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Last Updated: 28 September 2009
Stakeholders and Directors’ Duties: Law, Theory
and
Evidence
Shelley Marshall* and Ian Ramsay ∗∗
An important debate concerns the meaning of the duty imposed on
company
directors to act in the best interests of the company. Are
shareholders’
interests paramount when directors act in accordance with
this duty? To what
extent can the interests of stakeholders other than
shareholders be considered
by directors? Does this duty need to be changed to
facilitate socially
responsible behaviour by directors? There have been
significant international
developments addressing these questions. For
example, in the United
Kingdom the duty to act in the interests of the
company was reformulated in
2006. In Australia, two recent government
inquiries have investigated these
questions. However, the two government
inquiries lacked empirical evidence
regarding how directors understand their
legal duties. This paper assesses the
findings of the two government
inquiries against the results of a survey of
directors which inquired into
how company directors balance the competing
and sometimes conflicting
interests of stakeholder groups, including
employees, creditors and
shareholders. The paper also investigates the extent
to which the current law
of directors’ duties permits directors to consider the
interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders.
1. Introduction
Policy prescriptions in Australia regarding in whose interests company
directors
should act have largely been based on views about whose interests
directors ought
to take into account. This paper contrasts the results of a
recent survey of
Australian directors concerning the way they perceive their
obligations to various
stakeholders with current Australian corporate law1
and two recent Federal
government inquiries. These two inquiries were
conducted by the Corporations and
Markets Advisory Committee and the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Corporations and Financial Services. Both
reported in 2006. The aim of this paper
is first, to assess whether case law
and the outcomes of the two inquiries reflect
directors’ views. The
second aim is to explore alternative proposals to the
conclusions of the
inquiries based on this assessment.
∗ Lecturer, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash
University.
∗∗ Harold Ford Professor of Commercial Law and
Director of the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Melbourne
Law School, the University of Melbourne. Both authors are members of the
Corporate Governance and Workplace Partnership
Project. The project is now being
conducted by the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation and the
Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law at Melbourne Law School, the
University of Melbourne and the Departments of
Business Law and Taxation and
Management at Monash University. The project was funded by an Australian
Research Council Discovery
Grant. The authors thank Nicole Yazbec for her
research assistance in the preparation of this paper and Meredith Jones for
research
in relation to the survey data reported in this paper. 1 We use the
terms ‘company law’ and ‘corporations law’
interchangeably to refer to the body of statutory and common law which regulates
the operation of companies.
The push to reconsider the question in whose interests companies ought to
be
managed and directed has attracted strong interest due to the growing
impact of the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement. The board of
directors is the
highest decision making body in the company. As a result, it
receives a great deal
of attention within the CSR policy and academic
literature and, in particular, in the
sub-strand of stakeholding discourse.2
Whilst debates concerning the stakeholder
theory of the corporation have been
exchanged since the 1930s, it was not until the
late 1990s that the idea that
stakeholders who contribute to, benefit from, and bear
risk in, companies
should have their interests taken into account in corporate
decision-making
gained real influence in Australian public policy debates.
Stakeholder models
were seen as a means to moderate the shareholder primacy
model of corporate
governance by which shareholder interests are privileged,
sometimes at the
expense of other stakeholders in the company, such as employees.
In Australia, this aspect of the CSR movement has, for some companies,
been
driven by at least three related factors. The first of these is
corporate misbehaviour
which has resulted in harm to stakeholders and the
reputation of these companies.
Many businesses wish to present the image of
good citizens both to distinguish
themselves from companies which have fallen
into disrepute and also to enhance
their social licence to operate.3 A second
driver has been the growth of civil society
movements which have brought into
question the dichotomy between ‘public’
and
‘private’, claiming that private actors such as corporations
ought to act in the public
interest.4 The third of these is a shift away from
the provision of strong legislative
protections for some stakeholders, such
as employees, through conventional ‘hard’
law mechanisms.5 For
example, whilst statutory protection of employee
entitlements upon insolvency
within company law has increased, conventional
protections provided by
bargaining rights and the right to strike have been eroded
in labour laws
since 1993. As a result, stakeholder or other organisations such as
unions,
human rights bodies and environmental groups have looked for
alternative
mechanisms to make companies more accountable to stakeholders.6
Whilst
2 L. Mitchell, ‘The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social
Responsibility’ in D.
McBarnet, A. Voiculescu and T. Campbell (eds.),
The New Corporate Accountability:
Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007, at 279.
3 C. Tilt and C. Symes,
‘Environmental Disclosure by Australian Mining Companies:
Environmental
Conscience or Commercial Reality?’ (1999) 23 Accounting Forum 137.
4 S.
Wheeler, ‘An Alternative Voice in and Around Corporate Governance’
(2002) 25
University of New South Wales Law Journal 556 at 559 and J Farrar,
‘Frankenstein
Incorporated or Fool’s Parliament? Revisiting the
Concept of Corporation in Corporate Governance’ (1998) 10 Bond Law Review
142.
5 P. Utting, ‘Regulating Business via Multistakeholder
Initiatives: A Preliminary
Assessment’ in Voluntary Approaches to
Corporate Responsibility: Readings and a
Resource Guide, UN Non-Governmental
Liaison Service Development Dossier, New
York, 2002, 96-97.
6 Contrary to
this position, however, the 1989 report of the Senate Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Company
Directors’ Duties: Report on the
Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors (Australian
Government Publishing
Service, November 1989, available
at:
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?ContentID=542) at 18, found that
the proper
place for the protection of stakeholders was in the range of
Federal, State and Territory Laws that are designed to protect various
stakeholder groups or public values, and not
companies have mainly voiced a
preference for ‘soft law’ or voluntary mechanisms, there have been
occasions, such as following
the James Hardie incident, when companies have
called for stakeholder legislation to permit them to more carefully balance the
interests
of shareholders and other stakeholders.7
The development of corporate stakeholder-based policies in Australia has
lagged
behind some other liberal democratic OECD countries. Throughout the
1990s, for
instance, the term ‘stakeholder’ gained increasing
currency in the UK and the US.
In Britain, Tony Blair invoked the term during
and after his successful 1997
election campaign as a riposte to the
‘enterprise economy’ of the Conservative
Party.8 He referred to
the stakeholder economy as being a unifying theme under
which opportunity was
available to all and from which no-one should be excluded.9
Whilst Blair may
not have acted upon the full range of stakeholder-related policies
espoused
early in his period in office, the UK Labor government enacted a number
of
policies and regulations which took steps towards fostering a stakeholder
model
of the corporation. As is discussed in greater detail in Part 3 of this
paper, these
include the Companies Act 2006 which made reporting on
environmental and social
activities mandatory for companies listed on the
London Stock Exchange, and
created new obligations for company directors to
consider the interests of workers,
local communities, and the environment
alongside the interests of shareholders
when making decisions. In the US,
also throughout the 1990s, many states were
adopting stakeholder or
‘constituency’ statutes.10
It was some time after these developments in the UK and the US that serious
policy
consideration was given to these issues in Australia at the Federal
level.11
Significant policy consideration occurred after the events
concerning James
Hardie.12 On 23 March 2005 the Parliamentary Secretary to
the Treasurer sent a
company law.
7 B. Pheasant, ‘Directors Need a Safe Harbour’ Australian
Financial Review, 17 March
2005, 3. The outcry from this event led to the
government asking the Corporations and
Markets Advisory Committee to
consider, inter alia, directors’ duties regarding corporate
social
responsibility. The Committee’s report, The Social Responsibility of
Corporations,
was published in June 2006 and is available on the
Committee’s website:
http://www.camac.gov.au.
8 P. Ireland,
‘Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a
Less
Degenerate Capitalism?’ (1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 287
at 287. Ireland goes on
to explain that, “by the time of Blair’s
grand pronouncements, ‘stakeholding’ in this
narrower corporate
sense, had already been widely embraced in Britain, with both the
Trade Union
Congress and the Labor Party enthusiastically backing the
‘modernizing
theory’ of the stakeholding company. Considerable
support had also already been
expressed by some in industry, with the final
report of the Tomorrow’s Company inquiry,
organized by the Royal
Society of Arts and supported by companys such as Cadbury
Schweppes,
Guinness, Thorn EMI, and Whitbread, wholeheartedly endorsing the merits of
an
‘inclusive’ conception of the company” (at 288).
9 He
stated in an early speech delivered in Singapore that the stakeholder principle
should
also apply to companies which should operate as a community or
partnership in which
employees have a stake, and not as a mere vehicle for
the capital market. Blair’s speech is
referred to in A. Hicks,
Palmer’s In Company (1996) No 4, 17 April, at 41.
10 See the text
associated with nn 73-78.
11 Previous consideration of the issue was given by
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs, Company
Directors’ Duties: Report on the Social and
Fiduciary Duties and
Obligations of Company Directors, November 1989.
12 See DF Jackson QC, Report
of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical
letter to the
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) asking
CAMAC to inquire
into whether the Corporations Act 2001 should include
corporate social
responsibilities or explicit obligations to take account of the
interests of
certain classes of stakeholders other than shareholders.13
CAMAC’s
report, ‘The Social Responsibility of
Corporations’, was released in December
2006.
On 25 June 2005 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial
Services (PJC) resolved to inquire into corporate responsibility
and triple-bottomline
reporting for incorporated entities in Australia. The
PJC’s report, ‘Corporate
Responsibility: Managing Risk and
Creating Value’, was released in June 2006.
Neither of these reports
recommended changes to directors’ duties to reflect a
stakeholder model
of the company.
As we shall see in the account of the policy debate that occurred in relation
to the
two inquiries,14 it is generally assumed that a legal requirement that
directors take
into account the interests of stakeholders is unnecessary.
Within the debates and
policy literature two reasons gain most attention.
First, it is often said that
Australian companies largely follow a
‘shareholder primacy’ model, in which the
interests of
shareholders are pursued either over a short or long-term time frame.
For
some, this is seen to have wider economic benefits which would be diluted
if
companies were expected to pursue stakeholder interests as well. For
others, it
would be too complex and onerous to expect company directors and
managers to
change the way in which they operate so as to take into account
interests other than
those of shareholders.15 The second, more widely held
view, is that current
Australian company law permits directors sufficient
freedom to pursue stakeholder
interests without requiring that they do so.
Rather than legislating, policy makers
have shown a preference for allowing a
more temperate adaptation to current
practices and views through case law
developments.
Against this, advocates of the stakeholder model of the corporation argue
that the
law should be changed so as to more clearly permit directors to take
into account
the interests of stakeholders. There has been concern that under
the laws as they are
currently constituted directors may be breaching their
duties to the company if they
privilege the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders. Stronger advocates wish to
require directors to take into
account non-shareholder interests. These advocates
hark to the lengthy
development of the concept of ‘stakeholding’ in the sphere
of
company law and corporate management theory, where it has surfaced
regularly in
academic debates about corporate governance since the famous
debate between
Berle, Means and Dodd in the 1930s.16 Stakeholding conceptions
of the company
Research and Compensation Foundation, 21 September 2004.
13 CAMAC Homepage ‘Reference in relation to directors’ duties and
corporate social
responsibility' (March 2005) available
at:
http://www.camac.gov.au/CAMAC/camac.nsf/byHeadline/Whats+Newdirectors%27+dutie
s+and+corporate+social+responsibility?openDocument.
14
See the text associated with nn 118ff.
15 A mixture of these two reasons
informed the view of the Senate Standing Committee on
Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, Company Directors’ Duties: Report on the Social
and
Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors, November
1989.
16 A.A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931)
44 Harvard Law Review 1049;
are supported by the idea that companies need not
and should not be operated
solely in the interests of their shareholders.
According to its advocates, changes in
corporate management and company law
should be made to ensure that in their
decision-making and policy formulation
company directors take account of the
interests of not only shareholders but
all those with a ‘stake’ in the company,
including employees,
creditors, suppliers, consumers, the environment and the
community at
large.17
Whether imposing a legal requirement that companies take into account
the
interests of stakeholders or taking the lesser step of permitting them to
do so
through amendments to corporate law would entail a re-conceptualisation
of ‘in
whose interests the company operates’ is a matter which
lacks empirical evidence.
This is because, until now, very little has been
known about in whose interests
Australian company directors seek to act.18 In
this paper, new empirical evidence
collected through a major survey of
Australian company directors is examined
concerning in whose interests
directors consider themselves to be acting. This study
is the most
comprehensive of its type thus far conducted in Australia.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Part 2 provides a
brief
description of the stakeholder theory of the company. Part 3 considers
the extent to
which current Australian corporate law encapsulates a broader
sense of directors’
duties. In Part 4, examples of stakeholder or
constituency laws implemented outside
Australia are considered. In Part 5,
the findings and recommendations of the reports
of the two inquiries are
outlined, along with the main arguments of significant
submissions to the
inquiries. In Part 6 of the paper, empirical evidence regarding
the way in
which Australian directors perceive their obligations to various
stakeholders
is presented. In the concluding part of the paper, the findings of the
two
inquiries are critically assessed against this empirical evidence.
Whilst the stakeholder model of the company is concerned with the interests
of all
who contribute to, or benefit from, or bear risk in, the
company’s actions, this paper
uses, particularly in Part 6, employees
as the primary example of a stakeholder
group. This allows us to exemplify
and contrast the rights of shareholders with a
group who make a significant
contribution, with associated risks, in the company
with which they are
productively engaged.
2. Stakeholder Theory
The classical exposition of the stakeholder model of the company was
developed
by R Edward Freeman.19 Since the publication of Freeman’s
landmark book,
E.M. Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45
Harvard Law
Review 1145; A.A. Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate
Managers are Trustees: A Note’ (1932)
45 Harvard Law Review 1365
and the text associated with nn 19-26. In the 1990s there
were a number of
symposia on stakeholding which brought the idea back into academic
purview:
see for example (1993) 43 Toronto Law Review and (1991) 21 Stetson
Law
Review.
17 Ireland, above n 8.
18 Previous empirical
studies include I. Francis, Future Direction: The Power of
the
Competitive Board, FT Pitman Publishing, Melbourne 1997.
19
Freeman supplies a history of the term and the concept in R. E. Freeman,
Strategic
literature about the concept has expanded rapidly. Within this
still emerging
literature the concepts stakeholder, stakeholder model,
stakeholder management,
and stakeholder theory are explained and used by
different authors in very different
ways. The defining feature of the
normative aspect of the theory is the acceptance
of the following ideas:
(i) Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in
procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity.
Stakeholders are identified by their interests in the corporation.
(ii) The interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That is, each
group of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not
merely because of its ability to further the interests of some other
group, such as the shareholders.20
The managerial aspect of the theory, as defined by Donaldson and Preston, is
as
follows:
The stakeholder theory is managerial in the broad sense of that term. It does
not simply describe existing situations or predict cause-effect relationships;
it also recommends attitudes, structures, and practices that, taken together,
constitute stakeholder management. Stakeholder management requires, as
its key attribute, simultaneous attention to the legitimate interests of all
appropriate stakeholders, both the establishment of organizational structures
and general policies and in case-by-case decision making...Stakeholder
theory does not necessarily presume that managers are the only rightful
locus of corporate control and governance. Nor does the requirement of
simultaneous attention to stakeholder interests resolve the longstanding
problem of identifying stakeholders and evaluating their legitimate ‘stakes’
in the corporation. The theory does not imply that all stakeholders (however
they may be identified) should be equally involved in all processes and
decisions. 21
So who, or what, is a stakeholder within the corporation? In the
broadest
interpretation, stakeholders are persons or groups that have, or
claim, ownership,
rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities,
past, present, or future. Such
claimed rights or interests are the result of
transactions with, or actions taken by,
the corporation, and may be legal or
moral, individual or collective. Stakeholders
with similar interests, claims,
or rights can be classified as belonging to the same
group.22 These can be
divided into primary and secondary stakeholders.
A primary stakeholder group
is one without whose continuing participation the
corporation cannot survive
as a going concern. Primary stakeholder groups
typically are comprised of
shareholders and investors, employees, customers, and
Management: A
Stakeholder Approach, 1984, at 31-42. He claims an intellectual heritage
for
the concept derived from Adam Smith and A. Berle and G. Means.
20 T. Donaldson and L. Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications’ (1995) 20 Academy of
Management Review 65 at 67.
21 Ibid.
22 Freeman specifically includes
within such groups suppliers, customers, employees,
shareholders, and the
local community.
suppliers, together with what is defined as the public
stakeholder group: the
governments and communities that provide
infrastructures and markets, whose laws
and regulations must be obeyed, and
to whom taxes and other obligations may be
due.23 There is a high level of
interdependence between the corporation and its
primary stakeholder groups.
Failure to retain the participation of a primary
stakeholder group will
result in failure for that corporation.24
Secondary stakeholder groups are defined as those who influence or affect, or
are
influenced or affected by, the corporation, but they are not engaged in
transactions
with the corporation and are not essential for its survival. The
media and a wide
range of special interest groups are considered secondary
stakeholders under this
definition. Competitors may also fall into this
category.
What kind of rights does a stake give rise to?
The types of rights endowed upon constituencies by the stakeholder model
vary
depending upon the model of corporate governance that is proposed. In
theory,
according to Freeman, each one of these stakeholders has a right to
be treated as an
end in itself, not to be treated as a means to some other
end.
Evans and Freeman suggest that if the modern corporation or its management
and
directors insist on expanding their power by disrespecting the rights of
others, and
treating others as a means to an end, then at a minimum the
others must agree to
and hence participate or choose not to participate in
the decisions. It follows,
according to this thinking, that each stakeholder
group must participate in
determining the future direction of the company in
which it has a stake.25
What are the employees’ stakes within the
corporation?
Employees have at stake their jobs and sources of livelihood,
among other things.
As a result, they are concerned with what happens to them
(a) in the process of
employment, such as recruitment and selection, (b)
during job incumbency, and (c)
as they seek continuance of their jobs.26
23 Public stakeholders are sometimes considered to be secondary
stakeholders.
24 The corporation’s survival and continuing success
depend upon the ability of its directors
and managers to create sufficient
wealth, value, or satisfaction for those who belong to
each stakeholder
group, so that each group continues as a part of the
corporation’s
stakeholder system: M. Clarkson, ‘A Stakeholder
Framework for Analyzing and
Evaluating Corporate Social Performance’
(1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 92
at 106-7.
25 According to the
theory, managerial rights must have implicit and explicit limits.
Implicitly,
if they are exerted for any other aim, or disproportionately to their
legitimate
aims, they are unfounded and can be ignored. Explicitly, the
interests of a given category
of stakeholders limit the interests of the
other ones: E. Freeman and W. Evans ‘Corporate
Governance: A
Stakeholder Interpretation’ (1990) 19 Journal of Behavioural Economics
337.
26 C. Summers, ‘Codetermination in the United States: A Projection
of Problems and
Potentials’ (1982) 4 Journal of Comparative Corporate
Law and Securities Regulation
155 at 170, cited by K. Van Wezel Stone,
‘Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes’
(1991) 21 Stetson Law Review 45 at 49.
For some advocates of
the stakeholder model of the company, employees have a
particularly strong
stake in the company by virtue of both their high level
contribution and
risk. Employees make a financial contribution to the corporation
in the form
of human capital. Summers represents this view as follows:
[E]mployees . . . are as much members [of the company] as the shareholders
who provide the capital. Indeed, the employees may have made a much
greater investment in the enterprise by their years of services, may have less
ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the
enterprise than many of the stockholders.
Accordingly, employees as stakeholders have their own rights whose fulfilment
is
required by the corporate organisation. Therefore, it is argued, the
corporation,
working through its officers, must have a corresponding
responsibility to respect
each of those rights with the result that companies
need to be managed for the
benefit of their stakeholders, including
employees.
In this section we have sought to provide a sketch of the features of what is
an
amorphous construct. Within the jurisprudential setting, discussion has
centred on
the responsibilities and duties of directors, with the proponents
of the stakeholder
model making a variety of different proposals for legal
reform, most notably an
extension of directors’ duties, representation
of stakeholders on the board of
directors, voting rights for stakeholder
groups, and greater disclosure of corporate
information. Our main focus in
this paper is on directors’ duties.
3. Stakeholders and Directors’ Duties under Australian
Corporate
Law
A major argument used by those who are opposed to including
stakeholder
provisions in corporate law is that the law is already permissive
enough to allow
directors wide discretion to take into account the interests
of stakeholders.27 This
interpretation of corporate law is also held by some
proponents of the stakeholder
model. For instance, Blair and Stout, who
constructed the team production model of
corporate governance,28 argue that
‘many features of corporate law in the United
States are more
consistent with our team production model than they are with
shareholder
primacy, at least if shareholder primacy is interpreted to mean
maximization
of shareholder value in the short term’.29 For Blair, in the
United
States context, this is because the ‘prescriptions for
directors’ duties under the team
production model turn out to be very
similar, and perhaps even “observationally
equivalent” in
practice to the prescriptions that advocates of long-term share value
27 This was the conclusion of both the CAMAC and PJC Reports. See also R.P.
Austin,
H.A.J. Ford and I.M. Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law
and Corporate
Governance, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005, at 7.13,
for elaboration of this interpretation
of the law.
28 M. Blair and L.
Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85
Virginia
Law Review 247. This is one of the more thoroughly
developed, stakeholder-type,
alternative models of corporate
governance.
29 M. Blair, ‘Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron
World: Why Language Matters’ (2003) 38
Wake Forest Law Review
886 at 890.
mazimization would make’.30 For others, such as Sheldon
Leader, the formulation
of the company as an autonomous legal entity -
separate from its members as well
as other stakeholders - creates the
possibility that the legal conception of the
company may already be largely
consistent with the stakeholder conception.31 The
company has interests which
are independent of any single set of people affected by
it, including
shareholders. Thus, the role of managers and directors is to mediate
a
constantly shifting set of interests.
There is another view. The purpose of the company, according to a
narrow
conception, is to advance the interests of its owners (predominantly
to increase
their wealth), and the function of directors, as agents of the
owners, is to faithfully
advance the financial interests of the cormpany,
because the company is the
property of its shareholders.32 The purpose of
this part of the paper is to assess the
extent to which any of these
contentions is accurate with regards to Australian
corporate law.
Although it has not been discussed previously in the judgments of courts or
the
literature on Australian directors’ duties, it can be argued that
there has been a shift
in the extent to which the interests of stakeholders
other than shareholders can be
considered by directors. Writing in 1967,
Professor Parsons commented on what is
meant by the interests of the company
in the following terms:
It would seem that the interests of employees (cf, Re William Brooks & Co
Ltd and the Companies Act (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 354) consumers and the
public at large do not enter the calculation. The interests of creditors and
debenture holders do not enter the calculation (Richard Brady Franks Ltd v
Price [1937] HCA 42; (1937) 58 CLR 112; In re Atlas Engineering Company (1889) 10 LR
(NSW) Eq 179).33
Writing 20 years later, in 1987, Professor Sealy had a different
interpretation of
Australian corporate law – one that would allow the
interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders to be considered by directors, but
only where shareholders benefited
from such consideration:
Under the traditional rules of company law, directors’ duties are regarded as
being owed to the company and to the company alone; and for this purpose
the company’s interests are equated with the interests of the members
30 Ibid at 890-891.
31 S. Leader, ‘Private Property and Corporate
Governance Part 1: Defining Interests’ in F. Patfield (ed.), Perspectives
on Company Law: 1, Kluwer Law International, 1995, 85 at 86.
32 A more
radical view is the contract conception of the company espoused by R. Coase,
‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937)
4 Economica 386. In adaptations of
this model, the corporation tends to disappear, transformed from a substantial
institution into
part of the market in which autonomous property owners freely
contract. K. Van Wezel Stone and others suggest that this model does
not rule
out a role for labour in corporate governance, because no group has an a priori
privileged relationship to the entity as
a whole. For a development of the
Coasian view see also: O. Hart, ‘An Economist’s View of Fiduciary
Duty’ (1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 299; R. Daniels,
‘Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?’
(1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 315.
33 R.W. Parsons, ‘The
Director’s Duty of Good Faith’ [1967] MelbULawRw 1; (1967) 5 Melbourne University Law
Review 395 at 418, n 99.
collectively. Directors on this view are not entitled, still less bound, to
consider the interests of other groups, such as the company’s employees,
creditors, customers and suppliers, or to have any concern for such matters as
the community, the environment, welfare and charity, unless what they do has
derivative benefits for their shareholders.34
Three important questions can be asked. First, are there any circumstances
when
the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders can be considered by
directors without
there being any derivative benefit for shareholders?
Second, are there any
circumstances when the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders must be
considered by directors? Third, are there any
circumstances when the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders can be given
higher priority by directors than the
interests of shareholders? The
questions relate only to the duty of directors to act in
the best interests
of the company. There may be other statutory obligations that
require
directors to consider the interests of particular stakeholders.
Writing 21 years after Professor Sealy, Justice Owen provides insight into
these
questions.35 In brief, there can be limited circumstances when the
answer to all
three questions is yes. Justice Owen observes the ‘a
reflection of the interests of the
company may be seen in the interest of
shareholders’.36 This is the established
position. However, Justice
Owen further observes that this:
...does not mean that the general body of shareholders is always and for all
purposes the embodiment of ‘the company as a whole’. It will depend on the
context, including the type of company and the nature of the impugned
activity or decision. And it may also depend on whether the company is a
thriving ongoing entity or whether its continued existence is problematic. In
my view, the interests of shareholders and the company may be seen as
correlative not because the shareholders are the company but, rather, because
the interests of the company and the interests of the shareholders intersect.
...
It is, in my view, incorrect to read the phrase ‘acting in the best interests of
the company’ and ‘acting in the best interests of the shareholders’ as if they
meant exactly the same thing...it is almost axiomatic to say that the content of
the duty may (and usually will) include a consideration of the interests of
shareholders. But it does not follow that in determining the content of the
duty to act in the interests of the company, the concerns of shareholders are
the only ones to which attention need be directed or that the legitimate
interests of other groups can safely be ignored.37
Because of the nature of the case before him, Justice Owen gave particular
attention
to the interests of creditors. He stated that in an insolvency
context, the duty to act
in the best interests of the company includes an
obligation on directors to take into
34 L.S Sealy, ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities
– Problems Conceptual, Practical and
Procedural’ [1987] MonashULawRw 7; (1987) 13
Monash University Law Review 164 at 187.
35 The Bell Group Ltd (in
liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239.
36 Ibid at
[4392].
37 Ibid at [4393] and [4395].
account the interests of
creditors.38 His Honour stated the obligation can arise in
situations outside
of actual insolvency, noting that:
a decision that has adverse consequences for creditors might also be adverse
to the interests of the company. Adversity might strike short of actual
insolvency and might propel the company towards an insolvency
administration.39
Moreover, according to his Honour, although the interests of creditors must
be
considered in an insolvency context, there is no rule that in this
situation the
interests of creditors are paramount.40 They may be paramount
in a particular
situation but there is no rule that requires this
conclusion.
Therefore, returning to our three questions, we can answer them as follows.
First,
as a general proposition, acting in the best interests of the company
generally
means acting in the interests of shareholders as a general body.
The directors are
able, but not required, to consider the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders, and
where they do, such consideration needs to
be done with a view to the benefit of the
shareholders. However, in some
circumstances, directors can consider the interests
of non-shareholder
stakeholders without there being any derivative benefit for
shareholders. The
only such situation that courts have clearly identified is where
the company
is insolvent or is close to insolvency or some contemplated
transaction
threatens the solvency of the company.
Second, in an insolvency context, there is an obligation on directors to take
into
account the interests of creditors. Finally, the only situation where
the courts have
clearly identified that the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders can be given
higher priority by directors than the interests of
shareholders is where the company
is insolvent or is close to insolvency or
some contemplated transaction threatens the
solvency of the company. We now
consider these principles in greater detail.
Directors are subject to a range of duties in conducting the affairs of the
company.
These are, most relevantly, ss 180 and 181 of the Corporations Act.
Section 180
requires that directors and other officers of the corporation
exercise their powers
with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable
person would exercise in a
similar situation. This duty is tempered by the
‘business judgment’ rule (s 180(2)).
The purpose of this rule is
to make it clear that it is not the intention of the law to
second guess the
decisions of officers. The effect of the business judgment rule is
that the
officer is assumed to have acted with appropriate care and diligence if
all
the factors contained in s 180(2) are satisfied.
Section 181 obliges directors and other corporate officers to exercise their
powers
and discharge their duties ‘in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation’
and also ‘for a proper
purpose’. As well as acting in good faith, directors must
satisfy the
test of acting ‘in the best interests of the corporation’. In
applying that
test, the courts consider that it is the role of the directors
to determine what is in the
38 Ibid at [4418].
39 Ibid at [4445].
40 Ibid at [4436] –
[4440].
best interests of the company, unless no reasonable director could
have reached the
decision.41
An important question is what, if any, limits the requirements to exercise
powers
‘in the best interests of the corporation’ and ‘for
a proper purpose’ might impose on
directors in taking into account the
broader environmental and social context in
their decision-making. According
to one commentary on corporate law, although
there may be no direct legal
obligation for officers to take the interests of
stakeholders other than
shareholders into account, this does not preclude directors
from choosing to
do so:
The decided cases in this area indicate that management may implement a
policy of enlightened self-interest on the part of the company but may not
be generous with company resources when there is no prospect of
commercial advantage to the company.42
Mitchell, O’Donnell and Ramsay have argued that even if we accept that
the
interests of the company are largely co-extensive with the interests of
shareholders,
the formulation of directors’ duties is still imprecise
enough to allow considerable
discretion to directors to take into account the
interests of employees and other
stakeholders.43 These authors offer the
following view of directors’ duties:
It can be in the interests of existing shareholders for directors to take a longterm
view of shareholder welfare, having regard to their future as well as
existing interests. Similarly, although the end of shareholder benefit is
paramount, discretion as to the means to best achieve this remains with the
directors. That is, long-term maximisation of shareholder wealth may not be
served by short-term profit maximisation if the latter results in dissatisfied
suppliers, antagonistic employees, and angry community groups. Rather,
shareholder benefit might require a degree of largesse to other stakeholder
groups. Finally, the duty is largely based on a director’s motivation and
opinion as to what is in the best interests of the company, and not directed to
any assessment of actual outcome. This grants considerable leeway to
directors, as courts rarely interfere with the decision-making of corporate
boards or find conclusive proof that a director did not think the decision was
in the best interest of the company.
These three factors — the absence of a time frame, the distinction between
ends and means, and the focus on motivation and purpose rather than
outcome — mean directors retain considerable discretion and autonomy in
exercising their powers. It is up to them to identify the interests of
41 See, for example, Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1987) 16
NSWLR 212; 12
ACLR 537; 6 ACLC 154.
42 R.P. Austin, H.A.J. Ford and I.M.
Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law and
Corporate Governance,
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005 at 7.13.
43 R. Mitchell, A. O’Donnell and
I. Ramsay, ‘Shareholder Value and Employee Interests:
Intersections of
Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law’ (2005) 23
Wisconsin
International Law Journal 417.
shareholders, the period over which these can be appropriately achieved,
and the extent to which they require bestowing benefits on other stakeholder
groups. Thus the formulation ‘in the interests of the company as a whole’
remains compatible with directors striking a balance between the competing
interests of different stakeholders in order to benefit the interests of
shareholders in the long run. The main legal restriction on directors’
discretion in this regard is that there be the possibility of some eventual
return to shareholders which justifies a departure from short-term profit
maximisation. Bestowing benefits on other stakeholders has purely
instrumental value, and such value will be difficult to justify where
companies have ceased to trade (even where bestowing benefits reflects the
declared wishes of the majority of shareholders).
Even where the fate of the company and the short-term welfare
of
shareholders diverge, the law does not compel the pursuit of
shareholder
wealth maximisation but often continues to grant considerable
latitude to
directors to make discretionary judgments as to the best
interests of the
company.44
The Corporations Act makes it clear that the statutory duties in the Act do
not
exclude the operation of other laws, including the general law.45 Under
the general
law, directors are obliged to act in the interests of ‘the
company as a whole’. As we
shall see, this phrase has been interpreted
to mean the financial well-being of the
shareholders as a general body.46
Some commentators have argued that the current
formulation of this
directors’ duty embodies a time-factor which arguably
protects
employees (albeit not in express terms), in the sense that the
directors may, and
indeed must, direct their efforts towards securing the
continued prosperity of the
company’s enterprise (i.e. of the company
as an ongoing concern). Peter Xuereb
posits that it is arguable that in doing
this the law requires, at the least, that the
directors ensure that there is
an entity in existence on a continuing basis, thus
offering employment and
also furthering or protecting the interests of the general
body of the
company’s employees.47 At the broadest level of principle then, it
may
be said that as most stakeholders have an interest in the commercial
well-being of
the company in the long run, the formulation of
directors’ duties is consistent with
a minimal stakeholder approach.
Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen, for instance,
argue that ‘enlightened
value maximisation uses much of the structure of
stakeholder theory but
accepts maximisation for the long-run value of the firm as
the criterion for
making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders’.48
We now examine the case law to assess whether this view is supported by
the
courts’ interpretation of directors’ duties. The courts have
held as a general rule
44 Ibid at 436-438.
45 Section 185. Section 9 of the Corporations Act
defines the general law to mean the
principles and rules of the common law
and equity.
46 See Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1950] 2 All ER 1120. See
also Gaiman v National
Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317.
47 P.
Xuereb, ‘Juridification of Industrial Relations through Company Law
Reform’ (1988)
51 Modern Law Review 157 at 165.
48 J. Fuller and M.
Jensen, ‘Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings
Game’
(2002) 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 41.
that the
powers of directors are entrusted to them for the benefit of the
company,
namely, for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole, and not for
the benefit of the
directors themselves, or of a group of shareholders of the
company, or of outsiders:
Parke v Daily News Ltd.49 The interests of
the company as a whole have been said
to require the directors to have regard
to ‘the interests of the members of the
company, as well as having
regard to the interests of the company as a commercial
entity’:
Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd.50 This idea of the
company as
a commercial entity may thus support claims that an
‘enlightened value
maximisation’ approach is possible under
Australian case law.
When we further consider the case law we see that the interests of the
company as a
whole may vary according to the stage in a company’s
life.51 Whilst the duty to
consider the interests of the company as a whole
may be considered co-terminus
with the interests of shareholders when the
company’s financial health is buoyant,
it may not be true when the
company is in financial difficulty. Sheldon Leader, for
instance, points to
the fact that at the point of insolvency directors are sometimes
said to owe
a duty to the company’s creditors. It is possible for a creditor to have
a
derivative interest in seeing the company remain healthy and capable of
paying its
debt fully.52 It was on this basis, for example, that the court
acted in favour of
creditors in Standard Chartered Bank v Walker.53 In
this case the interests of the
creditors and those of the company coincided.
In the Australian context, Mason J in
Walker v Wimborne,54 held that
‘directors of a company in discharging their duty to
the company must
take account of the interests of its shareholders and its
creditors’
because failure to do so ‘will have adverse
consequences for the company as well
as for them.’ Subsequent cases
demonstrate that when a company is approaching
insolvency a director is not
only obliged to consider the interests of creditors as part
of the discharge
of his or her duty to the company itself but that the interests of
creditors
may become more important than the interests of shareholders. In Chew
v
R,55 Malcolm CJ cited Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in
liq),56 as standing for
the principle that, if a company's financial
position is precarious, the interests of
creditors may become the dominant
factor in what constitutes the ‘benefit of the
company as a
whole’.57 In Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq),58 it
was
suggested that creditors might have an action against directors of a
company for
49 [1962] 1 Ch 927. See also Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank
Ltd [1970] 1 Ch
62; Levin v Clark [1962] NSWR 686.
50 (1987) 16
NSWLR 212; 12 ACLR 537; 6 ACLC 154.
51 Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd
(in liq) (1986) 4 ACLC 215 at 221.
52 Under Australian law, directors do
not have any direct duty to creditors and no such duty
is enforceable by the
creditors other than in cases where a special responsibility has arisen
or
under statutory provisions dealing with liquidation: Sycotex Pty Ltd v
Baseler (1994)
122 ALR 531; 13 ACSR 766; 12 ACLC 494. This interpretation
was subsequently
endorsed by the High Court in Spies v R [1999] HCA 68; (2000) 201
CLR 603; 173 ALR 529; 35 ACSR
500; [2000] HCA 43. See also Geneva Finance
Ltd v Resource and Industry Ltd (2002)
169 FLR 152; 20 ACLC 1427; [2002]
WASC 121 at 6.
53 [1992] BCLC 602.
54 [1976] HCA 7; (1976) 50 ALJR 446 at 446.
55
(1991) 5 ACSR 473.
56 (1986) 4 NSWLR 722.
57 See also the discussion of
The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No
9]
WASC 239 at nn 35-40 and accompanying text.
58 [1985] 1 NZLR 242 at 249;
(1985) 3 ACLC 453 at 459.
breach of duty based on a duty owed by directors to
creditors. However this
approach was rejected in Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler,59
and by the High Court in
Spies v R.60
These cases clash with the idea that the interests of a company for the
purpose of
directors’ duties can only be the interests of shareholders.
It is on this basis that
Leader argues that there is a constantly shifting
set of interests of stakeholders to be
satisfied by the company if it is to
function successfully, and the notion of its
independent interests serves to
define the fixing of the priorities within that shifting
field at any
particular point of time. 61 As such, it is not possible to say that
a
company’s interest is reducible to the ‘sum’ of the
interests of different
constituencies, since the notion of a sum fails to
convey the fact that there is no
stable, single way of aggregating these
interests over time. The company therefore
remains independent of any single
set of stakeholders affected by it.
Extending this general principle, Robert Sadler argues that to fail to take
account of
employees’ interests, also, can have adverse consequences
for corporations, as a
result of, for example, prolonged industrial unrest.62
Therefore, the principle
articulated in Walker v Wimborne 63 could logically
be extended to employees.
Australian case law shows there are limits to the
application of this argument.
Directors have scope to take into account
employee and other stakeholder interests
unless they clash with the interests
of shareholders.
It is generally accepted that employees’ interests cannot be placed
ahead of those of
shareholders, unless this is necessary to ensure that the
company meets its
obligations to employees under employment, industrial or
occupational health and
safety laws.64 Where the interests of employees are
given priority over shareholders
by directors, the courts have indicated that
directors are in contravention of their
duties. In Parke v Daily News Ltd,
counsel for Daily News Ltd submitted that
although the directors’
principal duty must be to the shareholders, boards of
directors must also
consider their duties to employees. 65 Plowman J quashed any
hope for the
privileging of employees’ interests by stating that:
. . . no authority to support that proposition as a proposition of law was cited
to me; we know of none and in my judgment such is not the law.66
59 (1994) 122 ALR 531; 13 ACSR 766; 12 ACLC 494.
60 (2000) 201 CLR 603;
173 ALR 529; 35 ACSR 500; [2000] HCA 43.
61 Leader, above n 31 at 86.
62
R. Sadler, ‘Employee Representatives on Boards of Directors: Limiting
Directors’
Fiduciary Duties’ (1982) Journal of Industrial
Relations 282 at 283.
63 Above n 54.
64 Ensuring compliance with such laws
forms part of directors’ common law and statutory
duties to act with
due care and diligence; see, e.g., Justice S. Whelan and L. Zwier,
Employee
Entitlements and Corporate Insolvency and Reconstruction, Research
Paper,
Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of
Melbourne, 2005, at 10.
65 The issue of the stage in the company’s life
may have been important in Parke v Daily
News Ltd [1962] Ch 927, in which the
court held invalid a board of directors’ decision to
set aside the
entire net proceeds of 1,572,500 pounds from the sale of the London
News
Chronicle as a fund for severance pay to employees.
66 Ibid at
963.
In another rejection of the proposition that employees’ interests
may be privileged,
in Re William Brooks & Co Ltd,67 the court ordered the
company to be wound up
because the directors had acted improperly by giving
priority to employee interests
over those of shareholders.68
In any case, the extension of duties of directors has not been attended by
the
extension of rights for stakeholders. For instance, the courts have
stopped short of
perfecting a duty to consider the interests of creditors at
the point of insolvency
with an accompanying right of enforcement even though
their interests may be
important for the company’s ongoing commercial
survival. Their interests are
derivative. Employees are said to be
‘outsiders’ for the purposes of directors’
duties.69 The
discussion in this part of the paper has shown that employees’
interests
may only be taken into account for the purposes of directors’
duties where it is in
the interests of the shareholders, unless otherwise
dictated by law. For some
commentators, the problem of enforcement is one
which diminishes claims that
directors’ duties have been meaningfully
broadened. Although fiduciary discourse
is celebrated for its significant
socialising and educational role in corporate
governance,70 without an
element of enforceability, fiduciary law does not increase
the
‘stake’ of the employee in the company in the manner envisaged by
stakeholder
theorists as expounded in Part 2 of this paper. Katherine Stone
remarks that:
By linking decision making power over major issues of corporate policy to
equity, traditional corporate law theory says that labor has no role to play in
corporate decision making. Instead, it treats labor like suppliers and
customers, who contract with the company but are not of it.71
This examination of Australian corporate law has shown that directors are
able to
exercise significant discretion in executing their duties. This may
be consistent
with an ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach 72
and thus a limited stakeholder
approach to corporate governance. However, it
falls short of a fuller stakeholder
approach which would allow directors to
treat the discharge of employee and other
stakeholder rights and interests as
an end in itself, not as a means to some other
ends, namely long term
shareholder wealth creation.
67 [1962] NSWR 142.
68 See also Lyford v Commonwealth Bank of Australia
[1995] FCA 1261; (1995) 130 ALR 267; 17 ACSR 211;
[1995] FCA 1261; 13 ACLC 900.
69 Bercusson uses the
‘insider/outsider’ terminology in B. Bercusson, ‘Workers,
Corporate
Enterprise and the Law’ in R. Lewis (ed.), Labour Law in
Britain, Oxford, Blackwell,
1986, at 139.
70 M. O’Connor, ‘How
Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors’ Conflict-Of-
Interest
Transactions and the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance’
(1993) George
Washington Law Review 954 at 968.
71 K. Stone, ‘Labor
and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging
Possibilities’ (1988) University of Chicago Law Review 73 at
151.
72 See discussion of this phrase in the context of s 172 of the UK
Companies Act 2006: nn
79-90 and accompanying text.
4. International
Developments
The idea that directors owe special responsibilities to employees and
other
stakeholders has been explicitly recognised in corporate statutes in
some
jurisdictions. In this part of the paper we examine some examples of
these statutes
in the US, the UK and other jurisdictions. We also discuss the
recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in BCE Inc and contrast this
with US case law.
Stakeholder statutes and related initiatives
The United States
Starting with Pennsylvania in 1986, more than half of the state governments
of the
United States of America have passed stakeholder statutes, which
propose a
corporate governance model different from the classic or
conventional corporate
law paradigm of the director-manager acting for the
shareholder-owner. These
statutes, called non-shareholder constituency
statutes, can be divided into two main
categories: permissive statutes and
mandatory statutes. Permissive statutes allow,
but do not require, directors
to take the interests of employees and other
stakeholders into account when
making strategic-level decisions.73 An example of
the former is Pennsylvania,
where the board may consider ‘the effects of any
action
upon...employees’ An example of the latter is Connecticut, where
directors are
required to consider (inter alia) ‘the interests of the
corporation’s employees’.74
The following states have permissive statutes: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.75 Most of the statutes allow directors to
consider
stakeholder interests in any circumstances however 19 states only
allow stakeholder
consideration during takeover or change of control
situations.76 There is also a
difference amongst the statutes as to what the
directors are permitted to take into
account. Some statutes permit directors
to consider the ‘effects’ of their decisions
on stakeholders
whilst others only permit directors to take into account
the
‘interests’ of stakeholders. Most statutes allow for the
consideration of both long
and short-term interests.77 Indiana and
Pennsylvania have statutes that explicitly
provide that the claims of
shareholders need not be held above those of other
stakeholders. These
statutes presume the validity of a directors’ determination to
73 J. Hanks, Jr, ‘Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s’
(1991) 21 Stetson Law Review 97 at 103.
74 A.
Reynolds ‘Do ESOPS Strengthen Employee Stakeholder Interest?’ (2001)
13 Bond Law
Review 95.
75 J. Hanks, Jr, ‘Non-Stockholder
Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should Never
Have Come’
Insights, December 1989, 20- 26.
76 K. Hale, ‘Corporate Law and
Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes' (2003)
45 Arizona Law
Review 823 at 836.
77 Ibid.
consider non-shareholder interests if approved
by a majority of disinterested
directors unless it is proven after reasonable
investigation that the disinterested
directors did not act in good faith.
Two states, Connecticut and Arizona, have enacted mandatory statutes that
require
directors to consider the interests of other constituencies.
Connecticut requires
directors to consider the interests of the
corporation’s employees, customers,
creditors, suppliers,
‘community and societal considerations’, as well as long-term
and
short-term interests of the corporation and of the shareholders,
‘including the
possibility that those interests may be best served by
the continued independence of
the corporation’.78
United Kingdom
Until 2006, s 309 of the Companies Act 1985 provided that ‘the matters
to which
the directors are to have regard in the performance of their
functions shall include
the interests of the company’s employees in
general as well as the interests of its
members.’79 This was limited by
s 309(2) which expressly stated that the duty was
to be owed to the company
and enforceable as such. In 2006 the UK enacted its
much debated Companies
Act 2006. Section 172(1) imposes a duty upon a director
to act in the way he
or she considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote
the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing
so
have regard (amongst other matters) to (a) the likely consequences of
any
decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company’s
employees, (c) the need
to foster the company’s business relationships
with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s
operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the
company. Section 172(1)
is limited by
s172(2) which specifies that this list of purposes ‘has
effect as if the reference to
promoting the success of the company for the
benefit of its members were to
achieving those purposes’.
It can be seen that among other effects, this duty aims to introduce wider
corporate
social responsibility into a director’s decision making
process. Whilst the section
makes it clear that the directors owe a duty to
promote the success of the company
for the benefit of its members, it seeks
to provide a broader context for fulfilling
that duty.80 According to a
member of the UK Company Law Review Steering
Group which drafted the changes,
the laws reflect an ‘enlightened shareholder
value’ approach.
Section 172(1) is intended to articulate the common law view that
‘the
company’ means its shareholders as a whole. The phrase ‘in the
interests of the
company’ was intentionally omitted as being
meaningless.81 Section 172(1)(b)-(e)
78 Hanks, above n 73.
79 This is known as the ‘regard clause’:
A. Conard, ‘Corporate Constituencies in Western
Europe’ (1991) 21
Stetson Law Review 71; Xuereb, above n 47. The provision may be
traced to the
1970s industrial democracy movement: P. Redmond (ed.), Companies
and
Securities Law: Commentary and Materials, 2nd edition, The Law Book
Company, 1992, at
412.
80 CAMAC Report, above n 7 at 103.
81 P. Davies,
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the New Responsibilities of
Directors’,
seek to make clear that although shareholder interests are
predominant, the
promotion of these interests does not require ‘riding
roughshod’ over the interests
of other groups on whose activities the
business of the company depends for
success.82
There are further key provisions that place new responsibilities on companies
in
relation to their social and environmental impact. The Companies Act 2006
brings
together elements of the previous operating and financial review and
the
requirements of the EU Accounts Modernization Directive. Under the Act,
all
companies other than small companies must produce a business review as
part of
the directors’ report which contains a fair review of the
company’s business and
principal risks and uncertainties. This must
include information about the
environment, employees and social and community
issues to the extent necessary
for an understanding of the business.83 The
business review must be audited. The
Companies Act 2006 also includes a
reserve power to allow the government to
require institutional investors to
disclose how they have voted at annual meetings.
This was included for the
purpose of fostering voluntary disclosure. The resort to
law will take place
only if investors ‘fail to come clean on their voting
records
voluntarily’.84 McBarnet observes that: ‘In effect, while
supporting a voluntary
approach to CSR, UK government strategy . . . has been
to legislatively support and
strengthen the market pressures on companies to
pay attention to CSR issues’.85
The changes to directors’ duties under the UK Companies Act 2006 came
into force
in October 2007. Recent commentaries on the Act continue to
speculate about its
possible effects on company directors’
decision-making, and question whether this
form of regulation is best placed
to foster the enlightened shareholder value
approach in UK companies.86 An
immediate result of the changes agreed upon by
most commentators is that
directors will take greater precaution to evidence their
consideration of s
172(1) stakeholders in decision-making because of perceived
risks of being
censured by a regulatory body, or of facing a derivative action
brought by a
shareholder. Legal commentary on the changes contemplates much
use of the
derivative action provisions by activist shareholders.87 However, since
the
Act has come into force, little evidence of such a trend has arisen.
Loughrey,
Keay and Cerioni have considered the legal profession's reaction to
the Act and
suggest that the lack of shareholder derivative actions may stem
from lawyers who
W.E. Hearn Lecture at the University of Melbourne Law
School, 2 October 2005.
82 Ibid.
83 CAMAC Report, above n 7 at 130-131.
84 Financial Times, 6
June 2006, quoting Alastair Darling, Trade and Industry Secretary,
cited in
D. McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law,
for
Law: The New Corporate Accountability’ in D. McBarnet, A.
Voiculescu and T. Campbell
(eds.), The New Corporate Accountability:
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law,
Cambridge University Press,
2007, at 35.
85 McBarnet, ibid, at 35.
86 See A. Keay, ‘Tackling the
Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United
Kingdom’s
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’ [2007] SydLawRw 23; (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review
577
who argues that the enlightened shareholder value approach in s 172 is a
little different
from the shareholder value approach.
87 N. Mirchandani,
and R.Huntsman, ‘Directors Cut’ (2008) 21 (45) Lawyer 31;
‘New
derivative action may lead to increased claims against
directors’ (2007) 28 Credit Control
92.
have stated that they would
advise shareholder clients of the difficulties at
succeeding with a
derivative action, and discourage them from proceeding.88 Most
supporters of
CSR expect that the changes will have little impact initially.
Charles
Wynn-Evans posits that as a stakeholder group, employees may be worse
off under
the changes as they have no enforceable rights, and their concerns
may be
deemphasised if considered equally with the other s 172(1)
stakeholders.89
However he agrees with the views of other commentators that
anything that will
assist directors to internalise CSR considerations may
have real benefits for
stakeholders in the future.90
Other jurisdictions
Several African countries have in their corporate law statutes provisions
that
mention employees in the context of directors’ duties. The
Zimbabwe Companies
Amendment Act 1993, which was the first major amendment of
the principal Act
for many years, enables directors to take account of the
interests of their employees
as well as those of their shareholders.91 The
Ghanian Companies Code s 203(3)
states that:
In considering whether a particular transaction or course of action is in the
best interest of the company as a whole a director may have regard to the
interests of the employees, as well as members, of the company, and, when
appointed by, or as a representative of, a special class of members,
employees, or creditors may give special, but not exclusive, consideration to
the interests of that class.92
Due to fundamental differences between Member States’ traditions in the
company
law field, it appears unlikely that any similar development will
occur in the EU in
the near future.93 The EU Draft Fifth Directive on Company
Law, which provided
that each member of the supervisory board, management
board or administrative
organ, as the case may be, has the same duty at law
and shall exercise his or her
functions ‘in the interests of the
company, having regard to the interests of the
88 J. Loughrey, A. Keay, and L. Cerioni, ‘Legal Practitioners,
Enlightened Shareholder Value
and the Shaping of Corporate Governance’
(2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79
at 111.
89 C. Wynn-Evans,
‘The Companies Act 2006 and the Interests of Employees’ (2007)
36
Industrial Law Journal 188 at 192.
90 Wynn-Evans, ibid at 192; P. Yeoh,
‘The Direction and Control of Corporations: Law or
Strategy?’
(2007) 49 Managerial Law 37; L. Cerioni, ‘The Success of the Company in
s.
172(1) of the U.K. Companies Act 2006: Towards an 'Enlightened Directors
Primacy'?’
(2008) 4 Original Law Review 1 at 31.
91 (1994) 20 (1)
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 5-6. In South Africa, cl 76 (3)(b) of the
Companies
Bill 2008 provides that a director must act ‘in the best interests of
the
company’. For discussion of the South African position, see I.
Esser and J. du Plessis, ‘The
Stakeholder Debate and Directors’
Fiduciary Duties’ (2007) 19 South African Mercantile
Law Journal 346.
The authors observe that courts in South Africa have interpreted the
company
to mean the shareholders collectively: ibid at 357.
92 The Code has been
criticised for failing to give greater direction as to what degree
of
consideration is ‘special but not exclusive’ (Sadler, above n
62 at 285.)
93 Activities of the European Union, Summaries of
Legislation,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26002.htm,
shareholders
and of the employees’,94 was withdrawn by the Commission in
December
2001 because of political deadlock.
The limitations of stakeholder statutes
Over the 20 or so years since stakeholder statutes have been enacted, their
effect
would seem to be relatively insignificant. It is suggested that
although these statutes
lay a good foundation for stakeholder interests they
cannot achieve very much on
their own. Commentators disagree about whether
stakeholder statutes represent
radical changes in the law of ownership rights
in corporations or whether they
merely codify pre-existing corporate law
doctrine. Some commentators have
interpreted the US stakeholder statutes as
demonstrating that directors do not owe
duties exclusively to shareholders;
rather, they play the role of mediators between
different corporate
constituencies.95 Others believe the statutes are so limited as to
the rights
they create as to make very little concrete difference.96
There appear to be three main conflicting views of the stakeholder statutes
in the
US: (a) they create no enforceable rights of action on the part of
stakeholders but
do authorise directors to make trade-offs between
shareholder and stakeholder
interests, including the right to reduce
shareholder gains for enhanced stakeholder
welfare; (b) they create an
implied right of action; and (c) they probably do not
create an implied right
of action, but even if they do create an implied right of
action, in practice
they will only have the effect of entrenching managerial power.
The first view is held by Stephen Bainbridge.97 Alternatively, some
commentators,
such as Lawrence Mitchell, argue that stakeholder statutes
should be interpreted to
create enforceable obligations for non-shareholder
constituency groups. Although
none of these laws provide for an explicit
right of action, Mitchell argues that there
are implied rights. He argues
that the legislative intent was to grant a right of
action, because the
legislature would not have believed that it is likely that directors
are
generally motivated by a sincere interest in protecting employee and
community
interests. Instead, he argues that stakeholder statutes would have
no significance in
the absence of enforceable private rights of action, other
than granting uncontrolled
discretion to directors - a goal that cannot
plausibly be accepted as a legitimate
legislative purpose that legislators
would willingly use to justify publicly their
support for the statute. He
concludes that courts should interpret stakeholder laws
to contain private
rights of action on the part of their intended beneficiaries.
Others, such as Katherine Stone, reject the implied right of action argument.
With
the exception of the Connecticut and Arizona statutes, all the statutes
speak in
permissive tones. They say directors may consider the interests of
other
constituencies, making the likelihood of enforceability even less.
Given the
94 Articles 10(e) and 21(q). O.J. No. C240/2, 9.9.83.
95 R. Karmel,
‘Implications of the Stakeholder Model’ (1993) 61 George Washington
Law
Review 1156 at 1157.
96 M. Polonksy and P. Ryan, ‘The
Implications of Stakeholder Statutes for Socially
Responsible Managers’
(1996) 15 Business & Professional Ethics Journal 3 at 16, cited in
CAMAC
Report, above n 7 at 102.
97 S. Bainbridge, ‘Interpreting
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes’ (1992) 19 Pepperdine
Law Review
971.
business judgment rule, the range of stakeholder interests, and the
conflict between
them, the statutes would merely amplify managerial
discretion.98 No stakeholder
statute has yet been interpreted to contain
implied rights of action.99
In addition, there are practical considerations
that may inhibit application of the
law, as employees have, in the past, been
less likely to access court based remedies
to the same extent as management
or shareholders. The expense for individual
employees to bring the legal
actions necessary to vindicate statutory rights is often
prohibitive, and
thus, even if there was a right of action, most breaches would
go
unremedied.100 There are some signs that unions are becoming more willing
to
found actions of this nature on behalf of employees, which may assist
in
overcoming individual problems of access to courts. Union assistance will
not
overcome the barriers created by ambiguity as to the existence of an
implied right
of action.
This seems to be the general conclusion reached by other commentators.
Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller believe that:
[I]t seems patently clear that the true purpose of these statutes is to benefit a
single non-shareholder constituency, namely the top managers of publicly
held corporations who want still another weapon in their arsenal of antitakeover
protection devices. There is a risk, therefore, that non-shareholder
constituency statutes do not benefit the interests or groups that they
ostensibly are intended to benefit and instead assist a well organised, highly
influential special-interest group, namely the top managers of large,
publicly held corporations who wish to terminate the market for corporate
control.101
Evidence suggests that directors sometimes invoke the interests of employees
when
it serves their interests in answering claims by shareholders that they
have failed
adequately to serve the interests of the corporation. However,
during instances of
conflict between the interests of employees and either
shareholders or managers,
the interests of employees are difficult to enforce
using stakeholder statutes.102
98 K. Stone, ‘Policing Employment Contracts within the
Nexus-of-Contracts Firm’ (1993) 43
University of Toronto Law Journal
353 at 375.
99 J. Singer, ‘Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder
Debate’ (1993) 43 University of
Toronto Law Journal 475 at 503.
100
A study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice of 120 wrongful discharge cases
brought in
California between 1980 and 1986 found that over 53 per cent were
brought by executives
or middle management: J. Dertouzoso, E. Holland and P.
Ebener, ‘The Legal and
Economic Consequences of Wrongful
Termination’, Rand Corp, 1988, 19-21, cited by K.
Stone, above n 98, at
375.
101 J. Macey and G. Miller, ‘Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective’ (1993) 43
University of Toronto Law Journal 401 at
405.
102 Singer, above n 99 at 503. Some commentators have pointed out that
the US statutes were,
in fact, not intended to increase the power of the
constituencies directly, but were passed as
a result of pressure from
managers, employees, and municipalities to counter hostile takeovers,
which
these groups perceived to be inimical to the public welfare. The purpose
was
to protect managerial power, in order to increase stability. A few of the
statutes therefore
are limited to decision making regarding takeovers. These
include the statutes of
Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee:
L. Johnson and D. Millon, ‘Missing
the Point About State Takeover Statutes’ (1989) 87
ased on empirical
research on the operation of stakeholder statutes, Springer
concludes that
‘Directors appear to invoke constituency statutes more as
a
rationalization for deferring to their discretion than as a principled
justification for
consideration of constituent interests’.103 In any
case, it may be that in some
instances the gap between the stakeholders and
the corporate decision makers is too
broad to allow the corporate officers to
really understand and take into account the
interests of the various
stakeholders.104 More conservative critics of the laws have
also argued that
the statutes convert directors into ‘unelected civil servants’ with
a
responsibility for determining the public interest.105
A further reason stakeholder statutes, even in their broad and mandatory
form, fail
to give rise to enforceable rights, as Joseph Singer observes, is
that courts are likely
to be reluctant to ‘second-guess’
managerial decisions.106 Because judges are likely
to see managers as
‘experts’ in business matters they are usually reluctant
to
substitute their judgments for those of management.107 Further, despite
recent
descriptions of corporations as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or
as ‘social entities’,
traditional views of shareholders as the
‘owners’ of the corporation are likely to
exert a powerful
influence on judges’ perceptions of managerial activity. Studies
have
concluded that the statutes did little to alter the centrality of
shareholder
primacy in US corporate law.108
In practice, the permissive provisions appear to have been utilised primarily
in the
context of takeover defences. According to Polonsky and Ryan, in the
small
number of US cases that referred to stakeholder statutes in the early
years of their
operation, none insisted that directors demonstrate that they
in fact deliberated
about or balanced stakeholder interests to gain the
protection of the statute.109 As a
result, the American Bar Association
Committee on Corporate Laws may be correct
in stating that the stakeholder
statutes mainly confirm the common law position:
[D]irectors may take into
account the interests of other constituencies but
only as and to the extent
that the directors are acting in the best interests,
long as well as short
term, of the shareholders of the corporation.110
Michigan Law Review 846.
103 J.D. Springer, ‘Corporate Law and
Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears’
(1999) New York
University Annual Survey of American Law 85.
104 Hale above n 76 at
842.
105 J. Macey, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary
Duties’ (1991) 21 Stetson Law Review 23,
cited in CAMAC Report, above n
7 at 102.
106 Singer, above n 99.
107 Further, most of the statutes use
the words ‘may consider’. It is not clear what
‘may
consider’ means. Does it mean that directors should consider
the interests of employees,
but then decide they should act in the
shareholders’ interest anyway, even though the two
sets of interests
conflict? For this type of criticism of stakeholder statutes from
the
perspective of shareholders see Hanks, above n 73 at 116.
108
Springer, above n 103 at 122.
109 M. Polonksy and P. Ryan, ‘The
Implications of Stakeholder Statutes for Socially
Responsible
Managers’, above, n.96.
110 American Bar Association Committee on
Corporate Laws, ‘Other Constituencies Statutes:
Potential for
Confusion’ (1990) 45 Business Law 2253 at 2269, cited in CAMAC
Report,
above n 7 at 101.
Similar problems existed in relation to s 309 of
the UK Companies Act prior to the
enactment of the Companies Act 2006.
Section 309 gave the employee no remedy.
We can conclude, from this
discussion of the evidence at hand, that US stakeholder
laws do not generally
strengthen the stakeholder rights of employees in an
enforceable manner. This
is partly due to the fact that the stakeholder laws modify
only a small
aspect of corporate law. Shareholders alone continue to have the
power to
vote for the board of directors. Indeed, one American critic has argued
that,
if anything, the stakeholder laws have detracted from the need for real
changes
in corporate law that address stakeholder needs.111
Recent UK reform has avoided using the words ‘in the interests of the
company as
a whole’ and has instead used the words ‘be most
likely to promote the success of
the company for the benefit of its members
as a whole’. Regardless of this
difference, the reform was nevertheless
conceived of as encoding the existing
‘enlightened shareholder’
common law interpretation of directors’ duties, rather
than mandating a
‘pluralist’ conception of the company which gives
stakeholders
similar rights to those of shareholders.
Canadian and US cases compared
Courts in both Canada and the US have grappled with the question of the
interests
that may be considered by directors in compliance with their
duties. The most
recent judgment is that of the Supreme Court of Canada in
BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders.112 The court made the following
observations:
• the fiduciary duty of directors is a duty to act in the best
interests of the
corporation;
• often the interests of shareholders
and stakeholders are co-extensive with the
interests of the corporation but
if they conflict, the directors’ duty is to the
corporation;
and
• the duty is not confined to short-term profit or share value.
Where the
corporation is an ongoing concern, the duty looks to the long-term
interests of
the corporation.113
The court also stated:
In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may
look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors,
consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decision.114
...
The cases on oppression, taken as a whole, confirm that the duty of the
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to
treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and
fairly. There are no absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether, in all
111 Springer, above n 103 at 122.
112 [2008] SCC 69, date of judgment: 20
June 2008; reasons delivered: 19 December 2008.
113 Ibid at [37] and
[38].
114 Ibid at [4].
the circumstances, the directors acted in the best
interests of the corporation,
having regard to all relevant considerations,
including, but not confined to,
the need to treat affected stakeholders in a
fair manner, commensurate with
the corporation’s duties as a
responsible corporate citizen.115
In relation to what, if any, interests of
stakeholders are to be preferred, the court
stated:
Directors may find themselves in a situation where it is impossible to please
all stakeholders...There is no principle that one set of interests – for example
the interests of shareholders – should prevail over another set of interests.
Everything depends on the particular situation faced by the directors and
whether, having regard to that situation, they exercised business judgment in a
responsible way.116
The court referred to the ‘Revlon line’ of takeover cases from
Delaware and noted
that it had been argued that these cases support the
principle that where the interests
of shareholders conflict with the
interests of creditors, the interests of shareholders
should prevail.117 The
Canadian Court summarised these cases in the following
way:
In both cases, the issue was how directors should react to a hostile takeover
bid. Revlon suggests that in such circumstances, shareholder interests should
prevail over those of other stakeholders, such as creditors. Unocal tied this
approach to situations where the corporation will not continue as a going
concern, holding that although a board facing a hostile takeover ‘may have
regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, ... such
concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when . . . the object no
longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the
highest bidder’.
It may be possible to reconcile the Canadian and Delaware decisions.
According to
the Supreme Court of Canada, there is no rule that the interests
of one group of
stakeholders is to prevail over another. What set of
interests will be paramount will
depend on the particular circumstances. In
the context of the decision in Unocal
where the company was being sold to the
highest bidder, then the interests of
shareholders are paramount according to
the Delaware court. Perhaps the Canadian
court would have reached the same
decision as the Delaware court if faced with the
same set of facts. However,
it is notable that the Delaware court states that
consideration of
non-shareholder interests is inappropriate in the particular situation
of the
company being sold to the highest bidder. In other words, it is not a
situation
of the board balancing the interests of different groups of
stakeholders and
determining that the interests of shareholders are
paramount. It may be that the
Canadian court would allow a wider range of
interests to be considered in this
situation than the Delaware court. After
all, in the situation of the company being
115 Ibid at [82].
116 Ibid at [83] and [84].
117 Revlon Inc v
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc, 506 A.2d 173 (Del 1985) and
Unocal
Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A.2d 946 (Del
1985).
sold to the highest bidder, the directors may want to consider the
interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders, such as employees.
However, the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada, while allowing the
interests of a range of
stakeholders to be considered, does not provide
guidance on the weight to be given
to these interests by the directors.
5. Two Recent Australian Inquiries into Corporate Governance
In this part of the paper we review two recent Australian inquiries into
corporate
governance which had overlapping purposes. The first of these is
the Corporations
and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) inquiry; the second
is the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services
(PJC)
inquiry. We document and then analyse the different interpretations of
the duty to
act in the best interests of the company adopted by the two
inquires.
CAMAC Social Responsibility of Corporations Report
On 23 March 2005 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer requested
CAMAC
to provide him with advice concerning to what extent the Corporations
Act 2001
should include corporate social responsibilities or explicit
obligations to take
account of the interest of certain classes of
stakeholders other than shareholders.118
The relevant questions CAMAC was
requested to report on for our purposes are as
follows:
• Should the Corporations Act be revised to clarify the extent to which
directors
may take into account the interests of specific classes of
stakeholders or the
broader community when making corporate
decisions?
• Should the Corporations Act be revised to require
directors to take into account the interests of specific classes of stakeholders
or the broader community whenmaking
corporate decisions?
CAMAC’s report, ‘The Social Responsibility of Corporations’
(CAMAC Report)
was released in December 2006. Here, we focus on CAMAC’s
recommendations
regarding whether the duties of directors under the
Corporations Act should be
amended to require directors to take into account
the interests of employees and
other stakeholders.
Ultimately, CAMAC decided no reform was required. However, in the course of
its
deliberations CAMAC identified its preferred interpretation of the scope
of
directors’ duties based on the existing case law. CAMAC stated
that:119
• the phrase ‘the interests of the company as a whole’
under the common law of
directors’ duties means the financial
well-being of the shareholders as a general
118 CAMAC Report, above n 7.
119 The following list is extracted from the
CAMAC Report, above n 7 at 84-85, 86, 91-92, and
106-107.
body. The
overriding test is the well-being of the company and therefore
the
shareholders generally;
• the phrase ‘the best interests of the corporation’ in s
181 of the Corporations
Act obliges directors to act in the best interests of
the shareholders generally.
However, directors may take into account a range
of factors external to
shareholders if this benefits the shareholders as a
whole;
• directors are also obliged to consider the financial interests
of creditors when
the company is insolvent or near-insolvent, though they
have no direct fiduciary
duty to creditors;
• directors are not
confined in law to short-term considerations in their decisionmaking,
such as
maximising profit or share price returns. The interests of a
company can
include its continued long-term well-being; and
• directors have
considerable discretion over the factors they may choose to take
into account
in determining what will benefit the company. Although there may
be no direct
legal obligation in company law to take the interests of
stakeholders other
than shareholders into account (compared to statutes dealing
with other areas
of the law), this does not preclude directors from choosing to
do so.
CAMAC also considered a number of possible approaches to the reform
of
directors’ duties to take into account stakeholder interests. It
grouped the possible
approaches proposed in submissions and other
jurisdictions under three categories:
a ‘pluralist approach’, an
‘elaborated shareholder benefit approach’ and a
‘business
approach’.120 The various views grouped under the
‘pluralist approach’ shared the
opinion that the Corporations Act
should be amended so as to permit or require
directors to serve a wider range
of interests in their decision-making, not
subordinate to, or merely as a
means of achieving, shareholder well-being.121 The
‘pluralist’
approach is thus closest to a stakeholder model of corporate
governance
amongst the options considered by CAMAC. The ‘elaborated
shareholder benefit’
approach considers that current laws be extended
so as to expressly refer to various
considerations that directors should take
into account in determining what is for the
benefit of shareholder generally
(as has been done in the UK Companies Act 2006,
s 172).122
Submissions to CAMAC for legislative change under the auspices of the
pluralist
and elaborated shareholder benefit approach which would alter
directors’ duties
included:123
• a provision (possibly an amendment to s 181 of the Corporations Act)
that
would expressly permit or mandate directors to take into account the
interests of
specific classes of stakeholders, extending beyond shareholders,
or the broader
community;124
120 Ibid at 108-109; see also 109-110 for a complete list of all the
approaches considered by the Committee.
121 Ibid at 96-102.
122 Ibid at
102-108.
123 These proposals are noted in CAMAC Report, ibid at
109–110.
124 Support for this proposal was expressed by the NSW Lawyers
Association (submission 44) and the Public Interest Law Clearing House
(Submission 22): CAMAC Summary of Submissions at 32-33.
an amended business
judgment defence, either to liberalise the defence to give
greater protection
to directors and officers who choose to take various
stakeholder interests
into account or, alternatively, to impose additional
requirements on
directors and officers to take stakeholder interests into account
before they
can avail themselves of the defence;
• a replaceable rule permitting directors to take account of the
interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders;
• an ethical
judgment rule designed to afford directors some protection from
liability in
the event that their ethical decision causes a detrimental impact on
the
financial interests of the company as a whole.
The main concerns voiced regarding these approaches was how to identify
relevant
classes of stakeholders; which stakeholders would have standing to
enforce duties;
whether courts might become involved in making commercial
decisions if called
upon to balance or weigh up competing stakeholder
interests; and whether criminal
or civil enforcement of directors’
duties would be compromised if directors could
refer to a range of competing
or conflicting stakeholder interests in defending
claims of breach of duty.
For instance, the Law Council of Australia argued that
amendments to the
Corporations Act of the type noted above would reduce
flexibility,
potentially increase the range of persons who can sue directors,
reduce
directors’ accountability, likely increase red tape, be of
uncertain scope and have a
disincentive effect.125 Others were of the view
that environmental and social
concerns should be addressed through specific
legislation on those matters rather
than by amending directors’ duties
contained in the Corporations Act.
The majority of submissions could be grouped under the ‘business
approach’ as
they shared the view that the existing law of
directors’ duties provides sufficient
scope for directors to choose to
take into account a range of factors external to
shareholders if this
benefits the shareholders collectively.126 There was particular
concern for
the maintenance of directors’ accountability as was highlighted in
the
submissions of H Bosch (Submission 51) and ASIC (Submission 55). In
particular,
there was a shared view that companies are already subject to a
range of Federal,
State and Territory laws that are designed to protect
various stakeholder groups,
and directors cannot lawfully ignore or
subordinate these corporate obligations
because of a notion of shareholder
interests. In any case, it is likely to be in a
company’s own
interests, at least over the long term, to take into account
the
environmental and social context in which it operates due to concerns
regarding
value enhancement, risk management, including reputational risk and
regulatory
risk.
Doubts were expressed about the effectiveness of the business approach in
some
submissions. One respondent (Rupu Tex, Submission 47), for instance,
argued that
125 CAMAC, Summary of Submissions at 29-30.
126 Support for this view is
found in the submissions of the Business Council of Australia
(Submission
57), Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) (Submission
43),
National Australia Bank (Submission 45), the Australian Shareholders
Association
(Submission 3) and the Australian Bankers Association (Submission
49) to name a few. All
these submissions supported the view that legislative
change to the Corporations Act was
not desirable.
currently not all
companies recognise CSR issues as a potential material risk to
shareholders
or the company as a whole and there remains a focus on short-term
indicators
at the expense of the long-term sustainability of the company. The
NSW
Attorney General put forward the strongest critique of the business
approach in
relation to the James Hardie experience.127 The submission
stated:
I believe prudent directors already consider broader interests in
performing
their duties. I do not suggest that we need legislative reforms to
change the
behaviour of prudent directors. However, reform is necessary to
compel
directors who may not always follow prudent practices, to adhere
to
appropriate standards of corporate social responsibility. Voluntary
reforms
or directors’ education initiatives may be effective in
enhancing the
behaviour of prudent directors, but they will not be effective
in regulating
all directors. Legislative reform is required.
CAMAC rejected proposals for changes to the Corporations Act. The
Committee
took the view that:
the current common law and statutory requirements on directors and others
to act in the interests of their companies are sufficiently broad to enable
corporate decision-makers to take into account the environmental and other
social impacts of their decisions, including changes in societal expectations
about the role of companies and how they should conduct their affairs.128
CAMAC noted that a company may already choose (by resolution of shareholders)
to hold itself to a particular approach to the conduct of its business by adopting
some form of ‘social responsibility’ charter in its constitution. CAMAC concluded
that a ‘non-exhaustive catalogue’ of interests to be taken into account would serve
little useful purpose for directors and as such rejected the pluralist and elaborated
shareholder benefit approaches. CAMAC therefore considered that amendments to
the Corporations Act to have regard to certain matters of interest could be
counterproductive and blur rather than clarify the purposes that directors are
expected to serve.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services
Corporate Responsibility Report
In June 2005, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial
Services (PJC) resolved to inquire into corporate responsibility.
Its inquiry had
particular reference to a number of questions which are
relevant to this paper.
These are as follows:
• The extent to which organisational decision-makers have an existing
regard for
the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, and the
broader
community.
• The extent to which organisational
decision-makers should have regard for the
interests of stakeholders other
than shareholders, and the broader community.
127 Submission 53.
128 CAMAC Report, above n 7 at 111.
The extent to
which the current legal framework governing directors' duties
encourages or
discourages directors from having regard for the interests of
stakeholders
other than shareholders, and the broader community.
• Whether revisions to the legal framework, particularly to the
Corporations Act,
are required to enable or encourage incorporated entities
or directors to have
regard for the interests of stakeholders other than
shareholders, and the broader
community. In considering this matter, the
Committee will also have regard to
obligations that exist in laws other than
the Corporations Act.
• Any alternative mechanisms, including voluntary
measures that may enhance
consideration of stakeholder interests by
incorporated entities and/or their
directors.
• The appropriateness
of reporting requirements associated with these issues.
• Whether
regulatory, legislative or other policy approaches in other countries
could
be adopted or adapted for Australia.
The PJC’s report, ‘Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and
Creating Value’129
was published in June 2006. The PJC concluded that
no compelling case for change
to directors’ duties was presented during
the inquiry. Further, the PJC considered
that the existing network of social
and environmental legislation provided sufficient
regulation of the social
and environmental performance of companies.
The PJC identified its preferred
interpretation of the scope of directors’ duties,
although it is
arguable that the PJC interpretation is different to that provided by
CAMAC.
The PJC stated:
Directors’ duties as they currently stand have a focus on increasing
shareholder value. This is important, because the provision is first and
foremost intended to protect those investors who trust company directors
with their savings and other investment funds. Directors’ duties enable such
investors to have some confidence that their funds will be used in order to
increase the income and value of the company they part-own.130
This resembles, to some extent, the interpretation of CAMAC – that the
interests of
the company are generally those of its shareholders. However,
the PJC explicitly
rejected what it termed the ‘shareholders
first’ interpretation of directors’ duties.
The PJC defined this
interpretation as follows: ‘there is no particular objection
to
directors considering the interests of stakeholders other than
shareholders, but the
interests of shareholders must be the clear
priority’.131 The PJC stated that this
interpretation of
directors’ duties is too constrained and stated that, in the view
of
the Committee, acting in the best interests of the corporation and acting
in the best
interests of the shareholders does not inevitably amount to the
same thing.132
129 Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value, June 2006,
can be accessed
at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/corporations_ctte/corporate_responsibility/tor.htm
.
130 Ibid at 59.
131 Ibid at 51.
132 Ibid at 52.
Here we detect a
difference with the interpretation of directors’ duties adopted
by
CAMAC because CAMAC defined the best interests of the company as the
best
interests of the shareholders – while acknowledging that directors
could take into
account the interest of other stakeholders if this benefits
the shareholders.133
The PJC preferred what it termed the ‘enlightened
self-interest’ interpretation of
directors’ duties. The PJC
defined this as follows:
The enlightened self-interest interpretation of directors’ duties acknowledges
that investments in corporate responsibility and corporate philanthropy can
contribute to the long term viability of a company even where they do not
generate immediate profit. Under this interpretation directors may consider
and act upon the legitimate interests of stakeholders to the extent that these
interests are relevant to the corporation. Chapter 3 of this report included
discussion of the factors that drive corporate responsibility...These driving
factors demonstrate how forward thinking directors, motivated by an
enlightened approach to the company’s self interest, can undertake activities
which contribute to social wellbeing and environmental protection, and which
are clearly in the best interests of the company from a commercial
perspective.
...
The committee considers that the most appropriate perspective for directors to
take is that of enlightened self-interest. Corporations and their directors
should act in a socially and environmentally responsible manner at least in
part because such conduct is likely to lead to the long term growth of their
enterprise.134
An important observation to be made about the interpretation of
directors’ duties
adopted by the PJC is that the Committee does not
define what it means by the
company. According to the PJC, the enlightened
self-interest interpretation of
directors’ duties focuses on ‘the
long term viability’ of the company and the ‘best
interests of
the company from a commercial perspective’. CAMAC defined the
best
interests of the company as those of its shareholders, basing this
interpretation on
existing case law. The PJC does not define what it means by
the best interests of
the company and therefore the Committee does not engage
with the important
question that arises concerning what stakeholders’
interests receive priority if there
are conflicting interests among
stakeholders. The CAMAC definition does provide
an answer to this question if
(a) the conflict is between the interests of shareholders
and some other
stakeholder group, (b) the company is solvent, and (c) the conflict
is to be
resolved under the law of directors’ duties and there are no relevant
statutes
other than the Corporations Act that impact upon the decision
of directors.
133 See the text accompanying n 119 above. The statement by the PJC that
acting in the best
interests of the corporation and acting in the best
interests of the shareholders is not the
same thing could be reconciled with
the view of CAMAC if the PJC was commenting on a
company that is insolvent or
nearly insolvent. In this situation, as we have seen, directors
must consider
the interests of creditors and the interests of creditors may receive a
higher
priority than the interests of shareholders. However, the PJC does not
limit its statement to
this situation.
134 Ibid at 52 and 53.
It may be
that one way to understand the interpretation of directors’ duties
adopted
by the PJC is that it presents the company as an independent entity
with its own
interests that are separate to those of its stakeholders.
Whether this has a sound
basis in law is subject to some doubt. In
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd,135
Evershed MR stated that the
benefit of the company as a whole ‘does not (at any
rate in such a case
at the present) mean the company as a commercial entity,
distinct from the
corporators: it means the corporators as a general body’.
This
statement was quoted with approval by the High Court of Australia in
Ngurli Ltd v
McCann.136 The reference by Evershed MR to the
case before him leaves open the
possibility of the interests of the company
as a commercial entity being a relevant
consideration for directors. This was
acknowledged by Hodgson J in Darvall v
North Sydney Brick &
Tile Co Ltd,137 where he stated:
In my view, it is proper to have regard to the interests of the members of the
company, as well as having regard to the interests of the company as a
commercial entity. Indeed, it is proper also to have regard to the interests of
the creditors of the company. I think it is proper to have regard to the interests
of present and future members of the company, on the footing that it would be
continuing as a going concern.
Hodgson J here indicates that the interests of the company as a commercial
entity
are one of a set of interests that directors may consider, depending
on the
circumstances, although he does not indicate what priority each of
these interests
should receive.
On appeal, the decision of Hodgson J was affirmed. Only one judge, Kirby
P,
commented on the meaning of the interests of the company, and he stated
that ‘the
court is not obliged to look at the company as in some way
disembodied from its
members’138 which perhaps may be viewed as casting
doubt on the view that the
interests of the company can be viewed as a
commercial entity separate to the
shareholders of the company.
In Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq),139 Giles JJA also
expressed reservations
about the interests of the company being the company
as a separate enitity:
The description of the power as a fiduciary power is
because it
must be exercised in the interests of another or others. Who
or
what is or are the other or others? To refer to the company as a
whole
leaves much unanswered. In law the company has an
existence separate from its
shareholders. But, as the passage from
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd
[1951] Ch 286 at 291; [1950]
2 All ER 1120 at 1123 approved in Ngurli
Ltd v McCann shows
... the directors do not exercise their power
according to the
135 [1951] Ch 286 at 291.
136 [1953] HCA 39; (1953) 90 CLR 425 at 438; [1953] HCA
39.
137 (1987) 16 NSWLR 212 at 239-240; 12 ACLR 537; 6 ACLC 154.
138
(1989) 16 NSWLR 260 at 281; 15 ACLR 230; 7 ACLC 659.
139 [2002] NSWCA 395; (2002) 44 ACSR 21 at
56; [2002] NSWCA 395.
interests of the company as a separate commercial entity. To refer
to the corporators as a general body, however, is obscure and
incomplete guidance to the interests.
If it is correct that the PJC interpretation is one that views the company as
an
independent entity with its own interests, this would mean that in
some
circumstances the directors would be able to make a decision that is in
the interests
of the company, as a separate entity, even where this decision
went against the
interests of one or more groups of stakeholders, including
shareholders, creditors
and employees. However, the PJC does not elaborate on
the definition of directors’
duties it prefers, so it is only possible
to speculate concerning the content and
meaning of this interpretation of
directors’ duties.
While providing its own interpretation of the scope of directors’
duties, the PJC
noted there is a wide variety of interpretations of the scope
for directors to take into
account stakeholder interests under the current
law which leads to uncertainty for
directors about the appropriate behaviour
with regard to CSR strategies. The PJC
described these different
interpretations as follows (in addition to the
‘shareholders
first’ interpretation discussed above): the
directors’ restrictive interpretation, under
which directors
claim that they are unable to undertake activities based on
corporate social
responsibility because such activities may not be directly ‘in the
best
interests of the corporation’; the shareholders’ restrictive
interpretation, which
objects to corporations providing philanthropic
funds or acting with deliberate
corporate responsibility because those funds
could be invested in wealth generation
(and thus returns to the
shareholders); the short term interests interpretation, which
allows
that investment in corporate responsibility may be appropriate, but only if
it
can be justified on the basis of annual return on investment (competing
with other
possible investments); and the enlightened self-interest
interpretation, which holds
that careful and appropriate corporate
responsibility is almost always in the
interests of the corporation, and thus
falls well within the behaviours permitted to
directors under current legal
duties.140
The PJC considered that directors who adopt a ‘restrictive
interpretation’ approach
to the current law are misinterpreting the
law:
The current directors’ duties were intended to provide protection for
shareholders, not to create a safe harbour for corporate irresponsibility.
However, the committee also came to the view that this interpretation is
relatively uncommon in corporate Australia. Most directors appear to
readily accept that the current directors’ duties allow them some leeway for
corporate responsibility and philanthropy.141
The PJC also noted that where directors are uncertain about the proper course
with
regard to the adoption of a CSR strategy which would entail taking into
account the
interests of stakeholders’ interests or corporate
philanthropy, the directors could put
the board policy to a shareholder vote.
The PJC thus considered that those directors
who adopt the
‘directors’ restrictive interpretation’, the
‘shareholders’ restrictive
140 Above n 129 at 46.
141 Ibid at 49-50.
interpretation’ or the
‘short term interests interpretation’ are adopting
an
interpretation of the scope of directors’ duties that is too
constrained. The PJC did
not agree that ‘acting in the best interests
of the corporation and acting in the best
interests of the shareholders
inevitably amounts to the same thing’.142 Instead, the
PJC preferred
the ‘enlightened self-interest interpretation’ of directors’
duties under
the current law which acknowledges that investments in corporate
social
responsibility can contribute to the long term viability of the
company even where
they do not generate immediate profit. Under this
interpretation directors may
consider and act upon the legitimate interests
of stakeholders to the extent that
these interests are relevant to the
corporation.143 As a consequence of seeing this as
the preferred
interpretation of the current law, the PJC saw no reason to recommend
reform
of directors’ duties.
Conclusions regarding recent inquiries in Australia
As we have seen, both recent inquiries into whether reforms to
directors’ duties are
required decided in the negative. Both did so on
the basis that current corporate law
is sufficiently permissive for directors
to take into account non-shareholder
interests. However, we also saw that the
two inquiries adopted different
interpretations of the scope of the duty to
act in the best interests of the company.
6. Empirical Evidence in Australia
Other than the submissions of various companies and interest groups, the
two
Australian inquiries considered in the previous part of this paper lacked
empirical
evidence regarding how directors understand their obligations.
Their
determinations were based on whether the law reflected what directors
ought to be
doing, or the scope of the discretion that directors ought to
have to make business
decisions. They had no sense of whether the law was out
of step with wider practice
or consistent with it. A survey of Australian
directors conducted by the Corporate
Governance and Workplace Partnerships
project144 sheds light on these questions.
Methodology
The survey was undertaken using a self-completion, mail out survey form
which
was sent to 4000 company directors. Our sample was drawn from the Dun
and
Bradstreet ‘Business Who’s Who’.145 Company directors
were selected based on the
following criteria:
• a roughly equal
distribution of directors from companies in three sizes (by
employee
numbers): 50-100 employees; 101-250 employees and 250+
employees;
142 Ibid at 52.
143 Ibid at 52.
144 The website of the project is:
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/centreactivities/
research/corporate-governance-and-workplace-partnerships-project/index.cfm.
145
This database can be accessed in book form as a yearly volume: The Business
Who's Who
of Australia, Sydney : R.G. Riddell, or as a website
http://bww.dnb.com.au/advancedsearch.asp
•
a random mix from all states; and
• a random mix of all industries.
We achieved a final sample of 375 usable completed surveys. This is a
low
response rate but not uncharacteristically low for surveys of this kind,
i.e. of ‘elite
personnel’.146 Around 200 surveys were returned
due to incomplete or incorrect
mailing details. A further 50 responded with
apologies based on lack of availability
of the directors or stated that
company policy precluded the completion of surveys.
The responses were from a
cross section of small and large companies based on
employee numbers and
income, and a mix of listed and unlisted public companies
and proprietary
limited companies: 75.5 per cent of respondents were from
proprietary limited
companies rather than public companies, and only 16.5 per cent
of respondents
were from listed companies. Twenty-eight per cent had earnings of
less than
$20 million in the last financial year, 28.1 per cent had between $20 and
$50
million, 12.7 per cent earned between $50 and $100 million, and 30.8 per
cent
had more than $100 million in earnings. Thirty two per cent of companies
surveyed
had less than 100 employees, 40 per cent had between 101 and 1000,
and 30 per
cent had more than 1000. Eighty three per cent of companies had no
foreign
ownership and 95.3 per cent had their company headquarters in
Australia.147
Directors’ understanding of their duties as directors
One of the central aims of the survey was to explore directors’
understandings of
their legal obligations and the way this might affect their
approach to stakeholders.
We were particularly interested in the extent to
which shareholders were perceived
to be the most important among several
stakeholders. Do directors perceive that
their primary obligation is to
shareholders, either in the short term or long term,
and, if so, is this
partly a result of their understanding of the legal duties?
We asked directors to indicate which of four statements best represented
their
understanding of their obligation to act in the best interests of the
company. We
also asked them to indicate whether they believed the law
required them to act only
in the interests of shareholders or whether it
allowed them to consider a broader
range of stakeholders. Table 1 sets out
the responses for these questions. A majority
of directors understood that
their primary obligation to act in the best interests of
the company meant
that they should balance the interests of all stakeholders (55 per
cent). A
further 38.2 per cent believed that they must, by means of acting in
the
interests of all stakeholders, ensure the long-term interests of
shareholders. No
directors believed that they were required to act in the
short term interests of
shareholders only and only a very small proportion
(6.6 per cent) believed that they
were required to act in the long term
interests of shareholders only.
146 See S. Jacoby, E. M. Nason and K. Saguchi, ‘The Role of the Senior
HR Executive in
Japan and the United States: Employment Relations, Corporate
Governance and Value’
(2005) 44 Industrial Relations 207 at 216, and B.
Agle, R. K. Mitchell and J. Sonnenfeld,
‘Who Matters to CEOs? An
Investigation of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience,
Corporate Performance
and CEO Values’ (1999) 42 Academy of Management Journal 507
at
513.
147 All of the survey findings are available as a research report
at:
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/index.cfm?objectid=E3D38F25-B0D0-AB80-
E2F1BF648C87997F.
On
directors’ understanding of the parameters of their obligation, it is very
clear (as
shown in the bottom of Table 1) that most directors take a broad
view. Nearly all
directors (94.3 per cent) believed that the law is broad
enough to allow them to take
the interests of stakeholders other than
shareholders into account.
Table 1: Directors’ Understanding of the Scope of Directors’ Duties
|
Primary Obligation: I must act in the best interests of the company and
this means acting in the....
|
Per cent Yes
|
|
Short term interests of shareholders only
|
0.0
|
|
Long term interests of shareholders only
|
6.6
|
|
Interests of all stakeholders to achieve short term interests of
shareholders
|
0.3
|
|
Interests of all stakeholders to achieve long term interests of
shareholders
|
38.2
|
|
Balancing the interests of all stakeholders
|
55
|
|
Parameters of Law on Directors’ Duties
|
Per cent Yes
|
|
I must only be concerned with shareholders’ interests
|
5.7
|
|
Allows me to take account of interests other than shareholders
|
94.3
|
n=368
These findings are in certain respects both consistent with and
inconsistent with the
PJC and CAMAC determinations. On the one hand, they
indicate that both
Committees were correct in stating that the current law is
not inhibiting the pursuit
of stakeholder interests by directors. Almost all
respondents thought the law
allowed them to take account of interests other
than shareholders. Based on our
assessment (in Part 3 of this paper) and also
in the view of both inquiries, the
respondents were justified in holding this
opinion. On the other hand, it is the
second most popularly held conception
of directors’ obligations that appears most
consistent with the
‘elaborated shareholder benefit’ approach or the
‘business’
approach preferred by CAMAC. The understanding of
obligations held by the
majority of respondents to the survey (55 per cent)
would seem to go beyond the
preferred approach of CAMAC and possibly align
more with the ‘enlightened self
interest’ interpretation of
directors’ duties preferred by the PJC.
The survey instrument did not
allow for an ‘open ended’ inquiry into what exactly
respondents
had in mind by identifying ‘balancing the interests of all
stakeholders’
in relation to a concrete business practice. The results
reported in the following
sections provide some insights, however.
Stakeholder ranking
An important question is whether directors acknowledge a primary obligation
to the
interests of shareholders. We tested this assumption in a number of
ways. First,
using a ranking exercise adapted from the Francis study148 we
asked directors to
rank stakeholders in the order in which those
stakeholders’ interests were
prioritised. Second, we utilised a scale
to assess the relative influence of key
stakeholders over the decision making
of directors. Third, we asked directors about
the priority they assigned to
certain specific shareholder-oriented matters such as
dividend policy, share
price and special dividends. These three tests enabled us to
form an
assessment of the shareholder orientation of the surveyed group.
Table 2 sets
out the average ranking given to each stakeholder group, the
percentage of
directors who ranked that stakeholder group as their number one
priority and
the percentage of directors who included that stakeholder group as one
of
their top three priorities. It indicates that shareholders were most
commonly
ranked number one, followed closely by ‘the company’
according to both the
average ranking and the percentage who ranked that
group as their number one
priority. These results differ from earlier
research conducted, from which this
ranking exercise was drawn. In 1997,
Francis surveyed Australian and international
company directors and found
that a large majority of Australian directors ranked
shareholders number one
(74 per cent), regardless of the fact that their actual legal
obligation was
to the company.149 We found that employees were highly ranked
based on the
average ranking given (2.87).150 However, very few directors (6.7 per
cent)
ranked employees as their number one priority.
Table 2: Priority Ranking of Company Stakeholders#
|
Stakeholder
|
Average Ranking
|
Percentage
Ranked 1 |
Percentage
included in Top 3 |
|
1. Shareholders
|
2.23
|
44.0
|
78.2
|
|
2. The Company
|
2.25
|
40.4
|
71.1
|
|
3. Employees
|
2.87
|
6.7
|
72.8
|
|
4. Customers
|
3.53
|
8.2
|
44.8
|
|
5. Suppliers
|
5.99
|
1.2
|
3.9
|
|
6. Lenders/Creditors
|
5.83
|
0.6
|
10.6
|
|
7. The Community
|
6.43
|
0.3
|
3.4
|
|
8. The Environment
|
7.07
|
0.6
|
2.0
|
|
9. The Country
|
8.41
|
0.3
|
1.1
|
148 I. Francis, Future Direction: The Power of the Competitive Board,
FT Pitman Publishing,
Melbourne 1997.
149 Ibid at 354.
150 Francis
(ibid) also conducted the ranking exercise in the US and Japan. The rankings
made
by respondents to our Australian survey sit somewhere between US and
Japanese rankings.
According to Francis, eight out of ten US directors gave
shareholders a number on ranking compared with one out of nine Japanese
directors.
# Directors were asked to rank the list of stakeholders in order
of priority between 1 and 9
with 1 being highest priority. The smaller the average rank, the higher the
priority.
These findings indicate that although directors believe their
obligation is to balance
the interests of all stakeholders, they nonetheless
rank shareholders first amongst
those stakeholders.
Stakeholder ‘salience’
In order to obtain further information about what it means that shareholders
are the
highest ranking stakeholders we measured the influence of
shareholders, employees
and creditors using a scale devised in research
conducted in the US by Agle,
Mitchell and Sonnenfeld into which stakeholders
matter most to CEOs.151 Agle et
al sought to move beyond the assumption that
stakeholders have a fixed position of
influence in relation to the company
and devised a model of salience (as they call
it) or influence which is based
on the assumption that salience depends upon
managers’ perceptions of
the power, urgency and legitimacy of stakeholders.
Modifying Agle et
al’s test somewhat, a series of propositions was presented to
the
surveyed group concerning the relative influence of shareholders,
employees and
creditors. The scale was comprised of seven items: directors
were asked to rate the
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with certain
statements on a scale of 1
(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Table 3
sets out both the proportion of
directors who agreed with each proposition
(in relation to shareholders) and the
mean score for that proposition for
shareholders, employees and creditors.
151 B. R. Agle, R.K. Mitchell and J.A. Sonnenfeld, ‘Who Matters to
CEOs? An Investigation
of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience, Corporate
Performance and CEO Values’ (1999)
42 Academy of Management Journal
507-525, Special Research Forum on Stakeholders,
Social Responsibility
and Performance, Appendix, Table A (with minor modification –
some of
the items were removed because of duplication).
Table 3: Comparison of
Shareholders, Employees and Creditors Salience
|
Statement
|
S/H per
cent of Directors Agree* |
S/H Mean
score# |
Emp’ees
per cent of Directors Agree* |
Emp’ees
Mean score# |
Cred’s
per cent of Directors Agree* |
Cred’s
Mean Score# |
|
Had the power to
influence management |
81.2
|
4.03
|
78.0
|
3.74
|
23.6
|
2.44
|
|
Were active in
pursuing demands or wishes which they felt were important |
66.5
|
3.61
|
65.4
|
3.48
|
20.3
|
2.37
|
|
Actively sought the
attention of our management team |
64.6
|
3.54
|
70.5
|
3.60
|
21.6
|
2.39
|
|
Urgently
communicated their demands or wishes to our company |
48.8
|
3.20
|
47.0
|
3.14
|
19.6
|
2.35
|
|
Demands or wishes were viewed by our
management team as legitimate |
78.7
|
3.88
|
76.7
|
3.83
|
47.3
|
3.17
|
|
Received a high degree of time and attention from our
management team |
65.0
|
3.61
|
85.9
|
4.03
|
30.4
|
2.63
|
|
Satisfying the
demands or wishes of this stakeholder group was important to our management team |
83.3
|
4.02
|
87.9
|
4.04
|
54.7
|
3.22
|
* Includes responses ‘strongly agree’ and
‘agree’
# In this scale 5 is strongly agree and 1 is strongly
disagree
The table demonstrates that both the power of shareholders and the
legitimacy of
their interests remain a high priority in the perception of
directors’ interests. The
items ‘shareholders had the power to
influence management’ and ‘satisfying the
demands or wishes of
shareholders was important to our management team’
achieved the highest
scores and had the largest proportion of directors who agreed.
The item ‘shareholders demands or wishes were viewed by our management
team
as legitimate’ also scored highly. On the other hand these high
levels of legitimacy
and power do not seem to be associated with similarly
high levels of activity on
behalf of shareholders as measured by the items
‘shareholders were active in
pursuing demands or wishes’,
‘shareholders actively sought the attention of our
management
team’ and ‘shareholders urgently communicated their demands
or
wishes to our company’. This suggests that shareholder power and the
legitimacy of
shareholder interests for directors arise, at least in part,
independently of any direct
pressure exercised by shareholders over directors
in terms of governance strategy.
In other words, shareholders have a level of
power that is partly independent of
their specific demand activity. Taken as
a whole, though, these outcomes establish
that ‘shareholder
primacy’ is prominent in the attitudes of our respondent
company
directors.
When we further examine the break-downs for the items in the salience scale
we
see that with the exception of one item, the proportions and the scores
are similar
for both shareholders and employees. The exception to this is the
item ‘received a
high degree of time and attention from our management
team’ with which 65 per
cent of directors agreed in relation to
shareholders compared with 85.9 per cent in
relation to employees. Creditors
are the least influential of the three stakeholders
groups. Significantly
smaller proportions of directors agreed with all of the items
that comprise
the scale in relation to creditors. The items ‘creditors' demands
or
wishes were viewed as legitimate’ and ‘satisfying the demands
of creditors was
important to our management team’ had the largest
proportion of directors agreeing
with them and yet this was only around half
of the directors (47.3 per cent and 54.7
per cent respectively). These
findings suggest that creditors have some degree of
legitimacy (although
lower levels of legitimacy than shareholders and employees)
but low levels of
power and urgency.
Does high shareholder salience make a difference?
A key issue regarding the debate about the preferred formulation of
directors’
duties is to what extent a particular formulation affects
corporate behaviour. There
is very little detailed discussion on this point
in policy debates and the literature
does not provide much insight into
whether reforms to corporate law along the lines
of the US constituency
statutes have resulted in changes in corporate practice.
Looking behind the
assertions made in the submissions to the inquiries examined in
this paper,
it might be said that advocates for a stakeholder conception of
directors’
duties believe such reforms will impact positively on
corporate behaviour. This is
particularly the case where directors are
required to take account of nonshareholder
stakeholder interests. Some
of those who prefer the status quo with
respect to directors’ duties
argue that reforms to directors’ duties will not produce
the desired
results and in fact will have negative consequences.
Data from our project
provide further insights which may better inform this debate.
First, the data
discussed thus far shows there is a certain amount of decoupling of
corporate
practice and formal obligations. Second, it shows that, even within the
scope
of formal directors’ duties, directors are always juggling and
balancing
interests. This is at the heart of their job as the chief
strategists or stewards
(depending on the conception of their role in the
company) of the business. Third,
there is no reason to assume coherence
within companies in relation to ranking
stakeholders. In the course of case
studies associated with the research we repeated
the stakeholder ranking
exercise with a range of management personnel.152 We
found no coherent
approach to ranking stakeholders within any given company. For
instance, the
person responsible for human resource management and for ensuring
that
employment laws are complied with generally had a different view
of
obligations than the company secretary.
The results reported in this section provide further understanding of the
extent to
which shareholder salience (or influence) was consistent with
particular business
practices or priorities on behalf of directors. This is
important from a public policy
perspective because it is generally assumed
that having a ‘shareholder primacy’
corporate governance strategy
will result in the privileging of shareholder interests
to the detriment of
other stakeholders. In particular, it is assumed that those
directors who
prioritise shareholder interests will be less responsive to
employees’
needs and implement policies which are detrimental to
employee consultation, as
well as pay and conditions. This is one of the
bases for arguing for a stakeholder
approach.
We asked directors to rate a series of items on a scale indicating the
importance of
the items to the director.153 Table 4 shows the items that were
important to
directors overall and the comparison between directors in the
high range of the
shareholder salience scale and those in the low range. As
can be seen, there are
very few differences across the groups. Ensuring that
customers and clients were
satisfied was the most important item to directors
(97.4 percent of whole sample).
Growing the business was also very important
(95.4 percent of sample) as was
ensuring employees are fairly treated (94.2
percent of sample), with improving
productivity highly important as well
(92.8 percent). Interestingly, and contrary to
the assumption that the
shareholder primacy model of governance would lead to the
prioritisation of
shareholders’ interests by directors, the results show that
generally
the items that relate to employees’ interests (morale, fair
treatment, safeguarding
jobs and creating more job opportunities) were rated
as more important by more
directors than those relating to
shareholders’ interests (dividend policy, share price
and special
dividends).
It is also noteworthy that the only statistically significant difference between the
152 See Corporate Governance and Workplace Partnerships Case Studies
which is available
at:
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/centre-activities/research/corporate-governance-andworkplace-
partnerships-project/index.cfm
153
This question was adapted from S. Jacoby, E. Nason and K. Saguchi, ‘The
Role of the
Senior HR Executive in Japan and the United States: Employment
Relations, Corporate
Governance and Values” (2005) 44 Industrial
Relations 207. They present results for their
key executive values for
Japanese directors and for Japanese human resource executives,
US human
resource executives, and US chief financial officers.
responses of directors
was that directors in the high range of the shareholder
salience scale rated
‘ensuring employees are fairly treated’ as significantly
more
important than did directors who were in the low range of the scale.
Directors who
rated shareholder salience highly were not, however, more
likely to view the items
relating to shareholders as more important than
directors who gave it a lower rating.
Table 4: Importance to You as a Director
|
Item
|
percent of whole
sample important# |
percent of
high
shareholder salience important# (n=264) |
percent of
low
shareholder salience important# (n=63) |
|
Dividend Policy
|
41
|
43.7
|
33.3
|
|
Growing the Business
|
95.4
|
95.4
|
96.7
|
|
Improving Employee
Morale |
87.3
|
87.5
|
86.9
|
|
Creating Job
Opportunities within the Company |
46.3
|
46.7
|
43.3
|
|
Improving Productivity
|
92.8
|
93.8
|
91.8
|
|
Ensuring
Customers/Clients are Satisfied |
97.4
|
97.3
|
96.7
|
|
Making a Contribution
to Society |
32.1
|
31.6
|
26.7
|
|
Increasing Share
Price |
45.0
|
48.1
|
37.5
|
|
Diversifying and
Expanding into New Markets |
48.8
|
49.8
|
37.5
|
|
Safeguarding Existing
Employee Jobs |
66.2
|
63.8
|
70.0
|
|
Reducing Costs
|
80.1
|
81.1
|
76.7
|
|
Ensuring Employees
are Fairly Treated |
94.2
|
95.7
|
86.7**
|
|
Ensuring Other
Stakeholders are Satisfied |
67.2
|
68.5
|
60.0
|
|
Special Dividends
|
6.6
|
6.9
|
5.0
|
# Where rated either most or very important
** Significant at 1 percent
level, significant difference is between high and low shareholder groups
We tested the extent to which the company’s relationship with
shareholders may be
affected by the degree of salience and found some
statistically significant
differences between the responses of directors in
the high range and those in the
low range of the shareholder salience scale.
As would be expected, in companies
where directors rated shareholder salience
as high, the person who deals with
shareholders does so more frequently than
those in the low range of the scale.
Additionally, shareholders raised
particular issues more frequently in companies
where shareholder salience was
in the high end of the scale. Table 5 sets out the
responses to this
question.
Table 5: Dealing with Shareholders
|
Dealings with Shareholders
|
High shareholder salience
per cent (n=264) |
Low shareholder salience
per cent (n=63) |
|
Frequency of Dealing with
Shareholders (per cent indicating daily or weekly contact)# |
49.2
|
34.9*
|
|
How often issues
discussed |
Per cent sometimes or often
|
Per cent sometimes or often
|
|
Dividend Policy
|
51.4
|
47.5
|
|
Financial Performance of
Company |
96.2
|
88.3*
|
|
Social / Environmental
Performance of Company |
43.7
|
28.1*
|
|
Expenses
|
81.3
|
53.3**
|
|
Share Price
|
40.5
|
38.9
|
|
Expenditure/Investment
|
85.5
|
70.0**
|
|
New Business Strategy
|
83.7
|
78.3
|
|
Corporate Governance
Concerns |
52.3
|
42.1
|
|
Executive Remuneration
|
48.9
|
32.2*
|
|
Capital Management
Strategy |
68.1
|
50.0**
|
|
Human Resource
Management Strategy |
68.4
|
55.2
|
* significant at 5 per cent level, ** significant at 1 per cent level
#
Frequency with which person who deals with shareholders does so (not
necessarily
respondent director)
It can be seen that there were highly significant differences between the
responses
of directors in the high range of the shareholder salience scale
and those in the low
range regarding the frequency with which matters to do
with expenses, expenditure
or investment, and capital management strategy
were raised. There were significant
differences in the frequency with which
financial performance of the company,
social or environmental concerns, and
executive remuneration were raised – again,
being more frequently
raised in companies where directors were in the high range
of the scale than
in the low range.
It is interesting to note the relatively high proportion of each group that
reported
that shareholders had discussed matters to do with the
company’s human resources
strategy with management. For directors in
the high range of the shareholder
salience scale, the percentage was 68.4
compared with 55.2 per cent of directors in
the low range.
Another highly significant difference (which is not shown in the tables)
emerges in
response to the question about whether there had been areas of
tension between
company direction and shareholder expectations in the past
twelve months. In
companies where shareholder salience was rated as high, 30
per cent of directors
indicated that there had been areas of tension compared
with only 12.7 per cent of
companies where directors were in the low range
– a difference significant at the
one per cent level. This probably
reflects higher levels of engagement between the
company and shareholders in
these companies. However, there was only one
significant difference in the
responses indicating what the area(s) of tension were
and this was that
directors in the low range of the shareholder salience scale were
more likely
to report tension over the dividend policy or payout ratio (62.5 per cent
of
‘low shareholder’ salience compared with 19.8 per cent of
‘high shareholder’
salience, significant at the one per cent
level).
The three most common areas of tension indicated by directors in the high
range of
the shareholder salience scale were financial performance of the
company (64.2 per
cent of these directors indicated there had been areas of
tension), new business
strategy (38.3 per cent) and expenditure / investment
(32.1 per cent). For directors
in the low range of the shareholder salience
scale, the three most common areas of
tension were dividend policy (62.5 per
cent of these directors indicated there had
been tension), financial
performance of the company (62.5 per cent) and
expenditure or investment
policy (25 per cent). Only a small proportion of either
group reported
tension over the human resources strategy, with 13.6 per cent of
‘high
shareholder’ salience directors and 12.5 per cent of ‘low
shareholder’ salience
directors.
Having examined the relationship between directors and shareholders to assess
the
extent to which the respondent directors’ sense of shareholder
salience appears to
make a difference to this relationship, we move to
examine the situation in relation
to employees. Just as we asked directors
about the company’s relationship with its
shareholders, we asked about
the relationship with employees. If shareholders were
seen to be important
and influential, then employees’ interests and demands might
receive a
lower priority from directors. The results are presented now along
with
comparisons of the responses of directors in the high range of the
shareholder
salience scale and those in the low range.
We asked directors to indicate the issues concerning employees below
executive
level which had been raised at board level over the past twelve
months. Table 6
shows those results.
Table 6: Human Resources Issues
Raised at the Board
|
HR issues raised at
board |
Per cent of whole
sample raised 3 or more times |
Per cent of high
shareholder salience raised 3 or more times (n=264) |
Per cent of low
shareholder salience raised 3 or more times (n=63) |
|
Remuneration
|
37.1
|
37.9
|
35.5
|
|
Productivity
|
66.3
|
65.4
|
68.3
|
|
Performance
Management |
64.2
|
63.0
|
71.4
|
|
Industrial Disputes
|
10
|
10.2
|
6.5
|
|
Enterprise
Bargaining |
15.4
|
15.9
|
14.5
|
|
Restructuring or
Retrenchments |
16.1
|
18.9
|
4.8**
|
|
Employee Share
Schemes |
15.8
|
17.2
|
14.5
|
|
Work Organisation
|
56.9
|
57.6
|
61.3
|
|
Training
|
65.0
|
65.0
|
63.9
|
|
Occupational Health
and Safety |
73.3
|
71.6
|
74.2
|
** significant at 1 per cent level, significant difference is between high
and low shareholder
Groups
As can be seen, the most striking finding is that directors in the high range
of the
shareholder salience scale were significantly more likely to report
that restructuring
or retrenchments concerning employees below executive
level had been considered
by the board during the previous twelve months
(18.9 per cent) than directors in the
low range (4.8 per cent). A similarly
significant and related finding (not shown in
the above table) is that
directors in the high range of the shareholder salience scale
were more
likely to report that staff numbers had decreased in the past year (20.4
per
cent) than those in the low range (7.9 per cent). This finding seems to
provide
some support for the view that a strong shareholder orientation in
companies may
lead to an emphasis on costs and job reduction.
We also
examined differences between stakeholder and shareholder oriented
directors
in relation to their beliefs about the source of their obligation
to
employees and the role that the law plays in relation to the human
resources
strategy of the company.154 We asked directors to identify which of
four possible
sources was the dominant source of their obligation to
employees. Most directors
reported that they derive their sense of obligation
toward employees from sources
154 For this analysis we created two groups of directors. The
‘stakeholder oriented directors’ are
those who responded that
they are required to ‘balance the interests of all stakeholders’.
The
‘shareholder oriented directors’ are those who equated the
best interests of the company with
the long or short term interests of
shareholders.
other than law. Forty-two per cent reported that it was
business imperatives that
underpinned their obligation to employees. A
further 24.8 per cent believed that
they had ethical or social
responsibilities to ensure the well being of employees and
this was the
dominant source of obligation. A slightly higher proportion of
directors
(16.9 per cent) believed that their obligations stemmed primarily
from corporate
law, than did so in relation to labour law (15.8 per cent). We
cross-tabulated these
findings with data regarding directors’
understanding of their obligations. Table 7
shows the responses for both
stakeholder and shareholder oriented directors.
Table 7: Dominant Source of Obligation to Employees by
Director’s
Orientation
|
Dominant Source of
Obligation to Employees |
Stakeholder Oriented Group
(n=195) |
Shareholder Oriented Group
(n=155) |
|
Labour Laws
|
14.3
|
17.3
|
|
Corporate Law and Directors’
Duties |
16.3
|
17.9
|
|
Business Imperatives
|
39.9
|
47.5
|
|
Ethical or Social Values
|
29.6
|
17.3**
|
** significant at 1 per cent level
As can be seen, the stakeholder oriented group was statistically more likely
to
indicate that the dominant source of obligation to employees was ethical
or social
values (29.6 per cent) than were shareholder oriented directors
(17.3 per cent). The
dominant source of obligation for both groups was
business imperatives (39.9 per
cent of stakeholder oriented directors and
47.5 per cent of shareholder oriented
directors).
Finally, regarding the relationship with employees we asked directors whether
they
viewed this relationship as a partnership. Many authors suggest that
groups with a
stake in the company should have some ability to influence
decision making in the
company, not merely to have their interests taken into
account by directors. Deakin
et al, for instance describe the importance of
partnership for stakeholders as
follows:
. . . [T]o qualify as an ‘influential stakeholder group’ within an enterprise,
employees ‘must bear significant residual risks, contribute valued resources,
and have sufficient power to affect organizational outcomes’... In other
words, employees must not only put valued resources at risk, in the sense of
incurring costs if the enterprise fails or their relationship with it terminates;
management must in return accept that employees should be able to exercise
a degree of power in the context of corporate decision making. At the very
least, this implies that they should be meaningfully informed and consulted
when decisions over the shape and structure of the enterprise are made
In light of the importance of partnership to the concept of stakeholding, we
asked
our survey respondents to indicate whether they conceived of the
relationship
between their company and its employees as being one of
partnership. We also
asked them to indicate whether, if they did conceive of
a partnership, it was
founded on the alignment of interests between employees
and the company or
whether it allowed for difference of interests. If they
did not think that a partnership
style relationship was operating, we asked
them to identify the reason for this. The
responses are shown in the
following tables (Table 8 contains the ‘yes’ responses
and Table
9 contains the ‘no’ responses) cross-tabulated with shareholder
salience
findings.
Table 8: Yes to Partnership between Company and Employees
|
Partnership with
Employees? |
Per cent of Whole
Sample - No |
Per cent of High
Shareholder Salience – No (n=264) |
Per cent of Low
Shareholder Salience – No (n=63) |
|
Is the relationship between the company and its employees best described as
one of partnership?
|
76.9
|
75.8
|
76.2
|
|
If yes, which of the following best describes your understanding of that
partnership?
|
|||
|
Company and employees are parties with separate
interests working toward common goals |
29.2
|
30.2
|
25.5
|
|
Company and employees are parties with same interests working toward
common goals
|
70.8
|
69.8
|
74.5
|
155 S. Deakin, R. Hobbs, S. Konzelmann and F. Wilkinson, Partnership,
Ownership and
Control: The Impact of Corporate Governance on
Employment Relations, ESRC Centre
for Business Research, University of Cambridge, 2001.
Table 9: No
Partnership between Company and Employees
|
Partnership with
Employees? |
Per cent of Whole
Sample - No |
Per cent of High
Shareholder Salience – No (n=264) |
Per cent of Low
Shareholder Salience – No (n=63) |
|
Is the relationship between the company and its employees best described as
one of partnership?
|
23.1
|
24.2
|
23.8
|
|
If no, which of the following best describes your understanding of the
relationship
between the company and its employees? |
|||
|
Company and employees are parties with same
interests, with employees working under direction to further company goals |
38.3
|
41.3
|
26.7
|
|
Company and employees are parties with separate and sometimes
conflicting
interests |
18.5
|
17.5
|
26.7
|
|
Company and employees cannot be conceived of
separately – employees are part of the company |
43.2
|
41.3
|
46.7
|
We can see that a large majority of directors conceived of the relationship
between
the company and its employees as being one of partnership. This did
not vary
between directors in the high range and those in the low range of
the shareholder
salience scale. In terms of the type of partnership, a large
majority of directors,
around 70 per cent, saw the company and its employees
as parties with the same
interests working toward common goals. Again, the
importance of shareholders
within the company did not have a significant
effect on this response.
In the smaller proportion of directors who did not
describe the relationship between
employees and the company as being one of
partnership, the most common reason
identified was that employees are part of
the company and so cannot be conceived
of separately. There were no
significant differences in this respect between
directors in the high range
and those in the low range of the shareholder salience
scale.
Conclusions regarding survey data
To summarise, then, one of the major purposes of the survey was to
determine
whether directors adhere to a ‘shareholder primacy’
understanding of their
responsibilities, as is often believed to be the case
with Australian directors. We
expected that this understanding would derive from a number of sources,
including
understandings of legal obligations, institutional frameworks and
business
imperatives. Our findings in this regard were mixed, and it cannot
be said that the
data confirmed the ‘shareholder primacy’ view,
regardless of how broadly
‘shareholder primacy’ is defined (ie,
whether shareholder primacy is regarded as
involving the prioritisation of
shareholder interests in the short term or the long
term, to the exclusion or
detriment of other stakeholders’ interests). The first of our
findings
in this regard was that the majority of directors surveyed had what might
be
termed a ‘stakeholder’ understanding of their obligations. Just over
half of the
respondents believed that acting in the best interests of the
company meant they are
required to balance the interests of all stakeholders.
Furthermore, whilst 44 per cent
of directors perceived shareholders as their
number one priority, almost as many
(40 per cent) regarded the company as
their number one priority. However,
questions which sought to test the
shareholder primacy thesis in a more complex
way did provide support for the
argument that shareholder interests are prioritised
over those of other
stakeholders in relation to business practices. When
shareholder
‘salience’ (influence and ability to make demands)
was measured relative to the
salience of other stakeholders, shareholders had
a higher level of salience than
employees and creditors.
One of the main concerns of advocates of a stakeholder approach to
directors’
duties is that where directors perceive that their primary
responsibility is to
shareholders, the interests of employees and other
stakeholders receive a lower
priority. The evidence on this matter from our
survey data was mixed. Questions
regarding directors’ understandings of
their obligations under the law did not
suggest that prioritising
shareholders’ interests resulted in a diminution or deprioritising of
employees’ interests.
However, when we tested this issue using
the
‘salience’ scale as a measure of the orientation towards
shareholders and crosstabulated it with other measures, we found
some evidence
that employees’ interests may receive a lower priority. For instance,
those directors in the high range of the
shareholder salience scale were more
likely to indicate that matters relating to
restructuring and retrenchment
had been discussed at the board level over the past
year than those directors
in the low range of the scale. On the other hand, dividend
policy and
increased share price ranked relatively poorly as against job security
and
employee morale in the list of specific corporate agenda items put to
directors.
7. Assessment of the Reports of the Inquiries in Light of
this
Evidence
The question in whose interests directors of Australian companies should act
is one
which has not been settled satisfactorily in Australia. The CAMAC and
PJC
inquiries decided that maintaining the status quo was appropriate as the
current law
of directors’ duties provides sufficient flexibility for
directors to determine what
they think is in the best commercial interests of
the company. However, we also
saw that while the two inquiries reached the
same conclusion regarding whether
any reform of directors’ duties is
needed, the two inquiries adopted different
interpretations of the scope of
the existing law of directors’ duties. We have also
seen that
differences exist in the scope of directors’ duties in the corporate
law
statutes of some other countries.
When we compare the findings of the
two recent inquiries with the results of the
survey data reported in this
paper, a number of observations can be made:
1. The survey data indicates
that 94.3 per cent of directors believe that the existing
law of
directors’ duties allows them to take account of the interests
of
stakeholders other than shareholders. This is consistent with the
interpretation of
directors’ duties adopted by both CAMAC and the
PJC.
2. In relation to directors’ understanding of the scope of their
duties, the survey data
indicated that 55 per cent believe that acting in the
best interests of the company
means balancing the interests of all
stakeholders and 38.2 per cent believe that it
means acting in the interests
of all stakeholders to achieve the long terms
interests of shareholders. The
larger group of the directors (the 55 per cent
group) adopts the
interpretation of directors’ duties preferred by the PJC –
what
the Committee referred to as the ‘enlightened self-interest
interpretation’
whereby the interests of the company, arguably as an
entity separate to the
company’s stakeholders, are paramount. The
smaller group of directors (the 38.2
per cent group) adopts the
interpretation of directors’ duties preferred by
CAMAC.
3. These
different interpretations also appear in other data from the survey. We
saw
that in terms of priority ranking of interests, shareholders and
‘the company’
were ranked almost equally by directors as the most
important priority.
4. Other data from the survey indicated that shareholders
and employees have
approximately equal influence with company management (and
much more
influence than creditors) although a notable difference was that
employees
receive significantly more time and attention from management
than
shareholders.
5. There is also evidence that some matters relating to
the interests of employees
(such as improving employee morale, ensuring
employees are treated fairly, and
safeguarding existing employee jobs) are
rated by directors as more important
than some matters relating to the
interests of shareholders (such as dividend
policy and increasing the
company’s share price).
Do these results indicate any need for reform of directors’ duties? As
we have seen,
proposals for reform of directors’ duties have been
widely debated. One possible
approach, considered by CAMAC, is an amendment
to s 181 of the Corporations
Act that would expressly permit
directors to take into account the interests of
specific classes of
stakeholders, extending beyond shareholders. This approach is
reflected in s
172 of the UK Companies Act. Critics of this approach who prefer
the
status quo argue such reform will only confuse directors as they try to
work out
how to balance various interests. Our survey results demonstrate,
however, that
directors are already doing exactly this and they are not
looking to formal rules to
guide them in this process. They are guided by
business imperatives and other
considerations. On the other hand, reform of
this minimal variety will not ‘compel
directors who may not always
follow prudent practices, to adhere to appropriate
standards of corporate
social responsibility’, as is the wish of advocates of change
such as
the NSW Attorney General.156 This type of reform only permits directors
to
take into account the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders –
something they
can already do under the existing law.
156 See n 127 above and the accompanying text.
An extended approach which
compels directors to take into account the interests of
non-shareholder
stakeholders would require much more. Our study of the law and
international
developments suggest that this legal guidance would need to address a
number
of issues. The first amongst these is whether the statute is to
create
enforceable rights for certain stakeholders, and if so, which ones and
how they are
to be enforced (ie, as derivative rights on behalf of the
company or personal rights).
The literature indicates that without
enforceable rights constituency statutes
elsewhere in the common law world
are making very little difference to
stakeholders. Further, there is a risk
that they simply entrench managerial power. A
further challenge therefore is
how to ensure that shareholder rights are not rendered
less enforceable by
directors being able to argue that, in making a certain decision,
they were
exercising their option to prefer other interests.
The main problems with
expanding directors’ duties were succinctly identified in
1989 by the
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs:157
2.19 To be successful, enterprises need as a rule to take into account their
employees, their customers and the community, as well as their
shareholders. Evidence before the Committee emphasised this: it was
pointed out that, as a matter of reality, directors already take into account
the various interests their decisions might affect. It was urged upon the
Committee by some that the imposition of wider duties was therefore
unwarranted.
2.20 To require directors to take into account the interests of a company’s
employees, its creditors, its customers, or the environment, as well as its
shareholders, would be to require them to balance out what would on
occasions be conflicting forces. To make it optional for directors to take
into account the interests of a company’s employees, its creditors, its
customers, or the environment, as well as its shareholders, again would
mean that directors would be in the position of weighing up the various
factors. It would also limit the enforceability of shareholders’ rights if
directors were able to argue that, in making a certain decision, they had
been exercising their option to prefer other interests.
2.21 If contemporary public policy requires either of these approaches, then
a re-think of some of the fundamentals of company law would be required.
The fact that similar arguments were made almost 20 years later in
submissions to
the CAMAC and the PJC inquiries demonstrates the persistence
and force of this
debate.
The results of the survey indicate that directors do not typically look to
the law of
directors’ duties for specific guidance concerning the
interests they should pursue
157 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Company
Directors’
Duties: Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and
Obligations of Company Directors
(Australian Government Publishing
Service, November 1989,
see
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?ContentID=542), at 12.
as
directors. Rather, that specific guidance is found in a raft of statutes other
than
the Corporations Act if they look to the law at all. In any case,
they are more likely
to be guided by business imperatives and ethics.
In their interpretations of directors’ duties, the courts have offered
flexibility to
directors to consider a wide range of interests provided that
the interests of
shareholders are thereby served. The courts have also
indicated how the interests of
the company shift so that the interests of
creditors can assume greater importance
than the interests of shareholders
when a company is insolvent or nearly insolvent.
An important finding of the
study is that ambiguity exists among the directors
surveyed concerning the
permissible scope of their duties. We have also seen that
the CAMAC and PJC
inquiries adopted different interpretations of the scope of
directors’
duties. This may be an argument for some clarification of the law -
not
necessarily to have a non exhaustive list of the interests directors may
consider
such as the list in s 172 of the UK Companies Act but at
least to clarify for directors
which of the interpretations is to be
preferred.
At the same time, we should be cognisant of what appear to be
significant
limitations on the influence of the duty to act in the best
interests of the company
on the actual decision making of directors. The fact
that large proportions of
directors surveyed can adopt different
interpretations regarding the scope of the
duty to act in the best interests
of the company and yet this has not apparently lead
to significant litigation
or other challenges to the decisions of these directors may
tell us something
about the limited role of this duty compared to other obligations
and duties
that influence decision making by directors. The function of this duty
may be
to set very broad parameters within which directors operate and it
will
usually only be egregious cases where directors’ decisions are
successfully
challenged under this duty. The duty therefore permits extensive
balancing of
stakeholders’ interests by directors within the broad
parameters set by the duty.
This does not mean the duty is unimportant. There are of course some notable
cases
concerning the duty to act in the best interests of the company. The
often cited
Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq)158 is important
for the significance it
places on the interests of creditors when a company
is insolvent or nearing
insolvency.159 There is also an important series of
cases on the meaning of the
interests of the company when the company in
question forms part of a corporate
group.160 A notable feature of recent
Australian cases in which the actions of
directors have been held to breach
the duty to act in the best interests of the
company is that they often
involve the director pursuing a personal interest at the
expense of the
interests of the company.161 However, where such a personal interest
158 (1986) 4 NSWLR 722; 10 ACLR 395; 4 ACLC 215.
159 See A. Keay,
‘The Director’s Duty to Take Into Account the Interests of
Company
Creditors: When is it Triggered?’ [2001] MelbULawRw 11; (2001) 25 Melbourne
University Law Review 315.
160 See, for example, Equiticorp Finance
Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1993) BSWLR
50; 11 ACSR 642; 11 ACLC
952; Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd
[2001] NSWSC 448; (2001) 38
ACSR 404 and Lewis (as liq of Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) v
Melwren
Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 243; (2005) 54 ACSR 410.
161 Cases in this
category include Lawfund Australia Pty Ltd v Lawfund Leasing Pty Ltd
(2008)
66 ACSR 1; [2008] NSWSC 144; Australian Securities and
Investments Commission v
is not present, courts will typically not
interfere with a good faith decision of
directors that balances
stakeholders’ interests provided the decision is within the
broad
parameters established by the courts. When directors privilege
investor
interests at critical times in the life of the company, to the
detriment of other
stakeholder interests, this is likely to have more to do
with competitive business
pressures than corporate law.
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