Nasu, Hitoshi; Faunce, Thomas --- "Nanotechnology and the International Law of Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weapons" [2010] JlLawInfoSci 3; (2010) 20(1) Journal of Law, Information and Science 23

^[*] Hitoshi Nasu: Lecturer, The Australian National University College of Law, Australia.

Thomas Faunce: Associate Professor, The Australian National University College of Law and Medical School, Australia. Australian Research Council Future Fellow.

^[1] See eg, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 247-250, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48 (15 September 2009) (‘UN Gaza Report’); Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza, Human Rights Watch, (March 2009) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0309web.pdf>

Peter Herby, Phosphorus Weapons – The ICRC’s View, International Committee of the Red Cross, 17 January 2009, <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/weapons-interview-170109> . For the legality of white phosphorus in general, see eg, I J MacLeod and A P V Rogers, ‘The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War’ (2007) 10 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 75.

^[3] See, David Hambling, Cancer Worries for New U.S. Bombs, DefenseTech, <http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002434.html> Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME), Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/dime.htm> .

^[4] James Brooks, Warfare of the Future, Today? The DIME Bomb: Yet Another Genotoxic Weapons (12 December 2006) Grass Root Peace, 3, <http://www.grassrootspeace.org/israel_dime_bombs_121206.pdf> .

^[5] Alexandra C Miller, et al, ‘Neoplastic Transformation of Human Osteoblast Cells to the Tumorigenic Phenotype by Heavy Metal Tungsten Alloy Particles: Induction of Genotoxic Effects’ (2001) 22 Carcinogenesis 115.

^[6] Vicki Brower, ‘Is Nanotechnology Ready for Primetime?’ (2006) 98(1) Journal of the National Cancer Institute 9.

^[7] Bradley P Ladewig, et al, ‘Physical and Electrochemical Characterization of Nanocomposite Membranes of Nafion and Functionalized Silicon Oxide’ (2007) 19(9) Chemistry of Materials 2372; Mildred S Dresselhaus, Gene Dresselhaus and Phaedon Avouris (eds), Carbon Nanotubes: Synthesis, Structure, Properties and Applications (2001).

^[8] Robert J Mannix, et al, ‘Nanomagnetic Actuation of Receptor-Mediated Signal Transduction’ (2008) 3 Nature Nanotech 36.

^[9] Kewal K. Jain, The Role of Nanobiotechnology in Drug Discovery, 10(21) Drug Discovery Today 1435-1442 (2007); T Kubik, et al, ‘Nanotechnology on Duty in Medical Applications’ (2005) 6 Current Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 17.

^[10] Tom Faunce, et al, ‘Sunscreen Safety: The Precautionary Principle, The Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration and Nanoparticles in Sunscreens’ (2008) 2(3) NanoEthics 231.

^[11] See eg, Jun Wang and Peter J Dortmans, A Review of Selected Nanotechnology Topics and Their Potential Military Applications (2004), Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Government Department of Defence, 22-30 <http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/publications/2610/DSTO-TN-0537.pdf> .

^[12] Frits Kalshoven, ‘The Conventional Weapons Convention: Underlying Legal Principles’ (1990) 279 International Review of the Red Cross 510, 518.

^[13] See eg, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 13 January 1993, 1974 UNTS 45 (entered into force 29 April 1997) (‘Chemical Weapons Convention’); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975) (‘Biological Weapons Convention’); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970) (‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’). One of the notable exceptions is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 10 April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983) (‘Convention on Conventional Weapons’).

^[14] See generally, Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz, Buying Military Transformation: Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry (2006); Henry C Bartlett, et al, ‘Force Planning, Military Revolutions and the Tyranny of Technology’ (Fall 1996) 24(4) Strategic Review 28.

^[15] Alain de Neve, Military Uses of Nanotechnology and Converging Technologies: Trends and Future Impacts, Royal High Institute for Defence, Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Focus Paper 8,

<www.mil.be/rdc/viewdoc.asp?LAN=nl&FILE=doc&ID=1535>; M C Roco, ‘International Perspective on Government Nanotechnology Funding in 2005’ (2005) 7 Journal of Nanoparticle Research 707; M C Roco, ‘Government Nanotechnology Funding: An International Outlook’ (2002) 54(9) Journal of the Minerals, Metals and Materials Society 22.

^[16] The National Nanotechnology Initiative, Supplement to the President’s 2010 Budget (2009), 8 <http://www.nano.gov/NNI_2010_budget_supplement.pdf> .

^[17] Jürgen Altmann, Military Nanotechnology (2006) 64.

^[18] Nanoforum, Military Uses of Nanotechnology and Military-Based Projects in the USA, UK, Sweden, and European Union, (21 July 2006) AZoNanotechnology, <http://www.azonano.com/details.asp?Article ID=1659> .

^[19] Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2008-2009 (2009) 103 <http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html> .

^[20] See Defence Research and Development Organisation website <http://www.drdo.gov.in/centerofexcellence.html> .

^[21] ‘Russia to Invest over US$1 Billion in Nanotechnology in Next Three Years’, International Herald Tribune (online), 8 April 2007, <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/08/technology/EU-TEC-Russia-Nanotechnology.php> .

^[22] Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies: Enhancing Soldier Survivability, <http://web.mit.edu/ISN/> .

^[23] Corporate Watch, The UK Nanotech Industry, (30 September 2009) <http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?lid=2066> .

^[24] BAE Systems, BAE Systems to Develop Nano-Sensor Technology in Agreement with Micromem Applied Sensor Technologies, (30 June 2008) <http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_10853014158.html> .

^[25] Nanotechwire, Industrial Nanotech Begins Work with US Army, (2 February 2009) <http://www.nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=7437> .

^[26] Raytheon, Raytheon Awarded Phase Two Contract for Nano-Composite Optical Ceramics Project, (29 October 2009) <http://investor.raytheon.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=84193 & p=irol-newsArticle & ID=1348339 & highlight=> Nanotechwire, Raytheon Awarded Contract for Nano Thermal Interface Material Development, (25 June 2009) <http://www.nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=8120> .

^[27] US Patent 7520224, 21 April 2009.

^[28] Thomas A Faunce, ‘Toxicological and Public Good Considerations for the Regulation of Nanomaterial-Containing Medical Products’ (2008) 7(2) Expert Opinion in Drug Safety 103.

^[29] Thomas A Faunce, John White and Klaus I Matthaei, ‘Integrated Research into the Nanoparticle-Protein Corona: A New Focus for Safe, Sustainable and Equitable Development of Nanomedicines’ (2008) 3(6) Nanomedicine 859.

^[30] See eg, Australian Government, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia (2004), 33, 90 <http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/transnational_terrorism.pdf> United Kingdom, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (2009), 126-131

<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf?view=Binary> .

^[31] Bruce Alberts, ‘Modeling Attacks on the Food Supply’ (2005) 102 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 9737.

^[32] Lawrence M Wein and Yifan Liu, ‘Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk’ (2005) 102 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 9984.

^[33] Jennifer B Nuzzo, ‘The Biological Threat to US Water Supplies: Toward a National Water Security Policy’ (2006) 4(2) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 147.

^[34] Ronald J Jackson, et al, ‘Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox’ (2001) 75 Journal of Virology 1205.

^[35] Jeffery K Taubenberger, et al, ‘Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes’ (2005) 437 Nature 889; Terrence M Tumpey, et al, ‘Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus’ (2005) 310 Science 77.

^[36] Daniel S Hamilton and Bradley T Smith, ‘Atlantic Storm’ (2006) 7(1) European Molecular Biology Organization Reports 4.

^[37] Report of the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Doc BWC/MSP/2005/3 (14 December 2005), paras 18–24, <http://www.opbw.org/new_process/msp2005/BWC_MSP_2005_3_E.pdf> .

^[38] Altmann, above n 17, 84–103; Jürgen Altmann, ‘Military Use of Nanotechnology: Perspectives and Concerns’ (2004) 35 Security Dialogue 61, 66-70; Wang and Dortmans, above n 11, 22–30.

^[39] Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra and Francisco Aguayo Ayala, ‘Nanotechnology and the International Regime on Chemical and Biological Weapons’ (2005) 2(1) Nanotechnology Law and Business 55, 58–59.

^[40] Altmann, above n 17, 100–101; Altmann, above n 38, 68.

^[41] Pardo-Guerra and Ayala, above n 39, 59.

^[42] Daniel Moore, ‘Be All You Can Be: The Nano-Enhanced Army’ (2009) (15) Nano Magazine <http://www.nanoethics.org/nanomagazine_1209.pdf> .

^[43] Sean Howard, ‘Nanotechnology and Mass Destruction: The Need for an Inner Space Treaty’ (2002) 65 Disarmament Diplomacy <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd65/65op1.htm> .

^[44] Altmann, above n 17, 154–176; Altmann, above n 38, 70–73.

^[45] In recent years, however, civil society has increased its influence on the development of arms control treaties. Cf Kenneth Anderson, ‘The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society’ (2000) 11(1) European Journal of International Law 91.

^[46] St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight (29 November/11 December 1868) 138 CTS 297–299, reprinted in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War (3rd ed, 2000) 54–55 (‘St Petersburg Declaration’). The limit of 400 grams was more or less arbitrary, reflecting the dividing line, discernible at that time, between explosive artillery and rifle munitions, the latter not being generally rendered indispensable in enhancing military utility. Frits Kalshoven, ‘Arms, Armaments and International Law’ (1985-II) 191 Recueil des Cours 185, 207–208. Later on, light explosive or incendiary projectiles below 400 grams were developed and have been widely accepted unless they are used against human beings. See Kalshoven, ibid, 223.

^[47] Hague Declaration (III) Concerning Expanding Bullets (29 July 1899) 187 CTS 459–461 para 1, reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, above n 46, 64–65.

^[48] Hague Declaration (II) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases (29 July 1899) 187 CTS 453–455, reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, ibid, 60–61; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 8 February [1929] LNTSer 234; 1928, 94 LNTS 65.

^[49] Biological Weapons Convention, opened for signature 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975).

^[50] Chemical Weapons Convention, opened for signature 13 January 1993, 1974 UNTS 45 (entered into force 29 April 1997).

^[51] Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 13 October 1995, 35 ILM 1218 (entered into force 30 July 1998), reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, above n 46, 525 (‘Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons’).

^[52] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 3 December 1997, 2056 UNTS 211 (entered into force 1 March 1999).

^[53] Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature 30 May 2008 (entered into force 1 August 2010).

^[54] Geoffrey Duxbury, et al, ‘Quantum Cascade Semiconductor Infrared and Far-Infrared Lasers: From Trace Gas Sensing to Non-Linear Optics’ (2005) 34(11) Chemical Society Reviews 921.

^[55] Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, opened for signature 13 October 1995, 35 ILM 1218 (entered into force 30 July 1998).

^[56] Joyce S Tsuji, et al, ‘Research Strategies for Safety Evaluation of Nanomaterials, Part IV: Risk Assessment of Nanoparticles’ (2006) 89(1) Toxicological Sciences 42.

^[57] Peixuan Guo, ‘RNA Nanotechnology: Engineering, Assembly and Applications in Detection, Gene Delivery and Therapy’ (2005) 5(12) Journal of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology 1964.

^[58] See notes 2–4 above and accompanying text.

^[59] Greg Jaffe, ‘Air Force Seeks a Bomb with Less Bang’ Wall Street Journal/Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (online), 4 November 2006, <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06096/679996-84.stm> .

^[60] Protocol (I) on Non-Detectable Fragments to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 2 1983) (‘1980 Protocol (I)’).

^[61] For an analysis of the scope of the prohibition, see William H Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (2009) 196–198.

^[62] W J Fenrick, ‘The Conventional Weapons Convention: A Modest But Useful Treaty’ (1990) 279 International Review of the Red Cross 498, 503; Howard S Levie, ‘Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons’ (1994) 68 St John’s Law Review 643, 654.

^[63] Boothby observes that the Protocol can catch types of weapons which were not in the contemplation of the drafters because the prohibited weapons are defined by reference to the effects that they may have. See Boothby, above n 61, 198.

^[64] See, eg, Whitaker, above n 2.

^[65] See, ICRC, International Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm & id=505 & ps=P> . There are 107 state parties to the 1980 Protocol I as of July 13, 2009.

^[66] See the references in note 2 above.

^[67] Compare, eg, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (vol 1, 2005) 275–277; with David Turns, ‘Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 226, 226–227; Boothby, above n 61, 198–199.

^[68] Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium’ in Michael N Schmitt and Leslie C Green (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the New Millennium (US Naval War College Studies, vol 71, 1999) 185, 192.

^[69] Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, 205 CTS 277–298, art 22 (entered into force 26 January 1910), reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, above n 46, 73–82 (‘1907 Hague Regulations’); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art 35(1) (entered into force 7 December 1978) (‘Additional Protocol I’). Judge Weeramantry elaborated on the multicultural traditions underpinning limitations to the conduct of warfare in his dissenting opinion in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case. See, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (hereinafter ‘Legality of Nuclear Weapons Opinion’) 478–482.

^[70] This terminology appears in the ICJ judgment in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ 4, 22.

^[71] Hague Convention (II) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 29 July 1899, art 23(e) (entered into force 4 September 1900); 1907 Hague Regulations, art 23(e). Although the authentic French text remained the same (maux superflus), the identical phrase in the two instruments was translated differently. See, English translation of the treaty texts provided in James Brown Scott (ed), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (1915) 116. Article 35(2) of the Additional Protocol I placed those two expressions side by side.

^[72] Additional Protocol I, art 51(4).

^[73] The prohibition on indiscriminate attacks regulates the way in which a particular conventional weapon is employed, but does not necessarily render any use of the weapon illegal.

^[74] It reads, ‘the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; … would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity’.

^[75] Kalshoven, above n 12, 511.

^[76] See references in above n 71.

^[77] See, eg, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 67, 237–244.

^[78] See, Legality of Nuclear Weapons Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 257 para 78.

^[79] See, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, arts 8(2)(b)(xix) and (xx), (entered into force 1 July 2002).

^[80] Roger S Clark, ‘Methods of Warfare that Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Are Inherently Indiscriminate: A Memorial Tribute to Howard Berman’ (1998) 28 California Western International Law Journal 379, 385.

^[81] See, Guido den Dekker, ‘The Law of Arms Control and Depleted Uranium Weapons’ in Avril McDonald, Jann K Kleffner and Brigit Toebes (eds), Depleted Uranium Weapons and International Law (2008) 75, 81; Detlev F Vagts, ‘The Hague Conventions and Arms Control’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 31, 36.

^[82] Preamble to the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration and Additional Protocol I, art 1(2). Article 1(2) reads: ‘In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience’.

^[83] See, eg, Christopher Greenwood, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in D Fleck (ed), Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2nd ed, 2008) 101; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 187; Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 78; Cf Legality of Nuclear Weapons Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 408 (Judge Shahabuddeen dissenting opinion).

^[84] Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987) 402, para 1415.

^[85] Legality of Nuclear Weapons Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 266, para 105.

^[86] Depleted uranium is a waste product of the uranium enrichment process in which radioactive isotopes U-234 and U-235 are removed. DU is almost entirely U-238 and is 40-60% radioactive as natural uranium. It is chemically toxic like lead, nickel and other heavy metals. For more detailed description of depleted uranium, see, Dan Fahey, ‘Depleted Uranium and its Use in Weapons’ in Avril McDonald, Jann K Kleffner and Brigit Toebes (eds), Depleted Uranium Weapons and International Law (2008) 3, 4; D E McClaim, A C Miller and J F Kalinich, Status of Health Concerns about Military Use of Depleted Uranium and Surrogate Metals in Armor-Penetrating Munitions (2005) 2–8, <http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/pdf/mcclain_NATO_2005.pdf> United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, (May 2003) 15, available at <http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/BiH_DU_report.pdf> Michael H Repacholi, Background Material on Depleted Uranium (DU) (8 January 2001) <http://www.nato.int/du/docu/d010108e.htm> .

^[87] See, eg, Melissa A McDiarmid, et al, ‘Health Effects of Depleted Uranium on Exposed Gulf War Veterans: A 10-Year Follow-Up’ (2004) 67(4) Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health 277.

^[88] See generally, Antonietta Gatti and Stefano Montanari, Nanopathology: The Health Impact of Nanoparticles (2007) 54–55; Dan Fahey, ‘Environmental and Health Consequences of the Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons’ in Avril McDonald, Jann K Kleffner and Brigit Toebes (eds), Depleted Uranium Weapons and International Law: A Precautionary Approach (2008) 29; The Royal Society Working Group on the Health Hazards of Depleted Uranium Munitions, ‘The Health Effect of Depleted Uranium Munitions: A Summary’ (2002) 22(2) Journal of Radiological Protection 131, 132-134 (2002).

^[89] For example, some scientists assert combined health effects of chemical toxicity and irradiation causing damage to DNA. See, Duncan Graham-Rowe, ‘Depleted Uranium Casts Shadow over Peace in Iraq’ (19 April 2003) 178(2391) New Scientist 4.

^[90] See, Jason A Beckett, ‘Interim Legality: A Mistaken Assumption? – An Analysis of Depleted Uranium Munitions under Contemporary International Humanitarian Law’ (2004) 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 43; Owen Thomas Gibbons, ‘Uses and Effects of Depleted Uranium Munitions: Towards a Moratorium on Use’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 191, 206–224; Michael Byers, War Law (2005) 124.

^[91] See above n 71.

^[92] This was the view generally held by states during the UN Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979-1980. See, eg, W Hays Parks, ‘Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews’ (2005) 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 55, 76–82; Fenrick, above n 62, 500.

^[93] See, eg, James D Fry, ‘Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 453, 470–471.

^[94] See, Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1982) 196–197. Cf Avril McDonald, ‘Averting Foreseeable and Unexpected Damage: The Case for a Precautionary Approach vis-á-vis Depleted Uranium Weapons’ in Avril McDonald, Jann K Kleffner and Brigit Toebes (eds), Depleted Uranium Weapons and International Law (2008) 281, 285–287.

^[95] Marten Zwanenburg, ‘The Use of Depleted Uranium and the Prohibition of Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering’ in Avril McDonald, Jann K Kleffner and Brigit Toebes (eds), Depleted Uranium Weapons and International Law (2008) 111, 117, 120.

^[96] Government experts attending at the Conference on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in Lucerne in 1974 were in general agreement on this point. See, International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (Lucerne, 24 September 1974) 8–9, paras 23–24; Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman, above n 84, 408, para 1428.

^[97] Greenwood, above n 68, 195–199; Kalshoven, above n 46, 234–235.

^[98] See, Zwanenburg, above n 95, 119–120.

^[99] See, Henri Meyrowitz, ‘The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering: From the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol I of 1977’ (1994) 299 International Review of the Red Cross 98, 106–109.

^[100] The legality of fragmentation weapons in light of the general principles was in fact a point of disagreement in the 1974 Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in Lucerne. See, Kalshoven, above n 46, 239.

^[101] Eric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés (2nd ed, 1999) 280–281. See also, Jack H McCall, Jr, ‘Blinded by the Light: International Law and the Legality of Anti-Optic Laser Weapons’ (1997) 30 Cornell International Law Journal 1, 25–26.

^[102] See, eg, Rosario Domínguez-Matés, ‘New Weaponry Technologies and International Humanitarian Law: Their Consequences on the Human Being and the Environment’ in Pablo Antonio Fernández-Sánchez (ed), The New Challenges of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (2005) 91, 115.

^[103] See, Remarks by General Sir John Ardagh, in James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1899 Part II, (1920) 276–278; Frits Kalshoven, ‘The Soldier and His Golf Clubs’ in Christophe Swinarski (ed), Etudes et essays sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge, en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (1984) 369, 374–376.

^[104] This term is an acronym of ‘Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering’.

^[105] See, Robin M Coupland, ‘The SIrUS Project: Towards a Determination of Which Weapons Cause “Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering”’ in Helen Durham and Timothy L H McCormack (eds), The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law (1999) 99; Robin M Coupland and Peter Herby, ‘Review of the Legality of Weapons: A New Approach, the SIrUS Project’ (1999) 835 International Review of the Red Cross 583; Robin M Coupland, ‘Abhorrent Weapons and “Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering”: From Field Surgery to Law’ (1997) 315 British Medical Journal 1450. The project was not well received by states. See, ‘ICRC Expert Meeting on the Legal Reviews of Weapons and the SIrUS Project’ (2001) 842 International Review of the Red Cross 539, 541.

^[106] For a comprehensive critique, see, eg, Donna Marie Verchio, ‘Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned, But Unnecessary and Superfluous’ (2001) 51 Air Force Law Review 183.

^[107] Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above n 94, 196.

^[108] For a similar view in the context of fragmentation of bullets, see, Robin Coupland, ‘Clinical and Legal Significance of Fragmentation of Bullets in relation to Size of Wounds: Retrospective Analysis’ (1999) 319 British Medical Journal 403.

^[109] See, Meyrowitz, above n 99, 111–112.

^[110] Compare McDonald, above n 94, 299–305; with Beckett, above n 90, 82–83.

^[111] See, Fahey, above n 86, 6–7.

^[112] See generally, eg, Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (2002); Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (2002) ch 3; James Cameron, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Core Meaning, Constitutional Framework and Procedures for Implementation’ in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher (eds), Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (1999) 29; Harald Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law (1994).

^[113] Fahey, above n 86, 6–7.

^[114] For details, see, Fahey, above n 86, 12–23.

^[115] Asaf Durakovic, ‘The Quantitative Analysis of Uranium Isotopes in the Urine of the Civilian Population of Eastern Afghanistan after Operation Enduring Freedom’ (2005) 170(4) Military Medicine 277.

^[116] Robert Fisk, ‘Mystery of Israel’s Secret Uranium Bomb’, The Independent (online), 28 October 2006, <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisk/article1935945.ece> .

^[117] See, International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons, (21 April 2010) <http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/i/71.html> Lesley Wexler, ‘Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty’ (2006) 39 University California Davis Law Review 459, 493–495.

^[118] European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2008 on (Depleted) Uranium Weapons and Their Effect on Human Health and the Environment – Towards a Global Ban on the Use of Such Weapons, (22 May 2008) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0233+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> . Civil society has been calling for adopting a treaty to ban DU weapons for some years. See, M Mohr and A Samuel, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer and Use of Uranium Weapons and on Their Destruction (27 September 2006) International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons, <http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/docs/101.pdf> .

^[119] See, Fahey, above n 86, 11–12; Gibbons, above n 90, 214–215.

^[120] See, eg, Miller, et al, above n 5; McClaim, Miller and Kalinich, above n 86, 8–14; Alexandra C Miller, et al, ‘Effect of the Military-Relevant Heavy Metals, Depleted Uranium and Heavy-Metal Tungsten Alloy on Gene Expression in Human Liver Carcinoma Cells (HepG2)’ (2004) 255 Molecular and Cellular Biochemistry 247; Nikolay Strigul, et al, ‘Effects of Tungsten on Environmental Systems’ (2005) 61(2) Chemosphere 248.

^[121] Alexandra C Miller, et al, Preconceptional Paternal Exposure to Radiation or Heavy Metals Like Cadmium Can Induce Cancer in Unexposed Offspring, (2006), Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Cancer Research, 47 <http://www.aacrmeetingabstracts.org/cgi/content/abstract/2006/1/448-b> .

^[122] Antonio Cassese, ‘Weapons Causing Unnecessary Suffering: Are They Prohibited?’ in Antonio Cassese, The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers (2008) 192, 214.

^[123] See, Greenwood, above n 68, 220.

^[124] See above Part 3.2.

^[125] Timothy L H McCormack, ‘A Non Liquet on Nuclear Weapons – The ICJ Avoids the Application of General Principles of International Humanitarian Law’ (1997) 316 International Review of the Red Cross 76, 90.

^[126] Additional Protocol I, art 36. It reads: ‘In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or methods of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party’.

^[127] See generally, Fry, above n 93, 466–480; Marie Jacobsson, ‘Modern Weaponry and Warfare: The Application of Article 36 of Additional Protocol I by Governments’ in Anthony M Helm (ed), The Law of War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of Force (2006) 183, 185–189 (in relation to the Swedish practice); Parks, above n 92, 105–135; Justin McClelland, ‘The Review of Weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I’ (2003) 850 International Review of the Red Cross 397; Isabelle Daoust, et al, ‘New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare’ (2002) 846 International Review of the Red Cross 345.

^[128] See, Raymond G Decker and Mary Cynthia Dunlap, ‘War, Genetics and the Law’ (1971) 1 Ecology Law Quarterly 795, 817–818.

^[129] In truth, technological advancement has often led to the exponential growth in the sheer destructiveness of war. See, Charles J Dunlap, Jr, ‘Technology: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Nation’s Defenders’ (1999) 29(3) Parameters 24, 24–25.

^[130] Fry, above n 93, 469.

^[131] Charter of the United Nations, art 51 (‘UN Charter’).

^[132] See, eg, S Plous, ‘The Nuclear Arms Race: Prisoner’s Dilemma or Perceptual Dilemma?’ (1993) 30(2) Journal of Peace Research 163; Brian Betz, ‘Response to Strategy and Communication in an Arms Race-Disarmament Dilemma’ (1991) 35(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 678.

^[133] See generally, Michael N Schmitt, ‘Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 62(1) Air Force Law Review 1; Toni Pfanner, ‘Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action’ (2005) 857 International Review of the Red Cross 149.

^[134] The examples include the treatment of Iraqi detainees by US troops and NATO’s aerial bombing in Kosovo. The other side of the argument is that advanced militaries are to be held to a higher standard as a matter of law because they have greater ability to exercise feasible precautions in attack. See, eg, Stuart Walters Belt, ‘Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas’ (2000) 47 Naval Law Review 115.

^[135] Schmitt, above n 133, 14–38; Dunlap, above n 129, 27–30.

^[136] Michael N Schmitt, ‘War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict’ in Anthony M Helm (ed), The Law of War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of Force, (US Naval War College International Law Studies vol 82, 2006) 137, 151–154.

^[137] Decker and Dunlap, above n 128, 825–826.

^[138] See, Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (1997) 6–25; Gunther Teubner, ‘Autopoiesis in Law and Society’ (1984) 18 Law and Society Review 291.

^[139] See generally, John Braithwaite, ‘The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology’ (2000) 40 British Journal of Criminology 222, 223–227; Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Western Europe’ (1994) 17 West European Politics 77.

^[140] See, Laurent R Hourcle, ‘Environmental Law of War’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 653, 689–690.

^[141] See, eg, Andy Rich, ‘The Environment: Adequacy of Protection in Times of War’ (2004) 12 Pennsylvania State Environmental Law Review 445, 456; Rymn James Parsons, ‘The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, “Greenkeeping”, and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection during Armed Conflict’ (1998) 10 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 441, 488–489.

^[142] Zwanenburg, above n 95, 119.

^[143] See, Paul C Szasz, ‘The Existing Legal Framework, Protecting the Environment During International Armed Conflict’ in Richard Grunawalt, et al (eds), Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict (US Naval War College International Law Studies vol 69, 1996) 278, 282.

^[144] See, eg, Malgosia A Fitzmaurice, ‘International Protection of the Environment’ (2001) 293 Recueil des Cours 9, 265–266.

^[145] For details, see, Wexler, above n 117, 496–504.

^[146] See, Meyrowitz, above n 99, 118.

^[147] See generally, Robert Baldwin, ‘Regulation: After “Command and Control”’ in Keith Hawkins (ed), The Human Face of Law (1997) 65–84.

^[148] See generally, Guido den Dekker, The Law of Armed Control: International Supervision and Enforcement (2001); Charles F Parker, Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Evaluation of International Security Regime Significance (2001).

^[149] For a detailed analysis, see, den Dekker, above n 148, 167, 181–182, 206, 210.

^[150] Indeed, the proposal to establish a permanent international weaponry review committee was voted down in the Diplomatic Conference preceding the adoption of Additional Protocol I. See, Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman, above n 84, 421, paras 1463–1465.

^[151] See, eg, Simon Dalby, Security and Environmental Change (2009); David P Fidler, ‘From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New International Health Regulations’ (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 325.

^[152] See, David P Fidler, ‘Governing Catastrophes: Security, Health and Humanitarian Assistance’ (2007) 866 International Review of the Red Cross 247, 253–254 (in relation to threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons).

^[153] Erwin Dahinden, ‘The Future of Arms Control Law: Towards a New Regulatory Approach and New Regulatory Techniques’ (2005) 10 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 263, 268.

^[154] This is one of the reasons why a verification regime is difficult to achieve for the Biological Weapons Convention. See, Jack M Beard, ‘The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 271, 309–313; Kristen Paris, ‘The Expansion of the Biological Weapons Convention: The History and Problems of a Verification Regime’ (2002) 24 Houston Journal of International Law 509, 541–542.

^[155] Guido den Dekker, ‘The Effectiveness of International Supervision in Arms Control Law’ (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 315, 328.

^[156] Decker and Dunlap, above n 128, 818.

^[157] See, Timur Kuran and Cass R Sunstein, ‘Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation’ 51 Stanford Law Review 683, 685–688.

^[158] See, Wexler, above n 117, 504–515.

^[159] Ibid, 515–517.

^[160] See, Kathleen Lawand, ‘Reviewing the Legality of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare’ (2006) 864 International Review of the Red Cross 925; ICRC, ‘A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977’ (2006) 864 International Review of the Red Cross 931.

^[161] See, den Dekker, above n 155, 320.

^[162] Fry, above n 93, 490; Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando, ‘Neurobiology: A Case Study of the Imminent Militarization of Biology’ (2005) 859 International Review of the Red Cross 553, 567–568.

^[163] For a more detailed account of the rationale of transnational institutions, see, Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization’ (1999) 98 Michigan Law Review 168, 202–211.

^[164] See, Robin Coupland and Kobi-Renée Leins, ‘Science and Prohibited Weapons’ (2005) 308(5730) Science 1841.

^[165] See, Dahinden, above n 153, 275–276.

^[166] See, Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser and Edward Parson, ‘Seeking Truth for Power: Information Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 277, 305–314.

^[167] Cf Wheelis and Dando, above n 162, 567.

^[168] The full text of the Declaration is available online at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180E.pdf> . See also, Thomas Alured Faunce and Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Normative Foundations of Technology Transfer and Transnational Benefit Principles in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights’ (2009) 34 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 296.