Forster, Christine; Parkinson, Patrick --- "Compensating Child Sexual Assault Victims Within Statutory Schemes: Imagining a More Effective Compensatory Framework" [2000] UNSWLawJl 30; (2000) 23(2) UNSW Law Journal 172
[*] Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales.
[**] Faculty of Law, University of Sydney.
[1] Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, First Interim Report: Alternative Methods for Providing for the Needs of Victims of Crime, May 1997, which recommended a greater emphasis on counselling and rehabilitation rather than monetary compensation. This was followed by the Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Second Interim Report: The Long Term Financial Viability of the Victims Compensation Fund, December 1997, which recommended some specific changes to address escalating costs and to make the scheme more responsive to victims. In response to this Report the scheme was amended by the Victims Compensation Amendment Act 1998 (NSW). Recently a third Report, Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Report: Ongoing Issues Concerning the NSW Victims Compensation Scheme, February 2000, has further consolidated the view that the schemes should primarily focus on rehabilitation.
[2] Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ); Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic).
[3] See, for example, Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Report: Inquiry into Psychological Injury – Shock, December 1998 at 11, which concluded that the category of nervous shock was being misused by victims who would not normally receive compensation. See also the Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, Second Interim Report, note 1 supra at 39, which raised the issue of the misuse of the shock category.
[4] See Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld), s 11; Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA), s 7(9)(a); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic), s 29; Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act 1996 (NT), s 12(b) which all require the event to be reported within a “reasonable” time.
[5] Three schemes require claims to be brought within three years after either a conviction or injury: Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld), s 40(1); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA), s 7; Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1985 (WA), s 17(1). Two schemes require claims within two years: Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic), s 29; Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), s 26(1), although there is special provision for extension in instances of sexual assault, s 26(3)(b). And, two schemes require claims within 12 months: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT), s 10(2); Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act 1996 (NT), s 5(1).
[6] D Miers, “Compensation and Conceptions of Victims of Crime” (1983) 8 Victimology 204.
[7] New Zealand was the first in 1963 (Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963 (NZ)), followed by England in 1964 which introduced a non-statutory scheme administered by a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. The United States passed legislation in 29 jurisdictions between 1965 and 1977, followed by Canada and some European countries: D Carrow, Crime Victim Compensation, Government Printing Office (1980); D Miers, “The Provision of Compensation for Victims of Violent Crime in Europe” (1985) 10 Victimology 662.
[8] Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 (NSW); Criminal Code Amendment Act 1968 (Qld); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1969 (SA); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1970 (WA); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1972 (Vic); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1976 (Tas); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT).
[9] See I Davies, “Compensation for Criminal Injuries in Australia: A Proposal for Change in Queensland” (1991) 3 Bond Law Review 2.
[10] See P Duff, “Criminal Injuries Compensation: The Symbolic Dimension” (1995) 1 Juridical Review 102.
[11] Atiyah suggests that there are three possible principles underlying the notion of compensation: it may be restitutionary and attempt to restore to the victim what has been lost, it may be a substitute or solace for what has been lost, or it may be a form of equalisation offering the victim what they have never had in comparison to others in a similar situation. See P Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Butterworths (1993).
[12] Queensland has the highest maximum award of $75 000: Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld), s 25(2). The maximum award is $60 000 in Victoria: Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic), s 8; $50 000 in ACT, NSW and SA: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT), s 7(1); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA), s 7; Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), s 19(1); $25 000 in the NT: Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act (NT), s 13; and $10 000 in Tasmania: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1976 (Tas), s 6(10).
[13] Courts in all Australian State jurisdictions have held that common law principles of assessment apply. If compensation, once assessed, exceeds the statutory maximum then the maximum amount should be awarded. See Rigby v Solicitor for the Northern Territory [1991] NTSC 50; (1991) 105 FLR 48; In re Poore (1973) 6 SASR 308; Re Criminal Injuries Compensation Ordinance 1983 (1984) 58 ACTR 17; R v Fraser (1975) 2 NSWLR 521.
[14] See the Second Reading Speech, Criminal Injuries Compensation Bill (NSW) where the statutory limit of $2000 is challenged on the basis that it cannot provide real compensation for victims: New South Wales, Legislative Council, 1966-67, Debates, vol 66, pp 4405-19. These ideas were also fundamental to the implementation in 1972 of the comprehensive Accident Compensation Scheme in New Zealand that replaced civil claims for compensation. See Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand, 1967.
[15] See New South Wales, Legislative Assembly February 1967, Debates, vol 65, pp 3615-8.
[16] Queensland adopted a tariff-based model, discussed further below.
[18] See Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT), s 9(2); Crimes (Victims Offences Act) 1996 (NT), s 13, which excludes claims less than $100; and Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), s 20(1)(9), which excludes claims less than $2400.
[19] See Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), Schedule 1; Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld).
[20] Ibid.
[21] See Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), (5) Schedule 1.
[22] Most Workers Compensation schemes use this model. See also Sporting Injuries Insurance Act 1978 (NSW).
[23] Criminal Code Amendment Act 1984 (Qld), s 663A.
[24] Workers Compensation Act 1916, s 14(1)(C), later Workers Compensation Act 1990 (Qld), s 8.6.
[25] Criminal Code Amendment Act 1984 (Qld), s 663BA.
[26] See Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld), s 46.
[27] Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ), which reduced the non pecuniary component of the scheme.
[28] Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic), which completely removed the non-pecuniary component of the scheme.
[29] Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (UK).
[30] Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW).
[31] Accident Compensation Act 1972 (NZ).
[32] Ibid, s 119 (later Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1982 (NZ), s 78) initially provided a maximum of NZ$5000 that was gradually raised until it reached the maximum of NZ$17 000 in 1982.
[33] Ibid, s 119(4).
[34] Ibid, s 120 (later Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1982 (NZ), s 79).
[35] Raised to $10 000 in 1974.
[36] Accident Compensation Act 1972 (NZ), s 120(6).
[37] Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1982 (NZ).
[38] See Law Reform Commission Report No 4, Personal Injury and Prevention and Recovery, 1988; W Birch, Accident Compensation – A Fairer Scheme, GP Publications (1991).
[39] See R Millar, “An Analysis and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme” (1992) 5 Canterbury Law Review 2.
[40] Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ), s 54. The allowance was raised to NZ$60 per week from 1 July 1997. Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Amendment Act 1996 (NZ).
[41] Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Amendment Act 1996 (NZ), s 4 (1).
[42] Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic).
[43] Victoria, Assembly, Spring Session 1996, Debates, vol 432, p 1023.
[44] See C Corns, “ Victims of Crime Assistance Act”, Victims of Crime Assistance (1997) at [2.2], who argues cost cutting was the major motivation behind the Victorian amendments.
[45] See C Colby, “Financial Compensation for Victims of Abuse” (1998) 20(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 221 at 225.
[46] Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (UK).
[47] See Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), (6) Schedule 1; Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (UK), Schedule 1.
[48] Parliamentary discussions prior to the enactment of the new Bill emphasised the unsustainable costs of the scheme. The Home Secretary told the House of Commons that a tariff based scheme would enable costs “to be more easily controlled and predicted”: United Kingdom, House of Commons May 1995, vol HC 260, Official Report (6th Series) p 735.
[49] The Minister of State described the tariff as “avoiding specific reference to offences”. Rather, the tariff seeks to describe injury “in terms of the harm done”: United Kingdom, House of Commons October 1995, vol HC 566, Official Report (6th Series).
[50] Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (1995) (UK), Schedule 1. Minor isolated harm involving non-penetrative indecent acts will result in an award of £1000; a pattern of serious abuse including repetitive, frequent non-penetrative indecent acts will result in an award of £2000; a pattern of severe abuse involving digital or non-penile penetration or oral genital contact or both will result in an award of £3000; a pattern of severe abuse over a period exceeding 3 years will result in an award of £6000; repeated non-consensual vaginal or anal intercourse or both over a period of up to 3 years will result in an award of £10 000 and a similar pattern which exceeds 3 years will result in an award of £17 500. A separate scale of award is included for victims of sexual assault of any age including six levels of award with the same monetary limits as for child sexual assault. The categories are minor indecent assault which is defined as a non-penetrative physical act over clothing; serious indecent assault which is a non-penetrative indecent act under clothing, severe indecent assault which involves digital or non-penile penetration or oral genital contact or both; non-consensual vaginal or anal intercourse or both; non-consensual vaginal or anal intercourse or both by two or more attackers and finally non-consensual vaginal or anal intercourse or both with other serious bodily injuries.
[51] Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW). In New South Wales much of the parliamentary discussion leading up to the introduction of the new Act emphasises rehabilitation as a primary goal. See New South Wales, Legislative Council May 1996, Debates, vol LC250, p 975. See also Joint Select Committee on Victims Compensation, First Interim Report, note 1 supra. The passing of the Victims Rights Act 1996 (NSW), establishing a Victims of Crime Bureau to provide support for victims of crime further illustrates the shift in philosophy from compensation to rehabilitation.
[52] Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), Schedule 1. Category One includes indecent assault or assault with violence in the course of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse. The award range is $2400 to $10 000. The second category includes unlawful sexual intercourse or the infliction of serious bodily injury in the course of attempted unlawful intercourse. The award range is $10 000 to $25 000. The third category includes a pattern of abuse involving category one or two sexual assault; unlawful sexual intercourse in which serious bodily injury is inflicted; unlawful sexual intercourse in which two or more offenders are involved; or unlawful sexual intercourse in which the offender uses an offensive weapon. The award range is $25 000 to $50 000.
[53] CASA House, Just Tokens? A Report on the Experience of Victim Survivors of Sexual Assault when Making Applications for Crimes Compensation (1997). The Report found in a survey in Victoria of 163 sexual abuse applicants that 85 per cent did not receive any pecuniary award. For the ramifications in the New Zealand context see R MacKenzie, “Lump Sums or Litigation? Compensation for Sexual Abuse - The Case for Reinstatement of a Compensation for Criminal Injuries Scheme” (1993) 15 New Zealand Universities Law Review 367.
[54] A 1998 Court of Appeal decision, Queenstown Lakes District Council v Palmer [1991] 1 NZLR 549, held that civil litigation could proceed in respect of a nervous shock claim that did not involve any physical injury. Owing to the fact that such claims are no longer covered by the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ), the court held it would be anomalous to prevent such claimants from civil action as this would effectively leave them without remedy. Due to the fact that sexual abuse victims are specifically included in the Act (see Schedule 1) this decision will not clear the way for such victims to seek redress in the civil courts despite the fact they are likely to receive little compensation under the new legislation.
[55] H Swanston, P Parkinson, S Shrimpton, B O’Toole and K Oates, “Statutory Compensation for Victims of Child Sexual Assault: Examining the Efficacy of a Discretionary System” (2000) 8 International Review of Victimology 37.
[56] See Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT), s 2(1); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1985 (WA), s 3; Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic), s 3; Criminal Offence Victims Act 1996 (Qld), s 20; Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), Schedule 1; Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1976 (SA), s4; Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act 1996 (NT), s 4.
[57] Ibid.
[58] See for example, Behrans v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1, in which the victim suffered nervous shock when confronted with a rapidly approaching elephant, was compared to the shock of a victim abducted and raped in The Applicant v Larkin; Withnall v Wilkinson [1976] WAR 199. In R v Fraser, note 13 supra, the magistrate relied on Dilieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669 in which a woman gave premature birth to a child after suffering a near miss when a van drove into a building in which she was present to substantiate a finding of nervous shock to a victim abducted and repeatedly raped. In F v H (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Nicholson J, September 1992) the judge relied on Mt Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 45 ALJR, where an employee suffered nervous shock after witnessing two fellow employees burn to death to substantiate a finding of nervous shock for a claimant sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend over a period of six years. By contrast in Re Gage & Bird (1978) 19 SASR 239, the magistrate specifically rejected the use of Battista v Cooper (1976) 14 SASR 225, a case involving a witness to a murder, in a rape case on the basis that the rules surrounding nervous shock actions were irrelevant.
[59] See N Mullany and P Handford, Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, Law Book Company (1993) p 14; H Luntz and D Hambly, Torts. Cases and Commentary, Butterworths (4th ed, 1995) p 488; H Luntz, Assessment of Damages, Butterworths (3rd ed, 1990) p 135.
[60] See Jaensch v Coffey [1984] HCA 52; (1984) 155 CLR 549.
[61] See B Feldthusen, “Discriminatory Damage Quantification in Civil Actions for Sexual Battery” (1994) 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 133; “Therapeutic Jurisprudence?” (1993) 25 Ottawa Law Review 206; “The Canadian Experiment with the Civil Action for Sexual Battery” in N Mullany (ed), Torts in the Nineties, The Law Book Company (1997) 274.
[62] H Swanston, P Parkinson, S Shrimpton, B O’Toole and K Oates, note 55 supra. In only four out of the 32 successful claims was a diagnosis offered by a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. In all cases the diagnosis was of PTSD. There were five other diagnoses of PTSD offered by persons unqualified to make this diagnosis. It is unclear whether in all cases this labelling influenced the determination of the Tribunal.
[63] S Jarvis and F McIlwaine, “‘Telling the Whole Story.’ Reports To the Crime Compensation Tribunal” (1996) 7 Australian Feminist Law Journal 145.
[64] See D Wolfe, L Sas and C Werkerle, “Factors Associated with the Development of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Among Child Victims of Sexual Abuse” (1994) 18 Child Abuse and Neglect 37; L Briggs and P Joyce, “What Determines Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Symptomatology for Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse?” (1997) 21 Child Abuse and Neglect 575.
[65] The traumatic stress arises from the inability of the person to protect herself or himself by the normal mechanisms of fighting or flight. In J Herman, Trauma and Recovery, Harper Collins (1992) p 34, the author describes what happens when these ordinary adaptations to threat are rendered useless:
Traumatic reactions occur when action is of no avail. When neither resistance nor escape is possible, the human system of self-defense becomes overwhelmed and disorganized. Each component of the ordinary response to danger, having lost its utility, tends to persist in an altered and exaggerated state long after the actual danger is over...Traumatic symptoms have a tendency to become disconnected from their source and to take on a life of their own.
[66] S Nagy, R DiClemente and A Adcock, “Adverse Factors Associated with Forced Sex Among Southern Adolescent Girls” (1995) 96 Pediatrics 944; A Silverman, H Reinherz and R Giaconia, “The Long-term Sequelae of Child and Adolescent Abuse: a Longitudinal Community Study” (1996) 20 Child Abuse & Neglect 709.
[67] M Lynskey and D Fergusson, “Factors Protecting Against the Development of Adjustment Difficulties in Young Adults Exposed to Childhood Sexual Abuse” (1997) 21 Child Abuse & Neglect 1177.
[68] D Moyer, L DiPietro, R Berkowitz and J Stunkard, “Childhood Sexual Abuse and Precursors of Binge Eating in an Adolescent Female Population” (1997) 21 International Journal of Eating Disorders 23; S Wonderlich, R Wilsnack, S Wilsnack and T Harris, “Childhood Sexual Abuse and Bulimic Behavior in a Nationally Representative Sample” (1996) 86 American Journal of Public Health 1082.
[69] C Matthews, Breaking Through, Albatross (1990) p 114.
[70] K Kendall-Tackett, L Williams and D Finkelhor, “Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies” (1993) 113 Psychological Bulletin 164 at 173.
[71] M Lynskey and D Fergusson, note 67 supra.
[72] A Browne and D Finkelhor, “Initial and Long-term Effects: A Review of the Research” in D Finkelhor (ed), A Sourcebook on Child Sexual Abuse (1986) 143.
[73] Prior to 1995, the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) specified any bodily injury not listed in the Schedule of the Workers Compensation Act 1916 (Qld) was to be calculated by comparison to those that were. In Castle and Hughes; ex parte Hansen [1990] 1 Qd R 560, it was held that there was no limit to the amount of award that could be awarded for such unspecified bodily injuries. In 1995, the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) were replaced with the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld), which closed the door to unlimited awards but retained the principle that bodily injuries not listed in the schedule could attract awards up to the maximum of the scheme.
[74] R v Bridge & Maddams; ex parte Larkin (1989) 1 Qld R 554; West v Morrison (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Macrossan J, September 1996); R v GL Harrison (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Ambrose J, April 1993); Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byron J, April 1993); In the Matter of R v Thomas Richard Tiltman; and In the Matter of the Application for Compensation by Michael John Dawe (Also Known as Michael John Sullivan. By his Next Friend Lynette Mary Sullivan) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Lee J, April 1995); Ozcan as Next Friend of Tamcelik v Tamcelik [1998] 1 Qld R 330.
[75] The maximum award under the current Act is $75 000 but if the injury occurred prior to 18 December 1995 the provisions under Ch 65A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) continue to apply.
[76] R v Bridge & Maddams, note 74 supra.
[77] West v Morrison, note 74 supra.
[78] L Johnsen and L Harlow, “Childhood Sexual Abuse Linked with Adult Substance Use, Victimisation and AIDS-risk” (1996) 8 AIDS Education and Prevention 44.
[79] S Riggs, A Alario and C McHorney, “Health Risk Behaviours and Attempted Suicide in Adolescents who Report Prior Maltreatment” (1990) 116 Journal of Paediatrics 815.
[80] R Oates, B O’Toole, D Lynch, A Stern and G Cooney, “Stability and Change in Outcomes for Sexually Abused Children” (1994) 33 Journal American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychiatry 945.
[81] See M Harvey and J Herman, “Amnesia, Partial Amnesia and Delayed Recall Among Adult Survivors of Childhood Trauma” (1994) 3 Consciousness and Cognition 295; L Meyer Williams, “Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women’s Memories of Child Sexual Abuse” (1994) 62 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 1167; B VanderVolk and R Fisler, “Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic Memories: Overview and Exploratory Study” (1995) 8(4) Journal of Traumatic Stress 505.
[82] See R MacKenzie, note 53 supra at 369.
[83] See Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1985 (WA), s 20(2); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic), s 4; Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW), s 5(1); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1976 (Tas), s 6(2); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT), s 7(20); Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act 1996 (NT), s 14; Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA), s 9.
[84] J Christiansen and R Blake, “The Grooming Process in Father-Daughter Incest” in A Horton, B Johnson, L Roundy and D Williams (eds), The Incest Perpetrator (1990) 88.
[85] See, for example, M Elliot, K Browne and J Kilcoyne, “Child Abuse Prevention: What Offenders Tell Us” (1995) 19 Child Abuse and Neglect 579; L Berliner and J Conte, “The Process of Victimisation: The Victims’ Perspective” (1990) 14 Child Abuse and Neglect 29; P Phelan, “Incest and Its Meaning: The Perspectives of Fathers and Daughters” (1995) 19 Child Abuse and Neglect 7.
[86] J Conte, S Wolf and T Smith, “What Sexual Offenders Tell Us About Prevention Strategies” (1989) 13 Child Abuse and Neglect 293; L Budin and C Johnson, “Sex Abuse Prevention Programs: Offenders’ Attitudes About Their Efficacy” (1989) 13 Child Abuse and Neglect 77.
[87] L Laing and A Kamsler, “Putting an End to Secrecy: Therapy with Mothers and Children Following Disclosure of Child Sexual Assault” in M Durrant and C White (eds), Ideas for Therapy with Sexual Abuse (1990) 159.
[88] L Budin and C Johnson, note 89 supra at 81.
[89] M Elliot, K Browne and J Kilcoyne, note 88 supra at 585-6; J Conte, S Wolf and T Smith, note 89 supra at 77.
[90] R Goldney, “Victims of Crime. A Psychiatric Perspective” (1998) 5.1 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 153.
[91] Note 72 supra.
[92] P Mullen, J Martin, J Anderson, S Romans and G Herbison, “Childhood Sexual Abuse and Mental Health in Adult Life” (1993) 163 British Journal of Psychiatry 721.
[93] J Fleming, P Mullen and G Bammer, “A Study of Potential Risk Factors for Sexual Abuse in Childhood” (1997) 21(1) Child Abuse and Neglect 49.
[94] M Lynskey and D Fergusson, note 67 supra.
[95] J Paradise, L Rose, L Sleeper, and M Nathanson, “Behavior, Family Function, School Performance, and Predictors of Persistent Disturbance in Sexually Abused Children” (1994) 93 Pediatrics 452.
[96] Parliamentary discussion indicates an assumption that legal seriousness will provide an accurate depiction of the level of harm. See for example the Second Reading of the NSW Bill, note 14 supra at 976.
[97] H Swanston, J Tebbutt, B O’Toole and K Oates, “Sexually Abused Children 5 Years After Presentation: A Case-Control Study” (1997) 100 Pediatrics 600; J Tebbutt, H Swanston, K Oates, and B O'Toole, “5 Years After Child Sexual Abuse: Persisting Dysfunction and Problems of Prediction” (1997) 36 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 330.
[98] Home Office, Compensation for Victims of Violent Crime. Possible Changes to the Criminal Injuries Scheme, 25 March 1999 at 9.
[99] The issue concerning time limitations in victims’ compensation statutes is part of a broader problem with limitation periods in relation to compensation for child sexual abuse. For an extensive discussion of Limitations Acts in relation to common law claims by such claimants, see A Marfording, “Access to Justice for Survivors of Sexual Abuse” (1997) 5 Torts Law Journal 221.
[100] P Duff, note 10 supra, argues that the schemes were created to express a public statement of sympathy.
[101] J Liem, J James, J O’Toole and A Boudewyn, “Assessing Resilience in Adults with Histories of Childhood Sexual Abuse” (1997) 67 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 594.
[102] J Freyd, Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of Forgetting Child Abuse, Harvard University Press (1996) pp 9-10.
[104] The Medicare scheme provides rebates for consultations with psychiatrists, within certain annual limits. This leads some victims of abuse to seek psychiatric assistance even in the absence of a diagnosed psychiatric disorder.