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Alternative Law Journal |
Bryan Keon-Cohen QC
Bryan Keon-Cohen is currently Adjunct
Professor, Law Faculty, Monash University, and Principal Legal Officer Mirimbiac
Nations Aboriginal Corporation (the native title representative body for
Victoria) and is on leave of absence from the Victorian Bar. He was the founding
editor of the Legal Service Bulletin.
Viewing national
developments over 25 years, one is struck with the realisation that all things
change, but some things remain the same. Twenty-five years ago — 1974
— this journal hit the streets for the first time, as a roneoed A4
newsletter for about 70 members of the Fitzroy Legal Service. Look at us
now!
In 1974 the national ‘land rights’ scene was in its struggling
infancy. The Whitlam government was still in power; Woodward’s Reports
following the failed Gove Case[1] were completed and a land rights Bill for the Northern Territory
was being drafted. In the Territory, ‘needs’ claims concerning the
Alice Springs town camps were being heard by Ward J but with the fall of the
Whitlam government in November 1975, Ward J’s commission expired and his
report was never completed.
By 1974, South Australia was leading all
jurisdictions following the Dunstan government’s introduction of the
Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 (SA) which created the Aboriginal Lands
Trust of South Australia. The Trust held title in existing Aboriginal reserves
and provided that statutory royalties from mineral exploration on reserve land
could be paid, and used to acquire further land. There was no hint of a claims
process. Queensland in 1974 continued the much criticised Aboriginal reserves
system under the Land Act 1962 (Qld). The confrontation with the
Commonwealth over Aurukun and Mornington Island was still four years
away[2] and the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) was still a year away. The other States
had likewise determinedly ignored calls for specific land rights legislation
although all (save Tasmania) provided for Aboriginal reserves, some of which
were available for grant under statutory
schemes.[3]
Further afield,
the Australian Law Reform Commission was about to receive its reference on the
recognition of Aboriginal customary law; the Indigenous Law Centre at the
University of New South Wales was not even thought of; no ‘indigenous
law’ texts or university courses were in existence. The notion of
‘reconciliation’ was unknown; ATSIC was unthought of; and Eddie Mabo
was living in Townsville, working on the establishment of the first black
primary school. Henry Reynolds had written none of his seminal historical/legal
studies; the Aboriginal Legal Services were only just in place and, along with
the community legal services like Fitzroy, were viewed suspiciously by, and
considered a direct threat to, the mainstream profession. Lionel Murphy was
Commonwealth Attorney-General and had just introduced the Australian Legal Aid
Office. He used to attend annual editorial policy meetings of the Legal
Service Bulletin in the Fitzroy Town Hall, where he would say
energetic and encouraging things, then leap back into his white ‘Com
car’ and head off to his next meeting. Nobody spoke about
‘constitutional preambles’ (nor was ‘indigenous’ in
vogue) but Dr Nuggett Coombs’ Aboriginal Treaty Committee was about to be
formed.[4] The High Court had said
little about native title, save in two Papua New-Guinea
cases.[5]
Twenty-five years later, much has changed, but much remains the same. As to
‘land rights’ in the States and Territories, some significant
initiatives should be mentioned. In one way or another, each of the States and
mainland Territories have now introduced their own ‘land rights’
schemes of sorts.[6] In summary, all
jurisdictions have introduced schemes where areas of Crown land of various
categories is vested in Aboriginal or Islander corporations, usually in trust,
in fee, for the use and benefit of local communities. The scope of land so
conveyed varies, from very little in Western Australia, to extensive areas in
South Australia and the Northern Territory. This process involves no claims
before a tribunal or court. The vesting of land is achieved by the relevant
statute and/or executive proclamations and grants.
The Northern
Territory,[7] New South
Wales[8] and
Queensland[9] have established
additional statewide claims processes, with varying degrees of success. In New
South Wales, since 1983, claims are made to the Minister, concerning limited
categories of Crown land. In the Northern Territory, since 1976, and in
Queensland since 1991, claims to Crown land variously described are made to a
tribunal, which makes recommendations to the relevant Minister. A sunset clause
was recently inserted into the Northern Territory scheme and, after 25 years of
operation, it is in its closing phases. The Queensland and New South Wales
schemes continue.
The bases of claim differ among these jurisdictions.
The Territory Act requires ‘traditional ownership’ to be shown.
Across the border, Queensland’s legislation speaks of claims based on
traditional affiliation, historical association, and economic or cultural
viability. Further south, the New South Wales Act provides no such bases for
claim: the issue rather is whether the land falls within statutory definitions
of ‘claimable Crown lands’ such that it is available for claim at
all, or whether the statute and Ministerial discretions exclude it from claim,
for example, as land required for other ‘essential public purposes’
of various types — recreation, conservation, and such like. This New South
Wales scheme has been criticised for delivering very little over the years. One
novel and useful feature of it, however, is the requirement that 7.5% of State
land tax paid for the years 1984–1998 be paid into a special fund to
enable the purchase of land on the open market and the funding of land councils.
This might be seen as an equivalent of the federal land fund, mentioned
below.
Following 200 or so years of piecemeal efforts or complete neglect by
Australian governments, the High Court, on 2 June 1992, delivered a national,
though fragile, land rights scheme of its own: Mabo No 2 (1992) 175 CLR
1. Following two years of debate, much of it, at least at the political
level, singularly unedifying, the Keating government produced a three-pronged
response: the Native Title Act 1993; a land acquisition fund; and a
social justice package. The last-mentioned has sunk without trace: the first two
are still with us, though in depleted form. Thus the era of ‘native
title’ was born.
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the Act) came into operation
on 1 January 1994, and is now five years old. These years have been full of
action, though not much of it has involved the ultimate objects of the Act:
delivering land to its traditional owners. The Act has been subjected to a
constitutional challenge which
failed;[10] has been significantly
amended as of 30 September 1998 following the Wik decision in the High
Court;[11] has been the subject of
continuing vigorous public debate and, in some sectors of the community,
controversy. It has had several key provisions and issues at least partly
clarified by the Federal and High
Courts.[12]
In addition, as at 30 September
1998,[13] a total of 3707
applications of various types[14]
had been filed with the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT). These
claims break down as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
|
Type
|
Lodged by 29.9.98
|
Accepted by 29.9.98
|
|
Claimant (ie, for a determination of native title)
|
878
|
488
|
|
Non-claimant (eg, by a non-indigenous person seeking a
determination that no native title exists over a particular area)
|
158
|
51
|
|
Compensation (ie, for a determination that compensation is payable
by the Commonwealth, State or Territory for extinguishment or impairment of
native title due to its activity)
|
31
|
7
|
|
Future act (eg, that a proposed grant of an interest – eg a
mining tenement — may be done, or done on terms and conditions)
|
458
(169 withdrawn) |
187
|
|
Objections (eg, by claimants to a proposed future activity by
government or a grantee (eg, of a mining tenement)
|
2182
(646 withdrawn, 490 determined, 338 awaiting acceptance) |
1730
|
Of the above 878 claims for a determination of native title, at 30
September 1998:[15]
| • | 709 were currently before the NNTT |
| • | 58 were referred to the Federal Court for trial, |
| • | 19 were rejected by the NNTT, |
| • | 89 were withdrawn by applicants, |
| • | 4 had achieved decisions concerning determinations of native title (including Mabo), and |
| • | Western Australia recorded 42%; Queensland 30%; New South Wales 15%; Northern Territory 5%; Victoria 4%; ACT 1% and Tasmania 0%. |
Four major trials for a determination of
native title have been completed, three of which have now been the subject
of decisions —
Yarmirr,[16] Miriawung
Gajerong,[17] and
Yorta Yorta.[18] A fourth trial
— Alice Springs[19] —
has now been completed and the delivery of judgment by Olney J is
awaited. At 30 September 1998, 58 claims for a determination of native title had
been referred into the Federal Court (under the unamended Act s.74), and are
proceeding towards trial.
Perhaps more importantly, it should be noted that at 30 September 1998, 1349 agreements of various sorts between native title claimants, governments, and/or third parties wishing to use the land, had been struck:
| • | 257 related to native title determination applications,[20] |
| • | 1092 were future act related agreements (for example, that the act could be done, on agreed terms and conditions), |
| • | 1051 related to Western Australia (97%),[21] and |
| • | there had been just six determinations of native title, all of them by agreement. |
A
great deal of mediation has occurred since 1994, both under the Act and outside
it — including some which has now led to an agreed determination of native
title. Thus, for example, two communities in the Torres Straits at Moa and
Saibai Islands achieved orders of a consent determination of native title early
in March 1999 — although the process took two to three years. These last
two occurred at a special sitting of the Federal Court in Cairns, after
arrangements to have the final hearing on the islands were literally washed away
by cyclonic weather! Similarly, the community at Hopevale in Queensland filed a
claim in July 1994 and achieved final consent orders about native title in
December 1997.
Some agreements, or at least in principle agreements
— local and regional — have been successfully negotiated and entered
into, demonstrating that the mediation provisions of the Act can, despite all
difficulties, deliver successful outcomes.
In addition, the NNTT has been established with 18 tribunal members. As at 30
September 1998, these comprised a president, four deputy presidents, and 13
part-time members. Around the country, the various offices of the Tribunal
employed 235 staff — from a base of just nine in
1994.[22] The Tribunal’s
1998/99 budget is $21.5 million, a figure ‘which has grown significantly
over the last five years to accommodate the growth in native title case
load’.[23] The term of the
first president of the NNTT — French J — has expired (after being
extended) and a new president — Mr Graham Neate — has been
appointed, from March 1999.
Further, 24 representative Aboriginal/Torres
Strait Islander bodies — that is, land councils — provided for under
Part 11 of the Act have been established, with boundaries determined, throughout
the country. Under the 1998 amendments, these are now being reviewed by the
Federal Minister, Senator Herron, and must await a decision by him as to whether
each is to be continued, and if so, in relation to what area.
The States have also enacted their own complementary legislation as provided
for by the Act, to extinguish native title and, in addition, some have moved, or
are moving to introduce further
legislation,[24] concerning their
own negotiation or claims procedures as allowed for in the 1998 amendments.
There is now a long list of such State and Territory laws. This process
continues into 1999, with Queensland, for example, planning to establish its own
tribunal to deal with mining applications and s.29 future act notification and
objection procedures by June 1999.
One might ask: what has all this
yelling and shouting delivered? Where are the successes and failures? What
immediate problems are emerging? Where is it all going? I shall focus here on
the native title claims process, that is, claims firstly for a determination of
native title, and secondly, for compensation.
The Registrar is now required to assess each of the 878 claims filed for
determination of native title against the new and stiffer registration
criteria[25] to ascertain whether
the claimants may exercise a limited ‘right to negotiate’ over the
claimed areas. He aims to complete this process by September 1999. However,
these deadlines can be drastically reduced if a government gives notice, under
s.29 of the Act, that it proposes to do a ‘future act’ over the
claim area, or part of it, for example, to grant a mining tenement to a third
party. On the publication of such a ‘s.29 notice’, various time
limits are applied to various situations. For example, for a new (post 30
September 1998) s.29 notice of intention to do a future act, the NNTT Registrar
has four months only from the date of publication to assess the claim and decide
whether it meets the new registration test criteria. If no native title claim
has been filed at the date of publication of the s.29 notice, any prospective
native title claimant must now file an application within the four-month period
if they wish to access the statutory right to negotiate. Given the difficulties
of research and documentation of such claims, such a period is ludicrous, and
could well prove impossible for many claimants. If the claim documents are
filed, say, three months after the publication of the s.29 notice, the Registrar
is left with only one month to apply the test. This too could be a difficult
task.
In practice, the NNTT has reduced the new statutory regime, set
out in ss.190B(2)–(9) and 190C(2)–(4) to a total of 11 tests,
each of which must be satisfied. A Guide for Applicants has been issued
by the NNTT to assist in this process of re-visiting and re-documenting, if and
where necessary, their claim. If a claim is rejected (or accepted) by the
Registrar, judicial review of that decision is available to the Federal Court.
As at the end of March 1999, the Registrar had processed 20 claims from various
parts of the country. Of these, eleven had passed the new 11-point registration
test, and nine had failed.[26]
Proceedings by way of judicial review challenging one of these rejections have
been issued in the Federal Court at Melbourne, and awaits a
hearing.[27]
Passing the registration test enables the claim to be listed on the National Register of Native Title Claims, which is maintained by the Registrar. This delivers to applicants, in summary:
| • | a right to negotiate or be consulted about some ‘future acts’ concerning certain mining activity, or compulsory acquisition that a government may wish to pursue or facilitate; |
| • | a right to confirm any access rights applicants may have to some types of pastoral or other leases to do traditional things, for example, to hunt, fish, camp, perform ceremonies; |
| • | a right to have some types of Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) registered (giving them the force of a contract) including any rights to traditional country built into those agreements. |
These are very limited rights to negotiate. As
mentioned above, the 1998 amendments provide for the enactment, by the States
and Territories, of alternative schemes which may water down the above to a mere
right to be consulted about future acts.
If a native title claim fails
the registration test, the application still remains filed in the Federal Court
and may proceed to mediation and, if that fails, to trial. If previously
registered, the application is removed from the Register of Native Title Claims
and the applicants lose their right to negotiate.
The evidential requirements are now the subject of considerable controversy.
Section 223 of the Act sets out the basic definition of native title for
Australia, and provides some guidance for the court as to what must be shown. At
March 1999, three decisions by two Federal Court Justices (Olney and Lee JJ)
have been delivered.[28] These
indicate varying approaches to assessing the ‘primary’ evidence of
indigenous claimants. In Mirriawung Gajerong, a claim concerning land and waters
in the eastern Kimberly, Lee J adopted an approach which resembled the
prevailing Canadian view,[29] that
he would view evidence of occupation and use of land from the ‘Aboriginal
perspective’.[30] Thus, such
use — for example, hunting — of the land may be haphazard, but so
long as such activity is meaningful through Aboriginal eyes, it may be probative
of the required traditional connection. Olney J, by comparison, especially in
the Yorta Yorta claim, has not focused on this ‘Aboriginal
perspective’ approach, in assessing the significance of Aboriginal
evidence before him.
Further, real judicial differences have emerged in
two other important areas:
| • | what is required to prove genealogical connection with the original inhabitants of the claimed areas; and |
| • | how the court assesses continuity and change in the manifestation of traditional laws and customs. |
These, of course, are critical matters in any claim.
Lee J, again in conformity with Canadian authority, has indicated that
so long as some ‘genealogical links’ are shown between the claimant
community and the original ‘community in occupation’, then this will
suffice.[31] Olney J, however,
appears to require evidence of genealogical connection for each claimant back to
a named ancestor — not merely to the community of which that ancestor was
a member. Further, the applicants, according to Olney J, must show by evidence
the same traditional connection as the identified ancestor with the land under
claim.[32] These tests leave very
little room for the dynamic changing nature of traditional (or any) society.
They thus pose very high standards of proof on claimants, which many communities
probably would be unable to meet — even in northern and central Australia,
considered to be the more ‘traditional’ parts of the
country.
As to how much adaptation or change in traditional laws and
customs is acceptable as still qualifying as ‘traditional’, and as
to how the court should approach this issue, again differences have emerged. Lee
J accepts that the court should consider whether the activities and beliefs
shown on the evidence today can be said to be derived from, or founded in, the
traditional laws and customs manifested by the original occupiers in historical
times. Thus the fact that claimants today fish with dinghies and outboard motors
is irrelevant. What matters is the Aboriginal perspective from which they fish,
the cultural history and background lying behind that event. Lee J
held:[33]
Native title ...
will continue where occupation with the land is substantially maintained by a
community which acknowledges and observes, as far as practicable, laws and
customs based on the traditional practices of its predecessors ... the
activities or practices may be a modern form of exercise of those laws and
customs ... It will be immaterial that those laws and customs have undergone
change since sovereignty, provided that the general nature of the connection
between the indigenous peoples and the land remains ... [emphasis
added]
By contrast, Olney J seems less flexible, and appears to work from
historical times forward, rather than the reverse. In his reasons in Yorta
Yorta, his Honour relied heavily on descriptions of the original occupiers
recorded by an English squatter, Edward Curr. Curr made his observations (being
the earliest details available to the Court) in the 1840s, near the junction of
the Murray and Gouburn rivers, in Victoria. Olney J assessed the evidence of
current activities and beliefs by reference to what was known of the original
ancestors, via Curr, in the 1840s, and appeared to require close replication, in
1998, of what was known to be present in the 1840s. Thus the fact that the Yorta
Yorta today no longer conduct initiation ceremonies is considered to be adverse
to their case — rather than assessing whether the original manifestations
of social and spiritual life have been replaced by other activities or beliefs
which might be different, but which nevertheless can be seen to be derived from,
such original ceremonies and rituals. These trial decisions are now on
appeal,[34] and these issues are
raised, amongst others.
Much has been made of the availability of ‘just terms’
compensation as some sort of justification for the extensive extinguishment
achieved by the 1998 amendments to the Native Title Act. This was always,
and remains, a cruel hoax. The brief judgment of Mason CJ and McHugh J in
Mabo No 2[35] sets the
scene for the minimal rights that now exist. Essentially, by saying, as a bare
majority, that no compensation was available at common law for extinguishment of
native title due to Crown grants made over the land since 1788, being land
already the subject of native title — thereby departing from the common
law’s treatment of all other titles granted by the Crown — the High
Court enshrined into the common law, discriminatory treatment of one property
right — native title — in relation to extinguishment.
From
this common law base, the scheme of the Act compounds this discrimination. The
Act denies any real chance of compensation for acts of governments whereby
native title was extinguished or impaired, from 1788 up until the enactment of
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (operative on 1 October 1975). Prior
to that date, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate, at law, how the
pre-existence of native title in an area of land which was subsequently overlaid
with a Crown grant would invalidate that subsequent grant. Unless such
invalidity can be shown, that past activity of government does not require
validation, is not validated by the Act, and thus does not qualify as a
‘past act’. Absent a ‘past act’, no right of
compensation is available under the Native Title Act.
Thus the
Native Title Act declares that compensation for past government conduct
is only available for such ‘past acts’ — crown grants,
compulsory acquisitions and the like — which were invalid when done in
historical times by reason of the then existence of native title. Those acts are
expressly validated by the Native Title Act (for Commonwealth Acts) and
by complementary State and Territory legislation (for their Acts), with a right
to compensation for extinguishment which may result. The vast bulk of such past
acts and extinguishment throughout the country occurred well before 1975 —
and thus no compensation is available for this long period, either at common law
(per Mabo No 2) or realistically, under the Native Title Act, since
invalidity cannot be shown.
After 1975, invalidity arises in most
instances due to contravention of ss.9 or 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act
1975, through the Crown treating native title holders unequally as compared
to equivalent (freehold) title holders by, typically, failing to provide the
native title holders with compensation for extinguishment. This discriminatory
treatment is perhaps not surprising since nobody then knew that native title
existed. Nevertheless, this was the basis on which a majority of the High Court
in Mabo No1[36]
invalidated a Queensland law which purported to extinguish, retrospectively
and without compensation, all native title on Murray
Island.[37]
As mentioned
above, without a ‘past act’, no entitlement to compensation arises
under the Native Title Act. Thus ‘compensation’ for
extinguishment is illusory for most Aboriginal claimants, and the prospects of
both achieving a determination of native title, or compensation in lieu, for
Aboriginal communities especially in the closer settled regions of Australia
— namely the whole south, east, and south-west — are grim. These
communities (being most affected by colonisation) must look, it seems, to the
above mentioned land fund.
So, as to the Native Title Act, what has been learnt over the past
four years? One can only speak from one’s own corner. In this wide ranging
area of policy, government administration, and developing law and practice
around the country, it is impossible to be comprehensive. But some comments can
now be offered.
First, as with the experience in the Northern Territory
through the life of the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act 1976 (Cth)
(ALRA), no sooner do governments introduce ‘land-mark’
legislation, than subsequent governments set about watering it down. This was
the experience in the Territory with various rounds of amendments since 1976,
and it is certainly the experience of the latest review of the ALRA, conducted
by J Reeves QC.[38] He has
recommended sweeping changes to that Act, as it moves towards its demise, and
few of them are seen as favouring Aboriginal
claimants.[39] Similarly, with the
Native Title Act, the 1998 amendments have indeed delivered ‘bucket
loads of extinguishment’, have favoured the interests of miners and
pastoralists over native title rights and interests; have reduced the ability of
claimants to protect their land through negotiation pending a resolution of
their claim; and have rendered success in such claims more technical and
difficult — for example, by amendments to s.82 of the Act whereby the
rules of evidence are now, for the first time, introduced.
Second, the
complexity of the statutory laws, and the variation of experience around the
country under the Act have vastly increased due to the amendments. An Act
formerly of 127 pages now occupies 443. The future act provisions which govern
what may and may not be done on native title land are both greatly expanded and
more complex — all with the objective of enabling a wider range of
developments to avoid rights to negotiate, or to reduce such rights previously
in place. Further, the amendments allow much greater scope for the States and
Territories to introduce their own schemes, subject to final approval by the
Commonwealth, which is required to assess such schemes against stated minimum
statutory criteria. This process is still underway, but already demonstrates
considerable variation between procedures and subject matter caught up in these
schemes. The result is significant additional complexity for those practitioners
and community groups having to deal with not only the Native Title Act,
but also State variations on a theme.
Third, native title claims are
proving to be exhausting, lengthy, expensive, hard-fought, uncertain in outcome,
and difficult — just like any other arena of serious, large-scale
litigation. The sorts of lengthy trials so far experienced — Yorta Yorta,
114 days; Miriawung Gajerong, 83 days — cannot be repeated too often.
Nobody will have the resources. Hopefully, future trials will be both less
frequent and more expeditious — but there can be no certainty of that.
Fourth, negotiating agreements is now firmly recognised as the best
option for all parties — be they mediated through the NNTT or outside it.
Century Zinc perhaps highlighted to the nation the proposition that, difficult
though reaching agreement may be, it is not impossible with a modicum of good
will and common sense on all sides. Unfortunately, the climate is too often
still poisoned by often outrageous and quite misleading remarks by senior
politicians and stake holders who should know better, and whose motives must be
questioned. Native title — the simple notion that some Aboriginals and
Torres Strait Islanders enjoy, still today, some traditional rights to land
— remains vehemently opposed in many corners of the nation. One suspects
that this will never change. Some things remain the same.
Fifth, native
title is proving to be unattainable for many. Compensation is an illusory hoax,
and agitation for ‘reconciliation’ continues unabated, this time in
the form of a preamble to the Constitution. Whether ‘reconciliation’
is no more than a clever diversion from the main game, which, this decade, seems
to be to claw back severely on the land rights gains of the 1980s and early
1990s, all in the name of economic rationalism, and one suspects, ideological
obsession, remains to be seen. There is no doubt that Aboriginal affairs,
especially traditional rights to land, have entered a new age, and that a
serious struggle looms if indigenous people are to hold the line, let alone
advance on it. Whether this will prove to be so may have to await the
50th anniversary issue of this journal. That the journal has survived
and flourished to this 25th milestone says a great deal for those who have
supported it over the years, and for the intransigent, continually urgent nature
of the ‘poverty law, legal aid and law reform’ issues it canvasses.
One thing at least remains the same: in the arena of Aboriginal affairs,
especially land rights, every generation discards past solutions, and introduces
its own allegedly superior ‘modern’ scheme. In Canada, the Nunavut
(Eskimos) recently did a deal where they gave up their traditional title in
exchange for a form of self-government and other benefits concerning large areas
of the Arctic. One wonders how valuable native title will appear in 2024.
References
[1] Milirrpum v Nabalco
(1972) 17 FLR 141.
[2] See Local
Government (Aboriginal Lands) Act
1978.
[3] See eg Aboriginal Lands
Act 1970 (Vic); Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 (WA); Community
Services Act 1972 (WA); and Aborigines Act 1969
(NSW).
[4] See Harris, S.,
It’s Coming Yet, Aboriginal Treaty Committee, Canberra,
1979.
[5] Administration of the
Territory of Papua New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 397; Geita
Sebea v Territory of Papua New Guinea (1941) 67 CLR
544.
[6] See Laws of
Australia, Butterworths, Vol 1, pp.2351-2955 for a comprehensive
account.
[7] Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976
(Cth).
[8] Aboriginal Land
Rights Act 1983 (NSW) extensively amended in
1990.
[9] Aboriginal Land Act 1991
(Qld); Torres Strait Islander Land Act 1991
(Qld).
[10] Western Australia v
Commonwealth (1995)183 CLR
373.
[11] Wik Peoples v
Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1.
[12]
For example, the registrar’s (former) duties when accepting or rejecting
claims (see Northern Territory v Lane (1995) 138 ALR 544); the meaning of
‘negotiate in good faith’ in relation to the future act provisions
(see Walley v WA (1996) 137 ALR 561); whether the grant of a fee simple
title (later revoked) extinguishes native title (see Fejo v Northern
Territory (1998) 152 ALR 477; (1998) 156 ALR 721 (HC)); whether a pastoral
lease issued under the Queensland Land Act 1910 extinguishes native title
(Wik Peoples v Queensland , above); and much more
besides.
[13] See, Native Title:
A Five Year Retrospective 1994–1998, NNTT 1999, pp. 92 (Five
Years).
[14] A brief indication
of these is given in Table 1 — but this is a general indication
only. There are variations, and other types of applications that would fall into
these figures.
[15] Five
Years, pp.9, 20.
[16]
Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 370, a claim to sea
areas near Crocker Island off the top end of the Northern
Territory.
[17] Ward v Western
Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483, a claim to large areas in the eastern
Kimberly region, including lake
Argyle.
[18] Yorta Yorta
Aboriginal People v Victoria, Olney J, 19 December 1998, unreported, a claim
to forest and other reserves along the Murray river stretching into NSW and
Victoria, centred on Echuca.
[19]
A claim by the Arrarente people to areas in and around Alice
Springs.
[20] Five Years,
p.17. These comprise various types, eg, commercial, memorandum of
understanding, native title consent determination, s.21 agreement, regional
agreement, reconciliation/recognition, and process
agreement.
[21] Five Years,
p.35.
[22] Five
Years, p.59.
[23] Five
Years, p.64.
[24] See eg,
in WA, where a Bill to take over the entire functions of the NNTT has been
delayed in the Legislative
Council.
[25] Set out in ss.190B
and 190C.
[26] See NNTT homepage
at http://www.gov.au for these details, plus a wide range of valuable materials,
NNTT decisions, practical guides, template negotiated agreements,
etc.
[27] Being the Victorian Dja
Dja Wurung claim, VG6042/98; VG 6042/98 and VG 6043/98. The Registrar rejected
this claim on 4 December 1998, and issued reasons. In particular, the Registrar
ruled that the claim materials failed to sufficiently identify the native title
claim group, per s.190B(3).
[28]
Crocker Island and Yorta Yorta (Olney J); Miriawung Gajerong
(Lee J).
[29] Delgamuukw v
British Colombia (1997) 153 DLR (4th)
193.
[30] For example, re kinship
matters, see Ward v Western Australia (1999) 159 ALR 483 at 530;
and see generally at 159 ALR 500-501,
504.
[31] Ward v WA (1999)
159 ALR 483 at 532-33.
[32]
Yorta Yorta v Victoria, Olney J, 19/12/98, VG 6001/1994,
unreported.
[33] Ward v WA
159 ALR 501-502.
[34] As well as
the Crocker Island Seas Claim decision, Yarmirr v NT (1999) 156
ALR 370.
[35] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at
15-16.
[36] Mabo v Queensland
(1988) 166 CLR 186.
[37] See
Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act 1985
(Qld).
[38] J Reeves QC, Building
on Land Rights for the Next Generation, AGPS
1998.
[39] For one critical
assessment from the indigenous viewpoint, see Land Rights News,
NLC, March 1999, p.2, recording views of an ANU conference examining the
report held on 26-27 March 1999.