Low, Kelvin F K --- "the Nature of Torrens indefeasibility: Understanding the Limits of Personal Equities" [2009] MelbULawRw 7; (2009) 33(1) Melbourne University Law Review 205
[*] LLB (NUS), BCL (Oxon); Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.
[1] Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] [1988] HCA 16; (1988) 164 CLR 604, 613 (Mason CJ and Dawson J).
[2] Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385 (Barwick CJ).
[3] For background as to how the Torrens system was conceived, developed and eventually born, see P Moerlin Fox, ‘The Story behind the Torrens System’ (1950) 23 Australian Law Journal 489. Cf S Robinson, Transfer of Land in Victoria (1979) ch 1.
[4] Gibbs v Messer [1891] UKLawRpAC 2; [1891] AC 248, 254 (Lord Watson for the Lord Chancellor, Lords Watson, Hobhouse, Herschell, Macnaghten, Morris and Shand). See also Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 31; (2007) 230 CLR 438, 461, where Callinan J observed that:
The purposes and objects of the Torrens system of title were to simplify conveyancing, to introduce a greater assurance, indeed certainty, of title and in consequence to reduce the expense of establishing and protecting title under the old land titles system.
[5] Peter Butt, Land Law (5th ed, 2006) 717. As to what proof of title means and entails, see J T Farrand, Contract and Conveyance (4th ed, 1983) ch VI.
[6] That is, ‘one cannot give what one does not have’.
[7] Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 31; (2007) 230 CLR 438, 463 (Callinan J).
[8] See below nn 37–40 and accompanying text.
[10] Ibid 585 (Lord Wilberforce for Viscount Dilhorne, Lords Denning, Hodson, Wilberforce and Sir Garfield Barwick).
[11] Ibid.
[12] Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376, 385 (Barwick CJ).
[13] See Garofano v Reliance Finance Corporation Ltd (1992) 5 BPR 11 941, 11 945 (Meagher JA); Grgic v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202, 222–3 (Powell JA); Pianta v National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 17 Fam LR 34, 39 (Handley JA); Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty‑Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133, 146–7 (Tadgell JA) (‘Macquarie Bank’); Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] VSCA 51; [1999] 1 VR 643, 650–1 (Tadgell JA).
[14] LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy [2002] WASCA 291; (2002) 26 WAR 517, 556 (Anderson and Steytler JJ).
[15] Barry C Crown, ‘Indefeasibility of Title: Developments in Singapore’ (2007) 15 Australian Property Law Journal 91, 101. An excellent example of how this limitation is an inadequate one is the case of Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1991) 25 NSWLR 32. The case is generally regarded as wrongly decided by most commentators: see, eg, Peter Butt, ‘Indefeasibility and Sleights of Hand’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 596, 596; Barry C Crown, ‘A Hard Look at Bahr v Nicolay’ in Dora Neo, Tang Hang Wu and Michael Hor (eds), Lives in the Law (2007) 191, 202–4; Tang Hang Wu, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror: A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility’ [2008] MelbULawRw 20; (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 672, 682.
[16] (1980) 2 BPR 9451, 9454 (Lord Russell for Lords Wilberforce, Diplock, Russell, Keith and Lane).
[17] See Barry v Heider [1914] HCA 79; (1914) 19 CLR 197, 213 (Isaacs J); Vassos v State Bank of South Australia [1993] VicRp 74; [1993] 2 VR 316, 333 (Hayne J); Story v Advance Bank Australia Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 722, 737 (Gleeson CJ), 739–40 (Mahoney JA); Macquarie Bank [1998] 3 VR 133, 162 (Ashley AJA); LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy [2002] WASCA 291; (2002) 26 WAR 517, 552 (Murray J);
cf at 558–9 (Anderson and Steytler JJ).
[18] Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Recipient Liability and Torrens Title’ (2006) 1 Journal of Equity 135, 139.
[19] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 682.
[20] [2007] NSWSC 676; (2007) 64 ACSR 31, 44.
[21] [1967] 1 AC 569, 585 (Lord Wilberforce for Viscount Dilhorne, Lords Denning, Hodson, Wilberforce and Sir Garfield Barwick).
[22] See generally Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd [2007] NSWSC 676; (2007) 64 ACSR 31, 40–4 (Young CJ in Eq).
[23] [2006] NSWCA 180; (2006) 68 NSWLR 229, 245 (Tobias JA).
[24] [1879] UKLawRpCh 204; (1879) 12 Ch D 31.
[25] See below nn 178–81 and accompanying text.
[26] Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law (4th ed, 2006) 453.
[27] See, eg, Butt, Land Law, above n 5, 787–8. In relation to the personal equity title, see Crown, ‘A Hard Look at Bahr v Nicolay’, above n 15, 201; Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 679–84.
[28] Robert Chambers is one of the few commentators to contest the ‘exception’ label, but even then, Chambers accepts that the label is ‘not untrue’, merely ‘unhelpful’: Robert Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’ [1998] Restitution Law Review 126, 128.
[29] See, eg, Land Title Act 2008 (NT) s 189(1)(a); Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(a). Insofar as such personal equity ‘exceptions’ have been grafted onto earlier Torrens legislation that contained no such references, this cannot as a matter of principle expand the scope of the principle of indefeasibility as statutorily enshrined, unless the specific indefeasibility provisions of the legislation are themselves amended and expanded. They should therefore be regarded generally as merely clarifying that such claims coexist with the principle of indefeasibility rather than construed as first expanding the principle of indefeasibility and then cutting it back again by way of a true exception. An interesting Torrens jurisdiction where some ‘personal equity’ exceptions were included in the original legislation is the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 (Singapore) ss 28(2)(b)–(e): see Kelvin Low, ‘The Story of “Personal Equities” in Singapore: Thus Far and Beyond’ [2009] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming).
[30] J A Simpson and E S C Weiner (eds), The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 1989) vol V, 498.
[31] Butt, Land Law, above n 5, 725. But see Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) ss 37–8; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40.
[32] Butt, Land Law, above n 5, 725.
[33] [1967] 1 AC 569, 585 (Lord Wilberforce for Viscount Dilhorne, Lords Denning, Hodson, Wilberforce and Sir Garfield Barwick).
[34] See ibid.
[35] Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd ed, 2005) 66.
[36] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 675.
[37] Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(1) (emphasis added).
[38] [1967] 1 AC 569, 580 (Lord Wilberforce for Viscount Dilhorne, Lords Denning, Hodson, Wilberforce and Sir Garfield Barwick).
[39] Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69 (emphasis added).
[40] Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 70 (emphasis added).
[41] Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569, 585 (Lord Wilberforce for Viscount Dilhorne, Lords Denning, Hodson, Wilberforce and Sir Garfield Barwick).
[42] [1997] 3 NZLR 705, 712 (Thomas J).
[43] Ibid.
[44] Oh Hiam v Tham Kong (1980) 2 BPR 9451, 9454 (Lord Russell for Lords Wilberforce, Diplock, Russell, Keith and Lane).
[45] [1882] UKLawRpCh 85; (1882) 21 Ch D 9.
[46] Bunny Industries Ltd v FSW Enterprises Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 712, 715 (Connolly J), although the case of Walsh v Lonsdale itself was not considered.
[47] See Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 31; (2007) 230 CLR 438, 463–70 (Callinan J). Contra J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Bank of New South Wales [1971] HCA 57; (1971) 125 CLR 546, 552–4 (Barwick CJ).
[48] [1967] 1 AC 569, 585 (Lord Wilberforce for Viscount Dilhorne, Lords Denning, Hodson, Wilberforce and Sir Garfield Barwick).
[49] See, eg, Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68; (2001) 208 CLR 516, particularly at 543–4 (Gummow J); G J Virgo and J Beatson, ‘Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability’ (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 352. See also Paul Finn, ‘Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies’ in W R Cornish et al (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future — Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (1998) 251, 252. Cf Michael Bryan, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability in Australia: A False Dichotomy?’ in Jason W Neyers, Mitchell McInnes and Stephen G A Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (2004) 47.
[50] Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 28, 134.
[51] Cf ibid 129. Chambers’ reference to restitutionary proprietary interests here is generalised. Further, although Chambers refers to potential confusion between a new unregistered interest in land with a pre‑existing unregistered interest, in truth the potential for confusion extends to pre‑existing registered interests in land. Hence, the present text refers to pre‑existing interests in land rather than pre‑existing unregistered interests in land.
[52] Ibid 130–1.
[53] Robert Chambers, An Introduction to Property Law in Australia (2nd ed, 2008) 468–70.
[54] Ibid 468.
[55] Ibid 469.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Including the right to reduce the trust property into his or her possession by application of the rule in Saunders v Vautier [1841] EngR 629; (1841) 4 Beav 115; 49 ER 282.
[58] Chambers, An Introduction to Property Law in Australia, above n 53, 470.
[59] For examples of transfers void otherwise than for forgery that are nevertheless given effect by the Torrens system, see City of Canada Bay Council v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 351; (2007) 71 NSWLR 424; Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property Investment Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 6 (Unreported, Giles, Tobias JJA and Young CJ in Eq, 18 February 2008).
[60] Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 28, 134.
[62] Ibid 189 (Hayne JA).
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid 196.
[65] Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 28.
[66] A distinction is drawn between so‑called ‘two‑party cases’ and so‑called ‘three‑party cases’: ibid 129–30. It is suggested by Chambers that where a plaintiff seeks to recover property which has passed directly from himself to the defendant, such a claim falls within the inter se rule. However, where a plaintiff seeks to recover property from a defendant who received it, not directly from the plaintiff, but from someone who acquired it from the plaintiff and then transferred it in a separate transaction, it does not. If this distinction is sound, almost all cases of forged transfers would fall within Chambers’ two‑party rule, which would seriously undermine the principle of indefeasibility. In the context, the suggested distinction between notice of fraud or forgery and notice of the plaintiff’s original property interest may well be one that is too nice. Purchasers, for example, would have notice of their vendors’ original property interests but that will not allow their vendors to establish any claim in unjust enrichment against them. Nor, where the transaction is unauthorised, as in cases of forgeries, does notice of a plaintiff’s property interest feature. Notice of a party’s property interest has never given rise to any claim in cases of forgery. Such claims were permitted outside of the Torrens system simply because, being unauthorised, they were completely ineffectual. Nor is the analogy with the concept of notice in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] UKHL 6; [1994] 1 AC 180 obviously correct. That doctrine extends unjust enrichment liability for the misrepresentation or undue influence of another. It remains controversial whether persons who deprive others of their property are liable in unjust enrichment. To assume therefore that they are and that the same extension ought to apply is unsatisfactory. Furthermore, it is generally conceded that such ‘unjust enrichment’ liability serves to obliquely protect property rights: see, eg, Birks, Unjust Enrichment, n 35, 66. If so, labelling the claim one of ‘unjust enrichment’ ought not to permit it to succeed.
[67] See, eg, Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say‑Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 158–9 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (‘Farah Constructions’). See also Elise Bant, ‘“Ignorance” as a Ground of Restitution — Can It Survive?’ [1998] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 18; Peter Watts, ‘Book Review: Unjust Enrichment by Peter Birks’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 163, 166.
[68] See, eg, Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 35, 64–6. Contra David Fox, ‘Legal Title as a Ground of Restitutionary Liability’ [2000] Restitution Law Review 465.
[69] Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 35, 64.
[70] Francis Trindade, Peter Cane and Mark Lunney, The Law of Torts in Australia (4th ed, 2007) 129.
[71] Mere entry upon the land without the plaintiff’s permission suffices: see, eg, Schumann v Abbott [1961] SASR 149; Greig v Greig [1966] VicRp 53; [1966] VR 376; Coles‑Smith v Smith [1965] Qd R 494. In this respect, an action in trespass is distinct from an action of ejectment.
[72] See, eg, Waters v Maynard [1924] NSWStRp 66; (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 618, 620–1 (Campbell J).
[73] Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 35, 66. In the context of conversion of goods, for example, Lord Mansfield, in Hambly v Trott [1776] EngR 20; (1776) 1 Cowp 371, 374; [1776] EngR 20; 98 ER 1136, 1137, has suggested: ‘An action of trover is not now an action ex maleficio, though it is so in form; but it is founded in property.’
[74] Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 28, 134.
[75] Kelvin F K Low, ‘Recipient Liability in Equity: Resisting the Siren’s Lure’ [2008] Restitution Law Review 96, 103.
[76] Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 35, 66.
[77] Lionel Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees’ (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 294.
[78] Lionel Smith, ‘Transfers’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (2002) 111.
[79] J E Penner, The Law of Trusts (5th ed, 2006) 113.
[80] Crown, ‘Indefeasibility of Title: Developments in Singapore’, above n 15, 103 (emphasis added).
[81] Ibid 103–4.
[82] See above nn 44–8 and accompanying text.
[83] See Ben McFarlane, ‘Identifying Property Rights: A Reply to Mr Watt’ [2003] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 473, 474–6. Contra Graeme Watt, ‘The Proprietary Effect of a Chattel Lease’ [2003] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 61, 64–71.
[84] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 684–7.
[85] See, eg, ibid 693–5, where Tang argues that liability on the part of the registered proprietor that arises out of fact patterns seen in such cases as Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] UKHL 6; [1994] 1 AC 180, Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge [No 2] [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 AC 773, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447 and Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] HCA 48; (1998) 194 CLR 395 affects the principle of indefeasibility ‘in practice’: at 694 (emphasis added). In such cases, although reference is sometimes made to ‘notice’, such ‘notice’, actual or constructive, is not notice of a prior proprietary interest and hence irrelevant to the principle of indefeasibility. See below nn 114–15 and accompanying text.
[86] [1988] HCA 16; (1988) 164 CLR 604.
[87] Ibid 623–7 (Wilson and Toohey JJ).
[88] Ibid 638–9 (Wilson and Toohey JJ), 654–60 (Brennan J).
[89] Ibid 618–9 (Mason CJ and Dawson J).
[90] For a discussion of whether the constructive trust is an appropriate method of protecting property rights, see generally Susan Bright, ‘The Third Party’s Conscience in Land Law’ [2000] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 398; Ben McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of Property Sub Conditione’ (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 667.
[91] See, eg, Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359.
[92] Cf Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd [2007] NSWSC 676; (2007) 64 ACSR 31, 40–4 (Young CJ in Eq), albeit in the context of a discussion of the fraud exception.
[93] Assets Co Ltd v Mere Roihi [1905] UKLawRpAC 11; [1905] AC 176, 210 (Lord Lindley for Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Lindley and Sir Arthur Wilson).
[94] Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) [1965] HCA 17; (1965) 113 CLR 265, 273–4 (Kitto J); see also at 280 (Taylor J), 287–8 (Menzies J).
[95] See, eg, Elizabeth Toomey, ‘Why Revisit Sutton v O’Kane? The Tricky Trio: Supervening Fraud, the In Personam Claim and Landlocked Land’ [2007] CanterLawRw 10; (2007) 13 Canterbury Law Review 263; Law Commission (NZ), Review of the Land Transfer Act 1952 (Issue Paper No 10, October 2008)
46–7.
[96] See Douglas J Whalan, ‘The Meaning of Fraud under the Torrens System’ (1975) 6 New Zealand Universities Law Review 207; Peter Butt, ‘Notice and Fraud in the Torrens System: A Comparative Analysis’ (1977–78) 13 University of Western Australia Law Review 354; Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Indefeasibility: Logic or Legend?’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens in the Twenty‑First Century (2003) 3.
[97] [1953] 1 Ch 43. See generally Nicholas Hopkins, ‘The Pallant v Morgan “Equity”?’ [2002] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 35.
[98] See, eg, A‑G (HK) v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324.
[99] Adrian J Bradbrook, Susan V MacCallum and Anthony P Moore, Australian Real Property Law (4th ed, 2007) 171.
[100] Lynden Griggs, ‘In Personam, Garcia v NAB and the Torrens System — Are They Reconcilable?’ [2001] QUTLawJJl 6; (2001) 1 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 76; Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 683.
[101] See, eg, Burke v State Bank of New South Wales (1994) 37 NSWLR 53, 74–9 (Santow J).
[102] [1993] UKHL 6; [1994] 1 AC 180.
[103] [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 AC 773.
[104] See Yerkey v Jones [1939] HCA 3; (1939) 63 CLR 649, 683 (Dixon J); cf at 690 (McTiernan J), 666 (Rich J); Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447, 462 (Mason J); Garcia v National Bank of Australia Ltd [1998] HCA 48; (1998) 194 CLR 395, 403–9 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 441 (Callinan J).
[105] The various different doctrines arguably serve the same objective: see Andrew Phang and Hans Tjio, ‘From Mythical Equities to Substantive Doctrines: Yerkey in the Shadow of Notice and Unconscionability’ (1999) 14 Journal of Contract Law 72.
[106] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 679.
[107] Griggs, ‘In Personam, Garcia v NAB and the Torrens System’, above n 100, 87.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 694.
[110] See generally Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399.
[111] John Mee, ‘Undue Influence, Misrepresentation and the Doctrine of Notice’ (1995) 54 Cambridge Law Journal 536, 541–2.
[112] Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge [No 2] [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 AC 773, 802 (Lord Nicholls).
[113] Chambers, ‘Indefeasible Title as a Bar to a Claim for Restitution’, above n 28, 130.
[114] As appears to have been the case in Macquarie Bank [1998] VR 133.
[115] Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge [No 2] [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 AC 773, 802 (emphasis added).
[116] See, eg, Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 696. Tang’s suggestion that the remedy is based on the contract is a somewhat simplified view of matters. At least in respect of transfers of land, the common law recognises the principle of abstraction: see William Swadling, ‘Rescission, Property, and the Common Law’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 123, 139–40, citing Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459, 466 (Lord Cairns LC). It is thus not necessarily true that if the contract may be rescinded for mistake then the transfer would likewise be rescindable. It is more likely than not that the transfer would be affected by the same mistake, such that it will also be rescindable. The distinction is, however, important because there may be no contract at all (a mistaken gift) or the contract may not be afflicted by a mistake but the transfer may be. The principle of abstraction is more controversial in respect of transfers of goods: see Birke Häcker, ‘Rescission of Contract and Revesting of Title: A Reply to Mr Swadling’ [2006] Restitution Law Review 106, 109. See generally Dominic O’Sullivan, Steven Elliott and Rafal Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2008) ch 20.
[117] See, eg, Lynden Griggs, ‘Indefeasibility and Mistake — The Utilitarianism of Torrens’ (2003) 10 Australian Property Law Journal 108.
[118] See, eg, Lukacs v Wood (1978) 19 SASR 520; Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10.
[119] See, eg, Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Fisher [1984] 1 Qd R 606; State Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters Holdings Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 398; Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1999) 9 BPR 17 287.
[120] Lukacs v Wood (1978) 19 SASR 520; Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10. Cf State Bank of New South Wales v Berowra Waters Holdings Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 398.
[121] [1984] 1 Qd R 606, 612 (McPherson J).
[122] Ibid 606–7.
[123] Ibid 606.
[124] Ibid 606–7.
[125] Ibid 610.
[126] Ibid.
[127] See Garofano v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd (1992) 5 BPR 11 941, 11 945 (Meagher JA); Grgic v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 202, 222–3 (Powell JA); Pianta v National Australia Bank Ltd (1994) 17 Fam LR 34, 39 (Handley JA); Macquarie Bank [1998] 3 VR 133, 146–7 (Tadgell JA); Horvath v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] VSCA 51; [1999] 1 VR 643, 650–1 (Tadgell JA).
[128] (1999) 9 BPR 17 287.
[129] Ibid 17 292 (Windeyer J).
[130] Ibid 17 289.
[131] Ibid 17 294.
[132] Ibid 17 295.
[133] Ibid 17 296–8.
[134] Ibid 17 297.
[135] In this respect, the decision of Mijo Developments Pty Ltd v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 199 (Unreported, Hammerschlag J, 9 March 2007) is interesting as Hammerschlag J decided that ‘mere equities’ are caveatable, though not because they are a proprietary interest: at [32]–[34], [43]–[50].
[136] Tanzone Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1999) 9 BPR 17 287, 17 299 (Windeyer J).
[138] Ibid 403 (Needham J).
[139] Ibid 402–3.
[140] Ibid 402.
[141] Ibid 403.
[142] Consider the controversial case of Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 AC 919, which has drawn a host of criticisms: see, eg, Christopher Hare, ‘Identity Mistakes: A Missed Opportunity?’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 993; Karen Scott, ‘Mistaken Identity, Contract Formation and Cutting the Gordian Knot: Shogun Finance v Hudson’ [2004] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 292; Catherine Elliott, ‘No Justice for Innocent Purchasers of Dishonestly Obtained Goods: Shogun Finance v Hudson’ [2004] Journal of Business Law 381; Andrew Phang, Pey‑Woan Lee and Pearlie Koh, ‘Mistaken Identity in the House of Lords’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 24; D W McLauchlan, ‘Parol Evidence and Contract Formation’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 9; D W McLauchlan, ‘Mistake of Identity and Contract Formation’ (2005) 21 Journal of Contract Law 1; Robert Stevens, ‘Objectivity, Mistake and the Parol Evidence Rule’ in Andrew Burrows and Edwin Peel (eds), Contract Terms (2007) 101.
[143] [1874] UKLawRpCh 20; (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251–2 (Lord Selborne LC).
[144] See Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] UKPC 4; [1995] 2 AC 378, 382, 386 (Lord Nicholls for Lords Goff, Ackner, Nicholls, Steyn and Sir John May); Bank of Credit & Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437; Grupo Torras SA v Al‑Sabah [2001] Lloyd’s Rep 36, 62 (Robert Walker, Tuckey LJJ and Sir Murray Stuart‑Smith); Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164, 194 (Lord Millett); Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366, 391 (Lord Millett); Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank Canada (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 411; Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89. The controversy likewise rages outside the courts: see, eg, Peter Birks, ‘Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient’ [1989] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 296; P J Millett, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 71; Lord Nicholls, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in W R Cornish et al (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future — Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (1998) 231; Lionel Smith, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Property, and the Structure of Trusts’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 412; Peter Birks, ‘Receipt’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (2002) 213; Robert Walker, ‘Address: Dishonesty and Unconscionable Conduct in Commercial Life — Some Reflections on Accessory Liability and Knowing Receipt’ [2005] SydLawRw 9; (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 187; Sarah Worthington, Equity (2nd ed, 2006) 179–89; Low, ‘Recipient Liability in Equity’, above n 75.
[146] [1998] 3 VR 133, 156–7, 175 (Tadgell JA); see also at 136 (Winneke P).
[147] [2002] WASCA 291; (2002) 26 WAR 517, 549 (Murray J), 555 (Anderson and Steytler JJ), 568–72 (Pullin J). The Full Court consisted of five justices.
[148] [2002] QCA 232; [2003] 1 Qd R 556, 574 (Atkinson J); see also at 562 (McMurdo P).
[149] [1998] 3 VR 16, 75 (Hansen J).
[150] [2005] NSWCA 309 (Unreported, Mason P, Giles and Tobias JJA, 15 September 2005) [208] (Tobias JA). Mason P and Giles JA were in agreement with Tobias JA.
[151] For the High Court majority’s discussion of Macquarie Bank, see Farah Constructions (2007) 230 CLR 89, 171–2 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
[152] (2007) 230 CLR 89, 167–72 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
[153] Hugh Atkin, ‘“Knowing Receipt” Following Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say‑Dee Pty Ltd’ [2007] SydLawRw 27; (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 713, 720.
[154] (2007) 230 CLR 89, 169 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
[155] [1998] 3 VR 133, 156. The facts of Farah Constructions are further complicated because it was not alleged that the defendants received land as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty, but rather that they received information, which they used in breach of fiduciary duty to acquire land: see Rob Chambers, ‘Knowing Receipt: Frozen in Australia’ (2007) 2 Journal of Equity 40, 46.
[156] Mayer v Coe [1968] 2 NSWR 747, 754 (Street J), cited in Macquarie Bank [1998] 3 VR 133, 157 (Tadgell JA). Cf Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 31; (2007) 230 CLR 438, 451, where Gummow and Hayne JJ opined that ‘the title obtained by registration under the [Real Property] Act was not historical or derivative, but was a title which registration itself created in the proprietor.’
[157] See, eg, Atkin, above n 153, 721.
[158] Macquarie Bank [1998] 3 VR 133, 157.
[159] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 689.
[160] Mayer v Coe [1968] 2 NSWR 747, 754.
[161] Robert R Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title (1859) 9, 34. See also City of Canada Bay Council v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 351; (2007) 71 NSWLR 424, 438 (Mason P, Tobias JA and Young CJ in Eq); Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property Investment Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 6 (Unreported, Giles, Tobias JJA and Young CJ in Eq, 18 February 2008) [130] (Young CJ in Eq).
[162] Although it must be conceded that the same illustration is used by Sir Robert Torrens in his second reading speech introducing the South Australian Real Property Bill 1857: South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 4 June 1857, 203–4 (Sir Robert Torrens, Treasurer).
[163] The same may indeed be said of the comments made in City of Canada Bay Council v F & D
Bonaccorso Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 351; (2007) 71 NSWLR 424, 438 (Mason P, Tobias JA and Young CJ in Eq) and Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v KLALC Property & Investment Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 6 (Unreported, Giles, Tobias JJA and Young CJ in Eq, 18 February 2008) [130] (Young CJ in Eq).
[164] Matthew Harding, ‘Barnes v Addy Claims and the Indefeasibility of Torrens Title’ [2007] MelbULawRw 15; (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 343, 350–1.
[165] Ibid 353–4.
[166] Ibid 355–6.
[167] Tang, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror’, above n 15, 691.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Crown, ‘A Hard Look at Bahr v Nicolay’, above n 15, 207.
[170] Registrar of Titles (WA) v Franzon [1975] HCA 41; (1975) 132 CLR 611.
[171] William Swadling, ‘Property: General Principles’ in Andrew Burrows (ed), English Private Law (2nd ed, 2007) 219, 221.
[172] Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (4th ed, 2005) 1324.
[173] Ibid 1191,1323.
[174] See above nn 110–13 and accompanying text.
[175] See above nn 44–8 and accompanying text.
[176] As proposed by William Swadling, ‘The Vendor–Purchaser Constructive Trust’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (2005) 463. Contra Robert Chambers, ‘The Importance of Specific Performance’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (2005) 431.
[177] See, eg, McGrath v Campbell [2006] NSWCA 180; (2006) 68 NSWLR 229, 245 (Tobias JA).
[178] See, eg, Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 41(1); Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 181; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 67; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 49(1); Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 40(1).
[179] See, eg, Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore) cap 157, s 49 (2004 rev ed).
[180] [2006] HCA 3; (2006) 229 CLR 545, 560 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) (citations omitted).