Caldwell, Jillian --- "Protecting Privacy Post Lenah: Should the Courts Establish a New Tort or Develop Breach of Confidence?" [2003] UNSWLawJl 4; (2003) 26(1) UNSW Law Journal 90
[*] BA/LLB (Hons), Australian National University. This paper is an amended version of my Honours thesis.
[1] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 258 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
[2] [1937] HCA 45; (1937) 58 CLR 479.
[3] See, eg, Greg Taylor, ‘Why is there No Common Law Right of Privacy?’ [2000] MonashULawRw 10; (2000) 26 Monash University Law Review 235, 237; Megan Richardson, ‘Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law’ [1994] MelbULawRw 7; (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 673, 675; Gerald Dworkin, ‘The Common Law Protection of Privacy’ [1967] UTasLawRw 4; (1967) 2 University of Tasmania Law Review 418.
[4] Taylor, above n 3, 268.
[6] For other analyses of Lenah, see Megan Richardson, ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for Australia?’ [2002] MelbULawRw 20; (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 381; William Heath, ‘Possum Processing, Picture Pilfering, Publication and Privacy: Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd’ [2002] MonashULawRw 8; (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 162; Daniel Stewart, ‘Protecting Privacy, Property, and Possums: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2002] FedLawRw 1; (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 1; David Lindsay, ‘Protection of Privacy Under the General Law Following ABC v Lenah Game Meats: Where to Now?’ (2002) 9(6) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 101; Jonathan Morton, ‘Common Law Right to Privacy Moves Closer in Australia’ (2001) 8(7) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 144.
[7] Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 The Yale Law Journal 421, 442.
[8] Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976). It entered into force in Australia 13 November 1980. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), 3 UN GAOR, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/217A (III) (1948), art 12; Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 26 January 1990, 28 ILM 1448, art 16 (entered into force 2 September 1990); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, art 8 (entered into force 3 June 1952); American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 November 1969, 9 ILM 673, art 11 (entered into force 18 July 1978).
[9] See Hans Stoll, ‘The General Right to Personality in German Law: An Outline of its Development and Present Significance’ in Basil Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 29; John Craig and Nico Nolte, ‘Privacy and Free Speech in Germany and Canada: Lessons for an English Privacy Tort’ (1998) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 162; Basil Markesinis, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany’ (1999) 115 The Law Quarterly Review 47; Taylor, above n 3, 247–56.
[10] See Étienne Picard, ‘The Right to Privacy in French Law’ in Basil Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 49.
[11] See John Craig, ‘Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens’ (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 355; Craig and Nolte, above n 9.
[12] See below Part I(A).
[13] Ibid.
[14] See below Part II(A).
[15] Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Clarke JA, 13 October 1993) [14].
[16] Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 354.
[17] For analysis of the incidental protection of privacy in Australia, see Taylor, above n 3, 240–7; John Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998) 664–8; Stephen Todd, ‘Protection of Privacy’ in Nicholas Mullany (ed), Torts in the Nineties (1997) 174, 196–204; Peter Bailey, Human Rights: Australia in an International Context (1990) 272–3; William Morison, Parliament of New South Wales, Report on the Law of Privacy, Parl Paper No 170 (1973) 15–20; Haddon Storey, ‘Infringement of Privacy and its Remedies’ (1973) 47 The Australian Law Journal 498, 503–5; Dworkin, above n 3, 437–45.
[18] Taylor, above n 3, 242–3; Edward Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New York University Law Review 962, 978–81.
[19] Truth alone is a defence in the NT, SA, WA and Vic. In other jurisdictions, publication must also be in the ‘public benefit’: Defamation Act 1901 (ACT) s 6; Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) s 15; Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) s 15, or in the ‘public interest’: Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 15(2). See Michael Gillooly, The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand (1998) 104–23.
[20] Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth).
[21] Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 7B(1).
[22] Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 7B(4).
[23] Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 7B(3).
[24] Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 6C(1), 7(1)(ee).
[25] Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Courts and Policy: The Exciting Australian Scene’ (1993) 10 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1794, 1798.
[26] See, eg, Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘Continuity and Judicial Creativity – Some Observations’ [1997] UNSWLawJl 16; (1997) 20(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 145; Justice Michael McHugh, ‘The Judicial Method’ (1999) 73 The Australian Law Journal 37; Kirby, above n 25.
[27] Mabo v Queensland [No 2] [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 (Brennan J, with whom Mason CJ and McHugh J concurred).
[28] See, eg, R v L [1991] HCA 48; (1991) 174 CLR 379, in which the High Court overturned the presumption that there was irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse within marriage.
[29] Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Privacy and the Community (2001) [1].
[30] See, eg, Raymond Wacks, ‘Introduction’ in Raymond Wacks (ed), Privacy (1993) vol 1, x; Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Afairs 295; Raymond Wacks, ‘The Poverty of “Privacy”’ (1980) 96 The Law Quarterly Review 73; Stanley Benn, ‘The Protection and Limitation of Privacy’ (1978) 52 The Australian Law Journal 601.
[31] Gavison, above n 7, 424–7; Benn, above n 30, 601–3; Wacks, ‘Introduction’, above n 30, xii–xiii.
[32] Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2nd ed, 1888) cited in David Leebron, ‘The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law’ (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 769, 781.
[33] Gavison, above n 7.
[34] William Parent, ‘A New Definition of Privacy for the Law’ (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 305.
[35] Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 205.
[36] See, eg, Richard Posner, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 398.
[37] See Raymond Wacks, Personal Information (1989) 19; Wacks, ‘Introduction’, above n 30, xv.
[38] See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report No 11 (1979); Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy, Report No 22 (1983); Todd, above n 17, 178; Wacks, Personal Information, above n 37, 19–28; Gavin Phillipson and Helen Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 660, 662–3; Jane Wright, Tort Law and Human Rights (2001) 163.
[39] A discussion of whether corporations should be entitled to privacy rights is beyond the scope of this paper.
[40] Wacks, Personal Information, above n 37, 26; Wacks, ‘Introduction’, above n 30, xvi.
[41] See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, above n 38, [231]–[247]; Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy, above n 38, [930]–[931].
[42] But see Wright, above n 38, 181–2; Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 56–9.
[43] Daniel Laster, ‘Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Confidential Information’ [1989] OtaLawRw 5; (1989) 7 Otago Law Review 31; Daniel Laster, ‘Commonalities between Breach of Confidence and Privacy’ (1990) 14 New Zealand Universities Law Review 144; Wacks, Personal Information, above n 37, 125–34.
[44] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 328 (Callinan J).
[45] Diane Zimmerman, ‘“Requiem for a Heavyweight”: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort’ (1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 291, 292, 365–6; Taylor, above n 3, 259.
[46] Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716; Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. For judicial expressions of support for the tort, see Hobson v Harding (1994) 1 HRNZ 342; T v Attorney-General [1988] NZHC 656; (1988) 5 NZFLR 357, 378; Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (1992) 3 NZBORR 183, 189. See also Rosemary Tobin, ‘Invasion of Privacy’ (2000) New Zealand Law Journal 216; John Burrows, ‘Privacy’ in Stephen Todd (ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1997) 951; John Katz, ‘Sex, Lies, Videotapes and Telephone Conversations: The Common Law of Privacy from a New Zealand Perspective’ (1995) 17 European Intellectual Property Review 6.
[47] See above Introduction.
[48] Abernethy v Hutchinson [1825] EngR 653; (1824) 3 LJ Ch 209; Prince Albert v Strange [1849] EngR 261; (1849) 18 LJ Ch 120; Morison v Moat (1851) 20 LJ Ch 513. See Part II.
[49] Warren and Brandeis, above n 35, 193.
[50] Zimmerman, above n 45, 292.
[51] William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389.
[52] This tort largely protects reputation and financial interests, rather than privacy. In Australia, the tort of defamation will usually cover intrusive conduct actionable under this category, particularly in those jurisdictions in which truth is not a complete defence. See Harry Kalven, ‘Privacy in Tort Law – Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 332; Todd, above n 17, 178; Dworkin, above n 3, 420.
[53] This is more accurately characterised as a ‘right of publicity’ than a privacy right, for the conduct it proscribes usually amounts to depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to commercially exploit his or her own name or likeness. Such conduct is generally actionable in Australia under the tort of passing off. See Melville Nimmer, ‘The Right of Publicity’ (1954) 19 Law and Contemporary Problems 203; David Bedingfield, ‘Privacy or Publicity? The Enduring Confusion Surrounding the American Tort of Invasion of Privacy’ (1992) 55 The Modern Law Review 111, 114.
[54] The tort protects what is often described as the archetypal privacy interest of being ‘let alone’, receiving some protection under the common law of trespass and nuisance. This interest also receives some protection under statutes imposing criminal liability for the interception of telecommunications and postal communications: Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt VIIA, and for stalking and harassment: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 562AE; Criminal Code (Qld) s 359A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AA; Criminal Code (Tas) s 192; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A; Criminal Code (WA) ss 338D, 338E. However, as gaps in the law remain, Australian courts should consider whether this tort should be received into the common law.
[55] For critiques of Prosser’s classification, see Bloustein, above n 18, 962; Hyman Gross, ‘The Concept of Privacy’ (1967) 42 New York University Law Review 34, 46–53; Laster, ‘Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Confidential Information’, above n 43, 61.
[56] §§ 652A–E (1977).
[57] Zimmerman, above n 45, 299; Dworkin, above n 3, 422. See, eg, Time Inc v Hill, [1967] USSC 11; 385 US 374, 383 (1967); Cox Broadcasting Co v Cohn, [1975] USSC 44; 420 US 469, 488 (1975); Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, [1977] USSC 148; 433 US 562, 571–3 (1977).
[58] Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 423–4; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 601–2.
[59] Prosser, above n 51, 392–8.
[60] Werdner Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed, 1984) 857; Burrows, above n, 46, 967; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 601–2.
[61] See, eg, Todd, above n 17, 184–6; Zimmerman, above n 45, 350–62 and cases cited therein; Kalven, above n 52, 335–7 and cases cited therein; Bedingfield, above n 53, 113–14.
[62] Roderick Bagshaw, ‘Obstacles on the Path to Privacy Torts’ in Peter Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty (1997) 133, 141; Kalven, above n 52, 334–5.
[63] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(a) (1977).
[64] Zimmerman, above n 45, 337.
[65] Bloustein, above n 18, 979. For a critique of this approach, see Zimmerman, above n 45, 338–41.
[66] Cases in which individuals have been liable include: Brents v Morgan, 221 Ky 765 (Ky App, 1927) (shop owner placed poster announcing the plaintiff’s debt in main street window); Biederman ’s of Springfield Inc v Wright, 322 SW 2d 892 (Mo, 1959) (debt collector vocally demanded payment at plaintiff’s workplace on repeated occasions); Lambert v Dow Chemical Company, 215 So 2d 673 (La App, 1968) (company showed photographs of injured employee to other employees) cited in Zimmerman, above n 45, 300.
[67] Bagshaw, above n 62, 133, 141; Todd, above n 17, 181; Kalven, above n 52, 334–5.
[68] Todd, above n 17, 181.
[69] In this context, negligence denotes a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent publication, where publication was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions: Gillooly, above n 19, 76–7.
[70] Todd, above n 17, 181.
[71] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(b) (1977); Prosser, above n 51, 395–6.
[72] Parent, above n 34, 307.
[73] Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652D, 652D(b); Prosser, above n 51, 395–6.
[74] David Anderson, ‘The Failure of American Privacy Law’ in Basil Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 139, 157–9.
[75] [1975] USSC 44; 420 US 469 (1975).
[76] See also Florida Star v BJF, [1989] USSC 123; 105 L Ed 2d 443 (US Fla, 1989).
[77] Prosser, above n 51, 396; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(k) (1977). See Melvin v Reid, 112 Cal App 285, 297 (Cal App 4 Dist, 1931) (a former prostitute who had been acquitted for murder was granted relief after a film publicised her name and whereabouts several years later). This approach may now be unconstitutional following Cox Broadcasting Co v Cohn, [1975] USSC 44; 420 US 469 (1975).
[78] (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Jeffries J, 20 October 1968) (interlocutory judgment); (Unreported, Court of Appeal of New Zealand, 23 October 1986) (interlocutory appeal judgment); [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (trial judgment).
[79] Tucker (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Jeffries J, 20 October 1086) quoted in Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 732. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision: Tucker (Unreported, Court of Appeal of New Zealand, 23 October 1986) quoted in Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 732.
[80] Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 735.
[81] Ibid 735–6.
[82] Wilkins v National Broadcasting Company, 71 Cal App 4th 1066 (Cal App 4 Dist, 1999); Dempsey v National Enquirer, 702 F Supp 927 (D Me, 1988) cited in Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, ‘Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 305, 310.
[83] Mark v Seattle Times, 635 P 2d 1081 (Wash, 1981); Jacova v Southern Radio and Television Company, 83 So 2d 34 (Fla, 1955) cited in Paton-Simpson, above n 82, 310.
[84] Fogel v Forbes Inc, 500 F Supp 1081 (DC Pa, 1980) cited in Paton-Simpson, above n 82, 310.
[85] Jarrett v Butts, 379 SE 2d 583 (Ga App, 1989) cited in Paton-Simpson, above n 82, 310.
[86] Keeton et al, above n 60, 859. See below Part I(A)(3)(a) for a discussion of the ‘public interest’ defence.
[88] Bradley [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 423, cited with approval in Morgan v TVNZ (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Holland J, 1 March 1990) and C v Wilson and Horton Ltd (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Williams J, 27 May 1992) cited in Burrows, above n 46, 965. Justice Gallen noted, however, that the extent of the tort should be regarded with caution due to the importance of freedom of expression: Bradley [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 423.
[89] Bradley [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 424.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Prosser, above n 51, 396; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(c) (1977).
[92] 113 F 2d 806 (CA 2, 1940).
[93] Sidis v F-R Publishing Co, 113 F 2d 806, 807, 809 (CA 2, 1940).
[94] Bradley [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 424.
[96] P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 601.
[97] Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, ‘Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of Privacy by the Publication of “Private Facts”’ (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review 318, 322–3; Bagshaw, above n 62, 139.
[98] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(d)–(i) (1977); Prosser, above n 51, 410–11.
[99] Prosser, above n 51, 411.
[100] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(h) (1977).
[101] Zimmerman, above n 45, 353; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(g) (1977).
[102] 69 USLW 4323 (2001).
[103] See also Florida Star v BJF, [1989] USSC 123; 491 US 524 (1989); New York Times Co v United States, [1971] USSC 145; 403 US 713 (1964).
[104] Zimmerman, above n 45, 351. See also Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 113; Kalven, above n 52, 336; Bedingfield, above n 53, 114; Taylor, above n 3, 262.
[105] Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 735.
[106] P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 603.
[107] Ibid 602.
[108] Prosser, above n 51, 419–20; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652F(b) (1977). See, eg, McCabe v Village Voice Inc, 550 F Supp 525 (DC Pa, 1982).
[109] Warren and Brandeis, above n 35, 216; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652F, 652G (1977); Prosser, above n 51, 421.
[110] For absolute privileges available under defamation law, see Gillooly, above n 19, 149–68.
[111] [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520.
[112] Gillooly, above n 19, 169–220.
[113] Prosser, above n 51, 419; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 602; Tucker (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Jeffries J, 20 October 1986) quoted in Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 732; Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 735. Cf the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that the defence of justification may require consideration: Tucker (Unreported, Court of Appeal of New Zealand, 23 October 1986) quoted in Tucker [1986] NZHC 216; [1986] 2 NZLR 716, 732.
[114] Prosser, above n 51, 409.
[115] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977); Prosser, above n 51, 409.
[116] Gino Dal Pont, Don Chalmers and Julie Maxton, Equity and Trusts: Commentary and Materials (2nd ed, 2000) 902–3.
[117] Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 691.
[118] [1937] HCA 45; (1937) 58 CLR 479.
[119] The last case in which the High Court considered Victoria Park prior to Lenah was Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414, 444–6. Although that case did not involve privacy, the Court’s acceptance of the reasoning underpinning Victoria Park had been interpreted as upholding the principle that no privacy right exists in Australia: Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704, 706–7.
[120] Victoria Park [1937] HCA 45; (1937) 58 CLR 479, 495–6.
[121] John Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998) 664–8.
[122] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 220–1, 236–7, 291–3.
[123] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 293.
[124] Ibid 214, 234–5, 293–4.
[125] Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1999] TASSC 114.
[126] Justice McHugh did not sit.
[127] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 248–9.
[128] Ibid 249 citing Morison, above n 17, [12]. See also S Skala, ‘Is There a Legal Right to Privacy?’ [1977] UQLawJl 8; (1977) 10 University of Queensland Law Journal 127, 136; Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, above n 38, [216].
[129] Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967, 1001 quoted in Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256. See below Part II(A)(2)(b) for a discussion of this case.
[130] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(b) (1977) quoted in Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 258.
[131] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256.
[132] See International News Service v The Associat ed Press[1918] USSC 191; , 248 US 215 (1918).
[133] Victoria Park [1937] HCA 45; (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509–10.
[134] [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414.
[135] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 252.
[136] Ibid 250.
[137] Ibid 258. See the quote commencing the above Introduction.
[138] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225. See below Part II(B) for an analysis of Chief Justice Gleeson’s approach.
[139] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225.
[140] Ibid 226. See also Justice Gaudron’s comment in argument that the right to privacy is aimed at protecting individual dignity. She assumes that there are ‘essentially private’ matters that can be identified: Transcript of Proceedings, Lenah (High Court of Australia, Gaudron J, 3 April 2001) 101, 78.
[141] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225–6.
[142] Ibid 277.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid 279. For discussions of the relationship between art 17 and Australian law, see GS v News Limited (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-466, 64,897, 64,913–64,915 and Terry Gygar, ‘At Last – Enforceable Privacy Rights in Australia? The Potential for Treaties to Give Protection Against Uninvited Media Attention’ (2000) 12 Bond Law Review 192.
[145] Transcript of Proceedings, Lenah (High Court of Australia, Kirby J, 3 April 2001) 106. See, eg, Privacy Act RSBC 1979, c 336 (British Columbia, Canada); Privacy Act RSM 1987, c P125 (Manitoba, Canada); Privacy Act RSN 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland, Canada) and Privacy Act RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan, Canada). See Craig, above n 11; Craig and Nolte, above n 9, 166.
[146] Transcript of Proceedings, Lenah (High Court of Australia, Kirby J, 3 April 2001) 109.
[147] Ibid 62–3, 106.
[148] Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (2000) 11 quoted in Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 324.
[149] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 326–7.
[150] Ibid 322.
[151] Ibid 323.
[152] Ibid 299–309.
[153] Ibid 324–6.
[154] Ibid 328. See the quote commencing above Part I.
[155] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 328–30.
[156] Ibid 327.
[157] Ibid 328.
[158] Ibid. Note that on the basis of the above dicta of the Justices in Lenah, a judge of the District Court of Queensland, Skoien SJ, recently held that a tort of invasion of privacy exists in Australia. He saw the privacy tort as a ‘logical and desirable step’ towards meeting changing circumstances in Australia and awarded the plaintiff, the Mayor of Maroochy Shire, $178 000 in damages for invasions of her privacy by a former lover: Grosse v Purvis (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Skoien SJ, 16 June 2003) [415]–[447], [471]–[484]. It remains to be seen whether this decision will be endorsed by higher courts.
[159] Ibid 225 (Gleeson CJ).
[160] Francis Gurry, Breach of Confidence (1984); Roger Toulson and Charles Phipps, Confidentiality (1996); James Kearney, The Action for Breach of Confidence in Australia (1985); Roderick Meagher, Dyson Heydon and Mark Leeming, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002) 1109–42.
[161] Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 49.
[162] Abernethy v Hutchinson [1825] EngR 653; (1824) 3 LJ Ch 209; Prince Albert v Strange [1849] EngR 261; (1849) 18 LJ Ch 120; Morison v Moat (1851) 20 LJ Ch 513. See Kearney, above n 160, 5.
[163] Gurry, above n 160, 25. See also Toulson and Phipps, above n 160, 19; Peter Radan, Cameron Stewart and Andrew Lynch, Equity and Trusts (2001) 237–41; Gareth Jones, ‘Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another’s Confidence’ (1970) 86 The Law Quarterly Review 463; United Kingdom Law Commission, Breach of Confidence, Cmnd 8388 (1981) [3.1].
[164] Litholite Ltd v Travis and Insulators Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 266, 532; Lamb v Evans [1892] UKLawRpCh 171; (1893) 1 Ch 218; Seager v Copydex [1967] 2 All ER 415. See also Gurry, above n 160, 28–36; Kearney, above n 160, 22– 5; Radan, Stewart and Lynch, above n 163, 23 8–9.
[165] See, eg, Prince Albert v Strange [1849] EngR 261; (1849) 18 LJ Ch 120 (although equity was also cited as a basis for relief); Exchange Telegraph Co (Ltd) v Howard (1906) 22 TLR 375 cited in Gurry, above n 160, 50–1.
[166] Two senior judges have recently referred to the action as both a tort and equitable cause of action: Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430, 447–8, 462 (Butler-Sloss P); Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967, 998–1001 (Sedley LJ). See also United Kingdom Law Commission, above n 163, [6.5] (proposed the enactment of a statutory tort of breach of confidence); Peter North ‘Breach of Confidence: Is There a New Tort?’ (1972) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 149; Gurry, above n 160, 56–7.
[167] Gurry, above n 160, 58–61; Kearney, above n 160, 21. See also LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14, 74.
[168] See, eg, A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 202; Dal Pont, Chalmers and Maxton, above n 116; Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1112; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 48.
[169] Schering Chemicals v Falkman [1981] 2 WLR 848, 869.
[170] See, eg, R v Department of Health; Ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] QB 424, 439; Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 439, 361; Laster, ‘Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Confidential Information’, above n 43, 35; George Wei, ‘Surreptitious Takings of Confidential Information’ (1992) 12 Legal Studies 302, 304; Radan, Stewart and Lynch, above n 163, 240; Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1117.
[171] Dal Pont, Chalmers and Maxton, above n 116, 173–90; Radan, Stewart and Lynch, above n 163, 242–7. Artistic and literary information has also received some protection: Gurry, above n 160, 10 1–2.
[172] Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 674.
[173] William Wilson, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Press Freedom: A Study in Judicial Activism’ (1990) 53 The Modern Law Review 43, 45. See, eg, Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell (1948) 65 RPC 203, 215.
[174] Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752, 770–1; Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39, 51; Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1135–6; Gurry, above n 160, 103–8.
[175] Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47 approved by the House of Lords in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.
[176] Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell (1948) 65 RPC 203, 215. See also Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 282; Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760, 764.
[177] Bunn v British Broadcasting Corporation [1998] 3 All ER 552.
[178] Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 260, 276, 290, 293.
[179] Ibid 260. See also Schering Chemicals v Falkman [1981] 2 WLR 848, 870; Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449, 454; Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444, 456.
[180] Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 674.
[181] See, eg, British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] 2 WLR 310, 319; Home Ofice v Harman [1981] 2 WLR 310, 319, 328, 330; Riddick v Thomas Board Mills Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 677, 689 cited in Gurry, above n 160, 13.
[182] Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48.
[183] See, eg, Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449, 454 (details of a sexual relationship not trivial tittle-tattle), applied in Michael Barrymore v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 600.
[184] [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 206.
[185] See below Part II(A)(2)(b).
[186] A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 206.
[187] [2002] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003] 2 WLR 80.
[188] Campbell [2002] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003] 2 WLR 80, 95–6.
[189] Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 670.
[190] Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell (1948) 65 RPC 203, 213 (Lord Greene MR). See Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 670; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 53.
[191] Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48. For critiques of the reasonableness standard in this context, see Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1112–13; Deta Nominees Pty v Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd [1979] VicRp 17; [1979] VR 167, 191.
[192] Malone v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] 1 Ch 344, 361.
[193] [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967.
[194] Douglas [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967, 984, 998. See also Spencer v United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR CD 172. Cf Douglas [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967, 1012.
[195] See, eg, Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] 1 Ch 302, 330.
[196] Wilson, above n 173, 50.
[197] Laster, ‘Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Confidential Information’, above n 43, 39.
[198] Wright, above n 38, 179–81; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 59–71; Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-examination’ (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 447, 450–2; Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 670–2; Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1117–19.
[200] Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449, 482.
[201] Ibid.
[202] [1990] 1 AC 109.
[203] Ibid 281.
[205] Ibid 462.
[206] See Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 671; Wright, above n 38, 179–180; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 66–71.
[207] [1913] UKLawRpCh 80; [1913] 2 Ch 469.
[208] Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] UKLawRpCh 80; [1913] 2 Ch 469, 475. For other early cases adopting this approach, see Exchange Telegraph v Howard (1906) 22 TLR 375; Abernethy v Hutchinson [1825] EngR 653; (1825) 2 LJ Ch 219.
[209] Douglas [2003] EWHC 786 Ch (Unreported, Lindsay J, 11 April 2003) [227]–[228]. Note, however, that Lindsay J characterised the Douglas wedding as a valuable trade secret and analysed breach of confidence law accordingly. For other cases in which the improper means approach has been endorsed, see Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444, 453 and Shelley Films v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134 (surreptitious photographs taken of film shoots).
[210] Gurry, above n 160, 13–15; Megan Richardson, ‘Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law’ [1994] MelbULawRw 7; (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 673; Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy’, above n 198; Ng-Loy Wee Loon, ‘Emergence of a Right to Privacy from within the Law of Confidence’ (1996) 18 European Intellectual Property Review 307; Radan, Stewart and Lynch, above n 163, 257–60.
[212] Ibid 807. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Ng-Loy Wee Loon, above n 210.
[214] R v Department of Health; Ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] QB 424, 440. See also Guardian Newspapers [1990] 1 AC 109, 255.
[215] Douglas [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967, 984–5, 1001, 1011–12.
[216] Douglas [2003] EWHC 786 Ch (Unreported, Lindsay J, 11 April 2003) [186] (provides a summary of the cases in which the privacy approach has been adopted).
[217] [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195.
[218] European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 June 1952). See Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) ch 42 ss 6(1), 6(3)(a). These provisions have a ‘horizontal effect’ on litigation between private parties: Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 677; Murray Hunt, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Act’ (1998) Public Law 423, 442; Lord Justice Richard Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ (2000) 116 The Law Quarterly Review 48; Basil Markesinis, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany’ (1999) 115 The Law Quarterly Review 47, 72–3; Ian Leigh, ‘Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Commonwealth?’ (1999) 48 International Comparative Law Quarterly 57.
[219] A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 202.
[220] Ibid 206, 207. Although the existence of a privacy tort was rejected in Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, the issue was re-examined in Douglas [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967 and Wainwright v Home Ofice [2001] EWCA Civ 2081; [2002] QB 1334.
[221] A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 207.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] For a general discussion of this approach, see Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 64.
[225] Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) ch 42, s 12(4).
[226] A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 205. For a critique of the prioritisation of freedom of speech under the HRA, see Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy’, above n 38, 685–7.
[227] A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 207, 216–17.
[228] Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Dept of Community Services & Health [1991] FCA 150; (1991) 28 FCR 291.
[229] R v Department of Health; Ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] QB 424.
[230] Ibid 440.
[231] See, eg, Guardian Newspapers [1990] 1 AC 109, 270 (Lord Griffiths) (detriment necessary), 256 (Lord Keith) (disclosure constitutes detriment), 282 (Lord Goff) (left question open).
[233] Ibid 657.
[234] [2003] EWHC 786 Ch (Unreported, Lindsay J, 11 April 2003) [199].
[235] Gartside v Outram (1986) 26 LJ Ch 113, 114. See also Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396; Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349; Schering Chemicals v Falkman [1981] 2 WLR 848; Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape [1976] 1 QB 752.
[236] [1990] Ch 359.
[237] Ibid 415–16, 424. See also Lion Laboratories v Evans [1985] 1 QB 526; Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84.
[238] X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 650, 660–1.
[239] A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 206.
[240] Ibid 208.
[241] Ibid.
[243] Lennon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] FSR 573, 574. Cf Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] 1 Ch 302. See also Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760.
[244] Campbell [2002] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003] 2 WLR 80, 93.
[245] Gurry, above n 160, 411–16; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 165–6; Kearney, above n 160, 49–50.
[246] Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1140.
[247] Dal Pont, Chalmers and Maxton, above n 116, 215; Gurry, above n 160, 428–51; Kearney, above n 160, 50–6; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 148–54. For a critique of this view, see Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1140–1.
[248] Gurry, above n 160, 417–24; Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 154–5; Kearney, above n 160, 47–9; Dal Pont, Chalmers and Maxton, above n 116, 214–15.
[249] G v Day [1982] 1 NSWLR 24; Falconer v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1992] VicRp 47; [1992] 1 VR 662; Gilbert v Star Newspaper Co (1984) 11 TLR 4.
[250] Foster v Mountford and Rigby Ltd (1976) 14 ALR 71. Cf Church of Scientology of California v Kaufman [1973] RPC 685.
[252] Ibid 79–80.
[253] W Braithwaite, ‘The Secret of Life – A Fruity Trade Secret’ (1979) 95 The Law Quarterly Review 323, 323–4.
[254] [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39.
[255] [1913] UKLawRpCh 80; [1913] 2 Ch 469. See above Part II(A)(2)(b).
[256] [1913] UKLawRpCh 80; [1913] 2 Ch 469, 475 cited in Fairfax [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39, 50.
[257] [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414. See above Part I(B).
[258] Moorgate [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438.
[259] Fairfax [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39, 51.
[260] Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Department of Community Services & Health [1989] FCA 384; (1990) 22 FCR 73, 112; Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86, 190.
[261] Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31; Bacich v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1992) 29 NSWLR 1.
[262] Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) [1987] FCA 266; (1987) 14 FCR 434, 445–52 followed in Sullivan v Sclanders [2000] SASC 273. Cf Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86, 171.
[263] See, eg, A v Hayden (1984) 146 CLR 532, 545, 571–3; Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86; Dal Pont, Chalmers and Maxton, above n 116, 200–12; Radan, Stewart and Lynch, above n 163, 253–5; Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1132–4.
[264] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 221.
[265] Ibid 224–5.
[266] [1995] 1 WLR 804, 807. See above Part II(A)(2)(b).
[267] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224.
[268] Ibid 226.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Ibid.
[271] Ibid 225.
[272] Ibid 271–2 citing Moorgate [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438; Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] UKLawRpCh 80; [1913] 2 Ch 469, 475; and Fairfax [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39, 50.
[273] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 272 (footnotes omitted).
[274] Ibid quoting Wagner v International Ry Co (1921) 133 NE 437.
[275] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 276.
[276] Ibid 275–6.
[277] Ibid 258–9.
[278] Ibid 231.
[279] Ibid 285.
[280] Ibid 28 1–2, 288.
[281] Ibid 287.
[282] Ibid 288.
[283] Ibid 315.
[284] Ibid 317 citing Braithwaite, above n 253, 323–4.
[285] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 315.
[286] Ibid.
[287] Ibid 315–16.
[288] Ibid 297.
[289] Ibid 297, 315.
[290] See Staniforth Ricketson, ‘Confidential Information – A New Proprietary Interest’ [1977] MelbULawRw 14; (1978) 11 Melbourne University Law Review 223; Jennifer Stuckey, ‘The Equitable Action for Breach of Confidence: Is Information Ever Property?’ [1981] SydLawRw 6; (1981) 9 Sydney Law Review 402; Norman Palmer, ‘Information as Property’ in Linda Clarke (ed), Confidentiality and the Law (1990) 83; S Wheeldon, ‘Reflections on the Concept of “Property” with Particular Reference to Breach of Confidence’ (1997) 8 Auckland University Law Review 353.
[291] Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 160, 1126–8. See, eg, Moorgate [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414, 437.
[292] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 320 citing Douglas [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] QB 967, 998–1001, 1011.
[293] Transcript of Proceedings, Lenah (High Court of Australia, Kirby J, 2 April 2001) 38.
[294] Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, above n 42, 56; Wright, above n 38, 182. See also Keeton et al, above n 60, 859; Bradley [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 423, discussed in above Part I(A)(2)(b).
[295] [1995] 1 WLR 804, 807 (Laws J). See above Part II(A)(2)(b).
[296] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226, followed in Campbell [2002] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003] 2 WLR 80, 95–6. See above Part II(B) and II(A)(2).
[297] [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195, 206. See above Part II(A)(2)(a).
[298] Dal Pont, Chalmers and Maxton, above n 116, 975.
[299] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 250. See above Part I(B).
[300] Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225–6.
[301] Ibid 226.
[302] Wilson, above n 173, 43.
[303] Ibid.
[304] Laster ,‘Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Confidential Information’, above n 43, 56.
[305] Sir Thomas Bingham, ‘Should There be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy?’ (1996) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 450, 457.
[306] Stanley Ingber, ‘Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 772, 848–9 cited in Paton-Simpson, ‘Private Circles and Public Squares’, above n 97, 327.
[307] (2003) 36 Eur Court HR 41, 719.
[308] Ibid 719, 739.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Ibid 719, 752.
[311] Ibid 719, 751. Note that the facts of the case preceded the entry into force of the HRA and the development of the privacy approach. However, given that the events occurred in the public domain, the European Court would probably have come to the same conclusion in relation to facts occurring today.