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Bennett Moses, Lyria --- "Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep Up With Technological Change" [2007] UNSWLRS 21

[∗] The author would like to thank Professors Harold Edgar, Peter Strauss, Bill Sage, Frank Pasquale, and Arthur Cockfield as well as Leif Gamertsfelder, Kieran Tranter and Dean Mark Henaghan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.

[1] Lawyers have also looked at the implications of technology for legal practice, although that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.

[2] ISAAC F. REDFIELD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF RAILWAYS (1858); EDWARD L. PIERCE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN RAILROAD LAW (1857).

[3] See supra note 2.

[4] E.g. John F. Banzhaf III, When a Computer Needs a Lawyer, 71 DICK. L. REV. 240, 240 (1966-1967). This issue is compounded in an age of artificial intelligence: see Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 25 (1996); Gunther Teubner, Rights of Non-humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law, 33 J. LAW & SOC. 497 (2006).

[5] E.g. John R. Brown, Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer’s Collision with Law, 71 YALE L.J. 243, 248 (1961-1962); Rigdon Reese, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1033 (1969-1970).

[6] E.g. Houston Putnam Lowry, Does Computer Stored Data Constitute a Writing for the Purposes of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills?, 9 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 93 (1982).

[7] E.g. Note, Sales and Use Tax of Computer Software – Is Software Tangible Personal Property?, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1503 (1980-81).

[8] Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (N.J. 1996).

[9] Malloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2004).

[10] Munro v. Regents of the University of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. App. 1989).

[11] Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. App. 1980).

[12] E.g. David C. Bonnin, Comment and Note, The Need for Increased Oversight of Genetic Testing: A Detailed Look at the Genetic Testing Process, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 149 (2003); Anny Huang, FDA Regulation of Genetic Testing: Institutional Reluctance and Public Guardianship, 53 Food Drug. L.J. 555 (1998). See also Susan M. Faust, Baby Girl or Baby Boy? Now You Can Choose: A Look at New Biology and No Law, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 281 (2000) (in the context of sex selection).

[13] E.g. Demosthenes Lorandos, Secrecy and Genetics in Adoption Law and Practice, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 277, 277 (1996); Jessica Ann Schlee, Genetic Testing: Technology that Is Changing the Adoption Process, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 133 (2001).

[14] E.g. Randi B. Weiss et al, The Use of Genetic Testing in the Courtroom, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889 (1999).

[15] E.g. Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 Hastings L.J. 967 (1996).

[16] E,g, NIH-DOE Working Group on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) of Human Genome Research: NIH-DOE Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Research, Genetic Information and Health Insurance Report of the Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance (Jan. 2004), at http://www.genome.gov/10001750; National Human Genome Research Institute, Policy Recommendations for Genetic Discrimination in Insurance or Employment (Oct. 2004), at http://www.genome.gov/11510228; Hereditary Susceptibility Working Group of the National Action Plan on Breast Cancer (NAPBC): Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 5307, 1755-1757 (Mar. 21, 1997); Council for Responsible Genetics: Council for Responsible Genetics, Genetic Discrimination, Testing, and Privacy (2004), at http ://www.gene-watch.org/programs/privacy.html.

[17] This term is defined in Pt II. It is used in its general sense, and is not limited to information technology.

[18] See, e.g., Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey, [1970] HCA 60; 125 C.L.R. 383, 395 (Austl. 1970) (per Windeyer J.) (“Law, marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a little”); Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law, 1 AUST. J. FAM. L. 196, 212 (1987) (“The hare of science and technology lurches ahead. The tortoise of the law ambles slowly behind.”); Rev. John H. Pearson CSC, Regulation in the Face of Technological Advance: Who Makes These Calls Anyway?, 13 N.D. J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (1999) (“It has become commonplace to note that these dizzying changes in science and technology can easily outstrip those systems by which we humans make critical decisions about what can and should be done by those who are responsible members of society and about how to protect those responsible members of society from those who are not so responsible.”); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 65 (“Rapid technological change unsettles the law quite as much as it unsettles people.”). See also infra notes 21-23.

[19] See Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to Technological Change and Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 361, 371 (2000); Kieran Tranter, Terror in the Texts: Technology – Law – Future, 13 LAW & CRITIQUE 75, 76-77 (2002).

[20] See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW vii (2001) (“The railroad industry raised a host of novel problems and placed unprecedented demands on the legal system.”). See also Corwin v. New York and Erie R.R. Co., 13 N.Y. 42 (1855) (stating that the old common law rule that an owner of cattle could not maintain an action in negligence where the cattle were injured while trespassing was no longer appropriate “when applied to the new circumstances and condition of things arising out of the general introduction and use of railroads in the country.”)

[21] See examples cited in Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515-17 (2005).

[22] E.g. Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1073, 1073-75 (“It should therefore come as no surprise that, as computer technology has advanced rapidly in the past decade, the legal system has begun to question the applicability of its traditional doctrines to the digitized world.”); CURTIS E. A. KARNOW, FUTURE CODES: ESSAYS IN ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 1 (1997) (“I have seen the fields of law and technology thrown against each other, necessarily but often antagonistically.”); Gregory E. Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip By Any Other Name Would Still Be a Potato: The Failure of the Law and its Definitions to Keep Pace with Computer Technology, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 797, 799 (1993) (looking at the consequences when “the legal system fails to keep pace with computer technology”); I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies": A Hit or a Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 423, 425 (1997) (“Technological change presents challenges to the law”).

[23] E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2000) ("Doctrinal analysis often requires us to reconcile traditional legal principle with modern technological innovation. Nowhere is this task of reconciliation more daunting than with cyberspace, where the speed and spread of information has been ratcheted up to levels that were unimaginable even a generation ago."); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2002) (“While the law has lagged behind technological developments in the past, the Interent seems to present challenges of an entirely different order.”).

[24] See Leo Marx, Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 64(3) SOCIAL RESEARCH 965 (1997).

[25] Compare David R Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) and Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744–5 (1995) with Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000) and Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996). See also Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41 (1998); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT L. REV. 993 (1994).

[26] See, e.g., Justice Michael Kirby, The Commonwealth Lawyer: Law in an Age of Fantastic Technological Change, available at http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_thecommonwealthlawyer.htm; Justice Michael Kirby, The Law and Modern Technology (1982); Julian Burnside QC, Does the Law Cope with New Technology, Australian Bar Association Conference, Noosa, Queensland, Australia, 3-7 July, 1994 (on file with author).

[27] See, e.g., Alan Heinrich et al., At the Crossroads of Law and Technology, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1035 (2000) (discussing how technological change has created new forms of property, generated new ethical and legal questions, challenged legal institutions, and changed law school curriculums).

[28] Exceptions are Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing, and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965 (2004) (comparing the impact of genetic testing and the Internet on identity interests, showing how similar problems arise in different settings); Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241 (discussing how, where a technology has a negative impact on social values, certain features of a technology’s diffusion can create inefficient situations); Arthur Cockfield, Towards a Theory of Law and Technology, 30 MANITOBA L.J. 383 (2004); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2001); David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 71 (2001-2002). In the field of international law, see generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 (1999-2000); Colin B. Picker, A View From 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2001).

[29] For an extended discussion of the importance of a theory of law and technology, as opposed to narrower or broader thories, see Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change, (2007) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming).

[30] Robert E. McGinn, What is Technology, 1 RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 179, 179 (1978); Paul T. Durbin, Dictionary of Concepts in the Philosophy of Science 315 (1988) (entry on “Technology”); JOSEPH C. PITT, THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY 1 (2000). For a discussion of the different ways in which technology has been defined, see generally STANLEY F KASPRZYK, TECHNOLOGY (1973).

[31] CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 152 (1994); Leo Marx, Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 64(3) SOCIAL RESEARCH 965 (1997).

[32] For a history of the term “technology” in America, see Eric Schatzberg, Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of Technology before 1930, 47(3) TECH. & CULTURE 486 (2006); RUTH OLDENZIEL, MAKING TECHNOLOGY MASCULINE ch. 1 (1999).

[33] Larry A HICKMAN, PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE PUTTING PRAGMATISM TO WORK 11 (2001); CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 116-17, 150, 160, 308 (1994).

[34] LARRY A HICKMAN, PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE PUTTING PRAGMATISM TO WORK 26, 34 (2001), following the theme in John Dewey, What I Believe, in THE LATER WORKS, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882-1953 5.270 (Jo Ann Boydston, ed. 1981-1990).

[35] JOSEPH C. PITT, THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY 10, 44 (2000); URSULA FRANKLIN, THE REAL WORLD OF TECHNOLOGY 12 (1992).

[36] See CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 116, 150 (1994); JOSEPH C. PITT, THINKING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY 10, 44 (2000).

[37] Robert E. McGinn, What is Technology, 1 RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 179, 179 (1978); CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 153 (1994).

[38] See, e.g., GOVINDAN PARAYIL, CONCEPTUALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPLORATIONS 9, 146 (1999).

[39] See Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., History of Technology, in A GUIDE TO THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MEDICINE 70, 75 (Paul T. Durbin ed., 1980).

[40] E.g. LYNN WHITE, JR., MEDIEVAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1962) (looking at the social consequences of the invention of the stirrup and plough).

[41] E.g. Marx W. Wartofsky, Technology Power and Truth, in DEMOCRACY IN A TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY, 9 PHILOSOPHY & TECHNOLOGY 15, 18-19 (Langdon Winner, ed. 1992); LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 31-33 (2002); JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans. Vintage Books 1967).

[42] E.g. DAVID HAMILTON, TECHNOLOGY, MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 17 (1973) (defining technology as “the means by which Man extends his power over his surroundings”); JOHN ASHTON & RON LAURA, THE PERILS OF PROGRESS 1-2 (1998) (describing technology as a “tool for the rape of the earth” and the driving force behind technology as “the lust for control over the environment”).

[43] Michael Fores, Technology and Innovation: Some Comments on the Literature, 8(3) TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 94, 94-96.

[44] See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2005).

[45] E.g. Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943 (1994).

[46] E.g. Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Pink Collar Blues: Potential Hazards of Video Display Terminal Radiation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 139 (1983) (discussing the potential adverse effects of video display terminals).

[47] The “law of the horse” reference is from Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207-08 (1996) (comparing teaching cyberlaw to the futility of teaching torts, property and commercial law solely by reference to cases involving horses).

[48] DONALD SCHöN, TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE 1 (1967). See also LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY 98, 178-79 (1977).

[49] See generally, Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change, MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming).

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] See, e.g., Kieran Tranter, ‘The History of the Haste-Wagons’: The Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, [2005] MelbULawRw 26; 29 MELB. U.L. REV. 843, 869-875, 878-879 (2005).

[53] See Louis E. Wolcher, The End of Technology: A Polemic, 79 WASH. L. REV. 331 (2004). See also generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181-82 (1958); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (William Lovitt trans., 1977); JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964).

[54] See also Margaret Thornton, Technocentrism in the Law School: Why the Gender and Color of Law Remain the Same, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 369, 378 (1998) (“Technocratic law cloaks the partiality of justice so as to disguise its masculinist, class, race, heterosexual, and corporatist predilections.”)

[55] I have mentioned these categories previously, in Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 517 (2005).

[56] See Michael H. Shapiro, Lawyers, Judges and Bioethics, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 113, 113 (1997); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002); Christopher T. Hill, The Public Dimension of Technological Change: Impact on the Media, the Citizenry, and Governments--A U.S. Perspective, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 153, 155 (1999). Mesthene has described these impacts as negative externalities that result from “innumerable individual decisions to develop individual technologies for individual purposes without explicit attention to what all these decisions add up to for society as a whole and for people as human beings”: Emmanual G. Mesthene, The Role of Technology in Society, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE 65 (Albert H. Teich ed. 1997).

[57] See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2001). See also Aryeh S. Friedman, Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections, 1986 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).

[58] See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation – Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (February 22, 1987), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html; Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002); Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505.

[59] See David McGuire, Report: Kids Pirate Music Freely, Washingtonpost.com (May 18, 2004), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37231-2004May18.html. Child pornography generates approximately three billion dollars annually. Internet Filter Reviews 2005: Pornography Industry Revenue Statistics, available at http://internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html. Also, a researcher at Stockholm University’s Institute of Computer and System Science reported counting 5561 messages or postings about child pornography in four electronic bulletin boards listed in USENET during a seven day period between late December 1994 and early January 1995. See JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW 311 (1996).

[60] Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241; Aryeh S. Friedman, Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections, 1986 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (1986).

[61] See, e.g., NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOLOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY (1992); Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus 15 (Richard Beardsworth & George Collins trans. 1998) (“Technics evolves more quickly than culture”); Aant Elzinga, Theoretical Perspectives: Culture as a Resource for Technological Change, in M. HåRD & A. JAMISON EDS., THE INTELLECTUAL APPROPRIATION OF TECHNOLOGY 17, 24 (1998) (“The introduction of new technologies involves not only new modes of organization of social relations but also a triggering of cultural nerves.”); A. Jamison & M. Hård, The Story-Lines of Technological Change: Innovation, Construction and Appropropriation, 15(1) TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 81, 86-90 (2003) (discussing the cultural appropriation of technology).

[62] Michael H. Shapiro, Lawyers, Judges and Bioethics, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 113, 113 (1997); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002).

[63] Jesper Lassen & Andrew Jamison, Genetic Technologies Meet the Public: The Discourses of Concern, 31(1) SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 8, 27 (2006).

[64] ROBERT POOL, BEYOND ENGINEERING: HOW SOCIETY SHAPES TECHNOLOGY 278-301 (1997); Johan Schot, The Constested Rise of a Modernist Technology Politics, in MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 257, 272-276 (Thomas J. Misa et al eds., 2003).

[65] See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAF CODE § 24185 (2006) (prohibiting human cloning).

[66] According to a 2003 survey in Australia, a majority of Australians agree with the statement “It is important for governments to regulate new technologies”: Michael Gilding & Christine Critchley, Technology and Trust: Public Perceptions of Technological Change in Australia, 1(1) AUST. J. EMERGING TECH. & SOC. 52, 59 (2003).

[67] See generally Tony Honoré, The Dependence of Morality on Law, 13(1) OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993); Gregory N Mandel, Technology Wars: The Failure of Democratic Discourse, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 117 (2005).

[68] See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (1983). On the tendency of government to choose regulation over a ban, see Kieran Tranter, ‘The History of the Haste-Wagons’: The Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law [2005] MelbULawRw 26; 29 MELB. U.L. REV. 843, 867, 878-88 (2005).

[69] Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1262 (1986) (discussing radio, air travel and energy)

[70] E.g. High-Performance Computing Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501 et seq; Pennsylvania Act No. 102 of 1831-1832, summarized in Legislation, 9 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 192 (1833). See also JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 19-30 (2001) (on legal issues surrounding public funding for railroads).

[71] Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 533 n.137 (2005).

[72] For a description of different types of standards, see http://standards.gov/standards_gov/v/Standards/index.cfm

[73] E.g. Lorne Elkin Rozovsky, Legal Aspects of Human and Genetic Engineering, 6 MANITOBA L J 291, 294-95 (1975); JUSTICE MICHAEL KIRBY, THE LAW AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY 12-13 (1982).

[74] E.g. Richard H. Hunderwood & Ronald G. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing, and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion using Hypothetical Cases, 85 KY. L.J. 665 (1996-1997).

[75] E.g. Nancy Blodgett, Computer Law Quicksand: Pioneers in the Burgeoning Field Have Little to Guide Them, 70(11) A.B.A.J. 32 (1984); Robert P. Bigelow, The Challenge of Computer Law, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297 (1985).

[76] See, e.g., Frederick A. Fiedler & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems Of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 593 (1994).

[77] David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 105-06 (1988).

[78] See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 88, 106 (1983) (“The clear cases are those in which there is general agreement that they fall within the scope of a rule.”)

[79] See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How can Law be Determinate?, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990).

[80] Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 472, 494-95 (1987); Kent Greenawalt, How can Law be Determinate?, 38 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1, 86 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-43, 234-35, 254 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 84/ (1988)- Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminancy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989); TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000). This proposition is not beyond dispute. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Legal Theory: Aspects of Deconstruction: The “Easy Case” of the Under Aged President, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 250 (1990); Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1203-1216 (1985). See also Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 13-19 (1984) (arguing that legal doctrine is largely indeterminate).

[81] This seems to be the position taken by Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xiv, 104, 335-39; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, 119-45, 153, 162, 171-72; Ronald Dworkin, On Gaps in the Law, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW’S ONTOLOGY (Paul Amselek & Neil McCormick eds., 1991).

[82] TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 95 (2000).

[83] Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 512-14 (1994).

[84] Id. at 512.

[85] Id. at 515.

[86] Id. at 513; H.P. GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 177 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) at 177 (using the example of not knowing whether a man is bald despite knowing how many hairs he has). This notion of vagueness is similar to H.L.A. Hart’s concept of open texture and the penumbra of uncertainty surrounding legal rules. See H.L.A. Hart, The Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-12 (1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-154 (2nd ed. 1994).

[87] Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 513 (1994).

[88] H.L.A. HART, JHERING'S HEAVEN OF CONCEPTS AND MODERN ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE, IN ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 265, 269-70 (1983) (“It is a feature of the human predicament, not only of the legislator but of anyone who attempts to regulate some sphere of conduct by means of general rules, that he labours under one supreme handicap - the impossibility of foreseeing all possible combinations of circumstances that the future may bring... This means that all legal rules and concepts are "open"; and when an unenvisaged case arises we must make a fresh choice, and in doing so elaborate our legal concepts, adapting them to socially desirable ends.”).

[89] Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 538 (1994).

[90] Id. at 536.

[91] It is irrelevant for current purposes whether this is thought of as uncertainty in the rule itself, or uncertainty as to whether the rule will be ignored in certain situations.

[92] Stephen Munzer, Validity and Legal Conflicts, 82 YALE L.J. 1140, 1140-48 (1973).

[93] Julius Stone itemized these, referring to them as categories of competing reference, the single category with competing versions of reference, the category of concealed circular reference, the category of meaningless reference, and the single category of concealed multiple reference, respectively. See generally JULIUS STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW (1985).

[94] JULIUS STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW 32 (1985).

[95] John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1988).

[96] Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. Rev. 699, 702, 712-13 (1998).

[97] ISAAC F. REDFIELD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF RAILWAYS 1 (1858).

[98] Id.

[99] Id. at 1-2.

[100] Hemmingway v. Fernandes, 13 Simons 228[1842] EngR 1142; , 60 ER 89 (1842). The judge considered himself bound by Spencer’s Case[1572] EngR 170; , 5 Co. Rep. 31b, which held that a covenant by a lessee to build a wall on the premises was binding between the lessor and the assignee of the lessee.

[101] Keppell v. Bailey, [1834] EngR 448; 2 My & K 517, 39 ER 1042, 1048 (1834).

[102] Contrary positions were considered arguable by counsel. See Hemmingway[1842] EngR 1142; , 60 E.R. 89, 92; Keppell, 39 E.R. 1042, 1045.

[103] 14 Ill. 211 (1852).

[104] Id. See also HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850-1880 68-69 (2001).

[105] The requirement that an owner of private property use their land so as not to injure another.

[106] HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850-1880, 68-69 (2001).

[107] The Chicago & Mississippi R.R. Co. v. Patchin, 16 Ill 198, 202 (1854). See HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850-1880, 72-78 (2001).

[108] National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., D.C. Pa. 1980, 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (“It may well be that Judge Charles Clark and the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could not foresee the computer age.”).

[109] 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970).

[110] See, e.g., Leif Gamertsfelder, Electronic Bills of Exchange: Will the Current Law Recognise Them?, 21(2) U. NEW STH. WALES L.J. 566 (1998).

[111] Scott on Computer Law § 7.09[A] (noting a split of opinion on whether software not sold bundled with hardware qualifies as goods for the purposes of the UCC). Cases cited that held variously that it is issue of fact, that it is services and outside UCC, and that it is goods and governed by UCC.

[112] Vincent M. Brannigan & Ruth E. Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective Medical Computer Programs, 7 AM. J. L. AND MED. 123, 130-34, 144 (1981) (concluding that even specially-designed medical computer programs will be treated as products); Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270, 275-9 (1977) (concluding that it would not be appropriate to treat computer programs as products); Scott on Computer Law § 15.09[B] (concluding that only software licensed without significant modification as a standard packaged system is a product, citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons[1991] USCA9 605; , 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991).

[113] Ward v Superior Court, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 206, 208 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).

[114] Note, Sales and Use Tax of Computer Software – Is Software Tangible Personal Property?, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1503 (1980-81).

[115] Tom Allen and Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (for purposes of contract); Leon E. Wein, The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Automation Jurisprudence, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 103 (1992) (for purposes of liability); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1231 (1992) (for purpose of serving as a trustee).

[116].Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989,. at *9.

[117]Id. at *9, *11.

[118]Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2, *3 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), at *2-3.

[119] Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).

[120]Id. at 597.

[121]Id. at 603-04.

[122] Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 612-15 (2005)

[123] Haseldine v. Daw, [1941] 2 K.B. 343, 358, 373 (although, in that case, treatment as a common carrier or occupier did not affect the duty owed).

[124] Howard Schweber, The Creation of American Common Law, 1850-1880 78 (2001).

[125] Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 55-56 (1998).

[126] See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 362 (2003) (“In effect, we not only have two Internets, but two versions of Internet law.”). See also Brett M. Frischmann, The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205 (2003); Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by any other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for New Technologies, 2003 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 403, 425-431 (2003) (discussing the different metaphors which have been used to describe the Internet).

[127] Amir A. Naini, Convergent Technologies and Divergent Patent Validity Doctrines: Obviousness and Disclosure Analyses in Software and Biotechnology, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 541, 543 (2004).

[128] See James W. Ely, Jr., “the railroad system has burst through state limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce: 1830-1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933 (2002-2003); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1206 (1986).

[129] See, e.g., Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1347 (2001) (“Since websites are instantly accessible worldwide, the prospect that a website owner might be haled into a courtroom in a far-off jurisdiction is much more than a mere academic exercise; it is a very real possibility.”); BRIAN FITZGERALD ET AL., JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET 3 [8.1.05] (2004). See also David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); Macquarie Bank v. Berg, [1999] Austl. Def. Rep. 53-035 (Sup. Ct. N.S. Wales 1999) (refusing to grant an injunction to restrain defamation because of concerns about variation in defamation laws across jurisdictions).

[130] See, e.g., Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M: International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological Mother, 5 ANN. HEALTH L. 193, 216 (1996).

[131] This term is borrowed from Michael H. Shapiro, Lawyers, Judges and Bioethics, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 113, 118, 130 (1997).

[132] Two other women are also possible candidates for motherhood, depending on the circumstances: the woman raising the child and the woman co-ordinating or intending the child’s conception.

[133] See Darin Glasser, Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works: Whom, if Anyone, do we Reward?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24 (2001) (discussing copyright in computer-generated fractals). See also John F. Banzhaf III, When a Computer Needs a Lawyer, 71 DICK. L. REV. 240, 240 (1966-1967).

[134] Frederick Waismann, Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE (FIRST SERIES) 122 (Antony G. N. Flew ed. Anchor ed. 1965).

[135] Id.

[136] H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. VII (1994). See also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1958) (using the term “penumbra” instead of “open texture.”). Although the metaphor of the penumbra is usually attributed to Hart, it previously appears in the writings of both Benjamin Cardozo and Glanville Williams. See TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 8 (2000). The difference between Hart and Waismann formulations are referred to in ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 132-34 (1992); Michael Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 201-02 (1981); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 35-36 n.26 (1991).

[137] See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. VII (1994).

[138] H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).

[139] See Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461, 467 (1967) (“Our best informed guesses about what is going to happen next have an uncomfortable habit of missing the mark completely.”); David E. Nye, Technological Prediction: A Promethean Problem, in TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS: THE HOPES AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 159, 161 (Marita Sturken et al eds., 2004) (referring to a study demonstrating the common failure of technology predictions made by experts); ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 191 (1970) (giving examples of dramatic failures of technology prediction); Eugene Volokh, Book Review, Technology and the Future of Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1375-76 (1995).

[140] FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 28–9 (1991).

[141] See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990); CARLOS E. ALCHOURRóN & EUGENIO BULYGIN, NORMATIVE SYSTEMS 78 (1971).

[142] See PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW 4 (2000).

[143] McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS 3, 16-21 (1994).

[144] Id. Cf JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 142-146 (1999)

[145] Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 70-71 (1983). For instance, it has been suggested that a clear, but imprecise rule might increase ease of application. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 264-67 (1974). See also GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE CL TRADITION 447 (“But rules achieve clarity, certainty, and determinateness, at the price of including either more or fewer cases in the legal categories defined by the rules than the rationale underlying the rules calls for”); Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law’s Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (1974) (on negative consequences of attempting to enhance certainty).

[146] See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 67 (1983).

[147] Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357, 378 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1997).

[148] In this sense, Gilmore is wrong to assert that the only problem that a lawmaker should fear is over-inclusiveness. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977) (“With luck, the statute will turn out to have nothing to say that is relevant to the new issues, which can then be decided on their own merits.”) In the absence of a rule, the default norm is permission, not whatever a court thinks it ought to be.

[149] GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 97 (1977)

[150] Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing, and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965 (2004).

[151] 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17, 12201(c).

[152] 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

[153] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Original Compliance Manual, § 902, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html.

[154] Sutton v. United Air Lines, [1999] USSC 61; 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).

[155] Id. at 489-490.

[156] Bragdon v. Abbott, [1998] USSC 77; 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998).

[157] The issue was mentioned in Laws v. Pact, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8473 (N.D. Ill. 2000) at *8-9, but the court did not need to reach a decision. See generally Sheri Mezoff, Note, Forcing a Square Peg Into a Round Hole: The Negative Ramifications of Misaligned Protection for Predisposed Individuals Under the ADA, 85 B.U.L. REV. 323 (2005).

[158] See supra note 16.

[159] JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 182 (2001)

[160] JESSE DUKEMENIER AND JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 830 (4th ed., 1998).

[161] JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 342 (2d ed. 1975).

[162] JESSE DUKEMENIER AND JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 830 (4th ed., 1998).

[163] 3 Mees. & Welsb. 1

[164] Id.

[165] 45 Mass. 49 (1842).

[166] Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974).

[167] PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF BENJAMIN HARRISON 122 (1893).

[168] Report No. 1678

[169] See St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern R.R. Co. v. Taylor, [1908] USSC 126; 210 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1908). (“It is quite conceivable that Congress, contemplating the inevitable hardship of such injuries, and hoping to diminish the economic loss to the community resulting from them, shnoudl deem it wise to impose their burdens upon those who could measurably control their causes, instead of upon those who are in the main helpless in that regard.”)

[170] JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 31 (2004).

[171] C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 281-88, at 596-606 (1954); E FISCH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE, § 851, at 410 (1959).

[172] John R. Brown, Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer’s Collision with Law, 71 YALE L.J. 243, 248 (1961-1962) (referring to the relevant rule as “an anachronism”); Rigdon Reese, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1969-1970).

[173] Rigdon Reese, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1969-1970).

[174] E.g. King v State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 397-99 (Miss. 1969); Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871, 873-75 (1965).

[175] ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 17 (1969). See also FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 135 (enlarged ed 1839) (“if obsolete laws are not abolished by the proper authority, practical life itself, that is, the people, will and must abolish them, or alter them in their application”).

[176] Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 29 U. COLO. L. REV 461 (1967).

[177] Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC. 142 (1919).

[178] Robert C. Berry, Spirits of the Past: Coping with Old Laws, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 24 (1966).

[179] E.g. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE (1969); John R. Brown, Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer’s Collision with Law, 71 YALE L.J. 243, 243-44 (1961-1962).

[180] GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).

[181] E.g. Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking – Judges Who Can’t and Legislatures Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 802 (1963).

[182] THE ZEITGEIST AND THE JUDICIARY IN LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 6 (1st ed. 1939).

[183] These are now illegal in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., D.C. POL. REG: art. 25, par. 16; VA. CODE § 46.2-1079.

[184] A similar categorization appears in David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 71 (2001-2002).

[185] See Gregory E. Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip By Any Other Name Would Still Be a Potato: The Failure of the Law and its Definitions to Keep Pace with Computer Technology, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 797, 824 (1993).

[186] Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as 17 U.S.C. 1001-1010 (2000))

[187] See generally Aaron L. Melville, The Future of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: Has it Survived the Millennium Bug?, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372 (2001). For a case indicating the limitations of the Audio Home Recording Act, see Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia System, Inc., [1984] USSC 14; 180 F.3d 1072 (1999).

[188] Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 335 (1986) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 901-914). See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 452 (2004); Morton D. Goldberg, Semiconductor Chip Protection as a Case Study, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 329, 323 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993).

[189] E.g. Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 993 (1995); CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 131-32 (1996). Sunstein gives two examples: (1) the development of automated teller machines and prohibitions on branch banking, and (2) the rise of cable television and regulations designed for a small number of networks. See also R v. Iby, [2005] NSWCCA 178; 63 N.S.W.L.R. 278, [63] (New South Wales, Australia 2005) (“The born alive rule is, as I have indicated above, a product of primitive medical knowledge and technology and of the high rate of infant mortality characteristic of a long past era.”)

[190] Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 256 (2006).

[191] John M. Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the American Law of Evidence, 16 S. Cal. L. Rev. 161, 164-65 (1943).

[192] Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling The Puzzles Of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 50 (2003).

[193] Stats. 1980, ch. 1310, § 1 (effective September 30, 1980). The rule is currently codified in Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7540-41. Other states have made similar amendments. See Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling The Puzzles Of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 59-60 (2003).

[194] See e.g. Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246 (2006).

[195] JAMES MORTON HERRING & GERALD C. CROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 246 (1936).

[196] DAVID LOTH & MORRIS L. ERNST, THE TAMING OF TECHNOLOGY 127 (1972).

[197] Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 874 (2004).

[198] See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS chh 5, 12 (2001).

[199] Id. at 874, 898-99.

[200] Id. at 875-76.

[201] Id. at 878.

[202] See generally id.

[203] See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Public and Private Control, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2007 (2003).

[204] This example is cited in G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 243-44 (1982).

[205] The HALF LIFE OF POLICY RATIONALES: HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY AFFECTS OLD POLICY ISSUES (Fred E. Foldvary & Daniel B. Klein eds. 2003). The book gives numerous examples of how technology has reduced transaction costs, increased complexity, and reduced centralization and the need for monopolies.

[206] E.g. John Kelsey and Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copyrights, First Monday, June 1999. Enhanced copyright regimes, such Digital Millennium Copyright Act, are less susceptible to these problems, although are only effective due to the inability of most users to break through the protection measures.

[207] Examples of supplements that have been undetectable, at least temporarily, are tetrahydrogestrinone, human growth hormone, and erythropoietin. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetrahydrogestrinone; David Galluzzi, The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition: Lessons from the Chinese Doping Scandal in Women's Swimming, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 65, 93 n. 222 (2000).

[208] New York Times, March 27, 1992, A19; New York Times, April 19, 2002, at § 4, p 2. See, now, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006).

[209] See generally Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change, (2007) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming).

[210] Technological neutrality is not necessarily a good thing: Alberto Escudero-Pascual & Ian Hosein, The Hazards of Technology-Neutral Policy: Questioning Lawful Access to Traffic Data, 47 COMMUNICATIONS OF ACM 77 (2004). There may also be situations where technology neutrality is not an appropriate goal. As the Earl of Northesk stated during the House of Lords debate on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: “One of the many difficulties I have with the Bill is that, in its strident efforts to be technology neutral, it often conveys the impression that either it is ignorant of the way in which current technology operates, or pretends that there is no technology at all.”: UK Hansard, HL, 28 June 2000, Col. 1012.

[211] A search on LexisNexis on June 11, 2006 in the category of US and Canadian Law Reviews for “technolog! w/2 neutral” found 506 articles, of which exactly one hundred used those terms in a different context.

[212] Two articles that consider the issue of technological neutrality in some detail are Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation be Technology-Neutral, in BERT-JAAP KOOPS ET AL EDS., STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION. DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS, 9 IT & LAW SERIES 77 (2006); Ysolde Gendreau, A Technologically Neutral Solution for the Internet: Is it Wishful Thinking, in COPYRIGHT IN THE NEW DIGITAL ERA: THE NEED TO REDESIGN COPYRIGHT (Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans eds., 2002).

[213] The federal government of Australia committed itself to a technologically neutral approach to e-commerce regulation on this basis. Explanatory Memorandum, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Electronic Transactions Bill, 1999 (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/billsnet/1e99131.pdf ("technology neutrality means that the law should not discriminate between different forms of technology").

[214] E.g. Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism in Telecommunication Regulations?, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 130, 149-150 (2005).

[215] E.g. Adam White Scoville, Clear Signatures, Obscure Signs, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 373-74 (1999).

[216] Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation be Technology-Neutral, in BERT-JAAP KOOPS ET AL EDS., STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION. DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS, 9 IT & LAW SERIES 77 (2006) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227).

[217] See, e.g., Jennifer A. Manner, Achieving the Goal of Universal Access to Telecommunications Services Globally, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 85, 100 (2005).

[218] See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1268-69 (1981).

[219] E.g. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector's Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 390 (2001).

[220] See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1281 (1981).

[221] Marcus, J. Scott, "Beyond Layers" (May 9, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901477.

[222] Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1359 (2001) (“'Technology neutral" in this context refers to statutory tests or guidelines that do not depend upon a specific development or state of technology, but rather are based on core principles that can be adapted to changing technologies.”) This seems to have been the aim of Congress in S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 36 (legislation designed to avoid “Congress from having to revisit this issue almost annually in order to keep pace with the rapidly changing technological world.”). A similar point is made in White House Report, US Framework for Global Electronic Commerce of 1997, at 4 (“government attempts to regulate are likely to be outmoded by the time they are finally enacted, especially to the extent such regulations are technology-specific.”)

[223] Lionel Bently, Copyright and the Victorian Internet: Telegraphic Property Laws in Colonial Australia, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 71, 175-76 (2004). See also Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1630-38 (2003) (discussing whether there is a need for different treatment for different industries in patent law).

[224] See supra note 146.

[225] See Richard W. Downing, Shoring Up the Weakest Link: What Lawmakers Around the World Need to Consider in Developing Comprehensive Laws to Combat Cybercrime, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705, 716-19 (2005).

[226] See generally JAMES MORTON HERRING & GERALD C. CROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND REGULATION (1936).

[227] Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation be Technology-Neutral, in BERT-JAAP KOOPS ET AL EDS., STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION. DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS, 9 IT & LAW SERIES 77 (2006).

[228] E.g. David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 85 (2001-2002) (“If legal rules are defined in sufficient breadth, legal innovation is never necessary”).

[229] See generally EDWARD L RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005)

[230] EDWARD L RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE ch 2 (2005)

[231] Edward L Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381 (1989).

[232] Edward L Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 369 (1989).

[233] See generally PANEL ON TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE IV.B.3 (1969).

[234] CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 30-31 (3rd ed 2003)

[235] Edward L Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 399, 410, 414 (1989).

[236] David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1252-1260 (1985); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983).

[237] Edward L Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 415-16 (1989).

[238] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, [1984] USSC 140; 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).

[239] Id. at 843-44.

[240] Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is[2006] YaleLawJl 14; , 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2595 (2006).

[241] Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).

[242] Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989 (1999). See also generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).

[243] See generally Arthur Cockfield, Towards a Theory of Law and Technology, 30 MANITOBA L.J. 383 (2004).

[244] GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)

[245] See Arthur Cockfield, Towards a Theory of Law and Technology, 30 MANITOBA L.J. 383 (2004) (using the terms “conservative” and “liberal” in place of “rigid” and “flexible”); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).

[246] See generally, Lyria Bennett Moses, Adapting the Law to Technological Change: A Comparison of Common Law and Legislation, 26(2) U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 394 (2003).

[247] See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247 (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-12; TWINING AND MYERS, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES 267, 319 (2nd ed. 1982); Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1941); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1948); HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 126 (William M. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994) (stating that the “ratio decidendi is not imprisoned in any single set of words; and this gives it a flexibility which the statute does not have”); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 78-79 (1999). This may explain why the benefits of common law over statutory regulation have been noted in scholarship in the areas of both Internet law and biomedical law: e.g. ROGER B DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING (1996); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 309 (2002); Note, Thomas K. Richards, The Internet and Decisional Institutions: The Structural Advantages of Online Common Law Regulation, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 731 (2000).

[248] FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 178 (1991).

[249] See EDWARD H LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949); Cass R Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 (1993). See also Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1996) (describing the process of common law reasoning by analogy as comprising (1) abduction which is the search for an analogy-warranting rule, (2) confirmation which involves a kind of reflective equilibrium between the proposed rule, prior examples, and rationales for the proposed rule, and (3) application).

[250] See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 179-80 (1991).

[251] P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 418-19 (1987). Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, SSRN Research Paper No. 2005-6 (2005).

[252] Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1012 (1997).

[253] See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48-49, 298 (1990) (expressing the view that flexibility in this regard was a question of judicial temperament).

[254] MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 3 (1977).

[255] See generally P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987).

[256] Calabresi’s concept of obsolescence is different to the one used here, and in particular it it was not limited to obsolescence resulting from technological change. He regarded a statute as obsolete if (1) it no longer “fit” with the “current legal landscape,” and (2) it has (in the court’s view) ceased to enjoy majority support.

[257] GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 82, 164 (1982). See also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 97 (1977).

[258] GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7, 46, 73 (1982).

[259] Commentary on Calibresi’s approach includes Samuel Estreicher, Review Essay, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126 (1982); Abner J Mikva, Book Review, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534 (1982); Robert Weisberg, Essay, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983). In support of Calabresi’s proposal, see Dan Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769, 828 (1984).

[260] Hutchinson & Morgan, Calabresian Sunset, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1982); Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 541 (1982); Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1129 (1982); Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist. Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 257 (1983). The concept of legitimacy has been criticized: EDWARD L RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE ch 5 (2005).

[261] See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 514-15 (2005).

[262] E.g. David R Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), available at http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (in relation to the Internet).

[263] See Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1888, 1896 (2001) (“It is much less the case that technological change eliminates either the need for law or reduces the capacity for establishing and enforcing norms to nothingness.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (1980) (“Social circumstances continually change, but it is wrong to suppose that the substantive principles of the legal system should change in response to new social conditions”).

[264] Compare George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 9, 9-13 (1999) and Ronald M. Green & Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 571 (1998) with Douglas H. Ginsburg, Genetics and Privacy, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 17, 22-23 (1999).

[265] Compare David R Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) and Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744–5 (1995) with Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000) and Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996). See also Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different? 19 PACE L. REV. 41 (1998); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT L. REV. 993 (1994).

[266] Compare comments in supra note 20 with ALAN LESLIE, THE LAW OF TRANSPORT BY RAILWAY 1 (2nd ed. 1928).

[267] See Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 256-65 (1980) (citing examples of cases where a judge treated a rule as obsolete and discarded it despite the fact that no social change affected the justification for the original rule).

[268] See, e.g., Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. AND MED. 1 (2002).