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Individual Privacy And Observational Health Research:
Violating An Individual’s Privacy To Benefit The Health Of Others
ANDREW E GRULICH
[*]
AND JOHN M KALDOR
[**]
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The status of ethical considerations in the provision of health care
has undergone a substantial evolution over the past 50 years. This development
was partially a response to particular abuses of human rights that had occurred
in the name of health research,
[1 ]but
it was also a manifestation of the wider consumer rights movement that arose in
a number of countries over the same time period. Through legal and political
processes, a range of patient rights and health care worker responsibilities
were identified and enshrined in a series of documents, among the first of which
was the Helsinki Declaration of
1964.
[2]
[2] While concern about
experimentation on human beings was the main motivation behind these
developments, standards and procedures have also been developed and applied to
studies and public health investigations that do not involve experimentation on
subjects (‘observational research’). In some studies and
investigations, information is collected exclusively from medical records and
from tests that would normally be undertaken in the course of patient care.
However, other studies may involve specially developed questionnaires or tests
that are administered purely for the purposes of the research.
[3] Although
observational research does not involve the same potential for direct harm as
experimental research, it has become clear over the past few decades that it
nevertheless raises significant ethical issues, among which the protection of
privacy has proved central.
[4] Put in its simplest terms, the principle of
privacy protection (as it applies in the area of health) entails that people
must be able to seek and obtain health care without being publicly exposed or
obliged to provide information that is not directly relevant to their care.
Furthermore, medical information relating to an individual must be accessible
only to those people who need it to provide care, and must be used by them for
this purpose only.[3]
[5] There
are, however, a number of aspects or types of medical information that can be
used by health researchers or public health authorities to provide a health
benefit to people other than those to whom it directly pertains. This benefit
may be direct, for example, through the tracing of contacts of a person with an
infectious disease, thereby allowing others who have been exposed to be
diagnosed and treated. But more often the benefit is indirect, and arises
through research that provides new knowledge about the prevention or treatment
of disease.
[6] Recognising the potential benefits that may flow from the use
of an individual’s information other than for the purposes of providing
them with health care, laws and regulations have been devised to facilitate
legitimate uses of medical information relating to individuals, while still
protecting their privacy as far as possible. This article describes the ways in
which public health and research practice relies on information obtained about
individuals through the provision of their health care, and briefly assesses the
principal mechanisms developed to balance the apparently competing needs of
information and privacy.
II HOW IS INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY VIOLATED IN
OBSERVATIONAL HEALTH RESEARCH?
[7] The concept of privacy can be seen as deriving from the principle that
individuals have a part of their lives from which they should be able to exclude
any intrusion.
[4] In practice, privacy
is largely a cultural construct, with a meaning that differs markedly across
countries and communities. In the Australian context, privacy legislation has
been primarily concerned with the protection of information relating to
individuals (that is, data protection). A series of information privacy
principles have been identified and used as the basis for legislation such as
the
Privacy Act
1988 (Cth) (‘
Privacy
Act’).
[5] These
laws, and related codes of practice, cover a broad range of institutional
settings, including the health care system.
[8] As they apply to health
care, the Information Privacy Principles in the Privacy Act are
quite explicit in their exclusion of the use of individuals’ information
for any purpose other than the provision of health care to those
individuals.[6] There are a number of
ways in which the Principles may be breached by the implementation of research
and investigation procedures aimed at providing a health benefit to people other
than the individual in question. The following (non-exhaustive) list of examples
demonstrates the scope for violation of individual privacy in observational
research.
1 Referral of Patient Information to Third
Parties
[9] The conduct of most health research requires the involvement of people
other than those directly responsible for the care of the study subjects. As
soon as such people become aware of information that identifies study subjects
(and which was obtained through their medical care), there has been a violation
of the subjects’ privacy.
2 Approaches by People not Directly
Involved in an Individual’s Health Care
[10] In some investigations, a subject may be contacted by a third party to
provide further information. This situation can arise when a public health
authority is trying to find the source of an outbreak of an infectious disease,
or in studies involving subjects who have been reported through a routine
mechanism such as cancer registration.
3 Requesting Patient Information and
Carrying out Diagnostic Tests Beyond What is Required for Care
[11] For example, in investigating disease causation, people with a
particular condition may be asked about a range of factors in their lives that
preceded the diagnosis of the condition, and that have no bearing on its
treatment. Similarly, a number of studies involve tests that have no benefit for
the individual study subject. Knowledge of the results of these tests by others
may be construed as an invasion of privacy.
4 Linking Patient Information with Other
Sources of Information
[12] Investigators may obtain information beyond that involved in patient
care by linking to other, pre-existing registers and databases and thus collect
data on exposure and disease outcome for an individual.
5 Analysis and Presentation of Aggregated
Patient Information
[13] Once the information collection is complete, the results are analysed
and a report is generally prepared for external presentation. Even if no
individual patient information is included in the report, there is the
possibility that this step can be perceived as a violation of the privacy of the
subjects of the investigation.
III MECHANISMS FOR PERMITTING AND CONTROLLING
VIOLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN HEALTH RESEARCH
[14] Three broad approaches have been employed to allow researchers and
health authorities to undertake investigations that involve intrusions into
individual privacy.
1 Informed Consent
[15] The most straightforward and conceptually satisfactory solution is to
obtain subjects’ consent for any proposed violations of their privacy.
Informed consent is recognised as an ethical and legal requirement for the
provision of health services more generally. If potential study subjects are
given a clear explanation of the nature of the investigation being undertaken,
they can make an informed decision as to whether or not they wish to permit any
consequent loss of privacy.
[16] In practice, a number of difficulties arise
with the use of informed consent. First of all, it will not always be possible
to contact all people who are of interest in a health study. Some may have died,
moved away, or be otherwise uncontactable. Among those who can be contacted,
there is likely to be a great deal of variation in the degree to which they can
truly understand a research project that is explained to them, regardless of
whether or not English is their second language.
[17] Further, in some
studies, the precise objective of the investigation is deliberately concealed
from subjects in order to minimise various forms of bias. Consent in these
situations could not be said to be truly informed. Another issue is the
potential influence of the person seeking the individual’s consent, who
may well be a doctor or other health care worker with a relationship of
influence over the potential participant. Finally, under some study designs (for
example, when potential study participants are selected from a disease
registry), the very process of approaching a potential subject involves an
invasion of privacy, even before the process of obtaining consent has
begun.
[18] Many studies that have provided crucial information on disease
causation would have been seriously constrained by a requirement that individual
consent be sought from participants. For example, studies that have demonstrated
the long-term risks of various forms of occupation have relied on industry or
union records of large numbers of people who are either no longer alive, or who
would be very difficult to contact. Hospital and clinic records have also been
the basis for important research, undertaken without individual consent for the
same reasons. Had consent been required in these studies, either the studies
would simply not have gone ahead, as costs would have been prohibitive, or they
would have been restricted to those subjects from whom consent had been
obtained, possibly introducing serious bias into their results and certainly
limiting their reliability.
2 Legislative Sanction
[19] All health jurisdictions in Australia have powers under public health
legislation to require the provision of health information about individuals for
purposes other than their health
care.
[7] One of the main applications
of this power is in the area of disease surveillance, which is generally based
on laws that require doctors or laboratories to provide public health officials
with information related to new diagnoses of specified diseases. The purpose of
disease surveillance is to facilitate public health responses, both acute and
strategic. The timely identification of outbreaks allows action to be taken
quickly so that the general public’s health can be protected. Although
outbreaks attract public attention, disease surveillance continually informs the
public health response to a variety of infectious and non-infectious diseases,
allowing the development of government policy in the provision and improvement
of health services.
[20] Disease surveillance usually involves the collection
of fully identified patient data in order to avoid duplicate notifications, and
to provide a means of contacting affected individuals to facilitate further
investigation of disease causation.
[21] Although the collection of
identified data for public health practice is in general covered by legislation,
there has been considerable debate about whether individual consent for
collection of data should be required, given the increasing concerns about
individual privacy. Generally, the public health authorities have justified
their powers in the name of the public good. If an immediate response is
required to protect the health of others, individuals should be obliged to
provide information of relevance to disease control, even at the expense of
their privacy. Privacy concerns are nevertheless recognised, as the legislation
empowering health authorities to collect information without consent also
provides for strong safeguards to ensure that individually identified data is
used with great care. For example, identified data is typically available only
to the agency authorised to collect it; it must be kept securely on protected
databases; and there are substantial penalties for unauthorised release of
information to third
parties.[8]
[22] For some
diseases, such as sexually transmitted infections, it has been argued that there
is no immediate public health response required, and that legislation should
therefore not require reporting by name, provided that duplicates can be
adequately identified by a suitable coding scheme. Furthermore, if the disease
is associated with potential discrimination, people may actually avoid seeking
diagnosis or medical attention if they are concerned about a mandatory provision
that requires their names to be reported to public health
authorities.[9] Considerations such
as these have led over the past decade to all jurisdictions in Australia
modifying their public health legislation to make HIV infection and AIDS
reportable under code only.
3 A Determination of the Public Interest by
an Institutional Ethics Committee
[23] Ethical scrutiny of medical research in most countries has been
assigned to a network of institutional committees, generally based at hospitals,
universities, government health departments, or other agencies with an
involvement in health.
[10] Although
the original motivation for the establishment of institutional research ethics
committees was the need to control human experimentation, their role has since
broadened to include overseeing observational health research. If individuals
are asked to complete questionnaires or submit to additional tests in the course
of a study, it is an ethical requirement that the study be designed well enough
to be able to achieve its stated
objectives.
[11] Ethics committees
are essentially asked to make a determination as to whether the benefit to be
obtained from the research is sufficient to justify the burden placed on study
subjects through their involvement.
[24] Apart from the loss of their time,
and perhaps various forms of discomfort arising from specific testing
procedures, the violation of privacy is probably the major burden placed on
study subjects by observational research. If all study procedures are undertaken
with informed consent, the usual role of ethics committees in privacy protection
is to ensure that information collected through the study is adequately
protected against unauthorised use.
[25] The role of ethics committees in reviewing studies becomes more
complicated if a study proposes procedures for obtaining information without
consent. In 1991, the National Health and Medical Research Council and the
Federal Privacy Commissioner released
Guidelines for the Protection of
Privacy in the Conduct of Medical Research (‘
Medical Research
Guidelines’),
[12] which
govern the use of personal information obtained without consent in observational
health research. The
Medical Research Guidelines require that an
institutional ethics committee assess the benefit to the wider population that
might arise from the research, and weigh it against the harm that might result
from the violation of the study subjects’ privacy (arising through the
absence of consent). As expressed in the most recent version of the
Medical
Research Guidelines, an ethics committee can choose to approve the
collection of identifying or potentially identifying information without
individual consent provided that:
(a) Either (i) the procedures required to
obtain consent are likely either to cause unnecessary anxiety for those whose
consent would be sought, or to prejudice the scientific value of the research,
and there will be no disadvantage to the participants or their relatives or to
any collectivity involved; or (ii) it is impossible in practice, due to the
quantity, age or accessibility of the records to be studied to obtain consent;
and
(b) The public interest in the research outweighs to a substantial degree
the public interest in
privacy.
[13]
[26] This approach is appealing as it provides a mechanism for approval
that considers each application on its merits. Closer scrutiny does, however,
reveal some practical difficulties. First, there is little guidance given to
ethics committees as to how they are supposed to measure and weigh up the
competing costs and benefits of the research. Each committee must be able to
judge the study design, to determine whether or not there may be viable
alternatives that involve consent, as well as the public interest value of the
research finding,
before the research has even begun. There is also no
way to standardise these assessments across the many committees that are asked
to approve research of this kind in Australia.
[27] Furthermore, there is no
consensus among the State and Territory jurisdictions in Australia about the
relationship between the Medical Research Guidelines and the various
forms of privacy legislation that have been separately implemented. One
seemingly simple but central issue that has not been clearly resolved is the
definition of ‘identifying information’. Clearly a person’s
name or address would qualify as identifying, and a hospital serial number would
not, but in between these extremes there is a range of alternatives that have
been used. For example, national reporting of new diagnoses of HIV infection and
AIDS has employed a ‘name code’ consisting of the first two letters
of the given and family names of the subject, as well as their date of
birth.[14] Use of this data is seen
as providing sufficient precision to minimise duplicate reporting, while still
ensuring that individuals cannot be identified. Yet although there has never
been a real or perceived breach of privacy under this system, concerns have been
raised from time to time that, in some cases, and in the wrong hands, the birth
date and name code of an individual can in fact become identifying
information.
IV A DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
[28] Well justified societal concerns about privacy have led to increasing
regulation of individual information in a wide range of contexts. While privacy
protection is generally seen as a public good, we believe it is important that
its application to the health care system does not lead to a curtailment of
beneficial research and investigation. On the other hand, there has sometimes
been a tendency for health researchers to regard privacy legislation as an
externally imposed burden, not because they disagree with its objectives, but
because they feel that they are capable of respecting its principles without
being compelled to do so. While the vast majority of practitioners may be
excellent judges of community privacy standards, the regulatory framework now
provides formal protection against those who are not. Yet the promulgation of
privacy legislation and guidelines at both federal and State level has resulted
in inconsistencies in the specific provisions of privacy law as they relate to
health research, and particularly in the application of such law. The health
research sector needs to ensure that its own position is clearly and logically
communicated wherever the potential for violation of privacy is present. In
fact, only increased communication between users of health information,
representatives of people who might be adversely affected by its misuse, and
people whose profession entails drafting legislation, can ensure that the
balance is maintained between the sometimes competing (but equally important)
needs of privacy and the provision of health information for research.
[*] Senior Lecturer,
National Centre in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research, University of New
South Wales.[**]
Professor of Epidemiology and Deputy Director, National Centre in HIV
Epidemiology and Clinical Research, University of New South
Wales.[1 ] See Bernard
M Dickens, Larry Gostin and Robert J Levine, ‘Research on Human
Populations: National and International Ethical Guidelines’ (1991) 19
Law, Medicine and Health Care 157; R Smallwood, ‘Medical Ethics:
Past and Future’ (1993) 158 Medical Journal of Australia
444.[2] World
Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects, adopted by the 18th World
Medical Association General Assembly, June 1964. See also World Medical
Association, ‘Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Physicians
in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects’ (1997) 277 Journal of
the Australian Medical Association
925.[3] See Office of
the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Issues Paper: Application of the National
Principles for the Fair Handling of Personal Information to Personal Health
Information (1999); National Health and Medical Research Council,
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans
(1999).[4] See
National Health and Medical Research Council, above n
3.[5] Office of the
Federal Privacy Commissioner, above n
3.[6] See Privacy Act 1988
(Cth) Information Privacy Principle
9.[7] See, eg,
Public Health Act
1991
(NSW).[8] See, eg,
Privacy and Personal
Information Protection Act 1998
(NSW).[9]
Commonwealth, Privacy and HIV/AIDS Working Party, Report of the Privacy and
HIV/AIDS Working Party
(1992).[10] See
National Health and Medical Research Council, above n 3. In New South Wales,
ethics committees have been established at tertiary institutions, major
hospitals, and area health services.
[11] Ibid cll
1.13-1.15.[12]
National Health and Medical Research Council, ‘Guidelines for the
Protection of Privacy in the Conduct of Medical Research’, Commonwealth
of Australia Gazette No P19, 1 July 1991, 1.
[13] National Health
and Medical Research Council, above n 3, cl
14.4.[14] Australian
National Council on AIDS, Australian HIV Surveillance Strategy (1994).
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