McDonald, Stephen --- "Involuntary Detention and the Separation of Judicial Power" [2007] FedLawRw 2; (2007) 35(1) Federal Law Review 25
[∗] BCom, LLB (Hons) (Adelaide). I would like to thank Dr Wendy Lacey and an anonymous referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
[1] Behrooz v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486 ('Behrooz'); Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562 ('Al-Kateb'); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664 ('Al-Khafaji'); Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (by their next friend GS) (2004) 225 CLR 1 ('Re Woolley'); Vasiljkovic v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399 ('Vasiljkovic').
[2] Fardon v A-G (Qld) [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575 ('Fardon'); Baker v The Queen [2004] HCA 45; (2004) 223 CLR 513.
[3] [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1 ('Wilson').
[4] (1996) 189 CLR 53 ('Kable').
[5] R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('Boilermakers'), 270 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ); aff'd A-G (Cth) v The Queen [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 ('Chu Kheng Lim'), 26-7 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).
[6] R v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353, 366 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J).
[7] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245 ('Brandy'), 258 (Mason CJ).
[8] Ibid. See also R v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353, 356–9, 368–70 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); Huddart Parker & Co Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ); R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 8; (1970) 123 CLR 361 ('Tasmanian Breweries'), 374 (Kitto J); R v Local Government Board [1902] 2 IR 349, 373 (Palles CB); Precision Data Holdings Pty Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188–90 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
[9] Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd [1918] HCA 56; (1918) 25 CLR 434, 444 (Griffith CJ); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro [1926] HCA 58; (1926) 38 CLR 153, 175 (Isaacs J); Brandy [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 258 (Mason CJ); Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 23 [53] (McHugh J).
[10] For discussion of these doctrines, see, eg, R v Carroll [2002] HCA 55; (2002) 213 CLR 635; Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610; Rogers v The Queen [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251.
[11] Tasmanian Breweries [1970] HCA 8; (1970) 123 CLR 361, 374 (Kitto J).
[13] Ibid 12 [17].
[14] [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460.
[15] Ibid 497.
[16] [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 611 [76].
[17] See also Vasiljkovic [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399, 1421 [107] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, Heydon J agreeing), 1435 [193] (Kirby J).
[18] Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476.
[19] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562.
[20] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 650 [265] (emphasis in original), referring to H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968) 4. See also J Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules' (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 3, 5.
[21] See text accompanying below nn 205–8.
[22] [2004] HCA 42; (2004) 220 CLR 129, 145 [32] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
[23] Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 49; (2003) 216 CLR 161.
[24] Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
[25] Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26; (1974) 131 CLR 623, 628 (Barwick CJ, Menzies, Stephen and Mason JJ).
[26] Chu Shao Hung v The Queen [1953] HCA 33; (1953) 87 CLR 575 ('Chu Shao Hung'), 585 (Fullagar J).
[27] Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 588–90 [7]–[14] (Gleeson CJ). See also Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 495 (Deane J).
[28] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 648 [255], 650–1 [266]–[267] (Hayne J), cf 613 [140] (Gummow J). See text accompanying below nn 185–204.
[29] Polyukhovich v Commonwealth [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501 ('Polyukhovich'), 535–6, 539 (Mason CJ), 686 (Toohey J), 721 (McHugh J); Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 70 (McHugh J); APLA v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322 ('APLA'), 364 [77] (McHugh J).
[30] [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501.
[31] Ibid 537–8 (Mason CJ), citing Kariapper v Wijesinha [1968] AC 717, 721; United States v Lovett, [1946] USSC 104; 328 US 303 (1946).
[32] See generally the discussion and conclusions in Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 35–6, 206–10.
[33] Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 647 (emphasis added).
[34] Ibid 649 (emphasis added).
[35] Ibid 686.
[36] Deane and Gaudron JJ held that any retrospective criminal law would amount to an exercise or 'usurpation' of judicial power by the Parliament: [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 606–16 (Deane J), 703–8 (Gaudron J).
[37] Calder v Bull, [1804] USSC 10; 3 US 386, 389 (Chase J) (1798), cited in Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 535–6 (Mason CJ), 617 (Deane J); see also 646–7 (Dawson J), 685–6 (Toohey J), 721 (McHugh J).
[38] This may be contrasted with the United States, where the federal Constitution does not impose upon State legislatures the general principle of the separation of powers, but, through the XIVth Amendment, does extend the prohibition on the enactment of bills of attainder to State legislatures.
[39] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 ('S157'), 484 [9] (Gleeson CJ), 505 [73] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Boilermakers [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254; A-G (Cth) v The Queen [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR 529; Alexander [1918] HCA 56; (1918) 25 CLR 434, 442 (Griffith CJ), 450 (Barton J).
[41] Ibid 27.
[42] Note that 'arbitrary' can also be used in a wider sense: see below n 231.
[43] (2004) 225 CLR 1, 24 [57], 25 [60].
[44] See text accompanying below nn 213–18.
[45] See, by analogy, Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner for Taxation [1999] HCA 67; (1999) 201 CLR 49, holding that a 'but for' test is applicable in determining whether documents have been brought into existence for the dominant purpose of litigation.
[46] Cf Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11; (1985) 159 CLR 70, 148–9 (Deane J).
[47] See also Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 26 [61], where McHugh J spoke of a 'solely protective' or 'purely protective' purpose.
[48] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 584 [44]. It should be noted that the last two sentences of the quoted passage are unrelated to the question of whether the law imposes punishment. They refer to the conclusiveness of the judicial power and recognise that the Parliament could not, consistently with the separation of judicial power, invest an executive officer or tribunal with a power to determine, conclusively, the limits of its own jurisdiction: see S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 484 [9] (Gleeson CJ), 505 [73] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
[49] Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27.
[50] See Constitution s 49; R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne [1955] HCA 36; (1955) 92 CLR 157; Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 22 [50] (McHugh J), describing this exception as 'more apparent than real'.
[51] See Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1989) 166 CLR 518; Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460; Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308.
[52] Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 28. To the examples given in Chu Kheng Lim, one might also add the 'power to impose such restrictions on the liberty of movement of the suspect as are necessary to effect [a] search' or investigation: see Gibson v Ellis (1992) 59 SASR 420, 424 (King CJ); R v McKay (1998) 135 ACTR 29, 32–3 [11]–[15] (Crispin J).
[53] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 71.
[54] Leaving aside the two exceptions to the separation of powers which I have identified, namely the power of the Parliament to punish for contempt and the power of military courts martial to punish for a breach of military discipline.
[55] Kruger v Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1 ('Kruger').
[56] [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 162. In support of this proposition, Gummow J cited passages from Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 33 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ), 46 (Toohey J), 55, 58 (Gaudron J), 65, 71 (McHugh J). See also R v McKay (1998) 135 ACTR 29, 32–3 [11]–[15] (Crispin J).
[57] It has repeatedly been said that the categories of allowable detention by the executive government are 'not closed'. See Chu Kheng Lim [1991] HCA 21; (1992) 172 CLR 1, 55 (Gaudron J); Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 162 (Gummow J); Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 527–8 [121] (Kirby J).
[58] Bradley Selway, 'The Principle behind Common Law Judicial Review of Administrative Action — the Search Continues' (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 217, 217, citing Pyrenees Shire Council v Day [1998] HCA 3; (1998) 192 CLR 330, 397 (Kirby J); Stephen Gageler, 'The Underpinnings of Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Common Law or Constitution' (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 303. Although it is perfectly legitimate for a legislature or policy maker to create rules with exceptions designed to protect both civil liberties and historical anomalies, judicial development of constitutional principle cannot easily accommodate rules that admit of arbitrary exceptions with no textual basis; rather, judicially recognised 'exceptions' must be by reference to a class or classes the relevant features of which are identifiable. Cf Matthew Zagor, 'Uncertainty and Exclusion: Detention of Aliens and the High Court' [2006] FedLawRw 5; (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 127, 153.
[59] [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 85.
[60] Ibid 62.
[61] Ibid 110–11. The approach suggested by Gaudron J is considered in greater detail in text accompanying below nn 70–9.
[62] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562.
[63] Ibid 576 [17].
[64] Ibid 584 [45]; see also Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 35 [82] (McHugh J).
[65] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 609–10 [128]–[132]; cf 612–13 [136]–[139]; Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 612–13 [81].
[66] Ibid 650–1 [267].
[67] Ibid 659 [291]; see also 657 [287].
[68] [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486.
[69] Ibid 527 [119]–[120].
[70] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 57.
[71] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 110.
[72] Ibid 111. The phrase 'criminal guilt' here must be understood as referring to a determination of criminal guilt by a Ch III Court.
[73] Ibid 110–11 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
[76] Cf Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1988) 166 CLR 518; Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460; Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley [1994] HCA 25; (1994) 181 CLR 18.
[77] That is so whether one views as valid all laws taking 'aliens' as their 'object of command', or whether the aliens power is restricted to the regulation of 'aliens as aliens'. See Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 610 [132] (Gummow J); New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 52; (2006) 81 ALJR 34, 91 [198] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); cf Huddart Parker & Co Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 412 (Higgins J); Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468, 507–8 (Menzies J); Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 23; (1981) 150 CLR 169, 181–2 (Gibbs J); Cunliffe v Commonwealth [1994] HCA 44; (1994) 182 CLR 272, 316 (Brennan J).
[78] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 689–90 [258]–[259] (Hayne J, Heydon J agreeing). In contrast, Gummow J expressly stated at 610–11 [131]–[132] that he preferred the reasons for invalidity given in Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1 by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ, and by McHugh J, to those of Gaudron J. See also Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 11 [14] (Gleeson CJ), treating the approach of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ as binding.
[79] (2004) 225 CLR 1, 25 [59] (McHugh J).
[80] Professor Zines, writing after the decision in Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1 but before Gaudron J expanded upon her views in Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, appears to have interpreted her remarks in this way: Zines, above n 32, 208.
[81] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 110–11 (footnotes omitted).
[82] Cf R (Giles) v Parole Board [2003] UKHL 42; [2004] 1 AC 1, 21 [10] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), 27 [33] (Lord Hope of Craighead), 42 [72] (Lord Hutton), where it was held that the English parole board was 'a judicial body' and not part of the 'executive'. It is suggested that this was not a reference to the exercise of judicial power strictu sensu, but rather that what was meant was that board was required to exercise its power 'judicially', in the sense of according procedural fairness, and that it was independent from the political executive. As to the distinction, see Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348, 356 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
[83] [1974] HCA 26; (1974) 131 CLR 623, 628 (Barwick CJ, Menzies, Stephen and Mason JJ).
[84] Cf Baker v The Queen [2004] HCA 45; (2004) 223 CLR 513.
[85] See Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2003] NSWCA 151; (2003) 57 NSWLR 212, 238 [126]–[127] (Spigelman CJ), 241 [147] (Mason P).
[86] See Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 610 [73], 614 [85] (Gummow J), 658 [234] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); cf 619 [108] (Gummow J). The case considered the validity of s 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). See further discussion in text accompanying below nn 300–3.
[87] See, eg, Brian Fitzgerald, 'Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism' [1993] UTasLawRw 16; (1993) 12 University of Tasmania Law Review 263; H P Lee, 'Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adjudication' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 126; Bradley Selway, 'The Rise and Rise of the Reasonable Proportionality Test in Public Law' (1996) 7 Public Law Review 212; Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality' [1997] MelbULawRw 1; (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1. See also Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2004] HCA 41; (2004) 220 CLR 181, 266–7 [247]–[251] (Kirby J) ('Mulholland').
[88] See the critique in Kirk, above n 87, 24–7, 29, 34–5.
[89] Selway, above n 87, 213–14. See also Anthony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 527.
[90] [1933] HCA 56; (1933) 49 CLR 142.
[91] Ibid 155–6. See also South Australia v Tanner [1989] HCA 3; (1989) 166 CLR 161, 165 (Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 178 (Brennan J).
[92] Dennis Pearce and Stephen Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (2nd ed, 1999) 239.
[93] Cunliffe v Commonwealth [1994] HCA 44; (1994) 182 CLR 272, 322–3 (Brennan J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460, 484 (Brennan and Toohey JJ); Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 593 (Brennan J), 604–5 (Deane J), 697 (Gaudron J); Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1988) 166 CLR 518, 567 (Brennan and Toohey JJ), 583 (Deane J), 597 (Gaudron J); Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; (1983) 158 CLR 1, 138–9, 142–3 (Mason J), 259–61 (Deane J); Richardson v Forestry Commission [1988] HCA 10; (1988) 164 CLR 261, 289, 291 (Mason CJ and Brennan J), 300–1, 303 (Wilson J), 312, 314 (Deane J), 336 (Toohey J), 344–6 (Gaudron J); Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 2] [1965] HCA 3; (1965) 113 CLR 54, 86 (Barwick CJ).
[95] Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1988) 166 CLR 518, 597 (Gaudron J). For applications of a proportionality test in the context of characterisation under the defence power, see Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley [1994] HCA 25; (1993) 181 CLR 18, 30 (Brennan and Toohey JJ); Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1988) 166 CLR 518, 567–9 (Brennan and Toohey JJ), 583 (Deane J), 600–3 (Gaudron J). See also Kirk, above n 87, 22.
[96] Constitution s 51 (xxix).
[97] Kirk, above n 87, 22. See generally the cases cited in n 93
, above.
[98] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 132.
[99] Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth [1943] HCA 12; (1943) 67 CLR 116, 132 (Latham CJ); A-G (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth [1981] HCA 2; (1981) 146 CLR 559, 579 (Barwick CJ), 615–16 (Mason J), 653 (Wilson J); Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 40 (Brennan CJ), 86 (Toohey J), 132 (Gaudron J), 160 (Gummow J).
[100] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 134.
[101] [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1. See also James Stellios, 'The Intercourse Limb of Section 92 and the High Court's Decision in APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW)' (2006) 17 Public Law Review 10, 13–15.
[102] Similar considerations apply to the freedom of trade and commerce protected by s 92, although it is complicated by the fact that the prohibition is limited to discriminatory laws which are 'protectionist'. See Castlemaine Tooheys v South Australia [1990] HCA 1; (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472–4 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Amelia Simpson, 'Grounding the High Court's Modern Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case for Improper Purpose as the Touchstone' (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 445.
[103] Nationwide News v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1, 57. See also Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45; (1992) 177 CLR 106, 194 (Deane J), 144 (Dawson J); AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 178–9 [43]–[45] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ); Cunliffe v Commonwealth [1994] HCA 44; (1994) 182 CLR 272, 366–7 (Dawson J); APLA [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322, 392–4 [173]–[179] (Gummow J).
[104] See text accompanying below nn 110–17.
[105] In particular, ss 7, 24, 64, 128: see Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557–61 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ); see also Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 120 [320] (Heydon J), referring to ss 1, 6, 7, 8 , 13, 24, 25, 28, 30, 49, 62, 64, 83, 128.
[106] See, eg, Dan Meagher, 'The Protection of Political Communication under the Australian Constitution' [2005] UNSWLawJl 4; (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 30, 36–8; Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' [1999] MelbULawRw 26; (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 681–4.
[107] [1947] HCA 26; (1947) 74 CLR 31. See also Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185.
[108] Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth [1947] HCA 26; (1947) 74 CLR 31, 79–81 (Dixon J): a discriminatory tax 'is aimed at the States and is an attempt to use federal power to burden or, may be, to control State action'.
[109] For a recent discussion of this issue, see Simpson, above n 102, 465–70.
[110] Kirk, above n 87, 6, referring to R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 CANLII 69; [1985] 1 SCR 295, 335 (Dickson CJ).
[111] See, eg, APLA [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322, 394 [178]–[179] (Gummow J), 462 [423]–[424] (Hayne J); Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 576 [17] (Gleeson CJ), 622 [167] (Kirby J); Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 95 [245] (Kirby J); Singh v Commonwealth [2004] HCA 43; (2004) 222 CLR 322, 335–6 [19]–[20] (Gleeson CJ), 348 [52] (McHugh J), 385 [159] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 413 [247] (Kirby J); cf 424–5 [295] (Callinan J); Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 117–18 [262] (Kirby J); Eastman v The Queen [2000] HCA 29; (2000) 203 CLR 1, 46 [146]–[147], fn 175 (McHugh J); Byrnes v The Queen [1999] HCA 38; (1999) 199 CLR 1, 34 [80] (Kirby J); Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill [1991] HCA 28; (1991) 172 CLR 319, 321–2 (Brennan J), 339–40 (Gaudron J), 346 (McHugh J); Stenhouse v Coleman [1944] HCA 36; (1944) 69 CLR 457, 471 (Dixon J). Another way of expressing the idea of objective intention or purpose is by reference to the 'mischief' which a law addresses: see Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 160 (Gummow J); Richardson v Forestry Commission [1988] HCA 10; (1988) 164 CLR 261, 311 (Deane J); Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1 ('Communist Party Case'), 273 (Kitto J).
[112] [1925] HCA 53; (1925) 37 CLR 36, 135, cited with approval in Communist Party Case [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1, 269 (Fullagar J); Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 443–4 [157] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56; (1993) 178 CLR 408, 469 (McHugh J); R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 548 [15] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
[113] W D Popkin, Statutes in Court — The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (1999) 211, cited in Eastman v The Queen [2000] HCA 29; (2000) 203 CLR 1, 46 (McHugh J).
[114] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381 [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Indeed the 'purpose' of the law so identified might conceivably be quite different from the subjective purpose of those, or some of those, who enacted it.
[115] Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11; (1985) 159 CLR 70, 148–9 (Deane J).
[116] [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1.
[117] Ibid 258 (Fullagar J).
[118] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562.
[120] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 648 [255]–[256].
[121] Ibid 648 [255]. See text accompanying nn 185–204.
[122] See text accompanying above nn 14–20.
[123] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 647 [253].
[124] See Leask v Commonwealth [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR 579, 591 (Brennan CJ), 600–4 (Dawson J), 613–16 (Toohey J, Gaudron J agreeing), 616–17 (McHugh J), 624 (Gummow J); cf 634–5 (Kirby J); Theophanous v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 18; (2006) 225 CLR 101, 128 [69]–[70] (Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). At least that is so where no question of 'incidental power' characterisation arises. See also New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 52; (2006) 81 ALJR 34, 80–81 [144]–[145], 88 [183], 91 [198] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), holding that the same test is to be applied in respect of a power which takes as its subject matter a class of persons.
[125] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 584 [45].
[127] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 647–8 [253]–[256], 650–1 [267]. See text accompanying above nn 120–3.
[128] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 658–9 [290]–[291], 660–1 [294]–[295]. See text accompanying below nn 142–
47.
[129] Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 32 [77]
[130] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 71 (McHugh J) (emphasis added).
[131] Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 33 [78] (emphasis added).
[132] Ibid 33 [78].
[133] Ibid 34 [80]. Cf Vasiljkovic [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399, 1412 [41] (Gleeson CJ).
[134] See S157 ( 2003) 211 CLR 476, 484 [9] (Gleeson CJ), 505 [73] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
[135] [1975] HCA 45; (1975) 134 CLR 559, 622 (Jacobs J), 607 (Mason J).
[136] [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322, 366 [80]. Cf Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 66 [184] (Kirby J).
[137] Communist Party Case ([1951] HCA 5; 1951) 83 CLR 1.
[138] But cf Communist Party Case [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1, 240 (Webb J): 'If this Act is to be held valid it is because it is only preventative. If the measures taken by this act were punitive they would call for the exercise of judicial power.'
[139] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 586 [50] (footnotes added). Gummow and Kirby JJ, who referred to the Communist Party Case in Al-Kateb did not suggest that it had any specific relevance to aliens or to Ch III of the Constitution. See Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 599 [88], 613 [140] (Gummow J), 616 [149], 618 [155] (Kirby J).
[140] Communist Party Case [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J), 222 (Williams J), 243 (Webb J), 258 (Fullagar J), 272–5 (Kitto J).
[141] (2004) 225 CLR 1, 32 [75]–[76].
[142] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 659 [291]; see also 661 [298].
[143] On this interpretation, the 'formal and unequivocal abandon[ment]' of that purpose might be interpreted as an indication that, in the event that the legislation were supportable only because the detention could be said to be for the purpose of deportation, then it was the intention of the Parliament that it should have no operation at all.
[144] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 660–1 [295], 662 [299].
[145] Ibid 660 [294].
[146] Ibid.
[147] Cf the analysis of Callinan J's judgment in Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 32 [75] (McHugh J):
Callinan J referred to the joint judgment in Lim. But nothing in his Honour's judgment suggests that he took the view that the validity of a law that authorises detention depends on whether the law is 'reasonably capable of being seen as necessary' to achieve a legitimate non-punitive end.
(One might have thought that Callinan J would have positively indicated if he had intended to depart from a previous decision of the Court.)
[149] Ibid 84 [256].
[150] Ibid.
[151] Kirk, above n 87, 5–9.
[152] Ibid 7.
[153] Ibid 7, 29.
[154] Ibid 41, citing Actors and Announcers Equity v Fontana Films Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 23; (1982) 150 CLR 169, 192 (Stephen J).
[155] See Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 31 [31] (Gleeson CJ), 51 [98], 53 [100] (McHugh J). Some degree of deference to the judgment of the Parliament is in keeping with the High Court's longstanding insistence that the policy of a law is a matter for the Parliament: see Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 344–5 (Barton J); Marcus Clark & Co Ltd v Commonwealth [1952] HCA 50; (1952) 87 CLR 177, 256 (Fullagar J); Herald and Weekly Times v Commonwealth [1966] HCA 78; (1966) 115 CLR 418, 437 (Kitto J); Richardson v Forestry Commission [1988] HCA 10; (1988) 164 CLR 261, 310 (Deane J). See also Stone, above n 106.
[156] [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1.
[157] Cf the example of killing all sheep to prevent the spread of sheep disease: Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; (1983) 158 CLR 1, 260–1 (Deane J).
[158] [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 82 [210], 86 [222], 90–1 [234]–[236]; cf 32 [33] (Gleeson CJ), pointing out that the argument had proceeded on the basis that 'appropriate and adapted' was the accepted form of the test, and that it had been assumed that the application of a test of 'proportionality' would not have produced a different result in that case; Mulholland [2004] HCA 41; (2004) 220 CLR 181, 199–200 [39] (Gleeson CJ).
[159] Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 82 [210], 86 [222], 90–1 [234]–[236].
[160] Ibid 110 [292].
[161] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 33, 34 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) (emphasis added); cf 71 (McHugh J), where he used the expression 'reasonably necessary', 58 (Gaudron J), where she appears to have used 'capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted' and 'reasonably necessary' interchangeably.
[162] Cf Mulholland [2004] HCA 41; (2004) 220 CLR 181, 199–200 [39] (Gleeson CJ).
[163] [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567. But cf Levy v Victoria [1997] HCA 31; (1997) 189 CLR 579, 598 (Brennan CJ) (defining the Court's role as asking 'whether the means adopted could reasonably be considered to be appropriate and adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose'), 615 (Toohey J).
[164] [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 31 [31] (Gleeson CJ), 48 [87] (McHugh J), 78 [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 82 [212] (Kirby J); Mulholland [2004] HCA 41; (2004) 220 CLR 181, 251–2 [203], 266 [248] (Kirby J). Cf discussion in Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2003] FCAFC 91; (2003) 128 FCR 523, 534 [31] (Black CJ, Weinberg and Selway JJ).
[165] [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 82 [212].
[166] Obviously the same could not be said if the word 'reasonably' were omitted. Cf Richardson v Forestry Commission [1988] HCA 10; (1988) 164 CLR 261, 312 (Deane J):
In my view, it is not necessary for this Court to be persuaded that the particular provisions are, in fact, appropriate and adapted to the designated purpose or object. That is a matter for the Parliament. Obviously, the relevant requirement will be satisfied if the Court is so persuaded. As I have indicated however, it will, in my view, suffice if it appears to the Court that the relevant provisions are capable of being reasonably considered to be so appropriate and adapted.
See also Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11; (1985) 159 CLR 70, 149 (Deane J).
[167] The question of which objects are 'legitimate' is not confined to this area of constitutional law. A similar question has arisen in the context of the freedom of political communication, particularly in relation to whether 'civility of discourse' is a legitimate object: cf Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 79 [199] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); see also 24 [9] (Gleeson CJ), 54 [104]–[105] (McHugh J), 112 [297] (Callinan J), 121–2 [322]–[325] (Heydon J).
[168] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 651 [267] (emphasis added).
[169] Ibid 659 [291], where Callinan J spoke of 'some other purpose under the aliens or indeed the immigration power'.
[170] Leask v Commonwealth [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR 579, 591 (Brennan CJ).
[171] See Consolidated Press Ltd v Australian Journalists' Association [1947] HCA 11; (1947) 73 CLR 549, 559–60 (Latham CJ and McTiernan J), 561 (Rich and Williams JJ), 564 (Starke J); Mellifont v A-G (Qld) [1991] HCA 53; (1991) 173 CLR 289, 300 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), 312 (Brennan J).
[172] When Hayne J spoke of gleaning legitimate objects from the head of power, he should perhaps be understood as meaning that objects are to be assessed having regard to the peculiar features attendant upon the status of the persons affected; in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, the appellant's status as an alien.
[173] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 29.
[174] Singh v Commonwealth [2004] HCA 43; (2004) 222 CLR 322, 395 [190] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Koroitamana (an Infant by her next friend Naikelekele) v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 28; (2006) 80 ALJR 1146, 1150 [15] (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J), 1152 [31], [34] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). The applicant in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562 was a stateless person but was nevertheless regarded as an 'alien' for the purposes of s 51(xix).
[175] Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 29–31 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); Behrooz (2004) 219 CLR 446, 492–3 [20]–[21] (Gleeson CJ); Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 12–13 [18], 14 [24], 15 [28] (Gleeson CJ); Robtelmes v Brenan [1906] HCA 58; (1906) 4 CLR 395; Ah Yin v Christie [1907] HCA 25; (1907) 4 CLR 1428, 1431 (Griffith CJ), 1433 (Barton J); Ferrando v Pearce [1918] HCA 47; (1918) 25 CLR 241, 253 (Barton J); R v Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 QB 243, 300–1 (Lord Denning MR), referring to Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 1 (1765), 259–60. Incidentally, it will be noticed that the legislative classification of certain aliens as 'unlawful' is of no constitutional significance.
[176] See text accompanying above nn 49–69.
[177] See text accompanying above nn 29–38.
[178] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27.
[179] R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74, 111–12; Cunliffe v Commonwealth [1994] HCA 44; (1994) 182 CLR 272, 298–9, 327–8, 335–6; Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 500–1 [51]–[53]. See also the Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rasul v Bush [2004] USSC 2809; 542 US 466 (2004).
[180] [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 611–12 [78] (footnote in original; citations altered). This passage has since been referred to with approval in Vasiljkovic [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399, 1418 [83]–[84] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, Heydon J agreeing).
[181] DJL v The Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; (2001) 201 CLR 226, 277–80 [134]–[138] (Kirby J), 240 [21] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Vasiljkovic [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399, 1410–11 [35] (Gleeson CJ), 1413 [48] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, Heydon J agreeing).
[182] Perhaps the most obvious example is the extradition of a citizen to face charges in the court of a foreign country: see Barton v Commonwealth [1974] HCA 20; (1974) 131 CLR 477, 503 (Mason J) ('Detention inevitably is an incident in the process of extradition'); Vasiljkovic [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399, 1411 [37] (Gleeson CJ).
[183] For example, Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 12 and 29 provide for the issue of a provisional arrest warrant following an application on behalf of an extradition country for the extradition of an extraditable person. Sections 15 and 33 provide for the remand in custody of persons awaiting extradition. See R v Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 QB 243, 299–300 (Lord Denning MR).
[184] However, the time taken for relevant decisions to be made in connection with an extradition request may still result in detention for substantial periods, as was the case in Vasiljkovic [2006] HCA 40; (2006) 80 ALJR 1399: see 1415 [62] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 1425 [133]–[135] (Kirby J). Nevertheless, the situation may be contrasted with the legislation in issue in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664 and Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70; (2003) 126 FCR 54, which authorised continuing detention for an indefinite term pending an event which was found to have 'no real likelihood or prospect' of occurring 'in the reasonably foreseeable future'.
[185] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562. For more detailed discussion of the circumstances giving rise to this case and closer analyses of the statutory construction argument, see Zagor, above n 58; James Allan, 'Do the Right Thing Judging? The High Court of Australia in Al-Kateb' [2005] UQLawJl 1; (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 1; Dan Meagher, 'The "Tragic" High Court Decisions in Al-Kateb and Al Khafaji: Triumph of the "Plain Fact" Interpretive Approach and Constitutional Form Over Substance' (2005) 7 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 69; Dennis Rose, 'The High Court Decisions in Al Kateb and Al Khafaji — a Different Perspective' (2005) 8 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 58.
[186] [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664.
[187] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 645 [247], 648 [255], 649 [259]. See also Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 542 [171] (Hayne J); Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 36 [222] (Hayne J). See also Rose, above n 185, 62.
[188] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 576 [17] (Gleeson CJ), 584–5 [45]–[46], 586 [49], 595 [74] (McHugh J), 658 [289] (Callinan J). See also Behrooz [2004] HCA 36; (2004) 219 CLR 486, 498–9 [20] (Gleeson CJ).
[189] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 600 [92], 609 [126]–[127], 613–14 [140].
[191] Ibid 52 [137].
[192] Ibid 54 [146].
[193] Ibid 54–5 [147]–[148].
[194] Ibid 75–6 [223] (Hayne J).
[195] Ibid [222] (Hayne J).
[196] [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 597–8 [85] (Gummow J).
[197] [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664.
[198] Cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Te (2002) 212 CLR 162, 212 [183] (Kirby J); Robtelmes v Brenan [1906] HCA 58; (1906) 4 CLR 395, 413 (Barton J), quoting from Fong Yue Ting v United States [1893] USSC 185; 149 US 698 (1893).
[199] (2004) 225 CLR 1, 14 [26].
[200] Ibid, 27 [27] (Gleeson CJ); see also 34–5 [81] (McHugh J).
[201] (1992) 176 CLR 1, 71:
[I]mprisonment of a person who is the subject of a deportation order is not ordinarily punitive in nature because the purpose of the imprisonment is to ensure that the deportee is excluded from the community pending his or her removal from the country. Likewise, the lawful imprisonment of an alien while that person's application for entry is being determined is not punitive in character because the purpose of the imprisonment is to prevent the alien from entering into the community until the determination is made. (Emphasis added.)
[202] Ibid 33–4.
[203] Cf, div 105 of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which authorises a senior member of the Australian Federal Police to make an 'initial preventative detention order' which lasts for a maximum of 24 hours. The period of detention may be extended up to a total of 48 hours by a 'continued preventative detention order', issued by a consenting Judge, Federal Magistrate, AAT member or retired Judge. Complementary State legislation permits the further extension of detention by State Supreme Courts, up to a total of 14 days: see, eg, Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2A.
[204] Additional considerations, such as the risk to the alien of returning to another country that was prepared to accept them, might also be relevant factors to be considered.
[205] Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 659 [291] (Callinan J).
[206] As to the availability of exemplary or punitive damages under the common law of tort in Australia, see Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 40; (1966) 117 CLR 118 and Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1966] HCA 37; (1966) 117 CLR 185. In contrast, 'aggravated' damages are theoretically compensatory, and are awarded for indignity suffered by the plaintiff.
[207] Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 37; (1985) 156 CLR 522, 527.
[208] H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v Queensland [1998] HCA 54; (1998) 195 CLR 547, 562 [15]; Brandy [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 258 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro [1926] HCA 58; (1926) 38 CLR 153, 175 (Isaacs J); Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2003] NSWCA 151; (2003) 57 NSWLR 212, 238 [126]–[127] (Spigelman CJ), 241 [147] (Mason P).
[209] For a philosophical critique of such an institution ('telishment'), see Rawls, above n 20, 9–11.
[210] (2004) 225 CLR 1, 26 [61].
[211] See text accompanying above nn 110–17.
[212] See text accompanying above n 45.
[213] Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1; Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562; Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 219 CLR 664; (2004) 219 CLR 486; Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575; Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1.
[214] Cf submissions by David Bennett QC, Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth in Behrooz v Secretary, Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCATrans 456, 30 and Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (by their next friend GS) [2004] HCATrans 2, 62; cf Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers v Commonwealth (Industrial Lighting Regulations Case) [1943] HCA 22; (1943) 67 CLR 413, 416 (Latham CJ), 422 (Starke J), suggesting that a power to close a business which had failed to comply with industrial lighting standards was a judicial power.
[215] [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 612 [79].
[216] Re Nolan; Ex parte Young [1991] HCA 29; (1991) 172 CLR 460, 497 (Gaudron J).
[217] See Robtelmes v Brenan [1906] HCA 58; (1906) 4 CLR 395, 407 (Barton J).
[218] It may be possible to formulate legislation authorising the killing of a person which could be regarded as appropriate and adapted to a non-punitive purpose although the threat is not immediate: cf Schedule 4, Part 1 of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 (Cth) as first introduced, which provided for the insertion of the following provision into the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth):
An AFP member must not, in the course of taking a person into custody or detaining a person under a preventative detention order:
(a) do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, the person unless the AFP member believes on reasonable grounds that the thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to another person (including the AFP member); or
(b) if the person is attempting to escape being taken into custody by fleeing—do such a thing unless:
(i) the AFP member believes on reasonable grounds that doing that thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to another person (including the AFP member); and
(ii) the person has, if practicable, been called on to surrender and the AFP member believes on reasonable grounds that the person cannot be apprehended in any other manner.
[219] Incidentally, this is consistent with the requirement of Article 6.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), which requires judicial control of the death penalty.
[220] Osborne v Commonwealth [1911] HCA 19; (1911) 12 CLR 321; Radio Corporation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1938] HCA 9; (1938) 59 CLR 170; Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1965] HCA 64; (1965) 114 CLR 1; Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth [1993] HCA 12; (1993) 176 CLR 555.
[221] Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth [1993] HCA 12; (1993) 176 CLR 555, 569 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
[222] MacCormick v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1984] HCA 20; (1984) 158 CLR 622, 640–1 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ).
[223] [1908] HCA 43; (1908) 6 CLR 41.
[224] Cf Divisions 284, 286 and 288 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), which has effect by reason of s 3AA of that Act. The reference to taxation imposed under these sections as 'penalty tax' might lend support to the view that the imposition of such tax should be characterised as exclusively judicial punishment.
[225] [1908] HCA 43; (1908) 6 CLR 41, 99 (dissenting) (footnote added). See also Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] HCA 9; (1994) 179 CLR 155, 202 (Dawson and Toohey JJ); Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth [1993] HCA 12; (1993) 176 CLR 555, 571 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 588 (Dawson J, McHugh J agreeing); MacCormick v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1984] HCA 20; (1984) 158 CLR 622, 639 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ); Zines, above n 32, 35–6, 209.
[226] [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150. See also Nicholas v The Queen [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208–9 [74] (Gaudron J).
[227] Huddart Parker & Co Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ).
[228] Tasmanian Breweries [1970] HCA 8; (1970) 123 CLR 361, 374 (Kitto J).
[229] See, eg, Justice Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution protect substantive as well as procedural rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235; Fiona Wheeler, 'Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205; Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).
[230] Cf Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 134 (Gummow J):
The Act requires the Supreme Court to inflict punishment without any anterior finding of criminal guilt by application of the law to past events, being the facts as found. Such an activity is said to be repugnant to the judicial process. I agree.
[231] The concept of 'arbitrary detention' at international law, and particularly under Art 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), may be significantly broader: see Tania Penovic, 'Immigration Detention of Children: Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty' (2003–04) [2003] NewcLawRw 11; 7 Newcastle Law Review 56.
[232] Cf Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 078, 371–2 [16543]–[16569], where Gummow J suggested that '[i]t is not an absence of power. It is a question of location of power.'
[233] [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575.
[234] The argument sought to evoke the principle established in Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51. The principle is discussed in text accompanying below nn 289–306.
[235] Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 613 [84].
[236] Ibid 614 [85] (emphasis added).
[237] Ibid 631 [145]; see also 637–8 [164]–[165].
[238] Ibid 658 [234].
[239] Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 162 (Gummow J); Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 33 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ), 46 (Toohey J), 55, 58 (Gaudron J), 65, 71 (McHugh J).
[240] See also Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 657 [225] (Callinan and Heydon JJ):
The yardstick to which the Court is to have regard, of an unacceptable risk to the community, relevantly a risk established according to a high degree of probability, that the prisoner will commit another sexual offence if released, established on and by acceptable and cogent evidence, adduced according to the rules of evidence, is one which courts historically have had regard to in many areas of the law. The process of reaching a predictive conclusion about risk is not a novel one.
It is suggested that this passage was not intended to suggest that the court was exercising judicial power, but merely that the manner of the exercise of the power, and the steps involved in it, were not foreign to the judicial process.
[241] Ibid 648 [197]. This seems to be consistent with Hayne J's discussion of punishment in Al-Kateb [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, 650 [265].
[242] Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 591 [18].
[243] Ibid 596–7 [34] (footnotes in original).
[244] Tasmanian Breweries [1970] HCA 8; (1970) 123 CLR 361, 375 (Kitto J).
[245] M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69, 78.
[246] As to the need for issues to be defined with sufficient precision to involve an exercise of federal judicial power, see R v Spicer; Ex parte Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia [1957] HCA 96; (1957) 100 CLR 312, 319 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ).
[247] See In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ); Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 603 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ): a matter involves 'a justiciable controversy, identifiable independently of the proceedings which are brought for its determination' (emphasis added).
[248] Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner [1995] HCA 16; (1995) 183 CLR 323 ('Re Dingjan').
[249] Ibid 360 (citations omitted).
[250] (1991) 173 CLR 167.
[251] Ibid 191 (citations omitted).
[252] [1970] HCA 8; (1970) 123 CLR 361.
[253] Ibid 375 (emphasis added).
[254] Ibid 373 (Kitto J).
[255] R v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353, 368 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); Mellifont v A-G (Qld) [1991] HCA 53; (1991) 173 CLR 289, 314–15 (Brennan J); Peacock v Newtown Marrickville and General Cooperative Building Society No 4 Ltd [1943] HCA 13; (1943) 67 CLR 25, 35 (Latham CJ).
[256] [1945] HCA 50; (1945) 70 CLR 141 ('Barrett').
[257] Ibid 165–6.
[258] Ibid 159–60 (Starke J); see also 162–3 (Dixon J): 'The section thus provides for two separate and distinct proceedings. The first results in the imposition of a duty, breach of which is punishable. The second deals with the penal consequences.'
[259] See the example from 9 Geo I, c 19, given in Barrett [1945] HCA 50; (1945) 70 CLR 141, 166 (Dixon J). See also Criminal Code Act 1995 sch 1 s 104.4(1) and particularly s 104.4(1)(c)(ii), which might be defended on this basis: Thomas v Mowbray [2006] HCA Trans 660; [2006] HCA Trans 661; [2007] HCATrans 076; [2007] HCATrans 078. The legislation considered in Chu Shao Hung [1953] HCA 33; (1953) 87 CLR 575 illustrates the point: it provided for a penalty of '[i]mprisonment for six months and, in addition to or in substitution for such imprisonment, deportation from the Commonwealth pursuant to an order made in that behalf by the Minister'. It would have been possible to express, as separate powers, the judicial imposition of a penalty for breach of the criminal law, and the deportation to be imposed at the discretion of the Minister but on the precondition of a judicial finding of guilt.
[260] Cf Polyukhovich [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501. The implicit duty might be defined as a duty not to have engaged in particular conduct (ie, a perfect obligation). Cf the duty imposed by the legislation considered in Chu Shao Hung [1953] HCA 33; (1953) 87 CLR 575, not to be a 'prohibited immigrant', which status was in turn dependent upon failure to pass a test.
[261] Cf Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 614 [85] (Gummow J).
[262] See text accompanying below nn 283–306.
[263] See, eg, Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA); Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) pt 4 div 7; Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA); Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT) pt 2. Such powers are usually treated as quasi-criminal, proceedings being initiated by complaint. Note that the constitutional character of such orders may differ if they form part of the sentencing process following a judicial finding of guilt: see, eg, Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18B; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 163; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 98; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19.
[264] See, eg, Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) s 3A (definition of 'registrable person') and Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW).
[265] Under the Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT), a restraining order may be made by the Court, the Clerk of the Court, a Magistrate or police officer: see ss 4–6B.
[266] Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348, 359–60 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 389 (Gummow J); Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427, 444 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Love v A-G (NSW) (1990) 169 CLR 307, 320–1 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Ousley v The Queen [1997] HCA 49; (1997) 192 CLR 69, 84–5 (Toohey J), 87 (Gaudron J), 99–100 (McHugh J), 121, 124, 130 (Gummow J), 140, 145–6 (Kirby J).
[267] R v Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section [1951] HCA 3; (1951) 82 CLR 208, 248 (Dixon J); R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union [1983] HCA 35; (1983) 153 CLR 415, 419 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). See also S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 489 [21], 493 [34] (Gleeson CJ), 503 [66], 506 [76] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
[268] That is so because the Parliament cannot grant to an administrative officer a jurisdiction inconsistent with the Constitution, including the separation of judicial power.
[269] In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; (1921) 29 CLR 257.
[270] See Djalic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 292, 309 [66] (Tamberlin, Sackville and Stone JJ).
[271] Boilermakers [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254, 278 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). See also New South Wales v Commonwealth [1915] HCA 17; (1915) 20 CLR 54, 90 (Isaacs J); Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v Thornton [1953] HCA 11; (1953) 87 CLR 144, 151 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ).
[272] Historically, it may be more accurate to identify the court's power as a power to admit to bail a prisoner detained by the executive: see Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 28 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ), citing Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 4 (17th ed, 1830) [298]. However, nothing turns on this formal difference, and it is clear that courts now exercise the power to remand a prisoner in custody.
[273] Cf Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 24 [58] (McHugh J). For examples of legislation authorising the detention of the mentally impaired following trial, see Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 647; Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) ch 3 pt 7; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) pt 8A; Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) ss 23–4, 27; Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) pts 4, 5; Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) pt 5; Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas) pt 4. The mandatory detention of defendants acquitted on grounds of insanity was first provided for by the Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 (UK), 39 & 40 Geo 3, c 94 (enacted following the acquittal of James Hatfield for the attempted murder of King George III). Prior to 1800, trial courts appear to have assumed a discretionary power to imprison mentally ill defendants who were acquitted: see J M Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660–1800 (1986) 84.
[274] Cf R v Parks [1992] 2 SCR 871.
[275] See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 4 (1769) 251–2; Justices of the Peace Act 1361 (UK), 34 Edw 3, c 1; Lansbury v Riley [1914] 3 KB 229; R v County of London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee; Ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1948] 1 KB 670.
[276] Blackstone, above n 275, 252; R v County of London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee; Ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1948] 1 KB 670, 676–7 (Lord Goddard CJ).
[277] See, eg, Justices of the Peace Act 1883–4 (SA), 46 & 47 Vic, ss 16, 2, 29; Justices Act 1921 (SA), Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 126A; Justices Act 1928 (NT) s 99. The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 101 appears to assume that such a power resides in the court rather than justices personally.
[278] R v County of London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee; Ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1948] 1 KB 670, 674–6 (Lord Goddard CJ); R v Sandbach; Ex parte Williams [1935] 2 KB 192, 197 (Humphreys J); Chu Shao Hung v The Queen [1953] HCA 33; (1953) 87 CLR 575, 589–90 (Kitto J).
[279] Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 530 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), citing Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; (1986) 161 CLR 98, 107–8 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ); In re Freston (1883) LR 11 QBD 545; In re Grantham Wholesale Fruit, Vegetable and Potato Merchants Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 559.
[280] Hinch v A-G (Vic) [1987] HCA 56; (1987) 164 CLR 15, 49 (Deane J); Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 534 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
[281] Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21; (1965) 112 CLR 483, 498–9 (Windeyer J).
[282] Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 530, 532–4 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
[283] [1985] HCA 16; (1985) 157 CLR 57; confirmed in Jones v Commonwealth (1987) 61 ALJR 348.
[284] [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348.
[285] Ibid 364–5 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), referring to Mistretta v United States, [1989] USSC 9; 488 US 361, 404 (1989).
[286] Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348, 364–5 (Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Hilton v Wells [1985] HCA 16; (1985) 157 CLR 57, 83 (Mason and Deane JJ).
[287] Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365; see also Hilton v Wells [1985] HCA 16; (1985) 157 CLR 57, 73–4 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ), 83 (Mason and Deane JJ).
[288] [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17–20 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[290] See John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36; (2000) 203 CLR 503, 518–19 [18]–[19], 529–31 [51]–[54], 532 [58] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2004] HCA 31; (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [28] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Putland v The Queen [2004] HCA 8; (2004) 218 CLR 174, 178 [4] (Gleeson CJ), 187–8 [33] (Gummow and Heydon JJ, Callinan J agreeing), 199 [73] (Kirby J).
[291] Kable (1996) 189 CLR 53, 103 (Gaudron J). The capacity of State courts to determine exactly the same matters in the exercise of their non-federal jurisdiction (a power which they would retain, had the power in s 77(ii) not been exercised with respect to those matters) may present a difficulty for this justification of the Kable principle. Cf 142 (Gummow J):
decisions of the State courts, whether or not given in the exercise of invested jurisdiction, yield 'matters' which found appeals to this Court under s 73(ii). By this means, the judicial power of the Commonwealth is engaged, at least prospectively, across the range of litigation pursued in the courts of the States. (emphasis added).
[292] Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 618 [103] (Gummow J); cf Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J), 103–4 (Gaudron J), 127 (Gummow J).
[293] [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348.
[294] [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1.
[295] But see Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 117–18 (McHugh J).
[296] Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 390 (Gummow J); Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J), 121 (McHugh J), 128, 143 (Gummow J); Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 373 [116] (Kirby J); Silbert v DPP (WA) [2004] HCA 9; (2004) 217 CLR 181, 197 [49] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2004] HCA 31; (2004) 218 CLR 146, 172 [65] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Baker v The Queen [2004] HCA 45; (2004) 223 CLR 513, 519 (Gleeson CJ), 534 [51] (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 591 [15] (Gleeson CJ), 598 [37], 601 [43] (McHugh J), 617–618 [101]–[102] (Gummow J), 628 [141] (Kirby J), 648 [198] (Hayne J); APLA [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322, 365 [78] (McHugh J); Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44; (2006) 80 ALJR 1606, 1618 [41] (Gleeson CJ, Callinan J agreeing), 1623 [63] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ), 1634 [125], 1653 [195] (Kirby J), 1663 [244] (Heydon J).
[297] [1985] HCA 16; (1985) 157 CLR 57.
[298] [1995] HCA 26; (1995) 184 CLR 348.
[299] Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 65 (Brennan CJ), 77–80 (Dawson J), 92–4 (Toohey J), 109 (McHugh J), 142 (Gummow J). See also the cases cited in argument: 57, fn 28.
[300] Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575.
[301] Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 13.
[302] Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 619 [108].
[303] Cf Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 643–4 [182] (Kirby J).
[304] Wilson [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17–18 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[305] R v Moffat [1998] 2 VR 229, 260 (Charles JA), referred to in Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575, 586 [2] (Gleeson CJ).
[306] Kable [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51, 132 (Gummow J).
[307] Pasini v United Mexican States (2002) 209 CLR 246, 253–4 [12] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[308] As was the case under the State legislation considered in Fardon [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575. See also Djalic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 292, 309 [66] (Tamberlin, Sackville and Stone JJ).