in the following circumstances: the respondent attends at court on the
return date for the final order; and the respondent objects to the order
becoming final; and the respondent or their representative satisfies the court
of either of the following conditions:
• that
the respondent had a legal disability but did not have a litigation guardian to
assist with the process required to engage subsection (4),
• or that the respondent had a reasonable
excuse for failing to return the endorsement copy as was required under
subsection (4).
Examples are provided to
demonstrate circumstances where a respondent has a legal disability or has a
reasonable excuse for failing to return the endorsement copy as
required.
Clause 36(7) provides that when an
interim order does not become a final order under subsection (3) and the
application may not be decided by the Magistrates Court under subsections (5)
and (6), the Magistrates Court may decide that the interim order will become a
final order at the end of the return date for the
application.
Clause 36(8) provides definitions
for ‘endorsement copy’ and ‘respondent’.
‘Endorsement copy’ is discussed in part 8
below.
When making a final order under the
circumstances set out in clause 36, the court must consider the criteria in
clause 46 below. If the court decides that the application or evidence does not
satisfy the criteria in clause 46 then the final order is not made and the
interim order is inherently revoked.
Clause 37 — Length of interim orders by
consent
Clause 37 (previously s 52) states that
an interim order (other than a consent order) can remain in force for a period
of up to 2 years. It is highly unlikely that an interim order will last longer
than the time necessary to satisfy one of the possible outcomes contemplated by
clause 36. As per discussion in clauses 29 and 36, an interim order only exists
until a final order is decided. The period of 2 years corresponds to the
maximum time for which a final order can be made, on the basis that the
provisions in clause 36 will facilitate the process of an order crystallising
from an interim order to a final order in all circumstances where the provisions
in clause 38 and 39 do not apply.
Clause 38 — End of interim
orders
Clause 38 (previously s 53) provides
that an interim order ends before the period stated on the order if any of the
following happens: the application on which the interim order is made is
dismissed; or if the final order is made on the application in the
respondent’s presence when the final order is made; or when the final
order is served on the respondent.
Clause 39 — What if interim orders would expire
before final orders are served?
Clause 39
(previously s 55) provides that where a final order is made on an application
and the respondent is not present at the time the order is made, then the
interim order is taken to continue until such time as the final order is served
on the respondent.
Clause 40 — Firearms and interim
orders
Clause 40 (previously s 57) provides
that when an interim order is made, any firearms licence held by the respondent
is suspended until the interim order ends and any firearms or ammunition is to
be seized and detained for the period of the order. In the case of an interim
personal protection order, an application can be made under subsection (3) to
request that a firearms licence not be suspended if the court is satisfied that
the licence should not be suspended.
Clause 41 — May further interim orders be
made?
Clause 41 (previously s 59) provides that
in circumstances where an interim order cannot be extended because of clause
61(2), a further interim order on application to the court can be made in
special and exceptional circumstances. This clause recognises that in certain
situations an application may not be finalised before the 16 weeks period
allowed in clause 61(2) for an interim order.
Clause 42 — When may the registrar extend
interim orders?
Clause 42 (previously s 60)
gives the registrar power to extend interim orders when the respondent has not
been served with a copy of the application. It states that a registrar cannot
extend an interim order for longer than eight weeks. This clause needs to be
read in conjunction with clause 63(3) that stipulates that an interim order
cannot be extended beyond 16 weeks.
Part 5 — Consent
Orders
This is a new part of the Bill that
incorporates previous provisions relating to consent orders.
Clause 43 — Consent
orders
Clause 43(1) (previously s 29) provides
that on application for a protection order, the Magistrates Court may make an
order with the consent of the parties involved.
Subsection (2) provides that an order can be
made whether or not the parties have attended at court; whether or not grounds
for the order had been made out; and without proof or admission of guilt. It is
foreshadowed that the regulations will empower the Magistrates Court to delegate
appropriate powers and functions to a registrar or deputy
registrar.
Subsection (3) provides that if an
automatic consequence flows from the making of a kind of order provided for
under this Part (i.e. the suspension of a firearms licence), then that automatic
consequence will flow from the making of the order, unless the following two
elements are satisfied:
• there is a
discretion under the Act which would allow for the automatic consequences not to
occur; and
• the parties consent to the
automatic consequence not following.
An example
is provided in the Act to demonstrate this
provision.
Subsection (4) prevents the
Magistrates Court from making a protection order under this clause in
circumstances where it may not have otherwise been able to make it under this
Act or for a period longer than is allowed for under this Act.
Clause 44 — Consent orders and parties with
legal disability
Clause 44 (previously s 30)
ensures that a consent order cannot be made where a party to the proceedings is
a person with a legal disability who is not represented by someone else (either
a next friend or a litigation guardian), and it appears to the court that the
person should be represented by someone else.
This clause permits the Magistrates court to
adjourn the hearing to allow the person to obtain a litigation guardian.
Clause 45 — Length of interim orders by
consent
Clause 45(1) provides that an interim
order made as a consent order remains in force for a period of up to 16
weeks.
Clause 45(2) clarifies that clause 61(2)
applies to an interim order made by consent. Note that section 61(2) prevents
the extension of an interim order beyond a period of more than 16
weeks.
Part 6 — Final
orders
This part of the Bill sets out the
procedure, grounds and considerations for final orders (other than workplace
orders).
Division 6.1 — Final orders other than
workplace orders
Clause
46
— Grounds for making final orders
(other than workplace orders)
Clause 46
(previously s 40) provides that the Magistrates Court on application can make a
final order, other than a workplace order, if satisfied that the respondent has
engaged in domestic violence or if the respondent has engaged in personal
violence towards the aggrieved person and may engage in personal violence
towards the aggrieved person during the time the order is proposed to operate.
The difference in grounds regarding domestic violence and personal violence
recognises that domestic violence is a particular form of interpersonal violence
that needs a greater protective response, which gives rise to the need to
protect the aggrieved person.
The clause
clarifies in respect to personal violence, that it is not only necessary to
establish that violence has previously occurred, but also that it may reoccur in
the future. This provision exists to protect an applicant who applies for an
order on the basis that someone whom they fear may harm them is due to be
released from prison.
This clause also provides
that a Magistrate must consider a respondent’s objection in making the
final order, when the respondent has objected to the interim
order.
Clause
47
— What must a court consider before
making final orders other than workplace
orders?
Clause 47 (previously s 41) sets out
what the Magistrate must consider in deciding an application for a final order.
However, a failure to consider any of these issues does not invalidate the
order.
Clause
48
— What final orders (other than
workplace orders) may contain
Clause 48
(previously s 42) lists conditions and prohibitions that the Magistrates Court
may include on an order that they consider necessary or
desirable.
Division 6.2 — Workplace
orders
Workplace orders are a specific type of
personal protection order and as a consequence attract different considerations.
Clause 49 — Definitions—div
6.2
Clause 49 (previously s 42) contains the
definition section for workplace orders. It now defines a ‘child
facility’ as being a place of care or a therapeutic protection place under
the Children and Young People Act 2008, or an office or
facility used by the Territory for children or young people who are, under the
Children and Young People Act 2008, care and protection chapters, in need
of care and protection or in therapeutic
protection.
This clause also includes a note
that section 344 of the Children and Young People Act 2008 defines
a child or young person in need of care and protection.
Clause 50 — What is personal violence
for a workplace?
Clause 50 (previously s 44)
defines personal violence in relation to a workplace. The emphasis in this
definition is on the relationship of the violence to the employee in their
capacity as an employee in a workplace. If personal violence, harassment or
offensiveness is aimed at an employee outside their capacity as an employee in
the workplace, then that employee may need to seek a separate personal
protection order against the respondent.
Clause 51 — Effect of availability of workplace
orders
Clause 51 (previously s 43) stipulates
that the availability of workplace orders does not create any additional
obligations or rights in relation to the employment relationship. This
legislation is not intended to give rise to a cause of action by an employee
against an employer who does not apply for a workplace order in a given
situation.
Clause 52 — Grounds for making workplace
orders
Clause 52(1) (previously s 45) sets out
the grounds for a workplace order. The grounds are similar to those for a
personal protection order but further define the relevant behaviour, as personal
violence in respect of the workplace. Note that personal violence in the
workplace is defined in clause 50.
Clause
52(2) explicitly provides that a Magistrates Court can make an order in relation
to a workplace that is a child facility, if satisfied that the respondent poses
a risk to people at the workplace.
Clause 53 — What must a court consider before
making workplace orders?
Clause 53 (previously
s 46) sets out the factors that the Court must consider before making a
workplace order.
Clause 54 — What workplace orders may
contain
Clause 54 (previously s 47) lists the
conditions and prohibitions that a workplace order may contain. The court may
include such conditions and prohibitions, as it considers necessary or
desirable. The prohibitions and conditions set by the Court are specific to
workplace situations. An example demonstrating this provision is that the court
may prohibit someone from entering or coming within a certain distance from the
workplace.
Clause 54(3) has been rewritten to
improve comprehension. The substantive content of this clause remains the same
and states that a workplace order that is a consent order may contain a
condition or prohibition mentioned in clause 54(2).
Division 6.3 — Length of final orders
etc
This division stipulates the timeframes
permitted for final orders.
Clause 55 — Length of final domestic violence
orders
Clause 55 (previously s 35) stipulates
that a final domestic violence order can remain in place for a period of 2 years
or a shorter period. The Magistrates Court may make a domestic violence order
that remains in force for longer than 2 years if satisfied that special or
exceptional circumstances exist. However, an order made by consent cannot be
longer than 2 years. Note that specific conditions made on an order may give a
shorter period of effect than the entire order. An example of this is if the
order gives the respondent permission to attend their home on one occasion to
collect personal belongings in company of police and this is to occur within a 7
days of the order being made.
Clause 56 — Length of final personal protection
orders
Clause 56 (previously s 36) stipulates
that a final personal protection order can remain in place for a period of 1
year, or a shorter period.
Clause 57 — Firearms and final
orders
Clause 57 (previously s 38) provides
that when a final order is made, any firearms licence held by the respondent
will be cancelled by force of this section. It also provides that the court may
order the seizure of any firearm licence, any firearm and ammunition in the
respondent’s possession.
However in
respect to applications for personal protection orders, if the Court is
satisfied on the facts that harm to the applicant is unlikely, it may exercise
its discretion not to cancel the firearms licence.
Part 7 — Amendment of orders
This part of the Bill incorporates the
previous provisions relating to the amendment of orders. It introduces new
provisions relating the amendment of an interim order or to make temporary
amendments to a final order, in certain limited circumstances.
Clause 58 — Amendment
generally
Clause 58 (previously s 31) sets out
the circumstances in which the Magistrates Court can amend a protection order.
Clause 58(1)(b) affords protection to any
children named on an order in circumstances where the applicant intends to amend
that order. This provision stipulates that a Magistrate will need to be
satisfied in making the amendment that the child or children named on that order
are no longer in need of the protection afforded by the original order. The
purpose of this provision is to avoid circumstances where children may be placed
at risk in circumstances when an adult applicant amends an order and little or
no consideration is given to the status of the protection of the children named
on that order.
Clause 59 — Amendment of interim
orders
Clause 59 is a new section that provides
that the Magistrates Court may, on application by a party, amend an interim
order.
Clause 59(1) stipulates that the parties
who can apply for an amendment of an interim order are the aggrieved person, the
respondent, or a police officer.
Clause 59(2)
provides that the Magistrates Court may amend an interim order only in the
following circumstances: if there has been a change in circumstances of a party
to the order, or the order causes unnecessary hardship to the respondent, and
amending the order will not adversely affect the safety of the aggrieved person.
It is not intended that an applicant or
respondent will be able to have an order amended unless there has been a
relevant change in circumstances, or the order as it stands is considered to be
too restrictive of the personal rights and liberties of the respondent. Some
examples of situations that might justify amendments
are:
• an applicant is granted an interim
order but this order does not exclude the respondent from living in the home. A
number of days after the interim order is taken out, another incident occurs
that gives rise to an increased risk posed by the respondent to the applicant.
The applicant now requires an exclusion order to maintain his/her safety but is
unable to have the order amended during the interim period;
or
• an interim order has failed to take into
account the respondent’s employment situation and the respondent seeks to
have the interim order amended in order to be able to continue to
work.
Clause 60 — Temporary amendment of final
orders
Clause 60 introduces a new provision
that enables the court, on application by an aggrieved person or a respondent,
to amend a final order temporarily, for a stated period of time. Before the
court can make a temporary amendment of a final order, it must first be
satisfied of the following circumstances:
• it must involve a matter of significant
importance affecting at least one of the parties;
• the parties have taken reasonable steps to
deal with the matter without amending the order;
• the amendment is the only reasonable way
of dealing with the matter;
• the amendment
will not adversely affect the safety of the
complainant;
• and it is proper to amend the
order given all the circumstances.
This
provision is intended to assist in meeting unique needs of certain applicants
and respondents that were not contemplated at the time of taking out the
order.
An example of where this provision might
be used is in a situation where both an applicant and respondent want to attend
a funeral of a relative but a provision of the order stipulates that the
respondent not attend within 100m of the applicant wherever they may be at any
given time. The period of time granted for the amendment would be limited to a
period necessary for the respondent to attend the service. A Magistrate may
grant leave to an applicant on the basis that the circumstances giving rise to
the application are of significant importance (such as the attendance at a
funeral of a close family member or friend) and that alternate options have been
exhausted.
The time period allowed for an
interim amendment must be confined to a set period and is not to be left open
ended. Clear instructions are to be given by the Court to the respondent and
the applicant regarding the application of such an amendment.
Clause 61 — Extension of interim orders by
consent
Clause 61(1) (previously s 58) provides
that the Magistrates Court, on application, may amend an interim order that is a
consent order by extending it for an additional period, or a further additional
period, of up to 8 weeks.
Clause 61(2) provides that the interim order must
not be extended if the extension would mean that the interim order would be in
force for a period for more than 16 weeks.
Clause 62 — Extension of final
orders
Clause 62 (previously s 37) provides
that the Magistrates Court, on application, may amend a final order by extending
it in circumstances where the court is satisfied that the aggrieved person is
still in need of the protection afforded by the order. This provision also
allows that an application may be made out of time when parties consent under
this section. The subsequent sections set out the requirements to extend a
final order.
Part 8 — Service of non-emergency
protection orders
This part of the Bill
incorporates previous provisions relating to service of orders.
Clause 63 — Service of
applications
Clause 63 (previously s 16) sets
out the requirements for the registrar to serve copies of the application and
notice of proceedings. In addition to serving a copy of the application on the
respondent, it requires that the registrar serve a copy of the application and a
notice on the relevant people. Relevant people are described in section 63(5)
as the respondent and anyone else the registrar is satisfied has a relevant
interest in the proceeding. This requirement also applies when the aggrieved
person is a person with a legal disability.
Clause 64 — Service of non-emergency protection
orders
Clause 64 (previously s 33) specifies
how a protection order, other than an emergency order, must be served. Personal
service is specified in respect of the respondent due to the fact that the
offence provision in clause 92 is predicated on personal
service.
The documents served for the interim
order process include a document known as the endorsement copy. A respondent in
receipt of an endorsement copy must indicate on the endorsement copy whether
they object or consent to the order being made. The respondent must return the
endorsement copy within the required time.
Clause 65 — If personal service not
required
Clause 65 (previously s 97) sets out
the manner in which documents may be served when personal service is not
specified. The service methods specified are standard methods of
service.
Clause 66 — If service impracticable or
impossible
Clause 66 (previously s 98) is a
standard provision that allows the Magistrates Court to make an order about how
a document may be served when the specified method of service is not reasonably
practicable or possible.
Clause 67 — Service of documents by
police
Clause 67 (previously s 99) provides
that the Magistrates Court can direct that a document be served by a police
officer for a non-emergency order, when the court considers that it is
appropriate that a police officer serve the document.
Part 9 — Emergency orders
Part 9 contains the provisions for emergency
orders. An emergency order is available for domestic violence matters only. An
emergency order is available outside of court hours to afford immediate
protection to victims. The procedures for these orders differ from the
procedures for other orders in this Bill. An application for an emergency order
may only be made by a police officer via telephone to a judicial officer. A
judicial officer is responsible for granting an emergency order.
Clause 68 — Who may apply for emergency
order?
Clause 68 (previously s 61) provides
that a police officer may apply for an emergency order.
Clause 69 — When may emergency order be
made?
Clause 69 (previously s 62) sets out the
circumstances in which an emergency order may be made. A judicial officer must
be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent
may cause physical injury to the aggrieved person if the order is not made, and
that arrest is not practicable. The circumstances in which an emergency order
may be granted are narrower than those in which an interim order may be
granted.
Clause 70 — How can application for emergency
order be made?
Clause 70 (previously s 63)
stipulates the procedure for a police officer to apply for an emergency order
via telephone. A judicial officer, in considering whether to make an emergency
order, is required to take into account any relevant contact orders and the
provisions in clause 71.
Clause 71 — What should judicial officers
consider in making emergency order?
Clause 71
(previously s 64) provides what judicial officers must consider in making an
emergency order. However, a failure to take such matters into account does not
invalidate any subsequent order made. A note has been added to this clause to
take into account amendments made to the Family Law Act 1975
(Cwlth).
Clause 72 — Emergency
orders
Clauses 72 (previously s 65) sets out
the formal matters in relation to how orders are made and what records must be
kept.
Clause 73 — Action on refusing emergency
order
Clauses 73 (previously s 66) sets out
what the judicial officer must record if refusing to grant an emergency
order.
Clause 74 — Records of
proceedings
Clause 74 (previously s 67) states
that a judicial officer must ensure that the record of proceedings, including
any order made, will become part of the record of the Magistrates
Court.
Clause 75 — Detention of people against whom
emergency orders sought
Clause 75 (previously s
68) allows a police officer to detain a person for up to 4 hours in
circumstances where they are intending to obtain an emergency order against that
person.
Clause 76 — What emergency order may
contain
Clause 76 (previously s 69) sets out
what prohibitions and conditions can be included in an emergency
order.
Clause 77 — Length of emergency
orders
Clause 77 (previously s 70) establishes
the period for which an emergency order remains in place.
Clause 78 & 79— Emergency and non-emergency
amendment and revocation of emergency
orders
Clauses 78 & 79 (previously ss 71
and 72) provide the process in which an emergency order may be varied or
revoked. Outside of court hours, the application process for varying or
revoking an order is the same as for the initial grant of the emergency order;
that is the order may only be varied or revoked by a judicial officer on
application from a police officer. Within court hours, clauses 58 and 59 and
Part 11 provides the relevant mechanisms for parties seeking to have the order
varied or revoked. An interim order is inherently revoked if a final order is
considered as a consequence of an interim order process and the court decides
not to make a final order.
Clause 80 — Firearms and emergency
orders
Clause 80 (previously s 73) provides
that if an emergency order is made in relation to a respondent who is the holder
of a firearms licence, then that firearms licence is suspended until such time
as the order ends or is revoked.
Clause 81 — Service of emergency
orders
Clause 81 (previously s 74) requires
that police must serve an emergency order on a respondent personally, unless the
Magistrates Court makes an order under clause 66 (if service is impracticable or
impossible).
Clause 82 — Police
required to explain emergency order
served
Clause 82 (previously s 75) requires
that a police officer, when serving a copy of the emergency order on the
respondent, must, as far as it is practicable to do so, explain the effect of
that order and the consequences of contravening that order.
Clause 83 — Recording reasons if emergency
order not applied for
Clause 83 (previously s
76) requires that a police officer record his/her reasons for not applying for
an emergency order.
Part 10 — Other provisions about
protection orders
This part of the Bill
incorporates a range of pre-existing provisions relating to: the requirement to
explain orders; the reasons for the order; the order is not to include the
aggrieved person’s address; that prohibitions or condition may be shorter;
a recommendation can be made for counselling; and an offence for a contravention
of a protection order.
Clause 84 — Explaining orders if respondent
present
Clauses 84 (previously s 24), provides
that orders are to be explained to the respondent when that party appears before
the court.
Clause 85 — Explaining orders if aggrieved
person present
Clause 85 (previously s 25)
provides that orders are to be explained to the aggrieved person when that party
appears before the court.
Clause 86 — Reasons for
order
Clause 86 (previously s 26) requires that
when the court grants a non-emergency protection order, the court must record
the reason for making the order. If the order is a consent order, the court
must record the reason for making the order is that the parties have consented
to it.
Clause 87 — Orders generally not to include
aggrieved person’s address
Clause 87
(previously s 27) provides that the address of the aggrieved person (home and
work) is to be omitted from the protection order in certain circumstances. This
measure is designed to protect the complainant. However, there may be
circumstances where it is necessary to include an address in order to afford
adequate protection to the complainant by explicitly stipulating the places
where a respondent cannot go.
Clause 88 — Prohibitions or conditions may be
shorter
Clause 88 (previously s 28) provides
that specific conditions in an order may have a shorter period of effect than
the order itself as a whole. An example of this is where the order provides
that a respondent can attend at a prohibited place on one occasion to collect
personal items and that this is to occur within a certain
timeframe.
Clause 89 — Recommendations for counselling
etc
Clause 89 (previously s 39) enables the
Magistrates Court to recommend that parties to a proceeding undertake
counselling, training, mediation, rehabilitation or assessment.
Clause 90 — Offence for contravention of
protection order
Clause 90 (previously s 34)
creates an offence of breaching a protection order. To invoke this provision,
the respondent must have been present at court when the order was made, or have
been personally served with a copy of the protection order. A person commits an
offence if the person engages in conduct (within or outside of the ACT) that
contravenes the protection order (including a condition of that
order).
The maximum penalty for this offence is
500 penalty units or 5 years’ imprisonment or both.
Technically this provision can apply to both
parties named in the order (the respondent and aggrieved family member), however
the intention behind this provision is to apply to a respondent and not to an
aggrieved family member in circumstances where the aggrieved family member is
not acting in a vexatious manner. It is understood that the complexities and
dynamics of domestic violence can lead to circumstances where an aggrieved
family member may not feel confident enough to turn the respondent away or in
certain circumstances be the instigator in making the prohibited
contact.
Part 11 — Review of
orders
This part of the Bill incorporates
previous review provisions and new provisions for review at Magistrates Court
level of orders.
Clause 91 — Application for review of
particular final orders
Clause 91 enables the
Magistrates Court to review final orders apart from final orders that are made
as a consequence of an interim order process or consent
orders.
The dictionary defines ‘final
orders’ as including protection orders other than interim orders or
emergency orders. ‘Protection orders’ is defined as including
workplace orders, firearms orders and an order amending a protection
order.
A party to the original order may apply
for a review of a final order. A person with sufficient interest in the order
may also apply for a review with the leave of the Court.
Clause 92 — Review of particular final
orders
Clause 92(1) sets out the Court’s
powers following a hearing for a review of a final
order.
Clause 92(2) provides the criteria the
Magistrate must be satisfied of before deciding to revoke an
order.
Clause 93 — Application by respondent to review
of order finalised under s 36
Clause 93 is a
new provision and responds to the incompatibility issues between the Domestic
Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001 (the Act) and the
Human Rights Act 2004, first raised in the case of I v S. This
decision raised questions regarding a respondent’s right to fair trial in
circumstances where an order under the Act had automatically become final
because the respondent had not returned an endorsement copy of the order to the
Court.
In order to address the right to a fair
trial, this new review mechanism is being introduced to create additional access
to the Court in certain circumstances.
The
Court can hear an application in circumstances where the respondent would have
objected to the interim order becoming a final order, but did not object at the
time or did not appear at Court on the return date. To prevent abuse of the
process and underminig the purpose of clause 36, the Magistrate must be
satisfied that the respondent had a reasonable excuse for failing to act in
accord with the provisions of clause 36.
The
Court may also hear an application under this clause from respondents who have a
legal disability and did not have a litigation guardian when the interim order
became a final order. This can occur in circumstances where a person appears to
be an adult but is in fact a minor, and does not disclose to parents or other
responsible adults the fact that they have been served with court documents.
Similarly, this can also occur in circumstances involving people with
intellectual disabilities who may not have the capacity to engage in legal
processes on their own behalf.
Finally, the
Court may hear applications for review where the respondent demonstrates that
there are significant changes in circumstances relevant to the making of the
original order.
Clause 94 — Review of order finalised under s
36
Clause 94 states that a Magistrate on
hearing an application for review under section 93 must do one of the following:
dismiss the application; or confirm the original order; or set aside the
original order and either make a new interim order and set a new return date for
the interim order to become final.
Clause 95 — Review of consent
orders
Clause 95 (previously s 77) provides
that the Magistrates Court can review consent orders in circumstances where the
grounds given for making the order were induced or affected by fraud, duress,
other than fraud of the party or duress applied by the
party.
In reviewing the order in these
circumstances, the Magistrates Court may do any of the following: amend the
original order or declare the original order void; or refuse to amend the
original order or declare the original order void; or make an order that could
have been made on application in relation to which the original order was made
instead of the original order.
Clause 96 — Appealable
decisions
Clause 96 (previously s 78) specifies
which decisions under the Act are appealable. A decision regarding an interim
or emergency order is not appealable.
Clause 97 — When can someone appeal to Supreme
Court?
Clause 97 (previously s 79) establishes
the right of a party to appeal to the Supreme Court and sets out the procedure
to be used in making that appeal, including the giving of
notice.
Clause 98 — Giving notice of
appeal
Clauses 98 (previously s 80) sets out
the procedure to be used in making that appeal, including the giving of
notice.
Clause 99 — Evidence on
appeal
Clause 99 (previously s 81) requires
that the Supreme Court, in considering an appeal, must consider evidence given
in the proceeding from which the appeal arose, and has the power to draw
inferences of fact, and in its discretion, to receive further
evidence.
Clause 100 — Powers of Supreme Court on
appeal
Clause 100 (previously s 82) sets out
what the Supreme Court may do in respect of a judgment or order that is
appealed.
Clause 101 — Effect of filing
appeal
Clause 101 (previously s 83) provides
that the lodging of the appeal does not affect the operation of the
order.
Part 12 — Reciprocal
arrangements
This part of the Bill replaces
Part 9 of the previous Act and provides for the recognition in the ACT
jurisdiction of orders made under corresponding laws in other State, Territory
or New Zealand jurisdictions.
Clause 102 — Definitions—pt
12
Clause 102 (previously s 84) sets out he
definitions for this section of the Act.
Clauses 103, 104 and 105 — Applications for
registration of recognised orders
Clauses 103,
104,105 and 106 (previously ss 85, 86, 87 and 88) provide that a person may
apply to the registrar for registration of a recognised order. On receipt of
the application, clause 103 requires that the registrar must register the order
to convey the relevant information to both the local police and the court where
the order was originally made.
Once the order
is registered, clause 105 provides that the order becomes enforceable in the ACT
and may be varied or revoked accordingly under this Act. When a registered
order is varied, clause 106 requires that the registrar notify the court where
the original order was made of that variation.
Clauses 106 and 107 — Amendment and revocation
of registered orders
Clauses 106 and 107
(previously ss 88 and 89) provide that where the registrar is notified by the
originating court that an order has been revoked or varied, then the registrar
must cancel the registration of the original order and, in the case of a varied
order, register the varied order.
Clause 108 — Amendment of recognised
orders
Clauses 108 (previously s 90) provides
that where the registrar is notified by the originating court that an order has
been revoked or varied, then the registrar must cancel the registration of the
original order and, in the case of a varied order, register the varied
order.
Clause 109 — Notification by interstate court
of registration
Clause 109 (previously s 91)
provides that where a recognised court notifies the Magistrates Court that it
has registered a protection order made in the ACT, the Magistrates Court must
notify that court if it varies or revokes the protection order.
Clause 110 — Evidence of registered
orders
Clause 110 (previously s 92) stipulates
how a registered order may be admitted as evidence in a court.
Part 13 — Public access and
publication
This part replaces Part 12 of the
previous Act and relates to the restrictions on the publication of reports about
proceedings.
Clause 111 — Publication of reports about
proceedings — offence
Clause 111
(previously s 100) provides that a person commits an offence if they publish an
account or report of a proceeding on an application for a protection order.
Note that clause 112 provides some exceptions to this
provision.
The maximum penalty for this offence
is 50 penalty units, imprisonment for 6 months or both.
Clause 112 — Publication of reports about
proceedings — exceptions to
offence
Clause 112 (previously s 116) limits
the restriction on publication about proceedings by clarifying that clause 111
does not prevent a person who is a party to a proceeding telling someone else
about the contents of a protection order made in the proceeding and does not
prevent a lawyer of a party to a proceeding from telling someone else about the
content of a protection order in certain
circumstances.
This clause ensures that the
reach of clause 111 does not extend to services that are providing support
letters or other written forms of assistance for clients when requested to do so
by those clients. For example, a Legal Aid lawyer who assists a client to
obtain a protection order is asked to provide a support letter for an
application for housing. The content of the letter includes details about the
court proceedings and as a consequence may subject the writer to liability under
clause 111. It is not the intention of this section to prevent those who are
assisting applicants from providing support to people in
need.
Clause 112 provides an exception to
clause 111 through the inclusion of item 10 in schedule 2 of the Act which
provides the following: information about a party to a proceeding, or a
protection order made in the proceeding, communicated to another person, with
the party’s permission, for the purpose of organising the party’s
personal affairs. As a consequence, those people who are providing support to
clients in circumstances when the client has requested or consented that their
support person write a letter of support will not be liable under clause 111.
It is anticipated that support people will include solicitors, counsellors,
psychologists, support workers and other professionals.
Part 14 —
Miscellaneous
This section replaces Part 13 of
the previous Act and sets out a range of additional miscellaneous
matters.
Clause 113 — Deciding application if criminal
proceedings
Clause 113 (previously s 102)
provides that the power of the Magistrates Court or a judicial officer to make a
protection order may be exercised even if the person has been charged with, or
convicted or found guilty of, an offence arising out of the same
conduct.
Clause 114 — Crimes Act, s
397(1)
Clause 114 (previously s 103) provides
that the Act does not affect the operation of powers of the police in relation
to recognisances to keep the peace under the Crimes Act
1900.
Clause 115 — Working out time if less than 5
days
Clause 115 (previously s 104) establishes
time limits in respect to hearings.
Clause 116 — Directions about
procedure
Clause 116 (previously s 105)
provides that when a step in a proceeding under this Act is not prescribed in
the Act, the Chief Magistrate may give directions about the procedure to be
followed for that step.
Clause 117 — Recovery of certain
expenses
Clause 117 (previously s 95) provides for the recovery
of expenses in the case where an application is frivolous, vexatious or has not
been made honestly.
Clause 118 — Regulation-making
power
Clause 118 (previously s 106) is the
regulation-making power under the Act. The regulations will contain procedural
rules for proceedings under the Act. The language has been updated to be
consistent with current legislative drafting practice.
Part 20 —
Transitional
Clause 200 — Definitions—pt
20
This clause defines ‘commencement
day’ as the day the foreshadowed Act commences. Commencement day is used
in part 20 as a reference point for when the new provisions should be used or
the old provisions used.
Clause 201 — Legislation
repealed
Clause 201 repeals the Domestic
Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001 and the regulations made under that
Act in 2002. Likewise, any other instruments made under the Act are also
repealed.
However, clause 202 enables any
repealed instruments to continue their effect until replaced. For example, a
form that might have been made under the old Act can still be regarded as
valid.
Clause 202 — Construction of outdated
references
This clause clarifies that
commonsense is to prevail when dealing with any relevant instruments, documents,
forms, etc that refer to the repealed Acts, or repealed parts of Acts, and are
to be treated as instruments, documents, forms etc under the foreshadowed
Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act
2008.
For example, if the Magistrates Court
uses a form that is a form to apply for a final order under the Domestic
Violence and Protection Orders Act 2001, then this
transitional provision enables the form to be used as an application for a final
order under the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act
2008.
See for example New South Wales v
Corbett [2007] HCA 32.
Clause 203 — Applications for protection orders
made but not heard under repealed Act
This
clause deems an application for a protection order made under the old Act as an
application for a protection order under the new Act if immediately before the
new Act commenced the Court had not begun hearing the
application.
Clause 204 — Proceedings begun under repealed
Act
This clause enables proceedings that
commenced under the old Act to be continued as proceedings under the new
Act.
Clause 205 — Application for amendment or
revocation under repealed Act
This clause deems
an application for an amendment or revocation under the old Act to be an
application under clause 91.
Clause 206 — Application by respondent for
leave to apply for amendment or revocation under repealed
Act
This clause deems an application for an
amendment or revocation under the old Act to be an application under clause
91.
Clause 207 — Existing protection orders under
repealed Act
This clause deems protection
orders made under the old Act to be protection orders made under the new
Act.
Clause 208 — Review of consent orders under
repealed Act
This clause deems an application
for a review of a consent order made under the old Act as an application for a
review of consent order under the new Act if immediately before the new Act
commenced the Court had not begun hearing the application.
Clause 209 — Appeals under repealed
Act
This clause deems a notice of appeal under
the old Act as a notice of appeal under the new Act if immediately before the
new Act commenced the Supreme Court had not begun hearing the
application.
Clause 210 — Protection of proceedings under
repealed Act
This clause ensures there is
continuity between the restriction on publication under the old Act and the
restriction on publication under the new Act.
Clause 211 — Application for registration of
recognised order under repealed Act
This clause
deems an application for a recognised order made under the old Act to be an
application for a recognised order under the new Act if immediately before the
new Act commenced the registrar had not taken any action on the
application.
Clause 212 — Registration of recognised order
under repealed Act
This clause deems recognised
orders made under the old Act to be recognised orders made under the new
Act.
Clause 213 — Amendment or revocation of
recognised order under repealed Act
This clause
enables any amendments or revocation of recognised orders notified prior to
commencement of the new Act to be dealt with under the new Act.
Clause 214 — Amendment or revocation of
recognised order by Magistrates Court under repealed
Act
This clause enables any amendments or
revocation of recognised orders made by the Magistrates Court prior to
commencement of the new Act to be dealt with under the new Act.
Clause 215 — Transitional
regulations
The Executive may make regulations
to address any transitional issues not contemplated by the Bill. The
regulations may modify the transitional provisions of the commenced
Act.
Clause 216 — Expiry—pt
20
This clause provides that Part 20 expires
one year after the Act commences.
Clause 217 — Legislation amended —
Schedule 3
This clause enlivens the
consequential amendments set out in Schedule 3.
Schedule 1— Domestic violence offences
against other legislation
Clause 1.1 — Definitions—Schedule
1
This clause provides definitions of shortened
names of existing legislation.
Clause 1.2 — Domestic violence offences against
other legislation
The inclusion of trespass as
a domestic violence offence will give police an option to remand an offender in
custody in circumstances where this offence is committed in a context of
domestic violence. Its inclusion enhances the intention of the Act to raise a
presumption against bail for domestic violence offences on the basis of
protecting victims from further offences. Trespass is an offence under two
legislative instruments in the ACT: Public Order (Protection of Persons and
Property) Act 1971 (Cwlth) section 11, for private premises, and Crimes
Act 1900 (ACT) section 154 for government premises.
Schedule 2 — Permitted publication
about proceedings
Clause 2.1 — Definitions—Schedule
2
This clause sets out definitions referenced
to the Children and Young People Act 2008.
Clause 2.2 — Permitted publication about
proceedings
This schedule lists certain
circumstances in which publications about proceedings will be permitted.
Schedule 3 — Consequential
amendments
Schedule 3 provides consequential
amendments to other Acts.
Dictionary
This
section contains the relevant legal definition of terms used in the new
Act.
An alteration to the term relevant
person has been made to add a new category of relationship
(‘boyfriend/girlfriend and same sex relationship of this type’) to
the definition under the Act. It is intended that the Act not exclude people
who have shared an intimate relationship but perhaps for a variety of reasons
have not resided together. The intention is to capture relationships that have
interpersonal elements but not to extend it to relationships such as neighbours.
This definition provides that a personal relationship may exist between people
although they are not members of the same household and whether the person is of
the same or opposite sex.
A judicial officer is
now defined in the dictionary section of the Act. A judicial officer is either
a magistrate or, if the regulation provides for the exercise of the
Magistrate’s Court jurisdiction by the registrar or the deputy registrar,
the registrar or deputy registrar may act in the capacity of a judicial officer.
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