[1] P McBride, ‘Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Domestic Surveillance Operations’ (2009) Journal of Air Law and Commerce 74, 629.

^[2] Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary describes a drone as ‘a pilotless aircraft or missile directed by remote control.’

^[3] However, experts disagree as to when something actually can be described as a robot and when it is merely a machine. There is also disagreement as to the form and functions which such an entity may take on, for instance whether it can be completely software based or not: see Robin Murphy, Introduction to AI Robotics (2000) 3, 15–16.

^[4] John Keller, The time has come for military ground robots (2010) 20(6) Military & Aerospace Electronics <http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/article-display/363893/articles/military-aerospace-electronics/volume-20/issue-6/features/special-report/the-time-has-come-for-military-ground-robots.html> (accessed 10 March 2010).

^[5] The ancient Greek engineer Archytas is said to have invented the first UAV, a mechanical pigeon, in the 4^th Century BC. It was recorded as having flown some 200 meters. Kimon P Valavanis, Advances in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: State of the Art and the Road to Autonomy (2007).

^[6] Hence, the vast majority of early R&D in unmanned vehicles was directed towards gathering surveillance from, or delivering payloads to, high-risk territory. The Greeks and Chinese, for instance, set unmanned ships on fire and steered them into their enemies’ fleets to cause panic and destruction or break their formation. Chinese generals also made use of kites for military reconnaissance. In 200 BC, the Chinese General Han Hsin of the Han Dynasty was said to have flown a kite over the walls of a city he was attacking to measure how far his army would have to tunnel to reach past the defences. See Michael John Haddrick Taylor and David Mondey, Milestones of Flight (1983); Kenneth S Smith Jr, The Intelligence Link – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Battlefield Commander (1990) GlobalSecurity.org Reports, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/1990/index.html> (accessed 2 March 2010).

^[7] Including unmanned surveillance balloons that dropped explosives on enemies (patented in 1863), remotely controlled torpedoes (1866) and aerial kites equipped with cameras remotely controlled by a long string to take surveillance photos of enemy positions and fortifications (1898).

^[8] See Office of the Secretary of Defense (US) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005 – 2030, (2005) k-1, (‘US OSD Roadmap’).

^[9] During the 1980s the Israeli air force had successfully used UAVs to detect, and draw fire from, Syrian anti-aircraft batteries, allowing manned jets to then remove the threat. Following this success, Israel expanded its drone program, placing extensive resources into the novel technology and how it could be integrated into combat systems and strategy. By the turn of the century Israel was using a range of UVs to provide Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data from, or adjacent to dangerous enemy territory that could be provided via up-to-the-minute feeds to commanders, air support, battle units and strike teams. See Adam Stulberg, ‘Managing the Unmanned Revolution in the U.S. Air Force’ (2007) 51(2) Orbis 253.

^[10] Although the German V-1 bombs that terrorised London during the late part of WWII are often cited as the first successful UAV attack, we would not consider them either true UAVs in the modern sense, nor truly ‘successful’. Whilst the technology behind V1s was, at the time, groundbreaking, it was not capable of providing a significant advantage over traditional, manned vehicles. In part this was because the systems were too costly to operate both in terms of real costs but also in terms of payload efficiency: only about one quarter of V1s were to hit their targets, with the remainder failing. V-1s are simply single use, single target ‘terror weapons’ which ‘lacked precision guidance’. The guidance problems that plagued V-1s would also be a problem for postwar UAVs. These problems included; a … short duration aloft and communications limitations, which required a line-of-sight to the UV or at the least close proximity to it. Whilst this was acceptable in non-conflict arenas, for instance where the drones were used as test targets, the limitation undermined one of the main advantages of UV technology; that is, removing humans from the area of risk. See Bill Yenne, Attack Of The Drones: A History Of Unmanned Aerial Combat (2004) 19; see also, Daren Sorenson, Preparing for the Long War: Transformation of UAVs in Force Structure Planning for Joint Close Air Support Operations (2006) Joint Forces Staff College (US) 14–15, <http://en.scientificcommons.org/35201347> (accessed 12 March 2010).

^[11] As Goebel states: ‘The whole idea of reconnaissance drones seemed to be completely dead, but at the last moment the USAF rescued the program. One of the interesting themes in defence programs is how new military systems are often initially proposed in grand terms, with whizzy features and the latest technology. When the grand plan proves too complicated and expensive, the military then backtracks, finally ending up with a much more modest solution, often a minimal modification of an existing system. Interestingly, such compromise solutions often prove far more effective than expected.’ See Greg Goebel, Unmanned Arerial Vehicles (2010) Worldscapes, v1.6.0, ch 4 <http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav.html> (accessed 01 March 2010).

^[12] In particular limitations on computing processing power and communications meant that UVs were not suited to combat roles where complex decision-making and quick reactions were required. For this reason UGV development was also slower than UAV given the need for high order collision avoidance that was beyond the processing power of early computing processors. See generally, D W Gage, ‘UGV History 101: A Brief History of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) Development Efforts’ (1995) 13(3) Unmanned Systems Magazine.

^[13] Where they were not required to undertake complex navigation to avoid obstacles or hazards, and therefore did not require a large amount of command and control and therefore were less susceptible to jamming or spoofing. See Goebel, above n 11.

^[14] Although Newcome postulates that part of the reason that information about drone use in conflicts like the Vietnam War was suppressed was a fear that it would affect the livelihoods of human fighter pilots by creating a push towards the roboticisation of the air force. See Laurence Newcome, Unmanned Aviation: A brief history of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) (2004) 67–69.

^[15] UVs featured in conflicts such as the Vietnam war (see US OSD Roadmap, above n 8, p k-1) although it is clear that they did undertake important surveillance and decoy missions. See Newcome, ibid, 69.

^[16] G N Roberts, ‘Trends in Marine Control Systems’ (2008) 32 Annual Reviews in Control 263.

^[17] Indeed UUVs — albeit tethered versions — gained a great deal of public attention during the 1990s with the discovery and exploration of undersea wrecks like the Titanic, the Lusitania, and the Bismarck, which could only have been made possible through robotic UV systems. In fact, the first ‘golden age’ in UV technology occurred under the oceans more than a decade before it did in the air. See Andrew Henderson, ‘Murky Waters: The Legal Status of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles’ (2006) 53 Naval Law Review 55, 57.

^[18] Roberts, above n 16, 266.

^[19] With commercial use starting in the 1970s. See Mark Peterson, ‘The UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory Construct for Integration into the National Airspace System’ (2006) 71 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 521, 546.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Satellite technology seems to have played a large part in drone development. Before reliable satellite imagery could be obtained, drones were attractive as low risk alternatives to manned fly-overs of risky territory. However, as satellite imagery became more reliable and of better resolution it was favoured over drones as a much less provocative way of collecting intelligence data. See Goebel, above n 11, ch 5. Other factors which contributed include: Central Processing Units aboard UVs were much more powerful and could effectively manage a wider range of functions that were previously required human oversight; Roboticisation and miniaturisation meant that previously manual controls could be handed over to the central processing unit; Digitisation and miniaturisation made for lighter, more efficient vehicles, which could be deployed for longer periods and over longer distances. The efficiency gains permitted a wider range of onboard sensors to be installed. Improvements in sensor technology allowed a much wider spectrum of visual and non-visual data to be collected at a higher resolution than before. Digital compression overcame previously detrimental information ‘bottlenecks’ and permitted much more of this data to be transmitted to the controller. For information on the ‘digital revolution’ see generally, Stephen Hoare, Digital Revolution (20th Century Inventions) (1998).

^[23] See Peter Van Blyenburg and Philip Butterworth-Hayes, ‘UVS International Status Report on US UAV Programmes’ in 2005 Year Book: UAVs Global Perspective (2005) 112.

^[24] Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation (2002) 26.

^[25] Quoted in ibid.

^[26] R Ackerman, ‘Persistent Surveillance Comes into View’ (2002) Signal Magazine, 18.

^[27] See, Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (2004) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA428628> (accessed 5 April 2010); Frank Hoffman, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs’ (2006) 3(50) Orbis 395, 395–407; Mark Clodfelter ‘Airpower versus Asymmetric Enemies – A Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness’ (2002) 16(3) Air and Space Power Journal 37; Montgomery C Meigs, ‘Unorthodox thoughts about asymmetric warfare’ (2003) 33(2) Parameters, 5–6.

^[28] See Randal Bowdish, Theater-Level Integrated Sensor-to-Shooter Capability and its Operational Implications (1995) US Joint Military Operations Report <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA293332> (accessed 5 April 2010).

^[29] This as especially true in war zones where insurgency forces had accessibility to and expertise in using small surface-to-air missiles. See Cordesman, above n 24, 30.

^[30] US OSD Roadmap, above n 8, 2. See also, Gregory J Nardi, Autonomy, Unmanned Ground Vehicles, and the U.S. Army: Preparing for the Future by Examining the Past (2009) School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 10, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA506181> (accessed 4 April 2010).

^[31] Despite almost constantly being engaged in one war or another, there is a perception among many western military powers that, since the Vietnam conflict, the public has a low tolerance for domestic troop casualties arising out of foreign conflicts. See Charles Levinson, ‘Israeli Robots Remake Battlefield; Nation Forges Ahead in Deploying Unmanned Military Vehicles by Air, Sea and Land’ Wall Street Journal (New York, NY) 13 January 2010, A10. Although whether this is actually the case has been questioned. See Christopher Gelpi, Peter D Feaver and Jason Riefler, ‘Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq’ (2006) 3(30) International Security 7.

^[32] Sarah Kreps, ‘Debating American Grand Strategy After Major War: American Grand Strategy after Iraq’ (2009) 4(53) Orbis 629.

^[33] Ali A Jalali, ‘Winning in Afghanistan’ (2009) 39(1) Parameters 5.

^[34] See Nardi, above n 30, 10.

^[35] The Predator was developed for the CIA by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and is based on earlier Israeli UAV systems. See Bill Yenne, Attack Of The Drones: A History Of Unmanned Aerial Combat (2004) 56-57. For information on the Predator UAV see US OSD Roadmap, above n 8, 4. See also Bill Gunston, ‘Unmanned Aircraft – Defence Applications of the RPV’ (1973) 4(188) Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies Journal 41.

^[36] It is for this reason that predator and similar drone systems are often referred to as Unmanned Aerial Systems or (UAS). See R J Newman, ‘The Little Predator That Could’ (2002) 3(85) Air Force Magazine 48.

^[37] This is because, not only is the pilot no longer on board, there is no longer the need for a cockpit, ejector seats, atmospheric protections, controls. Indeed removing the pilot also renders much of the armor required to protect a human occupant redundant. See Gunston, above n 35.

^[38] For instance, Predator drones undertaking ISR duties carry a large range of sensor equipment including high-powered colour and night vision equipped cameras, infra-red and heat sensors. See Newman, above n 36, 51.

^[39] Even though this term is used it is well accepted that, whilst the targeting may be precise the Hellfire’s collateral damage may not be. See Roy Braybrook, ‘Strike Drones: Persistent, Precise and Plausible’ (2009) 4(33) Armada International 21.

^[40] Ibid.

^[41] Ibid.

^[42] Ibid.

^[43] Ibid.

^[44] Newman, above n 36, 48; Cordesman, above n 24 , 62-63; Stulberg, above n 9, 251.

^[45] Cordesman, above n 24, 60-61.

^[46] Newman, above n 36, 48.

[47] United States Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (2009) <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav.htm> (accessed 1 February 2010) (‘US Flight Plan’).

[48] Eyes of the Army: U.S. Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-2035 (2010) U.S. Army UAS Center of Excellence, Report no ATZQ-CDI-C, 72 <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-army.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2010) (‘US Army Roadmap’).

^[49] The US Army views UAS’ success in its ability to ‘significantly augment mission accomplishment by reducing a Soldier’s workload and their exposure to direct enemy contact. The UAS serve as unique tools for the commander, which broaden battlefield situational awareness and ability to see, target, and destroy the enemy by providing actionable intelligence to the lowest tactical levels.’ See US Army Roadmap, ibid, 1.

^[50] See Jack Beard, ‘Law and War in the Virtual Era’ (2009) 103(3) American Journal of International Law 409, 412.

^[51] Newman, above n 36, 58.

^[52] ‘Pentagon’s unmanned systems spending Tops $5.4 billion in FY2010’ Defence Update (online) 14 June 2009 <http://defense-update.com/newscast/0609/news/pentagon_uas_140609.html> (accessed 5 April 2010).

^[53] Alan Brown, ‘The Drone Warriors’ Mechanical Engineering Magazine (online) January 2010 <http://memagazine.asme.org/Articles/2010/January/> (accessed 1 March 2010).

^[54] Stulberg, above n 9, 251.

^[55] United States Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges (Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 6 April 2006) 5.

^[56] Levinson, above n 31.

^[57] Ibid.

^[58] S A Kaiser, ‘Legal Aspects of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’ (2006) 55(3) Zeitschrift Fur Luft-Und Weltraum-Recht 344, 345-346.

^[59] An informative list can be found at the US Flight Plan website, see above, n 47. A more comprehensive overview can be found at the Goebel Public Domain review of UAVs, see Goebel, above n 11.

^[60] Although some of the micro rotary wing vehicles can take off of their own accord, and some micro UVs have been developed which can ‘cling’ to the sides of building then release themselves into flight. See Alexis Desbiens and Mark Cutkosky, ‘Landing and Perching on Vertical Surfaces with Microspines for Small Unmanned Air Vehicles’ (2009) 57 Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 131.

^[61] James F Abatti, Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future (2005) Air Command and Staff College, 184.

^[62] For instance, the RQ-11 Raven can be stored in a backpack, is launched into the air by hand to allow troops in the field to ‘see over the next hill’ which could be over 10 kilometres away. See AeroVironment Inc, ‘AeroVironment Receives $37.9 Million In Orders For Digital Raven UAS, Digital Retrofit Kits’ (Press Release, 23 February 2010); AeroVironment Inc, ‘War on Terrorism Boosts Deployment of Mini-UAVs’ (Press Release, 08 July 2002). Both press releases are available at <http://www.avinc.com/resources/press_room/> (accessed 15 April 2010).

^[63] The CIA have reportedly used ultra-quiet micro-drones, ‘roughly the size of a pizza platter [that] are capable of monitoring potential targets at close range, for hours or days at a stretch. See Joby Warrick and Peter Finn, ‘Amid outrage over civilian deaths in Pakistan, CIA turns to smaller missiles’, Washington Post (Washington DC) 26 April 2010, A8.

^[64] Abatti, above n 61.

^[65] Kaiser, above n 58, 345.

^[66] See US OSD Roadmap, above n 8, 3–13.

^[67] Which can be undertaken in the air. The Reaper is also able to be fitted with additional fuel tanks, allowing a fully laden drone (including hundreds of kilos of munitions) to stay aloft for up to two days. See Goebel, above n 11.

^[68] The 4763-kg Reaper is cleared not only for Hellfire but also for the much heavier GBU-12 Paveway II, GBU-38 Jdam and GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II, based on 227-kg (class) warheads. See Braybrook, above n 39.

^[69] ‘Ocean-Going Drones’ (2006) 12(165) Aviation Week & Space Technology 56.

^[70] It internalises all storage and weapons bays and is designed to avoid visual and radar detection. The Avenger is also favoured by the Navy given its rear turbofan propulsion system is much safer in naval scenarios. See Goebel, above n 11.

^[71] US OSD Roadmap, above n 8, 9.

^[72] In 2007 for instance, a UAV resembling a sleek stealth bomber — minus the cockpit — was observed in Khandahar, and subsequently referred to as the ‘Beast of Kandahar’. Last year the US Air force confirmed that the UAV was in fact an ‘RQ-170 Sentinel’ tactical surveillance platform. No further information has been provided about the UAV. See Goebel, above n 11.

^[73] The record is 19,928 meters). See, UAV World Records, <http://records.fai.org/uav/aircraft.asp?id=2151> (accessed 18 March 2010).

^[74] That means that only five Global Hawks are required to provide high altitude ISR for the whole of the Afghan landmass (and of those, only three need to be aloft at one time).

^[75] Newman, above n 36, 52.

^[76] Braybrook, above n 39.

^[77] Lightweight air-to-surface missiles now under development will open the ground-attack role to far greater numbers of drone platforms. This in turn will pave the way for heavier, stealthy, dedicated unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). See Braybrook, ibid.

^[78] Christopher Drew, ‘Drones Are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan’ The New York Times (online) 19 February 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html> (accessed 15 March 2010).

^[79] See, Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie, ‘European UCAVs Take Shape’ Aviation Week & Space Technology (online) 13 July 2008, <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp? & id=news/aw071408p1.xml> (accessed 12 April 2010); ‘nEUROn UCAV Project Rolling Down the Runway’, Defence Industry Daily (online) 21 January 2009, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/neuron-ucav-project-rolling-down-the-runway-updated-01880/> (accessed 12 April 2010); Alexey Komarov and Douglas Barrie, ‘First Look at MiG Skat UCAV’, Aviation Week & Space Technology (online) 24 August 2007, <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/MIG082307.xml & channel=null> (accessed 12 April 2010); Nicolas von Kospoth, China’s Leap in Unmanned Aircraft Development (14 October 2009) Defpro.focus <http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/424/> (accessed 12 April 2010).

^[80] See definition section above. Teleoperated UGVs are controlled much in the same way as a remote control toy car, with a human operating the vehicle a short distance away, either by sight or via onboard cameras.

^[81] The most common role for teleoperated UGVs in contemporary conflicts is in the neutralisation of improvised explosive devices. US OSD Roadmap, above n 8, 19.

^[82] Levinson, above n 31.

^[83] Nardi, above n 30, 40.

^[84] SWORDS can be fitted with a range of high velocity, sniper, or machine guns or even rocket launchers. See Stew Magnuson, ‘Armed Robots Sidelined in Iraqi Fight’, National Defence Magazine (online) May 2008, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/May/Pages/Armed2265.aspx?PF=1> (accessed 15 April 2010).

^[85] Ibid. However, it is unclear whether the unit has been used or not, as some concerns were raised about the UGVs reliability.

^[86] K Jones, ‘Special Weapons Observation Remote recon Direct Action System (SWORDS)’ in Platform Innovations and System Integration for Unmanned Air, Land and Sea Vehicles (Paper 36, Meeting Proceedings, AVT-SCI Joint Symposium) 36–1, 36–8.

^[87] Katie Drummond, ‘Pentagon Seeks Robo-EMS to Rescue Wounded Warriors’, Wired (online) 3 March 2010, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/03/pentagon-seeks-robo-ems-to-rescue-wounded-warriors/#more-22983> (accessed 2 April 2010).

^[88] See Gage, above n 12, 2.

^[89] In this respect both Russian and American space exploration programs have provided major advances to artificial intelligence systems. Indeed, the Russians, unable to afford manned moon exploration, instead placed resources into UVs, placing them at forefront of UGV development until quite recently. See Gage, above n 12, 6.

^[90] This can be attributed to the fact that there is an ongoing state of war in that country combined with a low tolerance for casualties amongst the populace.

^[91] It does so, ‘in line with a set of guidelines specifically programmed for the site characteristics and security routines’. See the Manufacturer website for the Guardium, <http://www.g-nius.co.il/unmanned-ground-systems/guardium-ugv.html> (accessed 12 April 2010).

^[92] Levinson, above n 31.

^[93] It can carry over 1000 kilos of weapons and munitions. See GENIUS Unmanned Ground Systems (2010) <http://g-nius.co.il/unmanned-ground-systems/avantguard.html> (last accessed 12 April 2010).

^[94] See Brown, above n 53.

^[95] Ronald C Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture (2007) Georgia Institute of Technology, 5.

^[96] National Research Council (US), Technology Development for Army Unmanned Ground Vehicles, (2002) 1-12.

^[97] Office of the Secretary of Defense (US), Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, (2009) Report no FY2009–2034, 111-134 (‘Integrated Roadmap’).

^[98] Although it is also designed to undertake perimeter patrols and surveillance, the US is currently focusing much of their UGV deployment strategy on gear transport for ground units. The Black-I Robotics UGV is designed to carry packs, food, water, and ammunition for light infantry forces, which it will follow automatically through a range of terrains for up to eight-hour shifts before refueling. See Black-I Robotics , <http://www.blackirobotics.com> (accessed 14 May 2010).

^[99] Integrated Roadmap, above n 97, 116.

^[100] Ibid, 118.

^[101] Ibid.

^[102] The UAPS20 is an ‘Unmanned Autopilot System’ designed by an Italian company, SIEL, which can be fitted to a rigid-hulled inflatable boat to turn it into a low cost USV that can undertake relatively complex waypoint navigation as well as teleoperated control. Up to fifteen boats can simultaneously be controlled for a wide range of tasks, from harbor patrol and surveillance, to ordinance countermeasures and even as a UAV or UUV launch platform. See SIEL, <http://www.sielnet.com/index.php/products/usv> (accessed 20 April 2010). The company also cites the possibility of using the system for ‘naval targets’ but does not provide any further information on how this may work, quite possibly because the most obvious weaponised use of the system would be as a boat-bomb.

^[103] See RAFAEL, <http://www.rafael.co.il/Marketing/358-1037-en/Marketing.aspx> (accessed 12 March 2010).

^[104] Such as the use of an explosive laden motorboat against the USS Cole in 2000. See Erik Sofge ‘Robot Boats Hunt High-Tech Pirates on the High-Speed Seas’ Popular Mechanics (online) 1 October 2009, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/robots/4229443> (accessed 12 March 2010).

^[105] S J Corfield and J M Young, ‘Unmanned surface vehicles – game changing technology for naval operations’ in G N Roberts and Robert Sutton (eds), Advances in Unmanned Marine Vehicles (2006) IEE Control Series, 313.

^[106] Which operates it in a semi-autonomous manner to patrol harbors, gather ISR, laying and remove ordinance and engage in electronic warfare. See Matthew Graham, Unmanned Surface Vehicles: An Operational Commander’s Tool for Maritime Security (2008) Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 10 <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA494165> (accessed 20 April 2010).

^[107] See Sofge, above n 104.

^[108] Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) Phase 1, (2010) <https://www.fbo.gov/spg/ODA/DARPA/CMO/DARPA-BAA-10-43/listing.html> (accessed 20 April 2010).

^[109] Ibid.

^[110] During 2003, Australian, British and US UUVs cleared over 2.5 million square meters of the Iraqi coast of mines. Global Security Org, Intelligence Collection Programs and Systems (14 May 2008) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/uuv.htm> (accessed 20 April 2010).

^[111] Including the US and the UK in 2004. See ‘Unmanned Remote Minehunting System Installed for USS Momsen Commissioning’ Space Daily (online) 31 August 2004, <http://www.spacedaily.com/news/uav-04zzo.html> . Nicolas von Kospoth, Royal Navy Introduces New Reconnaissance UUV (24 February 2010) Defpro.focus <http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/515/> (accessed 12 April 2010).

^[112] Department of Navy (US), The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan (9 November 2004) United States Navy Report <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf> (accessed 12 April 2010) (‘UUV Master Plan’).

^[113] Based on four pillars ‘Force Net, Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Base’. See Henderson, above n 17, 57.

^[114] UUV Master Plan, above n 112.

^[115] See eg, Keith Somerville, ‘US drones take combat role’ BBC News (online) 5 November 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2404425.stm> (accessed 15 February 2010).

^[116] Hijazi was allegedly involved in the planning of a bomb attack against the USS. Cole in the port of Aden in 2000. See Mary O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009’ (Research Paper No. 09-43, Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies, 2009) in Simon Bronitt (ed), Shooting To Kill: The Law Governing Lethal Force In Context, Forthcoming.

^[117] Heinz Klug, ‘The Rule of Law, War, or Terror’, (2003) (2) Wisconsin Law Review 365, 378.

^[118] Richard Murphy and A John Radsan, ‘Due Process and Targeted Killings of Terrorists’, (Research Paper No. 114, William Mitchell College of Law Legal Studies, 2009).

^[119] Mary O’Connell, above n 116. See also David E Anderson, Drones and the Ethics of War, (May 14 2010) Religion and Ethics Newsweekly http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/by-topic/middle-east/drones-and-the-ethics-of-war/6290/ (accessed 16 May 2010).

^[120] ‘US warned on deadly drone strike’ BBC News (online) 28 October 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8329412.stm> (accessed 12 April 2010).

^[121] Klug, above n 117, 380.

^[122] ‘Targeted killing’ is the term used to refer to ‘extra-judicial, premeditated killing by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.’ See Murphy and Radsan, above n 118.

^[123] The theory behind this policy is that by repeatedly ‘decapitating’ terrorist groups by targeting their leaders and technical experts, eventually only replacements ‘from the shallowest end of the talent pool’ will remain, that ‘will be ineffective and easy to defeat’. See Noel Sharkey, ‘Death strikes from the sky: the calculus of proportionality’ (2009) 28(1) IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 17.

^[124] Ibid.

^[125] See for instance, Chris Downes, ‘Targeted killings in an age of terror: the legality of the Yemen strike’ (2004) 9(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 277; Jordan J Paust, ‘Self-defence targetings of non-state actors and permissibility of U.S. use drones in Pakistan’ (2010) 19 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy; Laurie Calhoun, ‘The Strange Case of Summary Execution by Predator Drone’ (203) 15(3) Peace Review 209; Mary O’Connell, ‘To kill or capture suspects in the global war on terror’ (2003) 35 Case Western Reserve International Law Journal 325; Norman J Printer, ‘The use of force against non-state actors under international law: an analysis of the U.S. predator strike in Yemen’ (2003) 8 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 331; Murphy and Radsan, above n 118.

^[126] Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4).

^[127] Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.

^[128] As was the official position of Pakistan when US drone strikes commenced. See O'Connell, above n 116.

^[129] In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep, [139] (the ‘Israeli Wall’ case) the ICJ held that self-defence requires an attack from a state, not a non-state group.

^[130] See, What is International Humanitarian Law? (2004) International Committee of the Red Cross Advisory Service of Humanitarian Law <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/humanitarian-law-factsheet/$File/What_is_IHL.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2010).

^[131] See for instance, The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Article 2 (entered into force 21 October 1950). The four Geneva Conventions, and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 contain similar provisions.

^[132] The ICRC, for instance, has stated whether a situation amounts to an armed conflict should be determined on a case-by-case basis. See International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict (2007) International Committee of the Red Cross, (Document prepared for the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva Switzerland, 26-30 November 2007) <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ihl-30-international-conference-101207/$File/IHL-challenges-30th-International-Conference-ENG.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2010).

^[133] Indeed, the ICRC argues that ‘it is both dangerous and unnecessary, in practical terms, to apply IHL to situations that do not amount to war.’ See International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict’, ibid.

^[134] Ibid.

^[135] Whilst the possibility of completely removing humans from the warzone is probably a long way off, UVs are now unquestionably embedded within the armed forces of many countries, undertaking the dull, dirty and dangerous roles that were once carried out by humans. So important are these ‘drone warriors’ to their human counterparts, that some members of the armed forces have given them honorary status as soldiers in their own right. Brown writes about an explosive ordinance team who were ‘giving [a packbot UGV] a full military honors funeral … They said it took six wounds … That robot had saved their lives. It had crawled up next to bombs how many times and they had actually developed a fondness that oftentimes you develop for your shipmates when you’re in tough times.’ See Brown, above n 53.

^[136] Robert Sparrow, ‘Predators or Plowshares? Arms control of robotic weapons’ (2009) 28(1) IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 25, 26.

^[137] Stulberg, above n 9.

^[138] Brown, above n 53, 28.

^[139] The US Air Force, for instance, now operates a recruiting centre filled with video games emulating aerial combat from a suburban shopping mall in Philadelphia. See Jon Hurdle, ‘U.S. Army Using Video Games to Recruit at Shopping Malls’ Reuters (online) 9 January 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE50819H20090110> (accessed 12 March 2010).

^[140] Israeli defence companies, for instance, model their UAV controllers on Playstation consoles and controllers on the premise that they can be piloted by ‘an average 18 year-old recruit with just a few months training.’ See Levinson, above n 31. The Crusher UGV can reportedly be controlled from an Xbox or even iPod console by troops on the ground. See Mark Scott, ‘Raytheon Taps Video Games to Pilot Drones’ Bloomburg BusinessWeek (online) 16 July 2008, <http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2008/gb20080716_470794.htm> (accessed 1 February 2010).

^[141] Philip Alston and Hina Shamsi, ‘A Killer above the law? Britain's use of drones in the war in Afghanistan must be in accordance with international law’ Guardian.co.uk (online) 8 February 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/08/afghanistan-drones-defence-killing> (accessed 15 March 2010).

^[142] O’Connell, above n 116, 9.

^[143] Ibid.

^[144] Ibid, 10.

^[145] Ibid.

^[146] Sparrow, above n 136, 26.

^[147] See International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 132.

^[148] Under IHL ‘protected’ status is conferred upon inter alia civilians, civilian objects, medical objects, cultural and religious sites.

^[149] See International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 132.

^[150] See Cordesman, above n 24, 21.

^[151] Gary Solis, ‘CIA drone attacks produce America’s own unlawful combatants’’ The Washington Post (online) Friday 12 March 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/11/AR2010031103653.html> (accessed 12 April 2010).

^[152] O’Connell, above n 116, 7.

^[153] Ibid, 6.

^[154] See Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010 (February 24 2010) Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf> (accessed 12 April 2010) on the difficulty of compiling reliable statistics on casualties in remote areas of Pakistan. One problem they note is the difficulty in distinguishing between militants and civilians, as militants often live amongst the population and do not wear a uniform.

^[155] David E Anderson, Drones and the Ethics of War (14 May 2010) Religion and Ethics Newsweekly, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/by-topic/middle-east/drones-and-the-ethics-of-war/6290/. At the other end of the spectrum, US officials have alleged that ‘just over 20’ civilians and ‘more than 400 fighters’ had been killed in less than two years. See Bergen and Tiedemann, above n 154.

^[156] See Bergen and Tiedemann, above n 154.

^[157] Jane Mayer, ‘The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?’ The New Yorker (online) 26 October 2009, <http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer> (accessed March 13 2010).

^[158] Hauri has argued that ‘the secrecy surrounding the CIA drone strikes program obscures the possible consequences if something goes wrong, as no visible structures of accountability are in place.’ Similarly, Alston has described the CIA program as operating in an ‘accountability void’. Walzer has argued that ‘there should be a limited, finite group of people who are targets, and that list should be publicly defensible and available.’ See Andrin Hauri, Obama’s drone handicap (17 May 2010) International Relations and Security Network, Security Watch, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4 & lng=en & id=116243> (accessed 15 March 2010); Michael Walzer, quoted in Mayer, ibid; Mayer, ibid.

^[159] See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (‘Additional Protocol I’), Part V, Section II (entered into force 7 December 1978). These include obligations on commanders to prevent and suppress breaches, including the duty to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators.

^[160] Rex v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1923] EWHC KB 1; [1924] K.B. 256, 259.

^[161] We accept that this is arguable, As per Sparrow’s arguments above. See Sparrow, above n 136, 26.

^[162] In fact, the first ‘golden age’ in UV technology occurred under the oceans more than a decade before it did in the air. See Henderson, above n 17, 57.

^[163] Stephanie Showalter, ‘The Legal Status of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles’ (2004) 38(1) Marine Technology & Society Journal 80.

^[164] For instance, armies have provided drones to police forces for trials, air forces have similarly provided UVs to search and rescue teams to deal with large-scale emergencies. See R Johnson, NASA drones aid firefighters (2008) Electronic Engineering Times 1535, 9-10; Randal C Archibold, ‘U.S. Adds Drones to Fight Smuggling’ New York Times (New York, New York) 8 December 2009, A.25; and Graham Warwick, ‘Drug Drones’ (2009) 170 Aviation Week & Space Technology 22.

^[165] Stafford writes that when ‘commercial drones do take off, four groups of businesses would be looking to cash in. Academic researchers … [with] associations with small, specialist companies that build UAVs. Older commercial companies … have long sold drones as toys. A handful of major corporations already have a toe-hold in the market. And military contractors have perfected the secret designs of the world’s best-performing drones — those already used by air forces and spy agencies.’ See Ned Stafford, ‘Spy in the sky’ (2007) 7130(445) Nature 808.

^[166] David S Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Seizing the Initiative, (2004) 26–28.

^[167] Indeed, modern military vehicles and platforms often rely on a mix of military grade and commercially available technology. Jay Stowsky, ‘Secrets to shield or share? new dilemmas for military R&D policy in the digital age’ (2004) 2(3) Research Policy 257. As Gormley notes, ‘Military breakthroughs are increasingly resulting from commercial, rather than secret military, research...’ Dennis M Gormley, ‘Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat’ (1998) 40(1) Survival 92.

^[168] As the US Administration admits, ‘Technological advances in propulsion that were previously driven by military-sponsored research are now largely driven by commercial interests—fuel cells by the automotive industry, batteries by the computer and cellular industries, and solar cells by the commercial satellite industry. [UVs] are therefore more likely to rely on COTS [Commercial off the shelf] or COTS-derivative” systems.’ US OSD Roadmap note 8, 52.

^[169] For instance, Reaper drones are now deployed by the international anti-piracy task force to scout for Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean. The drones are operated from a base in Germany to follow and record movements of suspect pirate vessels. Although many boats have been captured it has been extremely hard to prove that they were involved in piracy. The ability of the drones to capture video of suspect movements, over long periods of time (up to 18 hours) without detection makes them perfect for the detection and evidence-gathering role.

See Will Ross, ‘Drones Scour the Sea for Pirates’ BBC News (online) 10 November 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8352631.stm> (accessed 15 March 2010).

^[170] Countries like Australia, who have larger border areas are reportedly trialling semi-autonomous patrols of large areas of its northern approaches. See Ari Sharp ‘Unmanned aircraft could soon patrol borders’ The Age Newspaper (online), April 6, 2010 <http://www.theage.com.au/national/unmanned-aircraft-could-soon-patrol-borders-20100405-rn4l.html> (accessed 1 May 2010).

^[171] In late 2009, the US Department of Homeland Security expanded its use of drones into external jurisdictions, including the Caribbean and South America to spot and track drug smugglers. See Archibold, above n 164. The US Navy is also trialling drones over unspecified countries, seeking to use them to detect submersible vehicles which have been used to smuggle drugs into the US. See Warwick, above n 164.

^[172] US Predator drones for instance have been used to patrol the Canadian and Mexican borders. See Warwick, above n 164.

^[173] Paul Lewis, ‘CCTV in the sky: police plan to use military-style spy drones’, The Guardian (online) 23 January 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/23/cctv-sky-police-plan-drones> . However, note an earlier talk by the Home Office which was reported by La Franchi. See Peter La Franchi, ‘UK Home Office plans national police UAV fleet’, Flight International (online) 17 July 2007, <http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/07/17/215507/uk-home-office-plans-national-police-uav-fleet.html> .

^[174] ‘Unlicensed police drone grounded’, BBC News (online) Tuesday, 16 February 2010, although no conviction was recorded. <http://www.clickliverpool.com/news/national-news/128901-merseyside-police-drone-fails-to-convict-car-thief.html> .

^[175] See Lewis, above n 173.

^[176] Ibid.

^[177] David Hambling, ‘Future Police: Meet the UK's Armed Robot Drones’ Wired News (online) 10 February 2010, http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2010-02/10/future-police-meet-the-uk%27s-armed-robot-drones (accessed 25/5/2010).

^[178] Ibid. However, the author’s could find no official verification of this.

^[179] ‘Tecknisolar Seni designs armed mini-UAV for anti-terror operations’ Flight International, (online) 22 June 2004, <http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2004/06/22/183201/eurosatory-2004-tecknisolar-seni-designs-armed-mini-uav-for-anti-terror-operations.html> (accessed 25/5/2010).

^[180] Ibid.

^[181] See iDrone Website, <http://www.idrone.fr/index.php?option=com_content & view=category & layout=blog & id=39 & Itemid=59> (accessed 20 March 2010).

^[182] See Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd promotional website: <http://www.iai.co.il/34056-31663-en/Groups_Military_Aircraft_Lahav_Products_UGV.aspx> (18 April 2010).

^[183] Douglas McDonald, ‘Public Imprisonment by Private Means - The Re-Emergence of Private Prisons and Jails in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia’ (1994) 34 British Journal of Criminology 29, 29.

^[184] Richard Bloss, ‘By air, land and sea, the unmanned vehicles are coming’ (2007) 34(1) The Industrial Robot 12, 14.

^[185] Ibid.

^[186] Fire fighters can be blinded by smoke and debris during firefighting operations and wander into areas that are dangerous. For instance, certain regions of the fire may be too hot for humans, or areas of the ground may be covered in ash that would cause the firefighters’ boots to melt.

^[187] Heat detecting and radar equipment were retrofitted to the drones so that they could ‘see through’ the smoke layer to provide fire fighters with up-to-the-minute intelligence on the fire as well as any obstructions, hazards or impediments not visible to human eyes on the ground. Johnson, above n 164, 9-10.

^[188] Brian Yamauchi and Pavlo Rudakevych, ‘Griffon: A Man-Portable Hybrid UGV/UAV’ (2004) 5(31) Industrial Robot 443, 443.

^[189] Brian Ashcraft, ‘Just Press “Save”: Disaster search-and-rescue in robot-crazy Japan’ (2009) Popular Science (online) 14 May 2009, <http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2007-07/autonomous-flying-ambulances-could-save-troops#> (accessed 2 February 2010).

^[190] David Axe, ‘Autonomous Flying Ambulances Could Save Troops’ (2007) Popular Science (online) 7 November 2007, <http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2007-07/autonomous-flying-ambulances-could-save-troops#> (accessed 2 February 2010).

^[191] Carl E Nehme, Modeling Human Supervisory Control in Heterogeneous Unmanned Vehicle Systems (PhD thesis, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 28.

^[192] Ibid.

^[193] Researchers at the University of California, Irvine are developing drone technology which would repair aging subterranean pipes from the inside using carbon fibre. See Tom Vasich, No Mere Pipe Dream <http://www.uci.edu/features/2010/02/feature_piperobot_100208.php> (accessed 12 January 2010).

^[194] Howard Cannon, Extended Earthmoving with an Autonomous Excavator, (Master's thesis, Technical Report CMU-RI-TR-99-10, Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 1999).

^[195] The nontrivial navigational requirements for civilian motor traffic are simply beyond most of today’s artificial intelligence systems. Semi-autonomous UVs must deal with complex road rules, highly congested traffic, varying road and weather conditions and non-automotive traffic such as cyclists and pedestrians. More to the point, they must deal with other vehicles that may not be strictly adhering to the same road rules they will be programmed with along with unexpected events, emergencies or impediments (such as a child or animal straying onto the road).

^[196] See, for instance, see futurist and urban designer Michael Arth’s, forthcoming book, ‘The Labors of Hercules: Modern Solutions to 12 Herculean Problems’ (online) 2009 <http://michaelearth.com/herc_V_eco.html> (accessed 26 May 2010).

^[197] The Challenge aims to develop ‘technology that will keep warfighters off the battlefield and out of harm’s way. The Urban Challenge features autonomous ground vehicles maneuvering in a mock city environment, executing simulated military supply missions while merging into moving traffic, navigating traffic circles, negotiating busy intersections, and avoiding obstacles.’ See DARPA, Urban Challenge Overview, http://www.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/overview.asp (accessed 2 April 2010). However, a civilian car maker has been eying the technology, see Jon Stewart, ‘Robot cars race around California’ BBC News (online) 5 November 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/7078245.stm> (accessed, 25 May 2010).

^[198] Ibid.

^[199] Stafford, above n 165, 808.

^[200] Alan Hobbs, ‘Human factors, the last frontier of aviation safety?’ (2004) 14(4) International Journal of Aviation Psychology 331, 335-341.

^[201] Hence, UAVs will often have a single point of failure for many flight, electrical and communications systems, something unacceptable in civil aviation. ‘FAA: Drones Not Ready for Prime Time’ (2009) 44(23) Air Safety Week.

^[202] Alan Hobbs and Stanley R Herwitz, ‘Human Challenges in the Maintenance of Unmanned Aircraft Systems’ (San Jose State University Foundation, NASA Ames Research Center Publication, 2006) 17.

^[203] Adams writes: ‘UAS maintainers need to know a lot. You’ve got to know your bits and bytes …but at the same time, you’ve got to be able to adjust the carburetor.’ Charlotte Adams, ‘Technology Focus: Unmanned Vehicle Maintenance’ Aviation Maintenance Magazine (online) Thursday, 1 November 2007, <http://www.aviationtoday.com/am/categories/commercial/Technology-Focus-Unmanned-Vehicle-Maintenance_16794.html> (accessed 21 May 2010).

^[204] Ibid.

^[205] Ibid.

^[206] R Parasuraman, R Molloy and I L Singh, ‘Performance consequences of automation induced complacency.’ (1993) 3(1) International Journal of Aviation Psychology 1.

^[207] J J Spravka, D A Moisio and M G Payton, Unmanned Air Vehicles: A New Age in Human Factors Evaluations. In Flight Test – Sharing Knowledge and Experience (2005) Meeting Proceedings RTO-MP-SCI-162, Paper 5A, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, <http://www.rto.nato.int/abstracts.asp.> (accessed 25 May 2010).

^[208] See Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Issues Paper, 22 January 2007, 10 (‘NZ CAA’).

^[209] Karp and Pasztor write, ‘Air Force officials say that all of the crashes so far were the result of malfunctions or errors by pilots who are often as far away as Nevada and lack the sensation of being in the cockpit.’ Jonathan Karp and Andy Pasztor, ‘Drones in Domestic Skies?’ Wall Street Journal (New York, New York), 7 August 2006, B1.

^[210] Ibid. See also NZ CAA, above n 208. For Europe see, David Hughes, ‘UAV Road Map for Europe’ 168(15) Aviation Week & Space Technology 78. For Australia see, Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia, Unmanned Aircraft and Rockets: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations, Design Specification, Maintenance, and Training of Human Resources, (Advisory Circular 101-1(0) Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, 2002).

^[211] Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 4 April 1947).

^[212] Kaiser, above n 58, at 348 argues that Article 8 is broad enough to cover any form of UAV that could be deployed to another convention party’s airspace. Within that context, UAVs must be operated in such a way that does not endanger civilian aircraft. However, as he points out, the lex specialis nature of the Convention means that it only applies to civilian UAVs. Indeed art 3(a) of the Convention explicitly excludes ‘state aircraft’ which include military, customs and policing aircraft. However, the Convention does require that a contracting party obtain the authorisation of another contracting party before flying state aircraft over their airspace (art 3(c). Kaiser argues (at 349) that the wording of arts 3(c) and 8 (specifically the second sentence) may be interpreted to require state aircraft to also comply with civilian aviation rules designed specifically for unmanned aircraft. That interpretation is by no means certain and is more likely to rely on the goodwill and understanding of the parties.

^[213] See for instance, Transport Canada UAV Working Group Website <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards/general-recavi-uavworkinggroup-2266.htm> (accessed 25/5/2010); Eurocae Working Group 73 Website <http://www.eurocae.net/workinggroups.html> (accessed 25 May 2010).

^[214] The Convention requires that Visual Flight Rules (Annex 2 Chapter 4 of the Convention) are complied with. However, these are drafted in terms of contemporary manned aircraft. Specifically, there must be visible control by the pilot operating the flight, altitude control, navigation and avoidance of other traffic; that UAVs flying in controlled airspace maintain contact channels with air traffic control, which would oblige a voice data link back to a human controller should air traffic control seek to direct the UAV (see Kaiser, above n 58, 353); and adhere to collision avoidance principles – ‘vigilance for the purpose of detecting potential collisions be not relaxed on board aircraft in flight and when operating on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome’: Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 4 April 1947) art 3.2.

^[215] As happened in a recent crash of a Predator Drone in the United States. See Chris Johnson and Christine Shea, ‘The Hidden Human Factors in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’ Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on Systems Safety, Vancouver Canada, August 2008.

^[216] The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘transport’ as ‘To take or carry from one place to another by means of a vehicle, aircraft, or ship.’

^[217] Arguably these craft might fall under the ambit of the definition as they transport scientific and sensor equipment, although this seems to be taking a rather liberal approach to statutory interpretation.

^[218] These include rules to do with the lighting of the vessel; speed, steering and sailing rules and what sounds and signals are to be used in differing situations.

^[219] Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea opened for signature 20 October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16, (entered into force 15 July 1977) (‘COLREGs’); and International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, opened for signature 17 June 1960, 1967 ATS 7, (entered into force 1 September 1965) (‘COLREGs 1960’).

<^{a name="fn220" href="#fnB220">[220]} Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea opened for signature 20 October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16, Rule 5 (entered into force 15 July 1977).

^[221] Although the US Coastguard states outright that ‘in all but the smallest vessels [including USVs], the lookout is expected to be an individual who is not the helmsman and is usually located in the forward part of the boat.’ See Given the Coastguard specifically referred to unmanned craft in respect of that requirement, it is unclear whether that body feels USVs are not yet ready for autonomous operation or they simply missed the point. Clearly, like the civil aviation rules, approaches to sea traffic regulation may need some work. See US Coastguard, When Do I Need a Lookout? Navigation Rules FAQ, Department of Home Security <http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/mwv/navrules/navrules_faq.htm#0.3_12> (accessed 12 May 2010).

^[222] COLREGs, opened for signature 20 October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16, (entered into force 15 July 1977), Rule 3(g) defines restricted operations to include a range of routine maritime operations including: laying, servicing or picking up a navigation mark, submarine cable or pipeline; dredging, surveying or underwater operations; and minesweeping operations.

^[223] International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, opened for signature 27 April 1979, 1405 UNTS 97, Chapter 1, [1.3.2] (entered into force 22 June 1985). This rule is reflected in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires any ship of a party must ‘render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; and to proceed to the rescue of persons in distress…’ United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, art 98(1)(a), (b) (entered into force 16 November 1994).

^[224] Article 10(1) states ‘Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea.’ International Convention on Salvage, opened for signature 28 April 1989, ATS 1998 No 2, art 10(1) (entered into force generally 14 July 1996).

^[225] James Nafziger, ‘Historic Salvage Law Revisited’ (2000) 31 Ocean Development & International Law 81.

^[226] See for instance: Bureau Wijsmuller v United States, [1983] USCA2 252; 702 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1983); Tidewater Salvage, Inc. v Weyehaeuser Co.[1980] USCA9 1561; , 633 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.1980).

^[227] Roberts, above n 16, 267.

^[228] See E D Brown, Report on the Law Relating to Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, Prelims of a Report commissioned by the Southampton Oceanography Centre, Society for Underwater Technology (London EC2R 5BJ) 147. Showalter and Manley argue that such a situation would not automatically result in salvage dues being paid, but rather it would shield the mistaken captain from liability and would be ‘cold comfort to the operator who was unable to carry out the planned mission.’ Stephanie Showalter and Justin Manley, ‘Legal and engineering challenges to widespread adoption of unmanned maritime vehicles’ Proceedings of OCEANS 2009, Marine Technology for Our Future: Global and Local Challenges (online) October 2009, 1-5, 26-29 <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp= & arnumber=5422108 & isnumber=5422059> (accessed 25 May 2010).

^[229] UUV Master Plan, above n 112, 37.

^[230] United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, art 19 (entered into force 16 November 1994).

^[231] Ibid.

^[232] Ibid, art 56.

^[233] Ibid, art 20.

^[234] Ibid, arts 29-32, 95-96, 236.

^[235] Henderson, above n 17, 67.

^[236] United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, art 29 (entered into force 16 November 1994).

^[237] In Anderson v Territory Insurance Office [1999] NTSC 21, Bailey J posited that ‘a vehicle passenger might be found [to be a driver] where the relevant act was, say, suddenly and without warning to apply the handbrake forcefully, grab the steering wheel or force the gear lever into reverse of a fast moving vehicle.’

^[238] For instance, someone pushing the vehicle from outside whilst holding the steering wheel was held to be an unlicensed driver in R v MacDonagh (1974) 1 QB 448.

^[239] (1974) 1 QB 448, 451. The main question is whether a person exercises ‘some control over the movement and direction of the vehicle and generally [has] something to do with the propulsion’: Tink v Francis [1983] VicRp 74; [1983] 2 VR 17.

^[240] See Peter Francis Affleck (1992) 65 A Crim R 96, which involved three separate people operating a motor vehicle, one in control of the pedals, another the gear stick and the third the steering wheel. Each were found to be drivers for the purpose of the relevant criminal law.

^[241] For instance, a passenger operating a handbrake. See Mason v Dickason [2006] ACTSC 102.

^[242] See for instance, Road Traffic Act 1988 (UK) ss 1-5 (Driving Offenses); Part X (Road Rules), Highway Traffic Act 1990 (Ontario); Road Rules 2009 (Tasmania) s 16 (‘Who is a driver’).

^[243] See for instance, Highway Act 1835 (UK) which prohibits: ‘Riding upon the cart, or upon any horse drawing it, and not having some other person to guide it, unless there be some person driving it’ and ‘Quitting his cart, or leaving control of the horses.’

^[244] Masutti, for instance, argues that UVs will ‘have the potential to have as much, if not more of an impact on civilian life as it has military’ but such applications have ‘developed quite slowly due … to the lack of a regulatory frame- work.’ She argues for urgent regulatory review of air law to permit UAVS to ‘fly with other traffic out of segrated areas within national or international airspace’. Anna Masutti, ‘Proposals for the Regulation of Unmanned Air Vehicle Use in Common Airspace’ (2009) 34(1) Air and Space Law 1, 1.

^[245] ‘Lightweight drones poised for take-off’, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 13 January 2010, 1; see also Stafford, above n 165.

^[246] Karp and Pasztor, above n 209.

^[247] John C Munson, Allen P Nikora and Joseph S Sherif, ‘Software Faults: A Quantifiable Definition Source’ (2006) 5(37) Advances in Engineering Software 327.

^[248] Bruce T Clough, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Autonomous Control Challenges, A Researcher’s Perspective’ in Robert Murphey and Panos M Pardalos (eds), Cooperative Control and Optimization (2002) 35.

^[249] Janesch v Coffey [1984] HCA 52; (1984) 155 CLR 549, 414 (Deane J).

^[250] Robotic and computer engineers have long tried to reach the ‘holy grail’ of ‘evolutionary computation’ that is, computing systems which learn from basic principles and are able to program themselves or other systems. See Michael S Mahoney, ‘Software: The Self-Programming Machine’ in Atsushi Akera and Frederik Nebeker (eds), From 0 to 1: An Authoritative History of Modern Computing (2002) 91. Some recent examples can be found at on the following websites: ‘Robots learn to move themselves’ BBC News (online) Wednesday 6 August 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7544099.stm> (accessed 26 May 2010); ‘Computer Software that Writes Itself’ Newsweek (online) 26 December 2005 <http://www.newsweek.com/2005/12/25/computer-software-that-writes-itself.html> (accessed 26/5/2010).

^[251] John Adley, ‘Fears after UAV crash-landing’ Carmarthen Journal (Wales) 30 October 2009, 1.

^[252] Jed Rubenfeld, ‘The End of Privacy” (2009) 61(1) Stanford Law Review 101.

^[253] Paul Lewis, ‘Eye in the sky arrest could land police in the dock’ The Guardian (UK) 16 February 2010, 1.

^[254] McBride, above n 1, 637.

^[255] So much excitement in some cases like that of the abovementioned arrest, that they have operated the drones without regulatory approval.

^[256] See, ‘Fact Sheet on U.S. "Constitution Free Zone”’ (2008) American Civil Liberties Union <http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/fact-sheet-us-constitution-free-zone> (accessed visited 25 May 2010); Calo, M Ryan, ‘Robots and Privacy’ in Patrick Lin, George Bekey and Keith Abney (eds), Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (forthcoming), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599189> (accessed 2 June 2010); Declan McCullagh, ‘George Orwell, here we come’, CNET News (online) 6 January 2003, available at <http://news.cnet.com/2010-1069-979276.html> (accessed 25/5/2010); Mary Kaldor, ‘Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror’ (2005) 4(42) International Politics 491.