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The Case Concerning East Timor and
Self-determination
| Author: |
Bingbin Lu LLB (Fudan)
Law Librarian, Transnational Law & Business University, Seoul, Korea
|
| Issue: |
Volume 11, Number 2 (June 2004)
|
Contents
-
In the Case Concerning East Timor(Portugal v. Australia),[1] the International Court of Justice (ICJ) refused to rule on
the validity of the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia due to
the absence of Indonesia as a third party not consenting to the jurisdiction
of the Court. The Court could not exercise jurisdiction because in ruling on
Portugal's claims, it would have to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's
conduct in Indonesia's absence.[2] However, the Court did note enough in its "non-statement" of
the case to support the fact that East Timor remains a non-self-governing
territory under Chapter XI of the United Nations (UN) Charter.[3]
- Self-determination means the right
to control one's own destiny. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of people enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
all people have the right to freely determine, without external interference,
their political statute and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.[4]
- Self-determination is a well established principle now, but
there is some uncertainty about its origins. Some scholars claim the concept
of self-determination existed at the time of the Greek city states.[5] Some attributed the principle of self-determination to the
French and American revolutions.[6] However, legal scholars generally agree that US President
Wilson "elevated the principle of self-determination to an international
level"[7] through his Fourteen Points, recognizing "that every people
has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live...."[8] The League of Nations implicitly accepted the principle of
self-determination,[9] thereby leading to its subsequent incorporation into the
United Nations Charter.[10]
- The evolution of the principle of self-determination in
modern society has come about largely as the result of three General Assembly
Resolutions. First, in 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 which stated that all people have the right to
self-determination. The resolution, moreover, called on administering powers
of trust and non-self-governing territories to take immediate steps to
transfer without reservation all powers to the peoples of such territories "in
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire."[11] Next, in Resolution 1541, the General Assembly spelled out
principles for determining whether a territory was a non-self-governing
territory.[12] The resolution also listed the three modes of implementing
the right of self-determination.[13] Finally, the General Assembly took a further step in the
development of the principle of self-determination when it adopted Resolution
2625, which recognized that, under the U.N. Charter, a non-self-governing
territory has a separate status from its administering power.[14] As these
resolutions clearly demonstrate, the principle of self-determination, at least
with regards to non-self-governing territories,[15] is a matter of international concern. The United Nations,
therefore, is not limited by Article 2(7) in action respecting
self-determination for non-self-governing territories.[16]
- By the 1960's and "70's, ICJ advisory opinions,[17] treaties[18] and the charters of regional organizations[19] expressed support for self-determination. Today, the
international community considers the right to self-determination jus cogens,
that imposes binding obligations on all nation states.[20] All peoples possess an affirmative right to
self-determination which is "seen as a prerequisite to any genuine enjoyment
of any of the human rights."[21]
- Nonetheless, confusion remains about the scope and character
of self-determination. Some scholars feel the right extends only to colonies
or areas subject to foreign control.[22] This so called "external self-determination" gives people
subject to colonization or foreign occupation the right to govern their own
affairs free from outside interference.[23] Others disagree, saying that the right to self-determination
belongs to all peoples, including minorities and indigenous people living
within existing countries.[24] This broader definition known as "internal
self-determination", gives minorities and indigenous people control over their
own destinies. While some people believe that the term includes the right to
succeed, others advocate no more than the right to select a representative
government using a legitimate political process.[25] Although unclear in this East Timor opinion delivered by the
ICJ, the Majority appears to adopt the external self-determination position,
possible out of fear of alienating its members with substantial minority
populations. Since East Timor's relationship with Indonesia falls within the
narrower category, a deeper look at external self-determination is warranted.
- The U.N. Charter forbids nation states from interfering with the territorial
integrity of other nation states.[26] Similarly, external self-determination is the right of
individuals to be independent and free from outside interference.[27] The U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and People, found the "subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation" contrary to the U.N. Charter and "an
impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation."[28] Although external self-determination applies in both the
colonization and foreign domination contexts, colonial claims rarely arise
today. Instead, claims increasingly emerge from the foreign domination of one
state over the other, as with the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.
- Part of
the increase in external self-determination claims may result from an
expansion in the traditional definition of foreign domination to include
militaristic domination, such as when the troops of one country are stationed
in another; economic domination, when one or more countries economically
dominate another; and cultural domination, where one culture dominates the
other. In Self-Determination: Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, Halim
Morris specifically mentions the Lebanese objection to the presence of Syrian
and Israeli troops in their country, and American troops in Panama and Okinawa
as forms of militaristic foreign domination. Various third world nations view
economic domination by developed nations as a lack of economic
self-determination. Moreover, various ethnic groups throughout the world have
begun to assert a right to cultural self-determination in response to foreign
domination centering on language and religion. Morris notes that these claims
for external self-determination have been largely ignored by the international
community. Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor was no exception. Despite
hundreds of thousands of deaths attributed to the invasion, the outside world
paid little attention to the area until November of 1991 when Indonesian
forces killed an estimated two-hundred and seventy protestors in a cemetery in
Dili.[29]
- In light of the
principle of non-intervention (Article 2(7) of UN Chapter) and the principle
of self-determination, the status of East Timor under international law is of
fundamental importance. If East Timor is an Indonesian province (as claimed by
Indonesia), then the situation there is arguably not a matter of international
concern and generally is therefore outside of U.N. jurisdiction. Moreover, if
the people of East Timor have already exercised their right of
self-determination, then that principle is inapplicable to the consideration
of U.N. action there. On the other hand, if Indonesia's annexation of East
Timor was illegal (as claimed by Portugal), then the territory remains a
non-self-governing territory statute. As such, matters involving it would be
of international concern.[30] Unfortunately, East Timor's status under international law
was ambiguous. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had the
opportunity to answer the question in East Timor, it refused to do so.[31] Nevertheless, in a dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramantry
analyzed the matter at some length.[32] Because of the great importance of this issue to U.N. action
in East Timor, I will review the arguments on both sides posed before the ICJ.
Where appropriate, I will consider points made by Judge Weeramantry. However,
I want to remind again that the ICJ gave up the chance to address the East
Timor's statute under international law. The following opinion is my analysis
according to some relevant arguments.
- There are two possible arguments for
determining that East Timor is an Indonesian province. The first is that the
people of East Timor exercised their right of self-determination when the
"People's Assembly" formally requested integration with Indonesia. This
argument must fail because it is inconsistent with Resolution 1541, which
established the legitimate modes of exercising the right of
self-determination.[33] While integration with an independent state is an
alternative, it is subject to two important limitations. First, "the
integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of
self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would
have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic
processes."[34] It is doubtful that East Timor achieved such an advanced
stage of self-government between December 1975 and May 1976. Even assuming it
had, a second requirement undoubtedly was not met: "the integration should be
the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting
with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been
expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and
based on universal suffrage."[35] On the contrary, integration with Indonesia was not based on
universal suffrage but on a "Regional Popular Assembly" of questionable
legitimacy.[36] Furthermore, the fact that the territory was under
Indonesian occupation at the time of the request makes it doubtful that the
"People's Assembly" represented freely expressed wishes.
- The second argument
for East Timor being considered an Indonesian province is that even if the
people of East Timor did not exercise their right of self-determination, East
Timor is a part of Indonesia by virtue of effective occupation. This argument
must fail because Portugal's continued protests and the continued presence of
the question of East Timor on the General Assembly's agenda precluded
Indonesia's consolidation of title over East Timor.[37]
- If not an Indonesian province, a final argument for
Indonesian jurisdiction over East Timor is that the territory is a
non-self-governing territory under Indonesian administration. In East Timor,
Australia stated that recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor
did not involve a denial of its status as a non-self-governing territory. This
position, as Judge Weeramantry noted, does not make much sense. In any event,
the authority exercised by Indonesia over East Timor was clearly
distinguishable from that of a typical administering power. [38] Even if we regard Indonesia as an administering power. It
has breached its obligations in many ways.
- If not an Indonesian province, then
East Timor is a non-self-governing territory. In addition to the
counter-arguments discussed above, there are two positive arguments for East
Timor being a non-self-governing territory. The first finds its basis in the
U.N. Charter itself; the second in U.N. resolutions. First, Article 73(e) of
the Charter speaks of the relationship between an administering power and a
non-self-governing territory as a "sacred trust."[39] According to Judge Weeramantry, the idea that the use of
force by a third country could win out over this "sacred trust" "seems to run
counter to the entire scheme of the United Nations Charter." Judge Weeramantry
noted three legal concerns. First, granting importance to the loss of physical
control over the territory, regardless of the means by which control was lost,
is a dangerous proposition. Second, precedents do not support such a
proposition. Third, "there is more to the status of administering power than
mere physical control."
- The second argument for East Timor being a non-self-governing territory is
that General Assembly and Security Council resolutions have recognized it as
such. Judge Weeramantry noted, "questions of the termination of dependent
territory status upon the exercise of the right of self-determination have...
long been matters recognized as being within the scope of the General
Assembly's authority." According to Judge Weeramantry, "legal consequences
follow from these determinations." Judge Weeramantry also noted that the
General Assembly resolutions were confirmed by Security Council resolutions on
the matter. The argument of desuetude was rejected by Judge Weeramantry on the
ground that such an argument, "implying, as it does that the matter is a dead
issue, cannot succeed if the United Nations itself elects to treat the issue
as live." For the same reason, he rejected the argument that the resolutions
have been nullified by supervening events.
- Although Judge Weeramantry concluded that East Timor is "a territory
unquestionably entitled to self-determination," nevertheless, the question of
East Timor's status under international law remained ambiguous at that time
being because of the ICJ's failure to address the issue because the
jurisdictional problem.
- The statements of the ICJ in the
Case Concerning East Timor do not support either the proposition that
Indonesia officially annexed East Timor, or that Portugal remains the
administering Power over the territory. Rather, the Court suggests a novel
situation: a non-self-governing territory controlled by a non-traditional
administering power with an existing right of self-determination. Trends in
the principle of self-determination in international law support this
suggestion.[40]
- By questioning Portugal's status as the administering
authority and subsequently declining to rule on Indonesia's status regarding
East Timor, the I.C.J. implies one of three alternative situations concerning
East Timor's present status: Portugal remains a limited administering
authority over East Timor, with East Timor remaining a non-self-governing
territory; East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory with Indonesia as
its new administering authority; or Indonesia has annexed East Timor.[41] Each scenario results in a U.N. departure from the general
standard that only European colonies have the right to self-determination. The
facts, applicable cases, and current trends in international law all point to
the conclusion that it seemed Indonesia had exercised certain rights and
obligations toward East Timor as a substituted administering power, but this
is questionable.
- Even if Indonesia acted as an administering power, Indonesia owes a duty
to East Timor to protect East Timor's territorial sovereignty and natural
resources. Evidently, Indonesia has breached this duty in a number of ways: by
continued human rights violations against the East Timorese; by political,
social, and cultural repression; and by entering into treaties on behalf of
the East Timorese for self-serving economic reasons. Indonesia has thus
violated the territorial sovereignty of the East Timorese. Consequently, the
Timor Gap Treaty serves as a violation of East Timor's territorial sovereignty
and should be considered illegal under international law.
- As noted supra, In this Case Concerning East Timor, the I.C.J. refused to
rule on the validity of the Timor Gap Treaty due to the absence of Indonesia
as a third party not consenting to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court
did state enough in its "non-statement" of the case to support the fact that
East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory under Chapter XI of the U.N.
Charter. The Court would not expressly recognize Portugal's continued status
as the administering Power over East Timor. Considering the importance of
Indonesia's absence, their twenty-five year control over East Timor, the
rejection by the U.N. of Indonesia's annexation and illegal occupation of East
Timor, and the trends in the application of the principle of
self-determination, it appears that Indonesia had certain rights and interests
over East Timor in Portugal's absence.
- In one important sense, then, it can be said that the court's decision did
not so much reject Portugal's claims as it avoided them. The court's
resolution of the case had some superficial appeal. At a deeper level,
however, its rigid and formalistic approach side-stepped the substantive
questions. And in so doing, the court let Portugal's legitimate political
grievance and East Timorese's unassailable moral rights become obscured by the
misapplication of procedural requirements. The ICJ, by its prudential
diffidence, ensures that the question of East Timor will, for the time being,
remained just that: a question-an outcome that does not bode well for the
subjugated and suffering people of East Timor. Worse still, Indonesia may,
incorrectly, interpret the decision as a vindication of its brutal policies
towards East Timor.
- The decision has wider and equally disquieting
implications. First, by refusing to address the heart of the case, the
admittedly politically charged issue of East Timorese self-determination, the
Court did not help its standing in the international community as an effective
forum for international dispute resolution, rendering its voice merely "sound
and fury signifying nothing".[42] Second, the seeming ease and matter-of-fact manner with
which the court invoked the indispensable third party doctrine in a case
involving violations of an erga omnes obligation does not foretell a
satisfactory outcome for future cases involving a similar right. Third,
despite its recurrence in international politics, self-determination has
eluded a precise workable definition in international law. The court could
have used the East Timor Case to infuse the principle with a modicum of legal
determinacy and define in detail the legal and practical consequences flowing
from it-a potentially salutary result as the principle will continue to
occupy, if not haunt, international politics for some time to come.
- An ICJ ruling favorably disposed toward East Timorese right to self-
determination could have vivified the question of East Timor in the UN and
galvanized the world body into taking concrete action to ameliorate the
predicament of the East Timorese. In the meantime, the forlorn people of East
Timor (those that have survived the struggle for independence, anyway), not
quite inured to the bane of occupation, may rightly ask: how can international
law, by way of jurisdictional contortions, remain so obstinate and the
international community, by way of neglect, so obtuse about a cause so legally
and morally crystalline?
- The recent history of East Timor people is well
known.[43] It is not my task to elaborate these actions in this case
study note, but I here will briefly introduce the milestones of this East
Timor story. U.N. action with respect to East Timor is manifest in six
Security Council resolutions adopted between May 7 and October 25, 1999, and
three resolutions in the following three years.[44] Each of these resolutions authorized some form of direct
action, by or on behalf of the United Nations, in East Timor. On 30 August
1999, in a United Nations-sponsored 'popular consultation', the people of East
Timor voted overwhelmingly(78.5 percent) to reject the Indonesian offer of
'special autonomy' in favor of a United Nations-supervised transition to
independent statehood. From then on, events moved apace. On 15 September 1999,
the Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force
(INTERFET) with a mandate to restore peace and security in East Timor.[45] On 15 October 1999, the Indonesian People's Consultative
Assembly repealed the infamous law of July 1976 under which East Timor had
been annexed,[46] paving the way for the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to assume control of the territory.[47] And by November 1999, the last of the Indonesian troops had,
finally, left East Timor. On August 2001, Timorese people vote for 88-member
Constituent Assembly, responsible for drafting and ratifying a constitution
for the fledgling nation. On 17 April 2002, UN officially declares Xanana
Gusmão winner of first-ever presidential election. On 20 May 2002, UN hands
over authority to democratically elected government; President Gusmão swears
in Parliament. Thus Timor-Leste became an independent country. And, on 27
September 2002, UN General Assembly admits Timor-Leste as the 191st Member
State of the United Nations. However, there are still many challenges facing
this world's newest nation, one of the poorest, smallest and most traumatized
countries on the globe.[48]
[1] East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. The case Judgment
can be viewed online from the excellent ICJ website (http://www.icj-cij.org/); or, see, e.g.,
International Legal Materials, p1581-1591.
[2] The outcome of this case reflects some problems of the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. For general discussion of the problems and reforms of
the ICJ jurisdiction, see Bingbin Lu, The Reform of International Court of
Justice-Jurisdiction Perspective, Perspectives, Overseas Young Chinese Forum,
vol.5, 2004 (forthcoming).
[3] See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (announcing respect for
self-determination).
[4] See e.g., Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (4th Edn),
Cambridge, pp 144-146; Henkin Pugh, Schachter Smit, International Law (3rd
Edn), West, pp302-305; etc.
[5] See James Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Determination: A
Jeffersonian Perspective, 9 B.U. Int'l L.J. 209, 212 (1991).
[6] See Cf., Claudia Saladin, Self-Determination, Minority Rights
and Constitutional Accommodation: The Example of the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 172, 173 (1991).
[7] Halim Morris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere
Rhetoric?, 4 ILSA j. Int'l & Comp. L. 201, 203 (1997).
[8] President Woodrow Wilson, address before the League to Enforce
Peace (May 27, 1916), reprinted in 53 Cong. Rec. 8854 (May 29, 1916).
[9] Ved Nanda, Self-Determination: The Case of Palestine, 82 Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 334, 335 (1988).
[10] The U.N. Charter calls on member states "to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples...." U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. It also
creates a trusteeship system designed to "promote the progressive development
of the inhabitants of the trust territories toward self-government or
independence, taking into account the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned," and requiring members to become the administering powers and
protect the interests of those countries whose people had not yet attained
self-government. U.N. Charter art. 76.
[11] See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec.14, 1960).
[12] Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether
or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under
Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 29, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960).
[13] "A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached
a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent
State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with
an independent State." Id.
[14] See Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
[15] See Daniel Thumurer, Self-Determination, in 8 Encyclopedia
of Public International Law 470, 474 (R. Berhardt ed., 1985). "It should be
added that apart from the law of decolonization with its special foundation in
the U.N. Charter, the principle of self-determination does not seem to include
a general right of groups to secede from the States of which they form a
part." Id. at 474.
[16] See id. at 472.
[17] Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J.
12 (Oct. 16).
[18] See, e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para.
1, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Declaration on the Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 123, Doc. A/802 (1970).
[19] Charter of the Organization for African Unity, May 25, 1963,
African States 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
[20] Morris, supra note 7, at 204.
[21] Id.
[22] See Sam Blay, Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the Post
Communist Era,
[22] Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 275 (1994); Gregory H. Fox,
Self-Determination in the Post Cold War Era: A New International Focus?,
16Mich. J. Int'l L. 733 (1995).
[23] Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination:
The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 49 (1990).
[24] Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991,
22 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 209, 248 (1992).
[25] Catharine J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and
Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.
199, 353 (1993).
[26] U.N. Charter art. 2.
[27] Henry J. Richardson III, Rights of Self-Determination of
People in Established States: Southern Africa and the Middle East, 85 Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 541, 545 (1991).
[28] G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 11.
[29] See John Pilger, We Resist to Win. It is 20 Years Since
Indonesia Invaded East Timor, The Guardian, Dec. 2, 1995, at TO22.; John
Pilger, The Rising of Indonesia, June, 16, 1995 New Statesman & Soc'y 14;
Timor Trembles, Asian Wall St. J., May 20, 1994, at 8
[30] See U.N. Charter ch. XI.
[31] East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J.(holding that the
Court could not exercise jurisdiction because in ruling on Portugal's claims,
it would have to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's conduct in Indonesia's
absence).
[32] Id. at 139 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
[33] See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 12, at 29.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Only five of the twenty-eight representatives to the
"People's Assembly" were elected by popular vote. Peter Lawrence, East Timor,
in 12 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 94, 95.
[37] Id.
[38] Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter lays out several obligations
owed by the administering powers to non-self-governing territories. These
include the duty to develop self-government and the duty to regularly transmit
statistical and other information to the Secretary General.
[39] U.N. Charter art. 73(e).
[40] See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. (noting need to consider
realities of situation).
[41] See Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute:
Self-Determination at the International Court of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 323, 324 (1994), at 337 (providing several possibilities
facing East Timor).
[42] Willliam Shakespeare, Macbeth act 5, sc. 5, lines 27-28
(Nicholas Brooks ed., 1990) (1606).
[43] For background, see the UN's website, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm
[44] These Resolutions are available online at: http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/UntaetDrs.htm
[45] This was 'requested' by Indonesia on 12 September 1999 and
authorised by Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999), 15 September 1999.
Security Council Resolution 1264 is thus an interesting hybrid. In the
preamble, the Security Council welcomes Indonesia's readiness to accept an
'international peacekeeping force', yet paragraph 3 makes clear that the
establishment of the multinational force is more accurately characterised as a
(non-consensual) Chapter VII peace-enforcement action rather than (consensual)
peacekeeping. The Australian-led multinational force was deployed on 20
September 1999. It finally handed over to UNTAET peacekeeping troops on 22
February 2000.
[46] 19 October 1999. This was pursuant to Article 6 of the
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the
Question of East Timor (hereinafter the 'General Agreement'), A/53/951, Annex
1 of the 'Report of the Secretary-General', S/1999/513 (the Agreement is
available on the UN website,
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm). Article 6 of
the General Agreement provides: 'If the Secretary-General determines, on the
basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this
Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is
not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall
take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor
thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17
July 1976.' The decision of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly to
repeal the law was welcomed in Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999), 25
October 1999 and in General Assembly Resolution A/54/194, 15 December 1999.
For the background to the 1976 law, see e.g. Clark, 'The "Decolonisation" of
East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression',
in CIIR and IPJET (International Platform of Jurists for East Timor),
International Law and the Question of East Timor (1995) 65, at 69-73.
[47] UNTAET was established by the Security Council on 25 October
1999. Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999), 25 October 1999. Its initial
mandate was to January 2001. On 31 January 2001, the Security Council decided
to extend the current mandate of UNTAET until 21 January 2002. Security
Council Resolution 1338 (2001), 31 January 2001.
[48] See Charles Scheiner, Accomplishments and Challenges After
One Year of Independence, Eastafter, vol. 9, no. 1, available online http://www.etan.org/estafeta/03/spring03/default.htm
