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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 30 October 2008
REFERENCE: 0034-2008
ORDER OF A REFEREE
MADE UNDER PART V
BUILDING UNITS AND GROUP TITLES ACT 1980
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Number of Plan:
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GTP 220
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Name of Building or Parcel:
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Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate
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Address:
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SANCTUARY COVE, QLD 4214
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by
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I hereby declare that the special resolutions passed by the
Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate (PBC) on 20 March 2006 and 26 May
2008 do not give the PBC authority to transfer any part of the secondary
thoroughfare or amalgamate it
with lot 90 on GTP 3441 without the consent of the
The Proprietors – Plumeria Group Titles Plan No. 2207.
I further order that, within six months or such other time agreed by
the parties, the PBC must ensure that all occupiers have a right of way over
the
secondary thoroughfare between lot 90 on GTP 3441 and lot 50 on GTP 2207 as
required by section 56 of the The Sanctuary Cove
Resort Act 1985 (SCRA),
except for any parts of this area that have ceased to be secondary thoroughfare.
I further order that the application is otherwise dismissed
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STATEMENT OF REFEREE’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF 0921-2007A
“Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate”
Application
Plumeria Body Corporate (Plumeria) has brought this application against the Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate (PBC). The applicant is seeking orders in relation to dealings with part of a secondary thoroughfare lot controlled by the PBC.
Background
The Sanctuary Cove Resort Act 1985 (SCRA) provided the legal structures for the development of the Sanctuary Cove Resort. The registration of the initial plan of survey resulted in the creation of the Sanctuary Cove Primary Thoroughfare Body Corporate (PTBC). The members of the PTBC were, directly or indirectly, made up of the owners of lots in the initial plan of survey. Owners of lots in the non-residential zones automatically became members of the PTBC. Owners of lots in residential zones instead automatically became members of the Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate (PBC) and this PBC then became a member of the PTBC.
Subsequent subdivisions have resulted in a number of additional residential bodies corporate (RBC’s), each of which became a member of the PBC. Plumeria is one of these RBC’s, with the members of Plumeria being the owners of the 88 residential lots shown in group titles plan 2207.
One of the members of Plumeria is Sonja Trott (Trott), the owner of lot 90 on group titles plan of resubdivision 3441, being a resubdivision of group titles plan 2207 (lot 90). Submissions indicate that Trott’s house encroaches upon part of one of the secondary thoroughfare lots controlled by the PBC that services lots within Plumeria. This secondary thoroughfare lot is lot 70 on group titles plan 2207 (the secondary thoroughfare lot). Submissions further indicate that the PBC has proposed to transfer part of the secondary thoroughfare lot to Trott but that Plumeria has lodged the present application to seek to prevent the PBC from doing this.
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of a Referee under the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (BUGTA) to make orders concerning bodies corporate within the Sanctuary Cove Resort has been considered in a number of previous orders of referees.[1]
Section 77(1) of the BUGTA provides for the general power of a referee to make orders, being:
A referee may, pursuant to an application of a body corporate, body corporate manager, a proprietor, a person having an estate or interest in a lot or an occupier of a lot in respect of a parcel, make an order on any person entitled to make an application under this subsection or on the chairperson, secretary or treasurer of the body corporate for the settlement of a dispute, or the rectification of a complaint, with respect to the exercise or performance of, or the failure to exercise or perform, a power, authority, duty or function conferred or imposed by this Act in connection with that parcel.
However, this power of a referee to make orders about powers, authorities, duties or functions under BUGTA is extended to a power to make orders about the SCRA due to section 5A of BUGTA, which preserves the operation of BUGTA for the SCRA, and section 104A of the SCRA that deals with disputes and provides that:
Unless otherwise provided in this Act, a dispute about the operation of this Act or the rights and obligations of persons under this Act may be dealt with under the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980, part 5.
The SCRA sets out a number of matters for the regulation of the PTBC and the PBC. The RBC’s are then separate bodies corporate regulated under BUGTA. In this respect, the second reading speech for the SCR Act indicated that residential developments would be established under BUGTA with their own group titles plan[2] and section 325(2) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (BCCMA) provided that BUGTA continued in force where the registration of the plan for the body corporate had been for a specified Act including the SCRA.
The present application is by Plumeria against the PBC, seeking an order to stop the PBC from entering into deeds or agreements with Trott in respect to a transfer or other dealing with part of the secondary thoroughfare lot. I am satisfied that Plumeria is both a body corporate and a person having an interest in a lot who is seeking an order against the PBC, as a body corporate, regarding the exercise or performance of a power or function conferred on the PBC by the SCRA. As a referee I am therefore satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the present dispute due to section 104A of the SCRA and section 77 of BUGTA.
Submissions
The registered plans show the secondary thoroughfare lot runs along the northern side of Plumeria parallel to the Coomera river but with a small section about 8 metres wide and 38 metres deep running down to the Coomera River between lot 90 and lot 50. This small section of approximately 310 square metres is shown as easement D (Easement D). Easement D is an easement over part of the secondary thoroughfare lot for drainage purposes for the benefit of lot 90.
The main grounds in support of the application, provided on behalf of Plumeria, were to the effect that:
Submissions by the PBC were to the effect that:
Submissions by Trott were to the effect that:
All owners were given an opportunity to provide written submissions. The main submissions by owners were to the effect that:
A reply to submissions on behalf of Plumeria was to the effect that:
A further reply to submissions on behalf of the PBC was to the effect that:
Determination
Applicable law
The legislation includes provisions to the effect that:
Summary of issues
The main issues for determination are:
Landscaping and fencing of Easement D
Findings
Certain of the issues are not really in dispute. Based on the submissions I am satisfied that:
I note that the approved plan shows a pedestrian pathway along almost the entire western length of the easement, although for a short segment most of this pathway is on lot 90. Further, it is obvious from the plans and photographs provided that public access along this pathway would have significant privacy implications for the occupants of lot 90. Otherwise, the landscaping plan and photographs indicate that access from the road to the easement area is obstructed by electrical infrastructure to near the middle of the easement. A fence and some bushes then obstruct access along the eastern side of the easement.
Having considered the submissions, it seems more likely than not that the landscaping plan was validly approved. In this regard, I note the PBC resolution of 12 August 1996 to grant an easement over the area for the benefit of lot 90 for landscaping and beautification purposes. Even if there was no subsequent resolution specifically authorising the PBC to affix its seal to the landscaping plan, it appears that the body corporate did seal that plan on 18 October 2001, that the approval would have been largely consistent with the longstanding intention to allow for landscaping and beautification of the area, and that Trott would have relied upon the landscaping having been approved when purchasing her lot.
On the other hand, I am not satisfied that Trott has any right to restrict access to the easement area by any person. In particular, I can see no basis for an argument that approval of the landscaping plan varied the easement by equitable agreement to include a right in favour of the grantee to restrict access. I note that a stamp on the plan states that the plan is "SOLEY for the purpose of ensuring that the work done pursuant to these plans conforms with the current Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate Development Control By-laws". Further, the plans show a pathway that does give access along effectively the entire length of the easement and it is not obvious on the face of the plan that this access way would be restricted. Also, the explicit terms of the registered easement require the PBC to keep the easement area unobstructed at all times. I further note that a statutory declaration provided by John Reid indicates that he participated in the executive committee meeting on 17 June 1996 and that the original proposal for landscaping put forward at that meeting on behalf of Austek Enterprises was progressed subject to the condition that the relevant portion of lot 70 remained public space.
I also accept arguments that, even if it could be argued that the PBC impliedly granted exclusive use of the area by approval of the landscaping plan, the PBC had no power to do this except by by-law due to section 56 of the SCRA. In particular, section 56 provides that, subject to the by-laws, every person who lawfully occupiers any land within Sanctuary Cove has a right of way over primary and secondary thoroughfares (SCRA, 56(1)). The easement area is part of a secondary thoroughfare and there are no by-laws restricting pedestrian access to this area. Further, it would be arguable that any by-law that did restrict pedestrian access to the area would unreasonably restrict access and require the consent of affected persons (SCRA, 56(2)). As a matter of law, I do not see any inconsistency between an area of secondary thoroughfare being available for drainage purposes, for landscaping and beautification for the benefit of an adjacent lot, and also as parkland for the general benefit of occupiers within Sanctuary Cove. In particular, given other parts of the secondary thoroughfare are available for use as parkland rather than as a traditional right of way from one point to another, I do not accept the argument that restriction of access to the easement area does not contravene section 56 of the SCRA because it is not a traditional right of way allowing people to pass from point A to point B over the easement. Rather, I consider section 56 of the SCRA provides for access by occupiers to all parts of the primary and secondary thoroughfares. In fact, to the extent to which the PBC failed to take adequate account of section 56 of the SCRA in approving the landscaping plan without ensuring all occupiers had suitable access without the need to cross over the adjacent lot 90, that consent would have been unlawful. However, as stated above, it seems more likely that the consent to the landscaping plan was for the limited purpose of confirming compliance with by-laws and the PBC had not intention to approve any exclusive use of the area for the benefit of lot 90.
In conclusion, I am not satisfied that the PBC’s approval of the landscaping and fencing of the easement area was unlawful. However, as it stands, all occupiers have a right to access the area and the PBC should have ensured that the landscaping and fencing did not prevent occupiers from accessing the area. I am therefore prepared to order that the PBC must reconsider the landscaping plan and require amendments that facilitate access to the area by occupiers of Sanctuary Cove. This could be done quite simply by ensuring occupiers can access the path with some small modifications of the path and plantings so that occupiers to not stray onto the adjacent lot 90. Alternatively, it could be done by altering the plantings on the eastern side and removal or alteration of the fencing to allow access along the eastern side.
Unfortunately, I acknowledge that either of these actions alone are likely to have a significant impact upon the privacy of occupants of the adjacent lot 90. In this respect, I note the obligation of the PBC to control, manage and administer secondary thoroughfares for the benefit of its members (SCRA, 33(1)). In this respect, it might be more appropriate that the entire area be re-landscaped to open up access to the river but also include some fencing, hedging or privacy screening adjacent to the living area at the rear of lot 90. In this respect, I note a submission by Trott regarding the unsuitability of constructing a fence along the length of the easement due to the underground stormwater pipe. However, I see very little weight in such a submission due to the wide availability of different types of fences and privacy screening and the possibility that any fencing can be temporarily removed if necessary for access to the stormwater pipe. In fact, it seems obvious that the existing fence between the road and the easement would need to be temporarily removed if it was necessary for digging machinery to access the easement area. Under the terms of the existing agreement it also appears that the PBC would be entitled to remove any fence as necessary and then seek any additional costs from Trott.
Finally, I note that these orders requiring the PBC to ensure access to the easement area by occupiers of Sanctuary Cove should be subject to any potential transfer of the easement area to lot 90, as discussed below.
Proposal to transfer easement area
Findings
It is not in dispute that, on 20 March 2006, the PBC resolved by special resolution, with reference to a proposed Easement Deed:
I do not accept submissions on behalf of Plumeria that these resolutions do not disclose that part of the secondary thoroughfare was to be transferred to lot 90 absolutely. Based on the wording of the resolutions, the attached easement deed, and particularly the explanatory notes to the motions, it should have been obvious to the persons making the decision that the proposal involved a transfer of part of the secondary thoroughfare to the owner of Lot 90, albeit after an initial conversion of the relevant part to common property.[3]
I also do not accept submissions to the effect that the PBC is now planning to undertake the transfer without the consent of the local council. Plumeria has provided nothing to support this submission, the PBC has submitted that local council consent is being sought, and it seems unlikely any transfer could be registered without local council approval.
I do, however, accept the submission to the effect that the PBC is now intending to follow a different process from that agreed by special resolution but without any further special resolution approving the new process. The applicant refers to advice dated 10 May 2006 from McCullough Robertson to the effect that "As it is not intended to transfer land between different group title schemes, it is not necessary to go through a process of converting the land to common property or obtaining the approval of the relevant body corporate." Submissions on behalf of the PBC then confirm it has the view that two of the eight agreed steps for transfer of the land were unnecessary and a transfer of the area directly to lot 90 and without the consent of Plumeria is now proposed.
I also note that Plumeria has not consented to the transfer, as envisaged in the 20 March 2006 resolutions and that the PBC has passed a further special resolution on 26 May 2008 at which it was resolved that "Without contravening the interim order of the BCCM, the PBC wishes to reaffirm its previous resolutions to transfer at cost (being PBC’s costs and expenses including all legal fees) the relevant section of Lot 70 (as marked on the map below – between Lot 90 and Lot 50 Plumeria) to Lot 90 Plumeria.". This subsequent resolution does clarify that the entire easement D area was proposed to be transferred but purports to reaffirm the transfer process adopted in the previous resolutions rather than revoking or amending those resolutions to specifically provide for the transfer to take place without the consent of Plumeria.
It is perhaps able to be argued that the PBC can act on 6 of the 8 special resolutions passed in order to transfer the easement area to Trott and simply ignore the two resolutions that the PBC now considers to be unnecessary. However, having considered the circumstances and particularly the explanatory notes provided with the resolutions, I am satisfied that the meeting of 20 March 2006 adopted eight steps the PBC was to follow to resolve a particular problem and that a significant change to this approach that avoids the need to obtain the consent of Plumeria requires new special resolutions that amend this earlier decision.
In particular, the changes to the procedure adopted by the majority of PBC members on 20 March 2006 are significant. Members of the PBC might think quite differently about a proposal that authorises the PBC to alienate part of the secondary thoroughfare of one of its members with the consent of that member, as opposed to a proposal that authorises the PBC to alienate part of the secondary thoroughfare of one of its members against that member’s wishes. I therefore consider the PBC should be restrained from proceeding with the transfer without the consent of Plumeria unless further special resolutions are adopted that specifically authorise that transfer without consent. I do not consider the special resolution of the PBC of 26 May 2008 is sufficient for that purpose.
Alternatively, I accept arguments from Plumeria to the effect that the resolutions of 20 March 2006 were based on misleading and incorrect information if the PBC intends to rely on those resolutions to effect the transfer without the consent of Plumeria when those resolutions clearly indicated that the consent of Plumeria would be required.
In conclusion, I am satisfied that the decision of the PBC to transfer part of the secondary thoroughfare to Trott was on the basis that Plumeria would consent to this transfer. I consider it appropriate to make an order that the PBC not take any further steps to transfer the easement area pursuant to the resolutions of 20 March 2006 or 26 May 2008 without the consent of Plumeria. If the PBC wishes to pursue the transfer without the consent of Plumeria then the PBC will need to pass a new special resolution to that effect.
Failure to properly control, manage and administer the secondary thoroughfare
Findings
Submissions on behalf of Plumeria raise serious questions regarding whether the transfer of part of the secondary thoroughfare to Trott, without charge, contravenes the requirement that the PBC control, manage and administer the secondary thoroughfare for the benefit of its members (SCRA, 33(1)(a)).
The explanatory notes supporting the proposal make reference to the damage to some of the fencing and the risk of the PBC being subject to a claim brought by the condition of the fencing or the easement area. However, there is no evidence of consideration of the extent of this potential liability as against a similar potential liability for all other parts of the secondary thoroughfare. There is also no consideration of the extent to which this risk would be covered by any insurance policy as required by the legislation in respect of damage, death or injury occurring on the secondary thoroughfare (SCRA, 37).
The explanatory notes supporting the proposal also make reference to ongoing maintenance obligations but fail to refer to the terms of the existing agreement which provide the PBC’s responsibility to maintain the area in good repair and condition is subject to the owner of lot 90’s obligations to pay the costs and expenses in relation to such upkeep and maintenance.
These explanatory notes are also unclear on the basis for which it is thought the PBC cannot accept payment for the transfer of part of the secondary thoroughfare but can recover its costs.
Reference is also made to the lack of any express provision in the existing easement requiring the owner of lot 9 to maintain the profile of the area for overland flow purposes but no reference is made to ensuring the transfer and new easement results in the profile of the area being kept suitable for overland flow and the costs of doing this. Perhaps this is as a result of a letter dated 18 January 2006 from Burchill Partners Pty Limited, Civil and Structural Consulting Engineers and Planners, indicating that the overland flow path can be removed provided all driveway accesses maintain the standard footpath profile. However, it is not apparent from the submissions that this issue has been considered in detail.
The submissions generally tend to indicate that the PBC has not properly considered the extent to which the transfer of the area will benefit its members as opposed to the transfer of only part of the area or some other arrangement. From looking at the submissions, photographs and plans as a whole, it seems obvious that if occupiers are to have access to the river via this part of the secondary thoroughfare then Trott should be entitled to fence off a section of area closest to her home to provide privacy, security and pool safety. However, I am far from satisfied that it would not be possible to re-landscape the area to allow all occupiers of Sanctuary Cove access to the majority of the easement area and to the river. In particular, there is no reason the remainder of the area could not be re-landscaped as necessary to ensure appropriate overland drainage despite the fencing off of part of the area. It is also very difficult to belief that a suitable fence could not be erected in a way that does not interfere with the underground stormwater pipe and could not be removed on the rare occasion that access was needed to a relevant part of the stormwater pipe. In fact, during a teleconference, a representative for Plumeria referred to another similar location where the owner of the adjacent property had been given permission to erect pool-style fencing to allow them to enjoy the amenity of the adjacent park area and a representative of the PBC indicated that this type of fencing could be erected without damage to the stormwater pipe and be removed relatively easily if it was necessary for digging an access to the pipe.
Occupiers of Sanctuary Cove who would be prevented from accessing the easement area by a proposal of the PBC’s to transfer the area to lot 90 therefore do have some arguments that the PBC is failing to control, manage and administer the secondary thoroughfare for the benefit of its members as required by section 33 of the SCRA. This is particularly given the lack of evidence that the PBC has given real consideration to other possibilities including a re-landscaping of the area, a transfer of only part of the area, the likely consequences of encroachment proceedings, and the extent to which insurances and existing easement terms might protect the body corporate against expenses and liabilities associated with use of the area. However, I note that the occupiers who are most likely to be significantly affected by the PBC’s proposal are the occupiers living in the immediate area, being those within lots included within Plumeria. If the proposed transfer involved the consent of Plumeria or the representative for Plumeria voted in favour of the proposed transfer then it would seem strange for Plumeria to now raise the argument that the transfer was contrary to section 33 of the SCRA. This would seem to be the case with the resolutions passed by the PBC on 20 March 2006 and confirmed on 26 May 2008. Therefore, if the PBC does wish to proceed with the transfer in the manner outlined in the resolutions and explanatory notes of 20 March 2006 and Plumeria does in fact consent to the transfer on whatever conditions can be agreed then I do not see that section 33 of the SCRA would prevent the transfer. I will therefore provide for final orders that allow for the transfer to proceed if Plumeria consents. However, if the PBC decides instead to proceed with the transfer without the consent of Plumeria it would be open for Plumeria to challenge any proposed transfer under section 33 of the SCRA.
Costs
The applicant also seeks its costs of making this application. However, a referee has no jurisdiction to make an order for the payment of costs (BUGTA, 75(7)).
Order
In conclusion, the applicant has not satisfied me of any valid objection to the body corporate proceeding to transfer the easement area to Trott as proposed by special resolutions of 20 March 2006 and 26 May 2008. If this proposal was to proceed then the occupiers’ right to use the secondary thoroughfare as provided by section 56 of the SCRA would not be contravened because the area in question would no longer be secondary thoroughfare. Further, I would not be satisfied that the alienation of this part of the secondary thoroughfare would, contrary to section 33 of the SCRA, amount to a failure by the PBC to control, manage and administer the secondary thoroughfare for the benefit of its members because the proposal involves the consent of the persons potentially most disadvantaged by the proposal.
However, the applicant has also provided evidence that satisfies me the PBC is intending to transfer the easement area to Trott without the consent of Plumeria. This would be a process substantially different from the process agreed in the special resolutions of 20 March 2006 and confirmed by the special resolution of 26 May 2008. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make a declaration that the special resolutions passed by the PBC on 20 March 2006 and 26 May 2008 do not give the PBC any authority to transfer the easement area to Trott without the consent of Plumeria.
I also consider it appropriate to order the PBC to ensure that all occupiers have a right of way over the easement area as required by section 56 of the SCRA. The submissions of Trott do not satisfy me that there has been any action by the PBC or Plumeria that gives Trott the right to restrict access to this area. However, I am aware that access to this area has been restricted for practical purposes for some time and that access by other occupiers to this area will have privacy implications for the occupiers of lot 90. Further, submissions indicate that the PBC may wish to seek to procure the consent of Plumeria to transfer of part of this area to Trott or the PBC may wish to pass further special resolutions that will authorise the transfer of the area to Trott without the consent of Plumeria. In the circumstances I am satisfied that it is appropriate to allow a period of six months, or such longer time agreed by the parties, before requiring the PBC to ensure occupiers have a right of way over the easement area. After that time, the PBC will be required to grant access and may need to pass further resolutions altering the landscaping and fencing approvals for the easement area. Even if this results in a risk of a compensation claim by Trott, this right of way is required by section 56 of the SCRA and I therefore make the orders above.
[1] See, for example:
Roystonia and Colvillia, Order 0377-2004, CG Young, 12 January 2005. See also
Araucaria, Order 0686-2006, P Dowling,
28 November
2006.
[2] Page 2192
of the second reading speech to the Sanctuary Cove Resort Bill, the Hon. Russ
Hinze.
[3] Although,
there does seem to be some ambiguity about the boundaries of the “relevant
part”.
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