Bartos, Tomas --- "Uti Possidetis. Quo Vadis?" [1997] AUYrBkIntLaw 2; (1997) 18 Australian Year Book of International Law 37
* BSc (Hons) LLB (Hons) ANU, Partner, Smith and Barto[#]. The author may be contacted at: Tom.Bartos@smithbartos.com.
The author wishes to point out that there has not been an opportunity in this paper to consider an article on the same subject in the 1996 volume of the British Yearbook of International Law, which appeared in print whilst this paper was being published.
[1] Grotius H, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, Prolegomena, paragraph 24.
[2] See list in Wa Mutua M, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry” (1995) 16 Michigan Journal of International Law 1113 at 1113, fn 1.
[3] Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 22 June 1993, Article 3 (1995) 34 ILM 1279 at 1283 (dissolution of the former Soviet Union); SC Res 713, preambular paragraph 8, UN Doc S/INF/47 (1991) p 42, (break-up of the former Yugoslavia); Twining D, The New Eurasia (1993); Henkin L, International Law: Politics and Values (1995) pp 282, 287.
[4] See, eg, Charzan N ed, Irredentism and International Politics (1991) p 1 (“the tenuous connection between State boundaries and historical, cultural, and symbolic communities”); Kacowicz AM, Peaceful Territorial Change (1994) p 7; Henkin, n 3 above, p 279; Necatagil ZM, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (1993) p 232; Koskenniemi M, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice” (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Review 241; Anaya SJ, “The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Claims” (1990) 75 Iowa Law Review 837.
[5] See, eg, European Community Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (Brussels, 16 December 1991), European Political Cooperation Press Release P 129/91, reproduced in (1992) 31 ILM 1485 at 1487 (“respect for the inviolability of all frontiers”). Shustov V, “The Present and Future Development of the Situation in Europe and the Role of the CSCE” in Clesse A, Cooper R and Sakamoto Y eds, The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order (1994) p 749 at 754.
[6] Huntington SP, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 7; Henkin, n 3 above, p 280; Koskenniemi, n 4 above, at 259; Téson F, “The Kantian Theory of International Law” (1992) 92 Colorado Law Review 53; Sorel J-M and Mehdi R, “L'Uti Possidetis entre la Consécration Juridique et la Pratique: Essai de Réactualization” (1994) 40 Annuaire Français de Droit International 11 at 35. See also Kaiser RJ, The Geography of Nationalism in Russian and the USSR (1994) p 13 (rise of capitalism reduces nationalism as a barrier to integration). Developments in technology play a prominent role in removing geo-political divisions; eg, Dyson E, Release 2.0: A Design For Living in the Digital Age (1997) pp 103–30 (the Internet as a contributing factor in the privatisation of the role of government); Negropronte N, Being Digital (1995) p 163 (digitalisation of information leads to removal of the limitations of geography); Gates W, The Road Ahead (1996) pp 296–99 (communications systems reduce the importance of national boundaries and promote more widespread participation in the world economy); Mulgan G, Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World (1997) pp 27–29, 62–68 (regulation of international matters in political and economic spheres).
[7] Franck TM, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) p 482; Bykov ON, “Beyond Superpowership” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 63 at 80; Brown S, “Building Order and Justice into the Emerging Global Polyarchy” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 127 at 127–28; Andrén N, “Federalism in the Setting of Globalism, Regionalism, and Nationalism” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 362 at 362; Kaiser, n 6 above, p 3.
[8] Articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 1514 (XV), UN Doc A/4684 (1960); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UN Doc A/8028 (1970), reprinted in (1971) 9 ILM 1292; Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (1976); Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1971, p 16 at 31, 73–75; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, p 12 at 30–37; East Timor (Portugal v Australia) Judgment, ICJ Rep 1995, p 90 at 102.
[9] Necatagil, n 4 above, p 233; Radan P, “Secessionist Self-Determination: The Cases of Slovenia and Croatia” (1994) 48 Australian Journal of International Affairs 183; Eastwood LS, “Secession: State Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia” (1993) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 299; Weller M, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 569; Falk R, “Locating the Right of Self-Determination of Peoples as a Principle of International Law: General Considerations” in McCorquodale R and Orosz N eds, Tibet: The Position in International Law: Report of the Conference of International Lawyers on Issues Relating to Self-Determination and Independence for Tibet (1993) p 81 at 84; Asamoah H, “Rights of Self-Determination of Peoples in Established States: Southern African and the Middle East” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1991) p 541–61; Musgrave TD, Self-Determination and National Minorities (1993) pp 209, 220, 351, 357.
[10] See generally Tomuschat C ed, Modern Law of Self-Determination (1995); Cassesse A, Self-Determination of Peoples (1995); Hannum H, “Rethinking Self-Determination” (1993) 34 Virginia Journal of International Law 1; Cass D, “Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Recent Theories” (1992) 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 21. Concerning relatively modern controversies, see Brilmayer L, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation” (1991) 16 Yale Journal of International Law 177; Thornberry P, “Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments” (1987) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 867. Concerning self-determination during decolonisation, see Emerson R, “Self-Determination” (1971) 65 American Journal of International Law 459; Sureda AR, The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A Survey of United Nations Practice (1973); Umozurike U, Self-Determination in International Law (1972).
[11] Fox GH, “Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?” (1995) 16 Michigan Journal of International Law 733 at 733.
[12] Simpson G, “Is International Law Fair?” (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 619 at 629.
[13] For the purposes of this discussion uti possidetis is regarded as a “principle” rather than a “rule”. As to this distinction see Dworkin R, Law’s Empire (1986) (in the field of jurisprudence); Fitzmaurice G, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law” (1957–II) 92 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 5 (in respect of international law in general); Antonopoulos C, “The Principle of Uti Possidetis Iuris in Contemporary International Law” (1996) 49 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 29 (in respect of uti possidetis in particular).
[14] Frontier Dispute, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1986, p 554 at 566 (hereafter referred to as the Burkina Faso case); Boggs SW, International Boundaries (1940) pp 79–80; Cukwarah AO, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (1967) pp 112–16; Yakemtchouk R, L’Afrique en Droit International (1971) pp 83–87.
[15] Edicts comprised the ius honorarium, existing alongside and ameliorating the more formalistic ius civile; Berger A, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (1953). In this way, uti possidetis was analogous to equity rather than law. See Rossi CR, Equity and International Law: A Legal Realist Approach to International Decisionmaking (1993) pp 32–40.
[16] Moore JB, “Memorandum on Uti Possidetis” reproduced as “Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica — Panama Arbitration, 1911” in The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, vol III, pp 328ff.
[17] Per Moore, ibid, p 329: “Whichever party has possession of the house in question, without violence, clandestinely or permission in respect of the adversary, the violent disturbance of his possession I prohibit”. See also Schultz F, Classical Roman Law (1951) p 448; Jolowicz HF, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1952) pp 273–74.
[18] See, eg, Goodman MJ, “Adverse Possession of Land — Morality and Motive” (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 281; Delohery v Permanent Trustee Co (NSW) [1904] HCA 10; (1904) 1 CLR 283.
[19] Buckland WW, A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd edn (1963) p 734.
[20] See Greig DW, International Law (1976) pp 170–72; Greig DW, “The Beagle Channel Arbitration” [1976] AUYrBkIntLaw 13; (1981) 7 Aust YBIL 332.
[21] Cf Pellet A, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples” (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 178; Franck, n 7 above, pp 146ff; Franck TM, “The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination” Proceedings of the Second Amsterdam International Law Conference on the Rights of Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1992) p 25, fn 53; The equation of uti possidetis with territorial integrity has been rightly criticised; Higgins R, “The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: Commentary on Professor Franck’s Paper”, Proceedings of the Second Amsterdam International Law Conference on the Rights of Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1992) p 7. Compare Shaw M, Title to Territory in Africa (1985) pp 181–82.
[22] See Twining D, The New Eurasia (1993) pp 49ff (concerning ex-Soviet State borders).
Note: the role of uti possidetis in maritime delimitations will not be discussed in this paper. One view is that “[t]he delimitation of the area of spatial validity of the State may relate to the land area, the waters of rivers and lakes, the sea, the subsoil or the atmosphere” and so “there is no reason to establish different regimes” for these different contexts. See Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (1990) 83 ILR 1 at 36; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment of 11 September 1992, ICJ Rep 1992, p 351 at 712 per judge Torres Bernandez (hereafter referred to as the El Salvador case); Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 46–47. An alternative view is that the principle was never intended to be so applied and has been bypassed by developments in the law of the sea. See El Salvador case, ICJ Rep 1992, p 351 at 601–04; Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (1990) 83 ILR 1 at 61–62 (diss op Mr Bedjaoui); Guinea — Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case (1988) 77 ILR 635 at 657; Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1982 p 18 at 131-32, paragraph 100–02 (sep op Judge Aréchaga); Nordquist M, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982): A Commentary (1985), vol 1.
[23] de Hoyos R, “Islas Malvinas or Falkland Islands: the Negotiation of a Conflict, 1945–1982” in Morris MA and Millan V eds, Controlling Latin American Conflicts (1983) p 185; See, eg, Shaw, n 21 above, p 260; Frontier Dispute, Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, ICJ Rep 1986, p 3; Naldi GJ, “The Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali): Uti Possidetis in an African Perspective” (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 893; Butterworth RL, Data for 310 Interstate Security Conflicts (1945–1974) reproduced in Kratochwil F, Rohrlich P and Mahajan H, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict Over Territory” (1985) Table 1.
[24] El Salvador case, n 22 above.
[25] Burkina Faso case, n 14 above.
[26] See also Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1994, p 6 at 83–92 (sep op Judge Ajibola); Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal), n 22 above, at 49ff (diss op Mr Bedjaoui).
[27] Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: “Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia”; reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 1488.
[28] See Malenovsky J, “Problèmes juridiques liés à la partition de la Tchécoslovaquie, y compris tracé de la frontier” (1993) 39 Annuaire Français de Droit International 305; Franck, n 7 above; Pellet, n 21 above.
[29] Radan P, “The Borders of a Future Independent Quebec: Does the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Apply?” (1997) Australian International Law Journal 200.
[30] This argument was part of the Applicant’s submission in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 1996, p 13 at 14–16. Further information about the case available at the ICJ website <http://www.icj-cij.org/> .
[31] On the distinction, see Schachter O, International Law in Theory and Practice (1992) p 20ff.
[32] Jones SB, Boundary Making — A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty-Editors and Boundary Commissioners (1945) p 47.
[33] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) 165 LNTS 4; Jennings RY, Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963) p 2; James A, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (1986) p 13; Schapera I, Government and Politics of Tribal Societies (1956) pp 204, 211; Greig DW, International Law (1976) p 155. The territorial element of sovereignty is also recognised in Hindu political philosophy (Murty TS, Frontiers: A Changing Concept (1978) pp 59–60), but not according to the Islamic view of Dar El-Islam (ibid, pp 88–91).
[34] Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands/USA) (1928) 2 UNRIAA 829 at 839 (hereafter referred to as the Island of Palmas case).
[35] ‘Boundary’ refers to a line of separation between States. Often ‘frontier’ is adopted instead, but it is more appropriately ascribed to a zone of transition were the administrative power of one State recedes and another’s begins; see Murty, n 33 above, pp 14–21; Lattimore O, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1951); Lattimore O, “The Frontier in History” in Manners RO and Kaplan D eds, Theory in Anthropology (1968) pp 374–86.
[36] Brownlie I, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (1979) p 3; Boggs SW, International Boundaries (1940); Sharma SP, International Boundary Disputes and International Law (1976).
[37] Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) Case (India v Pakistan) (1976) 50 ILR 1 at 406 (diss op Judge Bebler) (hereafter referred to as the Rann of Kutch); Shaw, n 21 above, p 260.
[38] Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ Rep 1962, p 6 at 34; (hereafter referred to as the Temple of Preah Vihear case). Compare Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion, (1925) PCIJ Ser B, No 12, p 22; Dubai — Sharjah Border Arbitration (1993) 91 ILR 543 at 578. See also Rousseau C, Droit International Public (1977) p 235.
[40] Delimitation refers to a description of the boundary alignment (usually in a treaty or map), demarcation is the physical marking on the ground; see Brownlie, n 36 above, p 4; Jones, n 32 above, pp 57–58, 165.
[41] Eg the Aozou Strip covered 80,000 km2 in Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above; the dispute between Ecuador and Peru covers 325,000 km2 and includes parts of the Amazon and Marañon Rivers; Allcock JB, Arnold G, Day AJ, Lewis DS, Poultney L, Rance R and Sagar DJ, Border and Territorial Disputes (1992) pp 586–90. See Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above.
[42] See Alvarez A, “Latin America and International Law” (1909) 3 American Journal of International Law 269 at 290.
[43] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 387; McMahon MM, Conquest and Modern International Law: The Legal Limitations on the Acquisition of Territory by Conquest (1940) p 53.
[44] Affaire des Frontières Colombo–Vénézuéliennes (1922) 1 UNRIAA 223 at 228, (hereafter referred to as Colombia-Venezuela Arbitral Award); translation per Scott JB, “The Swiss Decision in the Boundary Dispute between Colombia and Venezuela” (1922) 16 American Journal of International Law 428. See also
El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 645 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez).
[45] See Alvarez, n 42 above, at 271; Moore, n 16 above, p 333.
[46] Greig DW, “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands Crisis” [1978] AUYrBkIntLaw 2; (1983) 8 Aust YBIL 20 at 50; Greig, “The Beagle Channel Arbitration”, n 21 above, at 371.
[47] Keller AS, Lissitzyn OJ and Mann FJ, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts 1400–1800 (1938) p 4; Shaw M, “The Western Sahara Case” (1975) 49 British Yearbook of International Law 119 at 127.
[48] Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v Chile) (1979) 52 ILR 93 at 125, (hereafter referred to as the Beagle Channel Arbitration); El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 387, paragraph 42. See also La Pradelle PG, La Frontière (1928) pp 77–78; Nelson LDM, “The Arbitration of Boundary Disputes in Latin America” (1973) 20 Netherlands International Law Review 267 at 269.
[49] In this respect uti possidetis was a variation of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’, which held that the American continent was not subject to colonisation by European powers; Naldi GJ, “The Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali): Uti Possidetis in an African Perspective” (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 893 at 897; Tower C, “The Origin, Meaning, and International Force of the Monroe Doctrine” (1920) 14 American Journal of International Law 1; Hughes CE, “Observations on the Monroe Doctrine” (1923) 17 American Journal of International Law 611 at 615; Jessup PC, “The Monroe Doctrine in 1940” (1940) 34 American Journal of International Law 704; Greig, “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands Crisis”, n 46 above, at 50; Alvarez, n 42 above, at 311–21; Schwarzenberger G, “Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge” (1957) 51 American Journal of International Law 308 at 320; Keller et al, n 47 above, p 6.
[50] See, eg, Nelson, n 42 above, at 268–71.
[51] More than half of the 30 or so boundaries demarcating the Latin-American States upon independence generated disputes, some lasting over a century; Wood B, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942 (1966) p 3; Kacowicz AM, Peaceful Territorial Change (1994) p 65; Langer R, Seizure of Territory, The Stimson Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and Diplomatic Practice (1947) pp 34–35; Greig DW, International Law (1976) p 171. See also Herring H, A History of Latin America (1955) pp 260–91, 434–37; Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 28–29. In practise, uti possidetis was “illusory and full of serious limitations”, Cukwarah, n 14 above, p 190. For example, Peru and Ecuador still dispute each other’s asserted title to the ancient audiencia of Quito, an area of approximately one million square kilometres.
[52] Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 14.
[53] Burkholder MA and Chandler DS, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias 1687–1808 (1977) pp 3–5.
[54] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 387–88.
[55] Cukwarah, n 14 above, p 114; Alvarez, n 42 above, at 289–92.
[56] Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 26–27.
[57] Boundary Case between Bolivia and Peru (Bolivia v Peru) (1909) 11 UNRIAA 133 at 143; (also reported in Hackworth AH, Digest of International Law (1940) vol 1, pp 726–29).
[58] See, eg, Maier G, “The Boundary Dispute Between Ecuador and Peru” (1969) 63 American Journal of International Law 28.
[59] Fisher FC, “The Arbitration of the Guatemalan — Honduran Boundary Dispute” (1933) 27 American Journal of International Law 403 at 416; Munkman ALW, “Adjudication and Adjustment — International Judicial Decision and the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes” (1972) 46 British Yearbook of International Law 1 at 22; Schwarzenberger G, International Law (1957) pp 21, 304–05; Waldock H, “Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies” (1948) 25 British Yearbook of International Law 311 at 326.
[60] Honduras Borders (Guatemala / Honduras) (1933) 2 UNRIAA 1307; (hereafter referred to as the Honduras Borders case). See further Fisher, n 59 above (includes map); Schwarzenberger G, International Law (1957) pp 320–21.
[61] Honduras Borders case, ibid, at 1323. See also Colombia-Venezuela Arbitral Award, n 44 above (as another example of parties having an interpretative disagreement).
[62] Honduras Borders case, ibid, at 1324.
[63] See Munkman, n 59 above, at 51.
[64] Where ‘prescription’ is “the long and uninterrupted exercise of sovereignty over a territory”; McMahon, n 43 above, p 4. Note that the parties in the Honduras case had agreed that acquiescence might modify the uti possidetis line: Article V of the Treaty, reproduced in (1933) 2 UNRIAA 1307 at 1322.
[65] Honduras Borders case, n 60 above, at 1324.
[66] Ibid.
[67] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 635 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez).
[68] See also Argentine–Brazil Boundary Arbitration (1899) Stuyt No 157; Guiana-Brazil Boundary Arbitration Treaty (1897), Article IV(a); 89 BFSP 57; Stuyt No 207; Otero JMQ, Memoria histórica sobre límites entre la república de Colombia i el Imperio del Brazil (1869) cited in Nelson, n 48 above, at 270, n 2.
[69] Eg, Brazil-Uruguay (12 October 1851) done at Rio de Janeiro, 40 BFSP 1151; Brazil-Venezuela (25 November 1852) done at Caracas, 49 BFSP 1213; Brazil-Paraguay (6 April, 1856) done at Rio de Janeiro, 46 BFSP 1304; Brazil-Argentine Confederation (14 December 1857) done at Paraná, 49 BFSP 1316. See also Greig, “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands Crisis”, n 46 above, at 40–41 (argument of Britain).
[70] Eg, Venezuelan Constitution of 1830, Article V, reprinted in 18 BFSP 1119; Ecuador’s Declaration of Boundary with Colombia, reprinted in 20 BFSP 1206-07; Constitution of Honduras of 1848, Article IV, reprinted in 36 BFSP 1086; Constitution of Costa Rica of 1848, reprinted in 37 BFSP 777 at 778. See also Alvarez, n 42 above; Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 31. The fact that the principle was part of the constitutional law of the disputing States was a relevant factor in the Tribunal’s decision in the Colombia-Venezuela Arbitral Award, n 44 above.
[71] See, eg, El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 634 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez). “the mere fact of having concluded without difficulty as to the applicability of the uti possidetis juris to the land boundary dispute did not solve the different question of the ‘definition’ … to be applied”.
[72] Comprising Judges Oda, Sett-Camara, Jennings; (ad hoc) Virally and Torres Bernárdez. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras); Constitution of Chamber, Order of 8 May 1987, ICJ Rep 1987, p 10.
[73] Cf Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, n 22 above, at 77.
[74] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 396. See also Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 633.
[75] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 514. See also Burkina Faso case n 14 above, at 632–33. Evidence for an alignment may be discerned from, inter alia, international agreements, unilateral governmental declarations, descriptions in national constitutions, and administrative practice; Brownlie, n 36 above, p 5. Concerning the increasing respectability of maps as evidence; see, Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, (1923) PCIJ Ser B, No 8, pp 32-33; Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian Frontier) (1924) PCIJ Ser B, No 9, p 21; Island of Palmas n 34 above, at 833; The Minquiers and Ecrehos case, Judgment of November 17th, 1953, ICJ Rep 1953, p 47 at 71, 80–81, (hereafter referred to as Minquiers and Ecrehos); Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1959, p 209 at 220–21; Temple of Preah Vihear case n 38 above, at 16–17, 83–85, 125–7; Beagle Channel Arbitration, n 48 above, at 201–08; Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 582–83; Re Labrador Boundary (1927) 43 TLR 289 at 298–99 (Privy Council); Hyde CC, “Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes” (1933) 27 American Journal of International Law 311; Weissberg G, “Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes: A Reappraisal” (1963) 57 American Journal of International Law 781.
[76] Goldie LFE, “The Critical Date” (1963) 12 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1251 at 1284; Fitzmaurice G, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951–54: Points of Substantive Law, Part II” (1955– 1956) 32 British Yearbook of International Law 20 at 24–25; Johnson DHN, “Acquisitive Prescription in International Law” (1950) 27 British Yearbook of International Law 332 at 342, n 4. Occasionally the term “critical period” is adopted where there is a certain legal arrangement subsisting, and there is no known modification to the boundary during that period; see Taba Award (Arbitral Award in the Dispute Concerning Certain Boundary Pillars between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel) (1989) 80 ILR 224 esp at 284, where the ‘critical period’ was for the duration of the Palestinian Mandate (29 September 1923 to 14 May 1948); (hereafter referred to as the Taba Award). On the more general issue of identifying the critical time applicable to disputes in international law, see Higgins R, “Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem” (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 501.
[77] Fisheries case, Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Rep 1951, p 116 at 130; (hereafter referred to as Fisheries case); Island of Palmas case, n 34, at 845.
[78] Eg, the entity known as Upper Volta/Burkina Faso was created in 1919, disappeared in 1932, reappeared in 1947, and was at various times attached to Ivory Coast, Niger and Mali; see Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 25. See also, ibid, at 36 (division of German Togoland into Togo and Ghana); ibid, at 39 (Article 122 of the new Estonian Constitution defines the border with Russia as per the treaty of peace of 2 February 1920 rather by reference to the date of its most recently won independence.); Klabbers J and Lefeber R, “Africa: Lost between Self-determination and Uti Possidetis” in Brölman C, Lefeber R and Zieck M eds, Peoples and Minorities (1993) pp 37 at 65.
[79] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 401.
[80] Minquiers and Ecrehos, n 75, at 59, 60, 66–67, 71; Rosenne S, The Law and Practice of the International Court (1985) p 512.
[81] Taba Award, n 76 above, at 284; Bardonnet D, Mélanges Michel Virally (1991) pp 53–78.
[82] Taba Award, ibid.
[83] See GA Res 390A(V), adopted 2 December 1950 (UNGA), binding by virtue of Annex XI to the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy, 49 UNTS 314.
[84] Mullerson R, “The continuity and succession of States by reference to the former USSR and Yugoslavia” (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 473 at 480.
[85] The weight attributed to these factors would depend on the nature of the territory; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, (1933) PCIJ Ser A/B, No 53; Murty, n 33 above, pp 50, 200–201; Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 68.
[86] See El Salvador case, n 22, at 400–01.
[87] Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963, ICJ Rep 1963, p 15.
[88] Beagle Channel Arbitration, n 48 above, at 160–63.
[89] Greig, “The Beagle Channel Arbitration”, n 20 above, at 374, 384.
[90] Ibid, at 372.
[91] Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 633; Rosenne, n 80 above, p 97; Columbian-Peruvian asylum case, Judgment of November 20th 1950, ICJ Rep 1950, p 266 at 402 (non ultra petita rule); (hereafter referred to as the Asylum case).
[92] See, eg, El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 621 (sep op Judge Valticos).
[93] See, eg, Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Bolivia–Peru) (November 8 1831), Article XVI, 19 BFSP 1383 at 1387–88; Treaty of Peace (Colombia–Peru) (22 September 1829), Article V, 16 BFSP 1242 at 1243.
[94] Kaikobad KH, “Some Observations on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries” (1983) 54 British Yearbook of International Law 119. See also Argentine–Chile Frontier Case (1966) 16 UNRIAA 111 at 177, 180–81; Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above, at 520–21 (straight lines drawn along the ‘jagged coastline’).
[95] Eg, Taba Award, n 76 above, at 284–85, where the majority observed that the Tribunal could only weigh evidence submitted by both parties and then decide in favour of the better claim.
[96] Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above, at 474–94; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, n 8 above, 41–49, 57–68; at 92–102 (sep op Judge Ammoun). See also Brazil–British Guiana Boundary Arbitration (1904) 11 UNRIAA 18.
[98] (1911) 11 UNRIAA 528 at 545–46.
[99] Temple of Preah Vihear case, n 38 above, at 53 (sep op Fitzmaurice). Other factors might be census data, land-use and pre-existing property lines; Jones, n 32 above, pp 96–97; Kelly JB, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (1964) pp 209ff, 286ff.
[100] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 641 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez).
[101] Eg, acts of jurisdiction concerning the Islands of Picton, Nueva and Lennox by Chile were used to confirm an interpretation of the boundary treaty in Beagle Channel Arbitration, n 88 above, at 200–01. See also El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 399, 565, and 566; Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 586–87.
[102] Rossi, n 15 above, p 81; Diversion of Water from the River Meuse, Judgment, (1937) PCIJ Ser A/B, No 70, p 77 (per Judge Hudson); Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, n 22 above, at 60 (“the legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law”).
[103] See, eg, Treaty of Arbitration for the Settlement of the Boundary Questions between the Republics of Bolivia and Peru, December 30, 1902, Article IV, Boundary Case Between Bolivia and Peru (Bolivia v Peru) (1909) 11 UNRIAA 133 at 139.
[104] See n 60 above, at 1336; Fisher, n 59 above, at 425–26. See Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion, n 38 above, p 85 (Iraq’s geographic connections with the area prevailed over Turkey’s legal claims).
[105] See n 60 above, at 1337, 1341, 1342.
[106] Eg, Anglo-American Convention for the Adjustment of the Boundary between Canada and Alaska (24 June 1903), Article 1, reproduced in 15 UNRIAA 485; India-Pakistan Agreement for the Rann of Kutch Arbitration (30 June 1965), Article 3 paragraph (ii), reproduced in (1968) 7 ILM 637; Bolivia-Paraguay Treaty of Peace, Amity and Boundaries (21 July 1938), Article 2, reproduced in 3 UNRIAA 1819; Colombia-Peru Treaties (6 May 1904 and 12 September 1905), Article 1, Stuyt No 271 and 281; Honduras–Salvador Convention of Boundaries (19 January 1895), Article 2 paragraph 4, reproduced in Miyoshi M, Considerations of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes (1993).
[107] Island of Palmas case, n 34 above, at 841; Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above, at 14.
[108] Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Espagne/France) (1957) 12 UNRIAA 281.
[109] Turkish-Armenian Boundary case (1920), reproduced in Hackworth GH, Digest of International Law (1940) vol I, pp 715–16.
[110] Indeed, it would be unsafe in many cases to refer to some of these criteria. Nationalism and ethnic self-consciousness frequently lead to reinventing and idealising historical fact so that territorial claims tend to be lacking in factual and historical legitimacy; see Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 108ff.
[111] Eg, Brazil-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration, n 96 above; Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above, at 569–70; El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 487–506 (on a “balance of probabilities” the boundary in the Colomonacagua sub-sector was held to follow the Las Cañas river). See also Reeves JD, “Vermont v New Hampshire” (1933) 27 American Journal of International Law 508.
[112] Eg Andes Boundary Case (Argentina/Chile) (1902) 9 UNRIAA 35; Miyoshi, n 106 above, p 171. Where neither the Austrian “dry” boundary nor Hungarian “fluvial” boundary was conclusively established, the land was divided according to which areas had greater value for one side relative to the other; Lake Meerage Arbitration (1902) 38 Revue de Droit International 196, discussed in Miyoshi, n 106 above, pp 110–11. See also Jones, n 32 above, p 49.
[113] Kaikobad, n 94 above, at 122; El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 401–09; Temple of Preah Vihear case, n 38 above; Fisheries case, n 77 above, p 116; Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above; Chamizal Arbitration (1911) 5 American Journal of International Law 728 at 806–07. See also municipal decisions: Indiana v Kentucky [1890] USSC 183; 136 US 479 (1889); Virginia v Tennessee, [1893] USSC 100; 148 US 503 (1893); State of South Australia v State of Victoria [1914] AC 283.
[114] Cf Greig DW, International Law (1976) p 172.
[115] In the agreement between Germany and Great Britain of 2 December 1901 concerning the boundary between the Gold Coast and Togo, “circonstances locales” were taken into account to allow flexibility in light of local demands of terrain and population; see La Pradelle, n 48 above, p 148; Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 24, n 185.
[116] Compare Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 660 (sep op Judge Abi-Saab); Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906, Judgment of 18 November 1960, ICJ Rep 1960, p 192. See also n 13 above.
[117] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 401.
[118] Ibid, at 513–15. See also Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 28, fn 111.
[119] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 566.
[120] Ibid. The tribunal seemed open to this possibility in Dubai – Sharjah Border Arbitration, n 38 above.
[121] Miyoshi, n 106 above, p 99–100.
[122] Ibid, p 193.
[123] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 565 (paragraph 345). See also paragraphs 64, 80, and 205.
[124] La Pradelle, n 48 above, p 11.
[125] Pursuant to Article 26(2) of its Statute, the ICJ convened a Chamber composed of President Bedjaoui, Judges Lachs and Ruda, and Judges ad hoc Luchaire and Abi-Saab; 40 ICJ Yearbook 1985–6, p 13. The Chamber mechanism was deployed to effect an expeditious resolution, the dispute having already generated armed conflict; see Bello EG, “The Uti Possidetis Principle in Africa”, Proceedings of the Second Amsterdam International Law Conference on the Rights of Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1992) p 12. Note that a Chamber’s decision is of equal status to a decision of the Court, owing to Article 27 of the Court’s Statute.
[126] See n 14, at 565. The Chamber’s observations on the issue were thus obitur dictum in terms of the common law’s notion of the doctrine of precedent. Of course, there is no strict precedential value to any decision of the ICJ owing to Article 59 of its Statute, but the notion of precedential value may still be relevant; see Shahabuddeen M, Precedent in the World Court (1996).
[128] Article 3, paragraph III (signed at Addis-Ababa on 25 May, 1963); reproduced in (1963) 2 ILM 766 at 768.
[129] OAU Doc AHG/Res 16(I) of 1964; reproduced in McEwen AC, International Boundaries of East Africa (1971) p 22; Brownlie I, Basic Documents of African Affairs (1971) pp 360–61.
[131] Statement of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Proceedings of the Summit Conference of the Independent African States, (1963) vol I, section 2; reproduced (translation) in McEwen, n 129 above, p 24. See also Statement of the President of the Malagasy Republic, ibid; also reproduced in Boutros-Ghali B, Les Conflits de Frontières en Afrique (1972) pp 12–13.
[132] Statement of the President of Mali (reproduced in Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 89, n 61) (translation: “one won’t find any true nation in Africa”).
[133] Declarations of international organisations are not binding per se; Sloan B, “General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)” (1988) British Yearbook of International Law 39; Onuf NG, “Professor Falk on the Quasi-legislative Competence of the General Assembly” (1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 349.
[134] Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 4. See also Ratner S, “Drawing a Better Line” (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 590 at 601, n 90.
[135] For example, President Daddach of Mauritania called for the reunification of all Hassaniya speakers who had been divided by “artificial colonial boundaries”; Hodges T, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (1983) pp 100–02; Thompson V and Adloff R, The Western Saharans (1980). The Moroccans in turn wanted to restore the boundaries of the ancient Almoravid Empire, and Chewa-dominant Malawi sought to restore the historic Maravi Empire; Vail L and White L, “Tribalism in the Political History of Malawi” in Vail L ed, Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (1989), 151; Phiri SH, “The Chewi and Ngoni” in Asiwaju AI ed, Partitioned Africans (1985), p 105; Shaw, n 47 above, at 120. However, note the suggestion that historic claims in Africa have since been abandoned, so that uti possidetis “is espoused by the entirety of the African States”; Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 34. Re-assertions of historic title have also been witnessed in Asia; Rao KK, “The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law” (1962) 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 375; Rubin AP, “The Sino-Indian Border Disputes” (1960) 9 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 96; Clark R, “The ‘Decolonization’ of East Timor and the United Nations norms on self-determination and aggression” in CIIR/IPJET, International Law and the Question of East Timor (1995) p 65 at 80–90; Wright Q, “The Goa Incident” (1962) 56 American Journal of International Law 617.
[136] Touval S, “The Sources of Status Quo and Irredentist Policies” in Widstrand CG ed, African Boundary Problems (1968) p 101.
[137] North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1969, p 3 at 44.
[138] “Succession of States to multilateral treaties: studies prepared by the Secretariat”, UN Docs A/CN.4/200, A/CN.4/200/Add.1, A/CN.4/200/Add.2, reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1968, vol II, p 1; First report on succession of States in respect of rights and duties resulting from sources other than treaties, by Mr Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/204, reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1968, vol II, p 94 at 112–13, paragraph 122.
[139] Suhrke A and Noble LG eds, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (1977) p 13. Compare Touval, n 136 above, at 117–18.
[140] Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, pp 83, 88; Boutros-Ghali, n 131 above, pp 77–81. See also de Pinho Campinos J, “L’Actualité de L’Uti Possidetis” in Blumann C ed, La Frontière: Colloque de Poitiers (1980) p 95 at 101–03 (“Il n’y a pas de doute que l’uti possidetis est, pour le moins, un principe de nature politique”; ibid, at 103). See also Ratner, n 134 above, at 595 (suggesting that with this stance, “African and European elites had struck a bargain to the benefit of both”), and 598 (“no more than a policy decision adopted to avoid conflicts during decolonisation”); Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 31–32 (citing the Secretary-General of the OAU); Ekwe-Ekwe H, Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Zaire (1990) pp 53–54 (“inspired by national interests rather than legal imperatives”).
[141] McEwen, n 129 above, p 26. Thus the Declaration “lassait intact le problème des territoires insuffisamment délimités l’époque coloniale”; Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 85. Cf Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 15 (suggesting that the Cairo Declaration embodies uti possidetis). The formulation “achievement of national independence” in the Cairo Declaration could also theoretically support expansionist claims by such States as Liberia, Ethiopia and Morocco which were independent prior to colonialism; Touval S, “The Organization of African Unity and African Borders” (1967) 21 International Organization 102 at 124–25.
[142] Eg, Somalia and Morocco; see Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 66; Boutros-Ghali, n 131 above, pp 36–37. Disagreement concerning the Cairo Declaration fuelled the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia concerning the Ogaden region, the former pointing to historic Somali habitation and the latter relying on the Declaration; see eg, Guilhaudis J-F, “Remarques à propos des récent conflits territoriaux entre Etats africains (Bande d'Aouzou, Ogaden, Saillant de Kyaka)” (1979) 25 Annuaire Français de Droit International 223; Annex to Letter from Permanent Republic of Ethiopia to the UN, 3 September 1980, UN Doc A/35/427; Rajagopal B and Carroll AJ, The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somalia (1992); Constitution of the Somali Democratic Republic of 1981 (Article 16), in Blaustein AP and Flanz GH eds, Constitutions of the World (1993) vol 17. Links to boundary disputes and boundary related matters via <http://www.smithbartos.com/intlaw/boundaries> . Recent boundary disputes can be searched on the University of Durham’s International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) website <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/database/data.html> .
[143] Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal), n 22 above, at 57 (diss op Mr Bedjaoui); Brownlie, n 36 above, p 11. See also Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above, at 90 (“Libya … accepted the principles which [the Cairo Declaration] embodied”) (sep op Judge Ajibola).
[144] An example is the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula and part of Cameroonian territory near Lake Chad, which Cameroon alleges has been the subject of Nigerian aggression since 1993. Provisional measures were sought at the International Court of Justice on 29 March 1994 and 6 June 1996, see Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, n 30 above. See note summarising the judgment in (1996) Australian International Law Journal 158.
[145] Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 566.
[146] Concerning ‘regional’ custom; Asylum case, n 91 above.
[147] Legum C, Pan-Africanism (1962) pp 229–32; Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 20–21. Cukwarah AO, “The Organisation of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems: 1963–1973” (1973) 13 Indian Journal of International Law 176 at 179–80.
[148] St John RB, “The Boundary Dispute between Peru and Ecuador” (1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 321 at 323.
[149] Comprising five ICJ Judges: Fitzmaurice (President), Gros, Petrén, Onyeama and Dillard.
[150] Beagle Channel Arbitration, n 88 above, at 125. See also Judge Gros at 230 (“intra-American … rule of uti possidetis”); El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 636 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez) (“applicable between Spanish-American Republics”); Touscoz J, Le Principe d’Effectivité dans l’Ordre International (1964) p 223, n 56. Former ICJ Judge Jessup regarded uti possidetis as a prime example of regional law; Jessup PC, ''Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations” (1964) 58 American Journal of International Law 341 at 347.
[151] Even in the Burkina Faso case the parties requested that the decision be based on the “intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonialization”, Preamble to the Special Agreement of 16 September 1983 (Burkina Faso/Mali); reproduced in ICJ Rep 1986, p 554 at 557.
[152] Fisher, n 59 above (“the indefinite and illusory concept of uti possidetis”); Waldock, n 59 above, at 325 (“discredited even as a criterion for settling boundary disputes between Latin-American States”); Boggs SW, International Boundaries (1940) p 289; Prescott JRV, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (1965) pp 116. See also Schwarzenberger, n 49 above; Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 401.
[153] La Pradelle, n 48 above, pp 86–87.
[154] Naldi, n 49 above, at 899. Concerning intertemporal law, see Island of Palmas case, n 34 above, at 845; Shaw, n 47 above, at 152; Elias TO, “The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law” (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 285; Jennings, n 33 above, pp 28–31.
[155] Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above, at 89.
[156] Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land, Judgment, n 75 above, at 240, 255 (respectively).
[157] See Sahurie EJ, The International Law of Antarctica (1992) p 224, n 113.
[158] Rann of Kutch case, n 37 above; Temple of Preah Vihear case,n 38 (respectively).
[159] McEwen, n 129 above, p 27.
[160] Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, n 22 above, at 65–66; Lissitzyn OJ, “Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus)” (1967) 61 American Journal of International Law 895; Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 12.
[161] Eg Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, (1923) PCIJ Ser B, No 4; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Judgment, (1932) PCIJ Ser. A/B, No 46, pp 153–58. Also Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1973, p 3 at 18. See further Shaw, n 21 above, pp 231–33.
[162] UN Doc A/CONF.39/27 (22 May 1969).
[163] Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, UN Doc A/6309/Rev.1, reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol I part II, pp 169, 259.
[164] Poulose TT, Succession in International Law (1974) p 8.
[165] McNair MH, The Law of Treaties (1961) p 655; Fitzmaurice GG, “The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties” (1948–II) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 292; Lester AP, “State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth: A Rejoinder” (1963) 12 International and Comparative Law Quarterly; 478 (1965) 14 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 262; O’Connell P, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law (1967); Jennings R and Watts A, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn (1992) pp 224–27, §65.
[166] Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, UN Doc A/CONF80/31 (22 August 1978); reprinted in (1978) 17 ILM 1488.
[167] Ibid (“A succession of States shall not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by a treaty”). See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1968, vol II, pp 92–93; Poulose, n 164 above, p 90; Report of the 53rd Conference of the ILA (1968) 589, pp 598, 603; ILA, The Effect of Independence on Treaties: A Handbook (1965) pp 361–67; De Lupis ID, International Law and the Independent State (1987) p 179; Jennings, n 33 above, p 13; Klabbers and Lefeber, n 78 above, at 62.
[168] See Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 11–13.
[169] Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above, p 6 at 37: (“A boundary established by a treaty thus achieves a permanence which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy”).
[170] Hannikainen L, Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988).
[171] Ibid, p 299.
[172] Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol II, pp 248–49.
[173] See n 14, above at 565, paragraph 22.
[174] Ibid, at 566, paragraph 24.
[175] See Brownlie, n 36 above, pp 26–43, pp 110–20 (Egypt-Sudan) pp 121–26 (Chad-Libya) pp 127–32 (Libya-Niger) pp 133–40 (Libya-Sudan) pp 141–46 (Libya-Tunisia) pp 149–58 (Morocco-Western Sahara) pp 164–89 (Benin-Nigeria) pp 190–201 (Benin-Togo) pp 213–29 (Gambia-Senegal) pp 230–49 (Ghana-Ivory Coast) pp 250–79 (Ghana-Togo) pp 280–95 (Ghana-Upper Volta) pp 296–99 (Guinea-Guinea-Bissau) pp 304–09 (Guinea-Liberia) pp 321–49 (Guinea-Sierra Leone) pp 350–57 (Guinea-Bissau-Senegal) pp 358–70 (Ivory Coast-Liberia) pp 379–405 (Liberia-Sierra Leone) pp 445–69 (Niger-Nigeria) pp 484–88 (Angola (Cabinda)-Congo (Brazzaville)) pp 489–514 (Angola-Zaïre) pp 545–48 (Cameroun-Equatorial Guinea) pp 553–87 (Cameroun-Nigeria) pp 597–601 (Central African Empire-Sudan) pp 602–06 (Central African Empire-Zaïre) pp 613–16 (Chad-Nigeria) pp 617–39 (Chad-Sudan) pp 659–69 (Congo (Brazzaville)-Zaïre) pp 670–73 (Equatorial Guinea-Gabon) pp 682–85 (Sudan-Zaïre) pp 705–36 (Zaïre-Zambia) pp 744–52 (Burundi-Tanzania) pp 753–66 (Djbouti-Ethiopia) pp 767–74 (Djibouti-Somalia) pp 826–51 (Ethiopia-Somalia) pp 888–916 (Kenya-Somalia) pp 989–1001 (Rwanda-Uganda) pp 1025–40 (Angola-Namibia) pp 1041–72 (Angola-Zambia) pp 1116–1212 (Malawi-Mozambique) pp 1219–37 (Mozambique-Zimbabwe) pp 1238–52 (Mozambique-South Africa) pp 1253–61 (Mozambique-Swaziland) pp 1262–72 (Mozambique-Zambia).
[176] Eg, ibid, pp 983–88 (Rwanda-Tanzania).
[177] Eg, ibid, pp 690–704 (Uganda-Zaïre) pp 968–82 (Mozambique-Tanzania). Historic developments of Sudanese sovereignty have created particular difficulty; pp 682–84 (Sudan-Zaïre), ibid pp 852–87 (Ethiopia-Sudan) pp 917–21 (Kenya-Sudan) (“No international agreement relates to the frontier”; ibid p 919). Incompleteness is not necessarily a problem; eg a median line has been adopted by default in Lake Tanganyika; ibid pp 686–89 (Tanzania-Zaïre).
[178] Eg, ibid, pp 436–44 (Mauritania-Western Sahara).
[179] Evans MD, “International Court of Justice: Recent Cases” (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 683; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above. See further Ricciardi M, “Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis” (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 301.
[180] De Lupis, n 167 above, p 187.
[181] Ibid, p 188.
[182] Eg, Chime S, “The Organization of African Unity and African Boundaries” in Widstrand ed, n 136 above, p 65; Bello, n 125 above; Naldi, n 49 above, at 893; Kacowicz, n 4 above; de Pinho, n 140 above, at 98–100.
[183] McEwen, n 129 above, p 31.
[184] Brownlie, n 36 above, p 11; Shaw, n 21 above, at 120, n 1; Warbrick C, “The Boundary Between England and Scotland in the Solway Firth” (1980) 51 British Yearbook of International Law 163 at 174; Jennings and Watts, n 165 above, pp 669–70, §235 (“adapted to the African continent”).
[185] Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal), n 22 above, at 22. Note that time the ICJ has declined to hear a re-opening of the case; Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, Order of 8 November 1995, ICJ Rep 1995, p 423.
[186] Note that this approach had been foreshadowed a year earlier in Guinea — Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case, n 22 above, at 657 (per Lachs, Mbaye and Bedjaoui) (Award of 14 February 1985).
[187] Naldi, n 49 above, at 899. See also Shaw, n 21 above, pp 186–87; El Salvador case, n 22 above, p 633, paragraph 13 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez) (distinguishing between “contemporary developments” following African decolonisation and “the Spanish-American uti possidetis principle”).
[188] Beagle Channel Arbitration, n 88 above, at 133. Compare Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 84 (suggesting that acknowledgment of uti possidetis does not impede boundary modification by treaty); Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 52 (making a functional distinction between ‘international’ colonial boundaries and ‘internal’ colonial boundaries).
[189] See Shaw, n 21 above, pp 252–53.
[190] 26 March 1979 18 ILM 362.
[191] Agreement of 1906 between the Egyptian authority and the neighbouring administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire, 1 October 1906, in (1906) 116 BFSP 842.
[192] Taba Award, n 76 above, at 321 (per Lapidoth) quoting from Ress G, “The Delimitation and Demarcation of Frontiers in International Treaties and Maps” in National and International Boundaries, Thesaurus Acroasium, vol XIV (1985) pp 395 at 435.
[193] Taba Award, n 76 above, at 321 (per Lapidoth), quoting from Ress, ibid, p 437.
[194] Ibid at 321.
[195] Ibid, at 323–24.
[196] Canton of Valais v Canton of Tessin (1987) 75 ILR 114 (full German text: Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts aus dem Jahre 1980, Amtliche Sammlung, 106 Band, Iib. Teil, p 154).
[197] Taba Award, n 76 above, at 325.
[198] Ibid, at 326.
[199] McEwen, n 129 above, pp 12, 28. Cf FV, St John RB, “The Boundary Dispute Between Peru and Ecuador” (1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 321 at 327 (“absolutely no agreement between the two States as to where the status quo lay”).
[200] Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above, at 89 (sep op Judge Ajibola) (“does it matter seriously whether the principle is uti possidetis juris or uti possidetis de facto with regard to its application in Africa?”).
[201] Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal), n 22 above, at 57 (diss op Mr Bedjaoui).
[202] Kacowicz AM, Peaceful Territorial Change (1994) p 9.
[203] Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 60.
[204] On inchoate title, Jennings and Watts, n 165 above, pp 689–90, §252.
[205] Keller et al, n 47 above, pp 43–45, 148, 151.
[206] See Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above, at 93–94 (diss op Judge ad hoc Sette-Camara); Shaw, n 21 above, pp 38–45; Lindley MF, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (1926); Shaw, n 47 above, at 129. The significance of such ‘treaties’ with natives related to rendering a territorial claim opposable against other colonial powers, rather than as a means of ‘transferring’ title from the tribal sovereign to the colonial sovereign.
[208] Kratochwil et al, n 23 above, p 130.
[209] Kim C and Lawson CM, “Law of the Subtle Mind: the Traditional Japanese Conception of Law” (1979) 28 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 491.
[210] See n 14 above, at 633; the pools were divided into halves, for in the absence of special circumstances equity amounts to equality North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, n 137 above, at 49. Equity infra legem will guide the court in interpreting and applying the law where there are few points of reference, and correspondingly a greater number of “degrees of freedom” (in the statistical sense), for geometrically defining the boundary line; Burkina Faso case, n 14 above, at 662 (sep op Judge ad hoc Abi-Saab). Judge Abi-Saab would have preferred a line more imbued with equity infra legem given that the region was “a nomadic one, subject to drought, so that access to water is vital” (ibid, at 663).
[211] Mazrui A, “The African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse and Human Displacement” (1995) International Journal of Refugee Law 21; Neuberger B, “Irredentism and Politics in Africa” in Charzan, ed, n 4 above, p 97; Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 30.
[212] Hannikainen, n 170 above, p 371; Wa Mutua, n 2 above, at 1142–50; Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, pp 70–73.
[213] Okoth-Ogendo HWO, “Property Theory and Land-Use Analysis — An Essay in the Political Economy of Ideas” in Woodman GR and Obilade AO eds, African Law and Legal Theory (1995) pp 291–305; Anene JC, The International Boundaries of Nigeria (1970) pp 5–6; Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, pp 67–69; Briggs LC, Tribes of the Sahara (1960) p 13ff, 135–36; p 178ff; Boutros-Ghali, n 131 above, p 8.
[214] Udokang O, Succession of New States to International Treaties (1972) p 381; Boutros-Ghali, n 131 above, pp 9–10.
[215] Anene JC, The International Boundaries of Nigeria (1970) p 3.
[216] See Brownlie, n 36 above, p 6. See also Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 72.
[217] Wa Mutua, n 2 above; Coker C, “The New World (Dis)Order” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 28 at 32. Cf Kratochwil et al, n 23 above, p 14; Murty, n 33 above, p 149 (“geometric boundaries in Africa have been a satisfactory divide”); McEwen, n 129 above, p 48.
[218] However, since certain geographic regions had long been a “conglomeration of ethnic communities”, the awkward mixture of nationalities in modern African States is not solely a legacy of colonial map-making; see eg Welch C, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Integration in West Africa (1966) p 200; Anene JC, The International Boundaries of Nigeria (1970) p 290.
[219] Twining D, The New Eurasia (1993) p 23.
[220] Reeves JS, “International Boundaries” (1944) 38 American Journal of International Law 533 at 538.
[221] Wa Mutua, n 2 above, at 1175.
[223] See Shaw, n 47 above, at 120; Eastwood, n 9 above; Weller, n 9 above; Brilmayer, n 10 above; Kiwanuka RN, “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 80.
[224] Eg, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, GA Res 217 (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71, 75 (1948), providing for the right of all people to participatory government, which remains merely rhetorical for many State populations.
[225] Ayittey GBN, Africa Betrayed (1992).
[226] Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, n 8 above; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, n 8 above; Burkina Faso case, n 14 above at 652–54 (sep op Judge ad hoc Luchaire).
[227] See, eg, Iglar RF, “The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia’s and Croatia’s Right to Secede” (1992) 15 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 213 at 221–29; Musgrave, n 9 above, p 218; Fox, n 11 above.
[228] See n 8 above.
[229] The relevant passage reads:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.
[230] Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal), n 22 above, at 57 (sep op Mr Bedjaoui). Compare Koskenniemi, n 4 above, at 243.
[231] Even assuming that secession of national groups from an existing State could now be considered to be a valid manifestation of self-determination, uti possidetis would be relevant only “in those few instances when … that secession has an effect on a colonial boundary”; McCorquodale R, “Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach” (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 857 at 882.
[232] Hitler A, Mein Kampf (translated James Murphy) (1939) p 532.
[233] The Chairman being Mr Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Council. The remainder of the Commission was composed of the Presidents of the German, Italian, and Spanish Constitutional Courts, and of the Belgian Court of Arbitration.
[234] Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission; “Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, n 27 above. See also Weller, n 9 above.
[235] Opinion 3 (1992) 31 ILM 1499.
[236] Opinion 1, paragraph 3 (1992) 31 ILM 1494 at 1497.
[237] Opinion 1, paragraph 1(d) (1992) 31 ILM 1494 at 1495.
[238] Kreca M, The Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Critical Commentary (1993) pp 12–14.
[239] See Bernier I, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (1973) p 26.
[240] Dicey AV, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1948) 9th edn, p 144. Duchacek I, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (1987) pp18ff; Bowrie RR and Friedrich CJ, Studies in Federalism (1954).
[241] Kreca, n 238 above, pp 14–18.
[242] Eg, Cooper v Aaron[1958] USSC 160; , 358 US 1 at 18 (1958).
[243] Figures from Blum YZ, “UN Membership of the 'New' Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?” (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 830 at 833.
[244] Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, n 166 above, Article 2(1)(b); Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, Article 2(1)(a); UN Doc A/CN.4/49, p 8, paragraph 1; Crawford J, The Creation of States in International Law (1979) p 303.
[245] Pakistan continued as a State despite losing 57% of its population in the Bangladesh secession; Musgrave, n 9 above, p 354. Concerning the secession see generally Nanda VP, “Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities — Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)” (1972) 66 American Journal of International Law 321.
[246] Opinion 8 (1992) 31 ILM 1521 at 1523.
[247] Crawford, n 244 above, p 405. Indeed, SFRY had itself adopted new constitutions on previous occasions; in 1946, 1963 and 1974; Musgrave, n 9 above, p 203.
[248] Cf dissolution of the USSR by the agreement of all its constituent parts: Alma Ata Declaration (Article V); reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 148 at 149; or the division of Czechoslovakia by federal municipal enactment; Constitutional Law Dissolving the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia (25 November 1992); Ústavní Zákon o zániku Ceské a Slovenské Federativní Republiky 542/1992, 110 Sbírka Zákonů, 3253–54.
[251] Specifically, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 4, n 8 above; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, n 8 above; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Principle IV, reprinted in (1975) 14 ILM 1292.
[252] As required by Article II of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, n 166 above.
[253] No mention was made of the fact that the Constitution also safeguarded the right of self-determination of all nations in Yugoslavia; Ramet SP, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1963–1983 (1984).
[254] Kreca, n 238 above, p 39.
[255] Opinion 8, paragraph 4 (1992) 31 ILM 1521 at 1523.
[256] Article 61(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, n 166 above; Kymlicka W, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995) p 117; Ratner, n 134 above, at 606–07.
[257] See Elazar DJ, “The Role of Federalism in Political Integration” in Elazar DJ ed, Federalism and Political Integration (1979) p 13 at 28–29.
[258] Owen D, Balkan Odessey (1993) p 34.
[259] Opinion 3 (1992) 31 ILM 1499 at 1500.
[260] Burkina Faso, n 14 above, at 565 (paragraph 20 from 565 is quoted in text accompanying n 103 above). See also Hannum, n 10 above, at 55; Kreca, n 238 above, pp 35–38.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Ibid.
[264] See also Ratner, n 134 above, at 614 (“the validity of the principle for noncolonial breakups is suspect”) Cf Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 34 (suggesting that uti possidetis in regards to Europe is implicit in Principle III of the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act (1975) 14 ILM 1292 at 1294); Fox, n 11 above, at 749 (the Commission made a “radical restatement” of the principle).
[265] As the Chamber of the ICJ observed in the Burkina Faso case, uti possidetis “stops the clock, but it does not put back the hands”, n 14, at 568. In this sense, making reference to dissolution in the application of uti possidetis is to do precisely the opposite: “to put back” the clock to a time prior to the usual critical date, ie the moment of the new State’s independence.
[266] Macartney CA, Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences (1937) pp 360, 364, 406, 413 (“insistence of the use of Serb in all public life”) p 414 (“All clubs, associations, etc, were ‘Serbized’”); Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 193–94 (discussing such ‘internal colonialism’ in the region of Eastern Europe).
[267] Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7.
[268] This characterisation had some unfortunate consequences for attempts to prosecute war crimes. For example, the majority of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found that as a consequence of the context being an ‘internal’ armed conflict there was an absence of one of the essential elements of the offence with which alleged war criminal Tadic was charged. See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ 'Dule' (Opinion and Judgment of 7 May 1997), Case No IT-94-1-T (extracts reprinted in (1997) 36 ILM 980). Summary in McCormack T, “From Solferino to Sarajevo: A Continuing Role for International Humanitarian Law?” [1997] MelbULawRw 21; (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 601 at 638, n 63.
[269] Weller, n 9 above, at 588. See also SC Res 757 (1992) 31 ILM 1525, 1526; Blum, n 243 above, at 833; Musgrave, n 9 above, pp 351, 359. Serbia and Montenegro would also need to formally apply for UN membership; SC Res 777 (19 September 1992) reproduced in (1992) 31 ILM 1427, pp 1473–74. Cf Craven M, “The EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia” (1995) 66 British Yearbook of International Law 333 at 385ff (uti possidetis used “as a tool for establishing the presumptive statehood of the entities to emerge from the dismemberment of the SFRY and to deny the Autonomous Serbian Republics the benefit of that presumption”).
[270] The Aaland Islands Question: Report submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations (1921) Doc B7/21/68/106. See Barros J, The Åland Islands Question (1968) p 289.
[271] North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, n 137 above, at 32.
[272] A recent illustration of this principle is the EC’s statement in “Recognition of former Soviet Republics” that “Recognition shall not be taken to imply acceptance … concerning territory which is the subject of dispute” [1991] Bulletin of the European Communities Commission, No 12, 121, paragraph 1.4.13. See also Cukwarah, n 14 above, pp 4–5, 25; municipal decisions Duff Development Co Ltd v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797; Foster v Globe Venture Syndicate [1900] 1 Ch 881.
[273] Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 36.
[274] Eg, Monastery of St Naoum (Albanian Frontier), n 75 above; Jaworzina, n 75 above, Crawford, n 244 above, p 40.
[275] Without necessarily being entitled to such recognition, though see Lauterpacht H, “Recognition of States in International Law” (1944) 53 Yale Law Journal 385.
[276] Dayton Peace Accord (Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Serbia); General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, UN Doc A/50/750, reprinted in (1996) 35 ILM 75 ( hereafter referred to as the Dayton Agreement).
[277] Radan, n 9 above, at 211.
[279] Burkina Faso, n 14 above, at 652 (sep op Judge ad hoc Luchaire, paragraph 1).
[280] Sharp A, The Versailles Agreement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (1991) p 119ff. See also Stevenson D, French War Aims Against Germany, 1914–1919 (1992); Lloyd George D, War Memoirs (1938) vol 2, p 1514 (“an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe”); See also FRUS, Paris Peace Conference (1919) vol II, pp 481–83, vol III, pp 583–84, 591–93.
[281] See generally Barros J, The Åland Islands Question (1968).
[282] Macartney CA and Palmer AW, Independent East Europe: A History (1962) pp 111–15; Temperley HWV, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (1969) vol 6, pp 266–78; Dockrill ML and Goold JD, Peace Without Promise (1981) pp 117–18; Lundgren-Nielsen K, The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918–1919 (1979) pp 385–99.
[283] Temperley HWV, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (1969) vol 4, pp 449–55.
[284] Sharp, n 280 above, pp 144–45.
[285] Deak F, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon (1942) pp 4–14; Temperley, n 283 above, pp 89–125.
[287] Ibid, p 43.
[288] Deak, n 285 above, pp 61–63; Temperley, n 283 above, pp 487–89; Dockrill and Goold, n 282 above, pp 103–05.
[289] Italy’s occupation and eventual acquisition of Fiume after Croatia was separated from Hungary and amalgamated into the new Serb-Croat-Slovene entity is a similarly blunt example of the rejection of uti possidetis (according to which Fiume should have reverted to the status quo ante of 1868 and become part of Croatia); Macartney, n 266 above, p 442.
[290] Temperley, n 283 above, pp 488–92; Dockrill and Goold, n 282 above, pp 103-05.
[291] Macartney, n 266 above, p 3.
[292] Beneš E, Bohemia's Case for Independence (1917); Opcenský J, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak State (1928); Pearson R, National Minorities in Eastern Europe 1848–1945 (1983) p 151; Perman D, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (1962) pp 1–9. See also Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 12–13, 135 (role of nationalist elites and intelligentsia in stirring nationalist movements).
[293] Macartney, n 266 above, p 246.
[294] Macartney, n 266 above, pp 75, 83(n 1), 126.
[295] Sharp, n 280 above, p 149.
[296] Perman, n 292 above, pp 228–42; Sharp, n 280 above, p 151.
[297] Stadler KS, The Birth of the Austrian Republic 1918–1921 (1968).
[298] Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 36.
[300] Charney JI, “The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law” (1985) 56 British Yearbook of International Law 1; Stein TL, “The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law” (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 457. Some commentators have speculated that there may be an even broader scope for the permissibility of secession; see, eg, Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 74–75; Kirgiis FL Jr, “Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-determination in the United Nations Era” (1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 304.
[301] Goy R, “L'independence de l'Erythrée” (1993) 39 Annuaire Français de Droit International 337 at 350.
[302] Hannum, n 10 above, at 55. See also Musgrave, n 9 above, pp 209, 220, 351, 357; McCorquodale, n 231 above, at 877.
[303] Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly, UN GAOR 47th Session, Annex I, at 2, UNDoc A/C3/47/5 (1992).
[304] Chase P, “Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict under the Contemporary Model of Sovereignty” (1995) 34 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 219 at 222–39; Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 358–73; Yakentchouk R, “Les conflits des territoire dans les états de l'ex-USSR” (1993) 39 Annuaire Fraçais de Droit International 393 at 395.
[305] Article 3, Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1995) 34 ILM 1279 at 1283.
[306] Light M, “Russia and Transcaucasia” in Wright JFR, Goldenberg S and Schofield R eds, Transcaucasian Boundaries (1996) p 34 at 37–39.
[307] Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 107–08, 111, 114.
[308] Yamskov I, “Nagorno Karabakh: Causes of the Conflict and Ways to Solve it” in Tishkov V ed, National Processes in the USSR: Problems and Trends (1991) p 129. The enclave has an Armenian majority of about 76%: Kaiser, n 6 above, p 361.
[309] Eg Kolosov VA, Ethno-Territorial Conflicts and Boundaries in the Former Soviet Union (1992); Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 362ff (various disputes amongst Georgians and Abkhazians, Moldovians and Turkic Gagauz/Slavic Russians/Ukranians). Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 39, n 161 cite reports of further disputes, eg, Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria.
[310] On Soviet federalism historically; Gleason G, Federalism and Nationalism (1990); Swoboda N, A History of the Nationality Problems in the USSR (1990). The sovereignty of the republics was conceded by the Communist Party to be “largely formal”, Draft Nationalities Policy of the Party Under Present Conditions, adopted by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Pravda, 24 September 1989, pp 1–2.
[311] Constitution of the USSR, Articles 73 and 113.
[312] Article 74.
[313] Article 75.
[314] Article 70.
[315] Article 72.
[316] Article 81.
[317] Article 76.
[318] Arteria Info Ltd, in cooperation with Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Landmarks in the History of the Czech State (1994) p 5.
[319] Ibid, p 7.
[320] Ibid, p 17.
[321] Ibid, p 28.
[322] Sharp A, The Versailles Agreement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (1991) p 148.
[323] Macartney, n 266 above, pp 73–76.
[324] Treaty for the General Delimitation of Frontiers of Federal States between Czech Republic and Slovak Republic of 29 October 1992, No 229/193. See Malenovsky, n 28 above, at 328.
[325] Malenovsky, n 28 above, at 328.
[326] Yakemtchouk R, Les Répubiques baltes en Droit international. Echec d'une annexion opérée en violation du Droit des Gens (1991) p 286.
[327] Ratner, n 134 above, at 590. Cf Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 39; Malenovsky, n 28 above.
[328] ‘If P then Q’ does not imply ‘If Q then P’. For example, uti possidetis is not necessarily the reason for the united Germany’s acceptance of its territorial limits in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany 1990, reproduced in (1990) 29 ILM 1186 at 1187–89. Cf Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 37.
[329] Dewey J, “Logical Method and Law” (1924) 10 Cornell Law Quarterly (1924) 17 at 20 (reproduced in Aarnio A and MacCormick DN eds, Legal Reasoning, vol II (1992) p 41 at 44).
[330] Germany and Italy recognised Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December 1991, with other States and international organisations extending recognition over subsequent months, culminating with admission of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegoniva to the United Nations on 22 May 1992.
[331] This takes account of the absence of such collective intervention in Eastern Bloc States within the USSR’s sphere of influence (including Yugoslavia) during the Cold War era, such as the conspicuous non-responses of European States to the USSR’s intrusions into Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).
[332] The formulation “otherwise subject to” has been added: (1) to cover the possibility that the classification of the Yugoslavian break-up as a ‘dissolution’ may have been erroneous; and (2) to permit reference to State practice outside the Yugoslavian context which may provide evidence for the norm.
[333] See, eg, Anaya, n 4 above, at 842; Klabbers and Lefeber, n 78 above, at 44. Franck TM, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 46; McGee RW, “The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution” (1992) 28 Stanford Journal of International Law 451; McCorquodale, n 231 above, at 864–65; Ratner, n 134 above, at 624 (referring to “constitutive changes in international law” which emphasise “participatory government”).
[334] See, eg, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, 1 August 1975, Principle VIII (1975) 14 ILM 1292 at 1295; (hereafter referred to as the Helskinki Final Act); Charter of Paris for New Europe (1991) 30 ILM at 19; GA Res 48/131, preambular para 2, UN GAOR, 48th Session, Supp No 49 at 250, UN Doc A/48/49 (1993) (UN assistance in elections for “building of institutions relating to human rights and the strengthening of a pluralistic civil society”). For data on UN supervised democratic elections see generally Beigbeder Y, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (1994).
[335] Eg, Weller, n 9 above, at 606; Hannum, n 10 above, at 39; Hanneman AJ, “Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics: A Double Minority Problem” (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 485 at 500–01, 524–28; Buchanan A, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (1991) pp 18–22, 151–62.
[336] Ratner, n 134 above, at 613.
[337] Ratner, n 134 above, at 616. Sanders D, “If Quebec secedes from Canada can the Cree Secede from Quebec?” (1995) 29 University of British Columbia Law Review 143.
[338] Eg, Louisiana v Mississippi[1906] USSC 55; , 201 US 1 (1906).
[339] Kunz JL, “International Law by Analogy” (1951) 45 American Journal of International Law 329 at 334.
[340] See, eg, Huber M, “The Intercantonal Law of Switzerland (Swiss Interstate Law)” (1909) 3 American Journal of International Law 62.
[341] See generally Ratner, n 134 above, at 602–08.
[342] See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1978, p 3 at 35; Boggs SW, International Boundaries (1940) p 10.
[343] Paddison R, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power (1983) p 29.
[344] See Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Espagne/France), n 108 above, at 307–08.
[345] See “Lotus”, Judgment No 9, (1927) PCIJ Ser A, No 10 pp 18–19; Murty, n 33 above, pp 236–37.
[346] Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 21–33.
[347] Kreca, n 238 above, pp 33–34. Cf Musgrave, n 9 above, p 202. Significant ethnic minorities were left in each of the total of six republics organised after the Second World War by President Tito to correspond to political units which had existed prior to the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918 at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. See Burg SL, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966 (1983) p 24.
[348] Bennett C, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (1995) p 16. See also Ratner, n 134 above, at 604 (“the administrative line … stands apart from the international border by the ease with which it may be crossed”).
[349] Ratner, n 134 above, at 609.
[350] Cohen WB, “The French Governors” in Gann LH and Duignan P eds, African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa (1978) p 19 at 23–27.
[351] Luchaire F, Droit d'Outre-Mer (1959) pp 100–05; Roberts-Wray K, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (1966) pp 19–62.
[352] Dubai – Sharjah Border Arbitration n 38 above, at 579. See also Bowett DW, “The Dubai/Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1991” (1994) 65 British Yearbook of International Law 103.
[353] For this typology see Boggs SW, International Boundaries (1940) pp 28–31; Murty, n 33 above, pp 217–21.
[354] Eg, Constitution of the United States of America, Article IV, paragraph 3; Canadian Constitution Article 43; Australian Constitution ss 123–24; German Constitution Article 29.
[355] Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 39 (observing that uti possidetis is more justified where a federation of unitary States dissolves as contrasted with the dissolution of an aggregation of a federal State’s administrative divisions).
[356] La Pradelle, n 48 above, pp 86–87, Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 33; Ratner, n 134 above, at 617 (suggesting, by reference to the original Roman Law meaning of the principle, that it be used “to preserve the status quo only until States can resolve their competing claims”).
[357] Ratner, n 134 above, at 620 introduces these two factors, but does not identify the common thread — both factors evidence a consensual line, which in turn suggests greater stability. Ratner also suggests that geographic and economic viability should be relevant to the status of boundaries between human populations, but does so by adopting the rather unpersuasive analogy of cases delimiting maritime resources of the continental shelf, ibid, at nn 244, 245.
[358] Murty, n 33 above, p 219.
[359] Reeves, n 220 above, at 537; Yakemtchouk, n 14 above, p 67.
[361] Kratochwil et al, n 23 above.
[362] Van Caenegem RC, An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law (1995) pp 13–35; Murty, n 33 above, pp 78, 106; Koskenniemi, n 4 above, at 251–53; Sorel and Mehdi, n 6 above, at 35.
[363] Rapaport J Muteba E and Therattil JJ, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (1971) p 11.
[364] Eg, Nauru (pop 10,149) and Tuvalu (pop 9,991); United States CIA, World Factbook 1995.
[365] Crawford, n 244 above, p 247.
[366] Eg, dissolution of the Soviet bloc and formation of a ‘new’ Europe; Andrén N, “Federalism in the Setting of Globalism, Regionalism, and Nationalism” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 362; Klabbers and Lefeber, n 78 above, at 38 (“from time to time, stability is only achieved through change”).
[367] Waltz KN, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” in Clesse et al, n 5 above, p 148; eg Israel has continued as a State despite persistent hostility (of varying degrees) with its neighbouring Arab States.
[368] Ratner, n 134 above, at 592. Note that Ratner concedes in n 12 that “international economic integration can mitigate” this problem (similarly, Kaiser, n 6 above, pp 339–40). However, he later restates the position in a different guise by suggesting that geographic and economic viability could be an alternative mechanism to uti possidetis modernis as a means of establishing the boundaries of new States; Ratner, n 134 above, at 621.
[369] Minorities: eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171, Article 27; Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 28 ILM 1989 at 1457, Article 30; Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) 34 ILM 351. Indigenous Peoples: eg, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its forty-sixth session, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/2-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 at 105; (1995) 34 ILM 546.
[370] See eg, Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, adopted by the European Community on 16 December 1991 (1993) 92 ILR at 173–74.
[371] Eg, SC Res 232 (1966) (economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia). See generally Doxley M, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (1980).
[372] Eg, Russians in the Soviet Union, Serbs in Yugoslavia, Czechs in Czechoslovakia.
[373] Eg, Grisbadarna case (1909) Vol II UNRIAA 147; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, n 85 above. See also Anaya, n 4 above, at 840.
[374] Wa Mutua, n 2 above, at 1116, 1136–37, 1147.
[375] Wa Mutua, ibid, at 1114. Cf Shaw, n 47 above, at 119–20 (“the precarious stability of third world States, the vast majority of which are not nation-States”).
[376] Cohen L, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (1993) pp 267–68; Musgrave, n 9 above, pp 203, 351; McCormack T, “From Solferino to Sarajevo” [1997] MelbULawRw 22; (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 621 at 639.
[377] Donia RJ and Fine JVA, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (1994) pp 194–99.
[378] Ibid, p 211 (“Croatia’s President Tudjman and Serbia’s President Milosevic actively cultivated the discontent of their fellow nationals” in neighbouring republics); ibid, p 210 (“the State-controlled media gave a one-sided advantage to Milosevic in Serbia”). Thus in December 1990 Slovenia and Croatia “were not seceding from Yugoslavia, but from Milosevic’s vision of Yugoslavia”; Bennett C, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (1995) p 13. See also personal profile of Milosevic in Bennett, ibid, pp 83–85, 93–101. See further Iglar, n 227 above, at 217 (concerning the Communist Party’s victory in Serbia and Montenegro, and losses elsewhere, in the 1990 elections); Pajic Z, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to ‘Apartheid’ ... and Back” in Akhavan P and Howse R eds, Yugoslavia the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region (1995) p 152 at 154–61; Silber L and Little A, The Death of Yugoslavia (1995) p xxiii.
The phenomenon of mythologising the ‘homeland’ in support of nationalist goals, as seen in Serbian government policy, was also used (with less dire consequences) in respect of the push for independence from the USSR by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbajdzhan, Moldovia and Belarus on the basis of their brief experiences of autonomy in the early part of the twentieth century; see Kaiser, n 6 above, p 94.
[379] Eg, the massacre by federal ‘police’ of 120 pro-democracy Albanian ‘rioters’ in Kosovo in March 1989; see Bennett, n 378 above, pp 10–11. Civil unrest and violence by authorities on the people of Kosovo was still underway in 1998 (on 6 May 1998 the Albanian Daily News at <http:www.albaniannews.com/> reported that 150 have been killed in fighting between ethnic separatists and Serbian forces since February 1998.
[380] Pfaff W, “Invitation to War” (1993) 72(3) Foreign Affairs 97 104; Donia and Fine, n 377 above, pp 239–40, 262–66 (Bosnian President Izetbegovic “had clung until the last moment to the hope of a political settlement”; ibid, p 239).
[381] Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 49 UN SCOR, UN Doc S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994) Annex III.A. See also Bassiouni C and Manikas P, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1996) pp 44–47.
[382] New York Times (16 September 1996) pp A1, A9; (18 September 1996) pp A1, A8.
[383] General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes (Dayton Peace Accord) (1996) 35 ILM 75, Annex 4: The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article IV (3)(d) and (e), Article V (2)(d) and Article V(5)(a). See also Yee S, “The New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1996) European Journal of International Law 176.
[384] Bugajski J, “Policy Forum: Bosnia — After the Troops Leave” (1996) 19(3) Washington Quarterly 61.
[385] Ibid. See also Gaeta P, “The Dayton Agreements and International Law” (1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 147 at 158–60. Donia and Fine, n 377 above, p 121; Iglar, n 227 above, at 216; Musgrave, n 9 above, p 203 (indicating the original disparity between Serb and non-Serb perceptions of Yugoslav ‘unity’, ie centralist v confederational).
[386] Ratner, n 134 above, at 601.
[387] Slovenia may be the only State, or one of only a limited few States, which falls in the latter class.
[388] Thus the basis for a customary norm is “less than rock-solid”; Ratner, n 134 above, at 598.
[389] See, eg, in the Honduras Borders case, n 60 above; Gámez-Bonilla Treaty, Oct 7, 1894, Honduras–Nicaragua, Article II, paragraph 6; Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v Nicaragua), Judgment of 18 November 1960, n 116 above, at 199–200.
[390] See ibid, at 215.
[391] See Case concerning the Northern Cameroons, Judgment of 2 December 1963, n 87 above, at 21–25.
[392] See Sureda, n 10 above, pp 15–63.
[393] Ibid, n 10 above, pp 199–202.
[394] Brownlie, n 36 above, p 739. This may be an example of an historic dividing line prevailing over uti possidetis, in this case the local customary boundary between the two traditional Kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi, leading to the separate statehood of neighbouring peoples.
[395] The significance of manifest consent is also mentioned by Antonopoulos, n 13 above, at 45 (stressing the need to be “cautious in applying the principle in the event of manifest disagreement between the relevant participants, ongoing conflict, and long-standing ethnic animosity”).
[396] Ratner, n 134 above, at 596.
[397] Treaty Concerning Common Boundary Between Czech and Slovak Republics 1996, on file at the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague; Malenovsky, n 324 above, at 328ff.
[398] For example, in one instance there was an exchange of 452 hectares of territory, coupled with 50 million Kr relocation compensation from the Czech government to 55 Czechs in the village of U Sabotu who had been left in Slovakian territory as a result of the division; Lidové Noviny (12 June 1997) p 1.
[399] However, an example is provided by the dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas; Argentina argued for title based on, inter alia, uti possidetis, whereas Great Britain rejected the application of uti possidetis and instead claimed title of its own based on prescription (British occupation since 1833) and advocated the right to self-determination of the inhabitants; Greig, “Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands Crisis”, n 46 above, at 68; Kacowicz AM, Peaceful Territorial Change (1994) pp 154–77; Cohen-Jonathan G, “Les îles Falkland (Malouines)” (1972) 18 Annuaire Français de Droit International 235. See also Allcock et al, n 41 above, pp 551-61.
[400] “If the boundary which had historically emerged is not acceptable to the two sides now ... a boundary will have to be worked out ... afresh; and the negotiated boundary may not correspond to the historical boundary”; Murty, n 33 above, p 183.
[401] Munkman, n 59 above, at 47.
[402] See, eg, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, n 26 above, at 88–89 (sep op Judge Ajibola).
[403] El Salvador case, n 22 above, at 631 (sep op Judge Torres Bernárdez).
[404] Udokang, n 214 above, pp 397–98. After all, uti possidetis “is not to be conceived in the absolute; it has always to be interpreted in the light of its function” Burkina Faso case, n 14, at 661 (per Judge ad hoc Abi-Saab) — this function essentially being to assist in boundary dispute resolution