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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 20 February 2007
REFERENCE: 0797-2006
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT
1997
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Number of Scheme:
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9557
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Name of Scheme:
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Baronnet
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Address of Scheme:
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Enderley Avenue Surfers Paradise QLD 4217
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by
the Body Corporate for Baronnet
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I hereby order that the owner of Lot 64, Joan Stevenson, shall be
permitted to keep her current dog in Lot 64, until ownership in Lot 64 is
transferred,
or until three (3) months after the date of this order, whichever
occurs soonest, subject to the following conditions:
1. The owner of Lot 64 must ensure the dog remains within the boundaries of Lot 64 and does not roam onto common property or other lots within the scheme. 2. If the owner of Lot 64 wishes to take the dog out of the scheme she must carry the dog in the lift directly to the carpark and then immediately off scheme land, ensuring the dog is closely controlled at all times. 3. The owner of Lot 64 shall ensure that the dog does not cause excessive noise, or otherwise create a nuisance likely to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of other owners and occupiers of lots in the scheme. 4. The owner of Lot 64 shall ensure that any animal litter or waste is effectively and promptly disposed of so as to avoid any health hazard or odour. 5. The Body Corporate Committee shall be entitled to rescind permission for the dog if it reasonably considers the owner of Lot 64 has not complied with these conditions and that the owner of Lot 64 has failed to respond appropriately to warnings about their concerns. I further order that the owner of Lot 64, Joan Stevenson, must immediately and permanently remove the dog from Lot 64 once three (3) months has elapsed after the date of this order, if ownership in Lot 64 has not already been transferred. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0797-2006
"Baronnet" CTS 9557
Baronnet community titles scheme (Baronnet) consists of 65 lots
and common property. The community management statement for Mercantile-Dalgety
Place indicates that the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard
Module) Regulation 1997 (Standard Module) applies to the scheme.
Department of Natural Resources and Water records show the scheme is registered
as Building Units Plan 5647.
APPLICATION
Pursuant to the
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Act), this
application was made by the Body Corporate for Baronnet (applicant)
on 29 September 2006, pursuant to a committee resolution on 18 August 2006.
The applicant sought orders against Joan Stevenson, owner
of Lot 64 [Unit 1601]
(respondent) in the following terms:
The Body Corporate wishes to enforce by-law 14 of the Body Corporate
by-laws and requests that the dog residing at Unit 1601 be removed
immediately.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Under section
243 of the Act, a copy of the application was provided to the respondent and
all owners with an invitation to respond to the matters
in the application. A
submission was made on behalf of the respondent and by ten other owners. The
applicant did not avail itself
of the opportunity to inspect and respond to the
submissions received (sections 246 and 244 of the Act).
It
is noted that four of the submissions comprises only the submissions cover sheet
and no comment in respect of the application.
A member of the
Commissioner’s Office contacted the owners involved twice to ascertain
whether they wished to comment on the
application but after three weeks since
the first follow-up contact was made no further comment has been received.
A dispute resolution recommendation was made referring the dispute to
departmental adjudication.
MATTERS IN DISPUTE
The
application relates to the keeping of a dog in Lot 64. The facts of the
dispute, as outlined in the application and submissions,
can be summarised as
follows.
The Committee meeting of 5 May 2006 noted reports that there
was a dog in a penthouse, instructed the secretary to determine if that
was the
case, and decided to send a circular to all owners reminding them animals are
not permitted in the scheme.
Apparently as a result, on 1 June 2006 the
respondent wrote to the Body Corporate seeking permission to keep a dog in her
lot. It
appears the dog had been in Lot 64 since February 2006. The
respondent’s letter claims other owners said they had no objection
to the
dog and had seldom seen or heard him. The request referred to a letter from her
cardiologist that "...I think it would benefit her health to have a small
dog." According the respondent asked that the Committee make an exception
to allow her dog, and indicated that it would not use any common
areas.
On 9 June 2006 the Committee considered and refused this request. The
applicant was advised by letter on 27 June. The Committee
says its reasons for
this decision are that:
as the request was made after the dog came into the unit, the Committee did not feel it could retrospectively approve the dog and felt it was being asked to rubber stamp a by-law breach; even if submitted in advance, the request would not have been approved because:
- the building is a high rise and units are too small for a dog;
- the dog would have to travel in the lift to access the ground floor or basement which would be unacceptable to other owners and visitors;
- the dog could access to common areas including the pool unless conditions were imposed;
- the Committee is reluctant to impose conditions that would require policing;
- the majority of owners do not want dogs;
- dogs in the common areas would impose a health risk to residents and visitors;
- a barking dog would infringe on residents’ quiet enjoyment; and
- By-law 14 is drafted in the negative which the Committee felt meant animals are not allowed unless there are sufficient circumstances to overturn that presumption.
At its meeting the Committee noted that the
respondent had not removed her dog and decided to issue a Notice of Continuing
Contravention
of a Body Corporate
By-law[1]. This notice was issued on
14 July 2006.
On 6 August 2006 the respondent wrote to the Body
Corporate advising that rather than relinquish her dog she would reluctantly put
her lot up for sale. She requested time to sell. On 18 August 2006 the Body
Corporate noted this request and complaints from some
residents, and resolved to
lodge this application.
The submission from the respondent notes she
first applied to have a dog in July 2005 and it seems the Body Corporate refused
this
request a few days later. She says she considered the decision to refuse
that first request to be discriminatory and questioned
its validity, although
she apparently took no steps to challenge it. She claims the Committee have
since altered the wording of
By-law 14, which she says shows the flexibility of
the interpretation of the by-law. In response to the basis for rejecting the
application the respondent claims:
Her lot is a large three bedroom apartment which is big enough for a small poodle.
The dog is taken in the lift directly to the carpark and is never taken into the lobby, pool or other common areas.
She is insulted by suggestions that someone would need to police any conditions.
She disputes that the dog imposes a health risk.
She accepts that barking would be unacceptable but says the owner below her can confirm that her dog never barks.
Four owners
support the application and the removal of the dog. One argues pets should not
be kept within such confined premises
and another notes allowing the dog would
set a precedent. However, one owner says they have no objection to the dog
remaining until
the unit is sold, providing it is kept clean and is not a
problem to other owners. Another owner says the dog is not harming anyone
or
having any detrimental affect and that it would be cruel to remove the dog.
JURISDICTION
I am satisfied that this is a matter which
falls within the dispute resolution provisions of the legislation (see
sections 227, 228, 276 and Schedule 5 of the Act).
Section 276(1) of the Act provides that an adjudicator may make
an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances (including a
declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles
scheme, about:
(a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or
(b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or the community management statement; or
(c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about -
(i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or
(ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles
scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from
acting, in a way stated in the order (section 276(2)). An adjudicator's
order may contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator
considers necessary or appropriate (section
284(1)).
DETERMINATION
The issue for consideration in
this matter is whether the Body Corporate decision to refuse the
respondent’s request to keep
her dog, and to require the dog’s
removal, should be upheld.
Applicable law
At the time
that this application was lodged, and at the times that the Body Corporate
refused the respondent’s requests for
a dog and issued a by-law
contravention notice, the community management statement (CMS) for
Baronnet included By-law 14 as follows:
14 KEEPING ANIMALS
(a) Subject to Section 181 of the Act, an Occupier must not, except with the consent in writing of the Body Corporate Committee:
(i) bring or keep an animal or bird on the Lot or the Common Property, or (ii) permit an Invitee to bring or keep and animal or bird on the Lot or the Common Property.
(b) Any consent of the Body Corporate Committee may be
(i) bring or keep and animal or bird on the Lot or the Common Property, or (ii) permit and Invitee to bring or keep and animal or bird on the Lot or the Common Property.
On 23 January 2007 a new CMS was
registered for Baronnet, pursuant to a resolution passed at the Annual General
Meeting on 24 November
2006. This new CMS includes an amended By-law 14 as
follows:
14 KEEPING ANIMALS
Subject to Section 181 of the Act, an Occupier must not -
(a) bring or keep an animal or bird on the Lot or the Common Property, or
(b) permit an Invitee to bring or keep and animal or bird on the Lot or the Common Property.
When a body corporate is
pursuing a by-law issue[2], the first
step is generally to issue a contravention notice. The contravention notice,
which must state certain things including
the nature of the breach, must be
given to the person who the body corporate believes is breaching the by-law. If
the issuing of
a contravention notice does not rectify the matter, the body
corporate can either commence proceedings in the Magistrate’s
Court or may
lodge a dispute resolution application in the Commissioner’s Office. The
Body Corporate has complied with these
steps, with reference to the version of
By-law 14 applying prior to January 2007.
General considerations
regarding animal by-laws
The general approach of adjudicators
regarding disputes involving animal by-laws has been as follows. Most bodies
corporate have
by-laws requiring written approval for the keeping of animals.
Adjudicators are often asked to determine requests for orders which
seek either
to have an animal removed, or to overturn the refusal of an application for an
animal. Often owners claim there are
‘special circumstances’ why
they should be allowed to keep their animal. The view of adjudicators has been
that animal
by-laws, like all other by-laws, must be observed by owners and
occupiers. They do not attract any special significance simply because
they are
often the subject of emotional appeals. There are three factors adjudicators
generally consider in regard to such applications.
The first is whether
there been acquiescence on the part of a body corporate, such as it not
taking steps to remove an existing animal over a reasonable period of time. If
a
body corporate has failed to act on the by-law for some time it can lead the
owner to assume implicit approval to keep the animal.
The basis for allowing
this approach is that it would be harsh and inequitable for an owner to have to
remove an animal that they
have been allowed to keep for an extended period of
time.
The second is whether the body corporate is acting in a
discriminatory manner. Examples of discrimination is where a committee
refuses one owner’s request but grants approval to another, or seeks the
removal of animal when there are other animals in the scheme, without any
logical or reasonable basis for the distinction. The basis
this exception is
that bodies corporate must treat all owners equally regarding the enforcement of
by-laws.
Thirdly, adjudicators must generally consider whether the body
corporate is acting reasonably in its application of the
by-laws.
Body Corporate decision regarding Lot 64
The
respondent’s submission says she considers the original refusal of her
request for a dog was discriminatory but she provides
no detail of why. The
Body Corporate have, on request, provided a copy of her original application
which says "There are already a number of pets already in residence so I
would say there is already a precedent set." But the respondent’s
submission makes no mention of other pets. I have specifically asked the Body
Corporate whether they
are aware any other animals in the scheme currently or in
the past, whether approved or not approved. In response the Body Corporate
says
its records show only one other request for an animal which was not approved.
On this basis I have no evidence before me to
indicate that the Body Corporate
has acted in a discriminatory manner by refusing this dog.
As the Body
Corporate had previously refused the respondent’s request for a dog, and
the Committee commenced action within a
comparatively short time of hearing
reports that there was a dog in the respondent’s Lot, there is also no
evidence of acquiescence
in this case.
The next issue is whether the Body
Corporate decision to require the removal of the dog was unreasonable in the
circumstances, or
it would otherwise be just and equitable in the circumstances
to overturn the decision. In this regard, I note that By-law 14 as
it applied
at the time of the Body Corporate’s relevant actions in this dispute does
not entirely prohibit pets in the scheme.
Rather it permits pets with specific
approval, and explicitly provides for conditions to be imposed. It is therefore
a decision
for the Body Corporate whether and under what circumstances it will
approve a pet.
It is appropriate for the Committee to have clear and
reasonable policies to guide the exercise of this discretion, and this could
include a preference against pets. But the Committee must still exercise its
discretion and consider each application on its merits.
As has been determined
in many previous adjudications[3], it
is not reasonable for a body corporate to rigidly apply a ‘no pets’
policy without consideration of individual circumstances.
The Committee Minutes
of 5 May 2006 implies there was a ‘no pets’ policy in the scheme.
While the application includes
some reasons for refusing the dog, there is some
indication that the decision was based on this ‘no pets’ policy.
Special considerations
Notwithstanding whether the
Committee tried to apply a blanket ‘no pets’ policy, I am not
convinced there were any special
circumstances applying in respect to the two
applications for a dog in Lot 64 (in July 2005 and June 2006) that would make it
unreasonable
for the Committee to refuse. While the Committee was required to
consider all applications on their merit, this does not mean that
it was obliged
to approve any pets unless there were particular circumstances that would make
manifestly unreasonable to refuse.
The respondent has claimed that she
has health issues which would benefit from a dog, and has a medical certificate
to that effect.
I am not persuaded by this evidence. There is research that
argues that pets can be beneficial to everyone’s health. The
applicant
has not given any indication of the nature of her health concerns, or how the
dog could assist her condition. Nor has
she presented medical evidence that a
pet is required or highly recommended as part of her treatment.
The
applicants other reasons for keeping a dog – that it was a gift and that
she is homesick and wants a companion – are
understandable but are not
unique or compelling reasons for the Committee to move away from its preference
against dogs. The respondent
brought the dog onto her lot with the full
knowledge that the Body Corporate had refused her previous request and was
likely to refuse
any future requests.
I am not convinced that the Body
Corporate’s stated justifications for refusing the dog (although not
communicate to the respondent
at the time, which ideally they should have been)
are entirely unreasonable. I accept that neither the Body Corporate nor any
other
owner has provided any indication that the dog is causing any nuisance or
having any adverse impact on any other occupier. However
I do not consider that
this alone is sufficient reason to determine that the Committee’s decision
was manifestly unreasonable.
However there is one factor that warrants
consideration. In August 2006 applicant said that she intends to sell the lot
and seeks
time to enable this to proceed. I quite understand that the Committee
may have viewed this statement with some scepticism because
in her letter of
July 2005 the respondent commented that she had been trying to sell her unit for
some time. However the Body Corporate
has noted that Lot 64 is currently listed
for sale. If the sale were to proceed quickly it I do think it would be
unreasonable for
the respondent to need to find an alternative home for the dog
for a limited time while that process proceeds.
Conclusion
On balance I consider it would just and
equitable to allow the dog to remain in Lot 64 for a limited time to give the
opportunity
for the respondent to make a genuine effort to sell her lot.
However, while the current property market may not be conducive to
a quick sale,
I do not consider it reasonable that the dog remain on the scheme for an
indefinite period. As six months have already
passed since the respondent
expressed her intention to list her property for sale, I have given her a
maximum of a further three
months from the date of the order to either complete
the sale and transfer of her lot or to find alternative accommodation for the
dog.
I have granted this permission subject to a range of conditions
which are outlined in the order. I believe that these conditions
should assist
in ensuring that the dog has little or no impact on other owners and trust these
conditions will allay the concerns
of owners who are opposed to the dog.
I have ordered that the Committee may revoke permission if they
reasonably consider the respondent is not complying with the conditions
and that
the dog has a greater impact that has been apparent to date. However the
Committee should ensure that it gives the respondents
the opportunity to address
any concerns before withdrawing permission and should be aware that if it fails
to act reasonably in withdrawing
permission its decision could similarly be open
to challenge.
There can be no issue of a precedent being set by this
order as the circumstances have now changed. The Body Corporate has taken
the
sensible step of entrenching its preference against pets in the by-laws. This
does not, as the respondent suggests, indicate
that there is flexibility in the
interpretation of the by-law but rather that the by-law itself has been formally
changed. The new
By-law 14 ensures that all owners can be in no doubt that pets
are now not permitted in the scheme, regardless of the circumstances.
The
passing of the resolution to effect the change in by-laws demonstrates that a
majority of owners in this scheme do not want
pets in the scheme.
[1] BCCM Form 10, pursuant to
section 182 of the Act
[2]
The steps for an owner to pursue concerns about by-laws breaches are set out in
section 185-6 of the Act
[3]
For example Palm Springs [2005] QBCCMCmr 687 (7 December 2005)
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