![]() |
[Home]
[Databases]
[WorldLII]
[Search]
[Feedback]
Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 19 December 2006
REFERENCE: 0591-2006
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT
1997
|
Number of Scheme:
|
32249
|
|
Name of Scheme:
|
Ikon Apartments
|
|
Address of Scheme:
|
27 Station Road INDOOROOPILLY QLD 4068
|
TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by
Jangram Pty Ltd As Trustees For The Maxim Unit Trust, the Owner of lot 1
|
I hereby declare as follows -
1. that Motion 11 of the Annual General Meeting held on 27th April 2006 and passed by a special resolution of the body corporate is invalid for the reasons detailed herein in respect of parts 11c, 11d, 11e, and 11f. 2. that a new community management statement lodged with the Land Titles Registry on 5th May 2006 contained wording not authorised by the body corporate. I order that within 21 days of the date of this order that the former community management statement be reinstated save only that if the committee so resolves, by-law 27 ( Display Unit) may be deleted, and the new by-laws 46 (Use of Name) and 47 (Signs) may be added. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0591-2006
"Ikon Apartments" CTS 32249
APPLICATION
This is an application dated 26th July
2006 and amended on 8th August 2006 by Jangram Pty Ltd, (the
Applicant) owner under a trust of Lot 1, against the body corporate of Ikon
Apartments (the body corporate) for an order that a special resolution
passed by the body corporate on 27th April 2006 be declared
oppressive, unreasonable or invalid and at all times void; and if appropriate,
an order requiring the body
corporate to lodge a request to record a new
community management statement to remove the by-law amendments and to restore
the by-laws
to their original wording; and such further orders as are
fit.
JURISDICTION
"Ikon Apartments" Community Title
Scheme is a community title scheme governed by the Body Corporate and
Community Management Act 1997 (the Act) and the Body Corporate and
Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 1997 (the
Accommodation Module). There are 49 lots in the scheme created under a
Building Format Plan of subdivision.
Section 276(1) of the Act
provides that an adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the
circumstances (including a declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the
context of a community titles scheme, about-
(a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or
(b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or the community management statement; or
(c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about-
(i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or
(ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles
scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from
acting, in a way stated in the order (section 276(2)). An adjudicator's
order may contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator
considers necessary or appropriate (section 284(1)).
An
application for an order to invalidate a resolution of the body corporate must
be made within three months of that resolution being
passed. (Section
242(2) Act) The application is therefore made within the time
limit.
SUBMISSIONS
The Applicant says that prior to the
Annual General Meeting on 27th April 2006 (the 2006 AGM) the
body corporate failed properly to consult all owners and in particular the
Applicant and the Applicant’s tenant who is
The Coffee Club (Properties)
Pty Ltd., (the Coffee Club) about the effect of Motion 11 at the 2006 AGM
(Motion 11). Motion 11 was for the consent to the recording of a new
community management statement for the scheme to give effect to certain
amendments set out as (a) to (g) all pertaining to the scheme by-laws. There
was an explanatory schedule circulated with the notice
and agenda for the 2006
AGM, but there was no explanatory note about M
The Applicant says that
the fact that there was no explanatory schedule is contrary to the legislation,
and that the body corporate
has a duty to inform lot owners prior to putting a
motion to the vote. It also says that Motion 11 contained technical changes to
the by-laws which were "questionable" and " forms part of a concerted
attack on the registered commercial interests of Lot 1" and the Coffee Club.
The body corporate’s actions were not reasonable and in breach of
section 94(2) of the Act.
The Applicant asked the committee to
withdraw Motion 11 from the Agenda but the committee would not talk about it or
withdraw it.
Consequently, the body corporate has acted inequitably,
unreasonably and the resolution may result in financial hardship for the
Applicant and the Coffee Club. It is illegal and unenforceable.
The
Applicant says that the body corporate erred in proposing Motion 11 since the
motion should have sought separate votes for each
by-law amendment. Motion 11
was "unreasonably prejudicial" to commercial lots and contrary to the "structure
of the scheme." The
amendment to by-law 37 (amendment (f)) has the practical
effect of revoking the benefit to Lot 1 of its exclusive use car park,
and in
any event required a resolution without dissent. Amendment (f) as
passed, will create commercial rights in favour of the on-site manager to the
prejudice of the commercial rights
of Lot 1, and as such was inequitable and
unreasonable and contrary to structure of the scheme. Amendment (d) (which
contained
a typographical error and should have read "consolidation" and not "
consideration") resulted in by-laws 1,39 and 44 being rolled
into a single
by-law, and should have been passed by a resolution without dissent since it
concerned an exclusive use by-law, and
the current status of the new by-law is
now unclear. The resolution should be void. In the case of amendment (c), the
amendment
to insert a proviso to by-law 19 went beyond the scope of the power
given to the body corporate and was a fraud on a power such as
was the subject
matter in Vatcher –v- Paull [1915] AC 372. Accordingly, the
Applicant says that the passing of amendment (c) to Motion 11 was
invalid.
The notice of the 2006 AGM was sent out on 31st March
2006. Motion 11 proposed a new bylaw 46; a new by-law 47; the amendment of
by-law 19 by a proviso that Lot 1 cannot be used
for any purposes which may
compete with the activities of the letting agent; the consolidation of by-laws
1,39 and 44 into one by-law
about parking and the addition of a "tow-away"
provision for non-compliance; the amendment to by-laws 14,15,18,and 20 by
removing
the word " residential" whenever it appears; the amendment to by-law
37 to prevent lot owners from lending security car park keys
to anyone who does
not reside in the scheme; and the deletion of by-law 27 concerning the display
home and which is now defunct.
On 26th April 2006, the day
before the 2006 AGM, the Applicant’s solicitors wrote to Body Corporate
Services Pty Ltd (the body corporate manager) detailing their
"client’s serious concerns in relation to Resolution 11." The
letter set out that Motion 11 attacked Lot 1’s commercial interests, and
said it would be breach of duty to pass it
and that it was unreasonable. They
pointed out that such a proposal had never been raised or discussed with the
Applicant, and asked
the committee to withdraw it pending some discussion about
the necessity for the amendments.
The committee did not withdraw Motion
11 and it was carried 15 in favour 2 against at the 2006 AGM. The minutes record
that an opportunity
was given to anyone who wished to speak on Motion 11 both
before and after the vote.
In accordance with section 243(2)(b) of
the Act, all lot owners were invited to make submissions. The Coffee Club wrote
in support of the application without further
comment.
Letting agent
Chris and Lyn Simpson (Mr Simpson) say that the application
misrepresents the facts, and that at no time in last 18 months has the Applicant
or the Coffee Club wanted
to talk, or to respond "to numerous requests and
communications either from body corporate or from him personally."
Mr
Simpson says that the suggested amendments were largely proposed to the
committee by him, following his day to day observations
in the management of the
scheme. He denies that there is any issue with the fact that Lot 1 is fitted out
by the Coffee Club franchise
or that there is a concerted attack against the
Applicant’s commercial interests. The Applicant’s solicitors
objected
to Motion 11 too late for the motion to be withdrawn, and the
Applicant’s representative did not speak at the 2006 AGM.
Mr
Simpson questions that the Applicant has demonstrated that any financial
hardship will arise from the amendments, and that the
changes are simply to
improve the operation of the building and to be advantageous to all lot owners.
In respect of the proviso
to by-law 19, Mr Simpson explains that this is to
formalise an existing arrangement in accordance with clause 6.3 of the letting
agent’s agreement, and is intended to stop Lot 1 being let to a real
estate agent. He says that in any event this is most
unlikely since Lot 1 is
set up as a restaurant.
The consolidation of the parking by-laws 1, 39,
and 44 was just for simplicity. The removal of the word " residential" from
by-laws
14,15,18,20, was to correct an oversight of the result that by-laws
14,15,18 and 20 did not refer to Lot 1 since it was not "residential".
He says
; "Obviously this was not intended by the authors of the by-laws" and it
is no detriment to Lot 1 to comply with the rest of the block.
The
amendment to by-law 37 has nothing to do with Lot 1 and is intended to stop
owners and tenants from subletting the basement car
park. The Coffee Club has a
remote control for entry into the car park , has unrestricted use of it, and
have never been refused
entry. He agrees however that the wording may be a bit
ambiguous, but here is no evidence that the body corporate is acting illegally
or with an intent to harm the Applicant’s interests. He blames the
Applicant’s unfounded worry on the fact that the Applicant
does not come
to meetings.
Hynes Lawyers made a submission for the body corporate. They
point out that there is no obligation on the body corporate to consult
with
owners, to put out explanatory material, or to draft the motion in separate
parts for each amendment. They deny that there
is anything "questionable"
about the motion and say that the Applicant "had more than 21 days to raise any
concerns," and failed
to speak out at the meeting.
The Applicant has
provided no evidence of the "significant commercial implications" or the
possibility of financial hardship resulting,
as claimed. In short, the
Applicant has failed to particularise alleged unreasonableness and how the
amendments are "contrary
to the structure of the scheme." Furthermore, the body
corporate exercised its powers in good faith, and the amendments to by-law
15
are " entirely sensible" since it brings the Applicant into line with all the
other lot owners. Lot 1 should not be permitted
to do any act which would
increase the premium for fire insurance, and the owner should be required to
seek body corporate approval
to make changes to the appearance of Lot 1,
although the body corporate acknowledges that the owner of Lot 1 would have to
ask for
such permission in any event, and has done so in the past.
The
body corporate acknowledges that the amendment to by-law 37 "could have been
better expressed." In the circumstances that the Applicant has failed to
prove its case, the body corporate seeks costs under section 270(3)
Act.
The Applicant exercised its right of reply, emphasising points
raised in its submission. It adds that
the directors of the Applicant live
in Hong Kong and travel on business and are not readily available for
discussion, but there
was no communication before the notice of the 2006 AGM was
received.
The Applicant says there is no need to demonstrate hardship and
that the amendments "speak for themselves." It gives the example
that if the
amendment to by-law 19 stands, then the letting agent could decide to sell
coffee from vending machines on the common
property, and then the body corporate
could by notice require the Coffee Club not to sell coffee, since it would be
competing with
the letting agent. It points out that the letting agent in the
ordinary course of its business may seek to sell products which
the Coffee Club
also sells.
Further, it submits that the use of the word "residential" in
respect of by-laws 14,15,18 and 20 in the original community management
statement was deliberate. For example, the very nature of the business
conducted on Lot 1 may from time to time increase the rate
of fire insurance for
the building as a whole and it would be unreasonable for the body corporate now
to use by-law 15, as amended,
to restrict the nature of the business.
It accepts that the amendment to by-law 37 may not have been
intended to affect the Applicant, but the result is the same, in that
it is now
detrimentally affected.
It confirms that it does not object to the new
by-laws 46 or 47, or to the additional clause about the towing away of wrongly
parked
vehicles.
DETERMINATION
In this matter certain
facts are not in dispute. The scheme has 49 lots and only one of those, lot 1,
belonging to the Applicant,
is a non-residential lot. The first Community
Management Statement for the scheme lodged on 16th January 2004, at
by-law 19 states that the proprietor or occupier of Lot 1 may use the lot for
any purpose permitted by the Local
Authority, and by-laws 40 - 43 inclusively
contain provisions pertaining only to the exclusive use by Lot 1 for the
purposes of using
Lot 1 as a dining area and commercial kitchen.
The
Coffee Club is the present occupier of Lot 1 by a by lease dated 12th
April 2005 from Havenland Pty Ltd (Havenland). Havenland is the
Applicant’s tenant and is the franchisor of the Coffee Club. The
occupation by the Coffee Club is not in
dispute. The Coffee Club runs a
café business from Lot 1.
At the 2006 AGM on 27th
April, Motion 11 proposed that the by-laws to the scheme were amended, and a new
Community Management Statement be recorded. The
Motion proposed 7 changes to
the by-laws, detailed as (a) – (g). The motion was passed by special
resolution 15 –
2. Consequently a new Community Management Statement
(new CMS) was recorded by the Registrar of the Land Titles Registry on
5th May 2006, showing not only the seven amendments as detailed in
the motion, but also revised wording to Schedule E of the new CMS
" Description
of Lots Allocated Exclusive Use Areas of Common Property" and in particular,
revisions to plan numbers and descriptions
of exclusive uses. I will comment
upon these changes later.
The Applicant objects to 4 of these amendments
which it says affect it or could affect it detrimentally. The Applicant says
that
amendments (c) (d) (e) and (f) should not have been proposed without prior
discussion with it, and that the resolution by the body
corporate was
inequitable, unreasonable and the resolution may result in financial hardship
for the Applicant and the Coffee Club.
It says the resolution is illegal and
unenforceable and in breach of section 94(2) Act. Further it says that
the motion should not have been proposed by the committee so that seven
amendments were proposed in one
motion, but that each amendment should have been
voted on separately.
For ease of identification, I set out those parts of
Motion 11 of the 2006 AGM as are in dispute. The motion was submitted by the
Committee.
"That the body corporate consent to record a new community management statement to give effect to the following amendment’s to the scheme’s by-laws:-
(a) addition of a new by-law 46 ....(no objection) (b) addition of new by-law 47 ....(no objection) (c) the amendment of by-law 19 by inserting the following sentence at the end of the by-law : Provided that, the proprietor or occupier of Lot 1, must not use that lot for any purposes which may compete with the activities of the letting agent." (d) the consideration (sic) of by-laws 1,39 and 44 into a single by-law and the addition of the following provision .....(about towing away vehicles.... The additional provision is not objected to by the Applicant although the consolidation of the three by-laws is in dispute.) (e) the amendment of by-laws 14,15,18 and 20 by removing the word " residential" wherever it appears. (f) The amendment of by-law 37 to include a new provision as follows – " A lot owner of a lot to whom any key or operating system is provided pursuant to these by-laws shall not make the same available for used by a person who does not reside in a lot in the scheme. To avoid doubt, a lot owner may not make a key or operating system available to a person for the purpose of providing access to the owner’s basement car space unless that person lives in the owner’s lot." (g) Removal of by-law 27 .....(no objection)
And that the body corporate enter into and sign under seal all necessary documentation to record the new community management statement."
As I understand the Applicant’s argument, it says that the body
corporate at a general meeting acted unreasonably by voting
in favour of Motion
11 because to do so was detrimental to the Applicant and the business conducted
from Lot 1; and that the committee
acted inequitably because it drafted the
motion in such a way that it had to be voted on " globally" and in any event the
committee
had a duty to discuss with an owner likely to be affected by changes,
any proposed changes to the by-laws. Further, the wording
of the amendments was
also unfair in as much as it affected only the Applicant directly, and
demonstrates a "concerted attack on the registered commercial interests of
Lot 1." As such it "erodes the structure of scheme as originally
established." Amendment (c) of Motion 11 was beyond the power of the body
corporate to vote upon and since it was voted on, is a fraud on a power
such as
seen in the case of Vatcher –v- Paull [1915] AC
372.
Finally, the resolution was technically flawed in as much as
amendments (d) and (f) required a resolution without dissent and not
a special
resolution in order to pass them since they concern the Applicant’s
exclusive use by-law (by-law 39) and all lot
owners’ car parking spaces
(by-law 37); and that the committee was in breach of section 40C
Accommodation Module in that explanatory material should have been circulated to
lot owners with the motion, and was not
Reasonable actions of the
body corporate
Section 94 of the Act states as follows -
94 Body corporate’s general functions
(1) The body corporate for a community titles scheme must--
(a) administer the common property and body corporate assets for the benefit of the owners of the lots included in the scheme; and
(b) enforce the community management statement (including any by-laws for the scheme); and
(c) carry out the other functions given to the body corporate under this Act and the community management statement.
(2) The body corporate must act reasonably in anything it does under subsection (1).
There is some authority to say that this section applies only to
functions of the committee acting as the representative of the body
corporate,
and that it cannot be used to overturn a decision of the body corporate taken at
a general meeting.[1] Whilst I am
not bound by precedent, I would agree that to overturn the decision of the body
corporate would need strong evidence
to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the
lot-owners exercising their votes at a general meeting. There is no evidence
that the
lot owners acted unreasonably by casting their votes, simply because
the result was unfavourable to the Applicant.
Was it reasonable for the
committee to have drafted the motion "globally" as it did? There is no reason
why the committee could
not draft an "all-or-nothing" motion. Any lot owner who
was in favour of only parts of the motion could vote "No." There have
been no
submissions from lot owners saying that they were confused by the motion or that
any lot owner wanted to vote for parts of
the motion and not other parts.
Further, there is no duty on the committee to discuss its proposed
motions with lot owners, or specific lot owners, before they are
submitted to a
general meeting. If lot owners think the motion is poorly worded, or wrong,
or unfair, they can vote "No."
Was the committee ‘acting
reasonably’ in drafting such a motion without first discussing it with the
Applicant? The answer
to that question will always depend on the circumstances
in each case. Here, the committee is proposing changes to the by-laws
which in
respect of amendments (c) and (e) will affect only Lot 1.
I do
not accept the body corporate’s argument that to remove the word
"residential" from by-laws 14,15,18 and 20 can have
no effect on the Applicant
because it merely puts the Applicant on an equal footing with other lots. There
is no evidence that such
amendment will definitely be detrimental to Lot 1, but
I find that the intent of it is directed solely at the Applicant. Mr Simpson
says it is just an oversight by the drafters of the first community management
statement. I do not agree. The Applicant is in
a different position from the
owners of other lots as the first community management statement recognises, and
as the committee and
the letting agent also recognise. By-laws 14,15,18 and 20
are specifically drafted for owners of residential lots. A café
would be
expected to be able to hang signs, display boards, and bring inflammable
materials onto the property of a commercial kitchen.
Safeguards for the
behaviour of the occupiers of Lot 1 are found at by-laws 40 – 43, by-laws
which refer only to Lot 1 because
of its unique position in the scheme.
Section 167 Act (nuisance) will apply to the Applicant and the Coffee
Club if the café patrons make unreasonable noise. By-law 18 is
not aimed
at controlling noise from the ordinary business of the café.
The
proviso now added by amendment (c) to by-law 19 is expressed to be aimed
specifically at Lot 1.
In such circumstances, I find that the committee
did not act reasonably in submitting amendments (c) and (e) to a general meeting
without prior discussion with the Applicant. Mr Simpson says that he has tried
to communicate with the Applicant, and the Applicant
acknowledges that its
directors are based in Hong Kong and difficult to contact. However, neither Mr
Simpson nor the body corporate
committee have provided any evidence of the
"numerous requests and communications from the body corporate" to the Applicant
which
Mr Simpson mentions, nor is said that such communications concerned this
particular matter.
Amendment (c) -The Proviso to By-Law
19
The amending proviso reads: " provided that the proprietor or
occupier of Lot 1, must not use that lot for any purposes which may compete with
the activities
of the letting agent."
The letting agent’s
"activities" will be defined by the authority given by the body corporate to the
letting agent. The legislation
defines the letting agent as a person authorised
by the body corporate to conduct a letting agent business, which is a business
subject
to the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000, wherein the
letting agent acts as agent of owners of lots included in the scheme who choose
to use the person’s services for
securing, negotiating or enforcing
(including collecting rents or tariffs for) leases or other occupancies of lots
in the scheme.
(Section 16(2) Act.) Ancillary businesses or activities
are particularly envisaged eg. video hire, linen hire, and agency tour operator
given as
examples. (Section 16(4) Act.) Whilst in is not envisaged
that the letting agent sells coffee or produces meals, such activity is not be
prohibited by the
legislation.
It is not unusual to find by-laws in the
community management statement which protect the letting agent in a similar way,
for example,
the body corporate undertakes not to engage another person to
perform the same duties whilst a letting agent is acting under an authorisation.
However, where a by-law is "oppressive or
unreasonable",[2] it is within the
power given to an adjudicator under section 276 Act, to have such by-law
removed from the community management statement.
Mr Simpson may be
reasonably concerned that Lot 1, which can be used for any purpose which has the
consent of the local authority,
is not used for example, as a real estate
agency, or letting agency. The Applicant says that its concern is that such a
proviso
may enable the letting agent to sell coffee, for example from vending
machines on the common property, and then set up the claim
that the Coffee Club
is breaching a by-law by competing with the letting agent.
In practice,
in those circumstances, if the letting agent asked the body corporate to take
action against the Coffee Club to enforce
by-law 19, it may well be that such
action by the committee would be found to be unreasonable by this Office.
The fears of both the letting agent and the Applicant may be abated if
this proviso was better and more particularly worded, so that
actual
competition, or actual detriment must be in contemplation, not merely an
activity which "may compete" which allows for uncertainty.
The activities of
the letting agent which are to be protected should be detailed. I find the
proviso to the by-law, as drafted,
uncertain and open to varied interpretation.
It gives a power to the letting agent against the owner of Lot 1 which did not
previously
exist. In the circumstances that this proviso was not discussed with
the Applicant, as set out above, I find that the Applicant’s
fears are
founded, and that this proviso should not be allowed to stand. That is not to
say that a better worded proviso drafted
following discussion, so that the
particular concerns of the letting agent and the owner of Lot 1 can be
addressed, would fail.
In practice, any use of Lot 1 which required the
consent of the local authority is likely to have as a condition of approval,
that
the body corporate also approve the use. The body corporate would also
have a certain amount of control over Lot 1 in any application
to use common
property within the new use.
Fraud on a power in the case of
amendment (c)
The Applicant submits that the vote by the body
corporate in respect of amendment (c) was a "fraud on a power" and quotes the
Privy
Council case of Vatcher- v – Paull, without giving me any
argument in support of that submission.
The famous passage of Lord Parker
in that case is as follows -
‘The term fraud in connexion with frauds on a power does not
necessarily denote any conduct on the part of the appointor amounting
to fraud
in the common law meaning of the term or any conduct which could be properly
termed dishonest or immoral. It merely means
that the power has been exercised
for a purpose, or with an intention, beyond the scope of or not justified by the
instrument creating
the
power."[3]
I am given to
understand that whilst there is no fraud alleged, the amendment as proposed by
the committee, or the vote on the motion
by the body corporate, or perhaps the
result of the resolution, constitutes the exercise of a power beyond its scope,
or not justified
by the legislation.
I do not find that this has been
demonstrated by the facts in this matter. Both the committee and the lot
owners acted within a
power given to them by the legislation, and to show that
such power has been used in a way beyond its intended scope, I am of the
view
that some oppression or fraud would have to be shown, even though Lord Parker
says that this is not ‘necessarily’ the case. There is no
evidence of fraud or oppression. There is no evidence of the "concerted
attack on the registered commercial interests of Lot 1."
No
explanatory material
Section 40 C Accommodation Module
requires that an explanatory schedule accompanies the voting papers going out
with the notice of the general
meeting in certain specific circumstances. The
explanatory schedule merely shows who submitted the motion, explains the
mechanics
of voting on certain motions, and includes copies of up to 300 words
as written by any submitter of a motion. Certain motions,
for example a motion
to change the regulation module, require some explanation (section
40C(1)(d)) but otherwise, the committee must not comment on motions
(section 40C(6) and (8)) , and if it wishes to put out any other
explanatory material, it must do so separately from the explanatory schedule
(section 40C(7)) and it should be of a general or informative nature
only.
The fact that there was no explanatory material about the by-law
amendment is therefore not a ground which succeeds.
Amendment
(d) - The consolidation of By-laws 1,39 and 44
The body corporate has
now recorded a new CMS with by-laws 1, 39 and 44 consolidated as a new by-law 1
since all three by-laws concerned
parking. The Applicant says that since by-law
39 concerned all lot owners’ exclusive uses to car parking spaces that
such an
amendment should have been authorised only by a resolution without
dissent at a general meeting. The body corporate argues that
since the context
or text of the exclusive use by-law is not amended, that a special resolution
sufficed in this regard, and that
only the position of the wording in the CMS
has changed.
Section 171 Act sets out the requirements for an
exclusive use by-law as follows-
171 Requirements for exclusive use by-law
(1) The common property or body corporate asset to which an exclusive use by-law for a community titles scheme applies must be--
(a) specifically identified in the by-law; or
(b) allocated--
(i) by a person (who may be the original owner or the original owner’s agent) authorised under the by-law to make the allocation (an authorised allocation); or
(ii) by 2 or more lot owners under a reallocation agreement (an agreed allocation).
(2) An exclusive use by-law that specifically identifies the common property or body corporate asset to which it applies, other than an exclusive use by-law contained in the first community management statement for the scheme--
(a) may attach to a lot only if the lot owner agrees in writing before the passing of the resolution without dissent consenting to the recording of the new community management statement to incorporate the exclusive use by-law, or the lot owner votes personally in the resolution; and
(b) may stop applying to the lot only if the lot owner agrees in writing before the passing of the resolution without dissent consenting to the recording of the new community management statement that does not incorporate the exclusive use by-law, or the lot owner votes personally in the resolution.
(3) If an exclusive use by-law authorises the allocation of common property or a body corporate asset for the purpose of the by-law--
(a) the by-law may attach to a lot on the basis of an authorised allocation only if the lot owner agrees in writing before the allocation of the common property or body corporate asset to which the by-law applies; and
(b) the by-law may stop applying to the lot only if the lot owner agrees in writing before--
(i) the allocation is revoked under the by-law (if the by-law provides for the revocation of an allocation); or
(ii) the passing of the resolution without dissent--
(A) consenting to the recording of the new community management statement that does not incorporate the exclusive use by-law; or
(B) in which the lot owner voted personally.
The area of the exclusive use must be specifically identified in the
by-law. This is why exclusive uses in community management statements
are always
set out separately, and since the Registrar of Titles can require a plan of an
exclusive area to be lodged, Schedule E
of a community management statement
describes in writing the exclusive use areas for each lot, and is followed by
plans.
Whilst the removal of by-law 39 to part of by-law 1 is not
unlawful, it is most unusual and does not follow the accepted format for
a
community management statement.
Section 62(4)(i) Act says that a
resolution without dissent (or even a special resolution) is not required if the
existing community management statement
is reproduced without any change to
substance. However, in this case changes have been made to the new CMS which
alter the sense
of the exclusive uses, and which cannot be allowed to remain.
By-law 1 at paragraph 3 now refers to "Annexure "A"". There is no
such Annexure
recorded on the new CMS. The plans associated with the exclusive use car
parking allocations are drawings numbered
58451-003, 58451-004 and 58451-005,
respectively. In the former community management statement, the exclusive use
car parking space
for each lot was shown as a number on one or other of these
plans. Only Lot 1 contained a reference to "Area A" on drawing 58451-005.
There was no "Annexure A" in the former community management statement
either.
The new CMS by-law 1 is meaningless in respect of the exclusive
use car parking spaces, and a prospective purchaser will not be able
to identify
his/her exclusive use area, in contravention of section 171 Act. Since
all mention of Area A ( the exclusive use dining area for Lot 1) has been
removed, and all exclusive uses are now said
to be shown by numbers
corresponding to numbered lots on "plan marked A" (at the new Schedule E) and
the plan is not marked "A",
the new CMS becomes a quite unacceptably flawed
document. As drafted, there are no exclusive use car parking areas for any lot,
and Lot 1 has lost its outdoor dining area as well, or alternatively it might be
taken to mean that Lot 1 could use car space 1 for
outside dining.
This
is no doubt an error on the part of the draftsperson, and not a deliberate
revocation of Lot 1’s exclusive use "Area A"
on drawing 58451-005, which
would be in contravention of the provisions of section 171, and would
require the consent of the Applicant and a resolution without
dissent.
Another unauthorised change appears at by-law 40 which refers to
Lot 1’s outside dining area. This again refers to "Annexure
A" and the
identifying number "1". This number is said to be referable to the outside
dining area. In fact the number "1" appears
only on drawing number 58451-004
and refers to Lot 1’s car parking space. The dining area is only shown as
"Area A "on the
plan or drawing number 58451-005. By-law 40 as amended now
makes no mention at all of Schedule E, the exclusive uses schedule.
There was
no motion (at the 2006 AGM) to amend by-law 40 in this way, or at
all.
For this reason alone, the new CMS as it stands cannot be relied
upon. I have not perused the entire new CMS but any such changes
to " tidy up"
the wording in pursuit of the motion as passed, must be authorised by the body
corporate in the detail in which such
change is to be made. Whilst the
committee does not have to seek the consent at a general meeting to the whole
re-drafted community
management statement, if the new community management
statement as drafted is inconsistent with the consents given by the body
corporate,
the statement as recorded is void to the extent of the inconsistency.
(Section 64 Act.)
Amendment (f) - By-law 37
It
is agreed by the body corporate that this amendment might have been better
worded and as it stands it is "a bit ambiguous." Mr
Simpson says that the
objective is to stop owners and tenants from subletting the basement car parking
spaces, and that for security
reasons. The Applicant says that it has the
practical effect of revoking the benefit to Lot 1 of its exclusive use
car-parking
space, since it now reads that a lot owner cannot let a non-resident
park in the owner’s space. The Coffee Club, of course,
is technically
"non-resident" within the meaning of "resident" as maintaining a habitual place
of abode within the scheme. It is
"resident" in that it occupies a building in
the scheme for which it pays rent under a lease. However, the Applicant cannot
comply
with the wording of the new by-law 37 as its tenant does not "live in"
its lot.
The words "resident" and "residential" are not defined in the
former community management statement or in the legislation, but from
the
references to the word "residential" as used in the former community management
statement, it appears that a difference is to
be drawn between those owners who
have habitable areas within the scheme, designed as homes; and those ( Lot 1
only) who have non-habitable
spaces, designed as commercial areas.
I
accept that this is the meaning intended by the body corporate. However, as
by-law 37 currently stands, the 5th and 6th paragraph
conflict with each other. Paragraph 5 details how the owner of Lot 1 may issue
tokens to visitors to facilitate car-parking;
paragraph 6 now reads that no
visitors may use the secure car-parking spaces. This wording needs some further
thought as has been
accepted by the body corporate.
I am also concerned
that if the car-parking spaces are those to which the owners have exclusive
uses, then any re-wording which changes,
extends or curtails the use of such
exclusive use areas, for any lot owner, will need a resolution without dissent.
Conditions may
be imposed on an exclusive use area (Section 173 Act; section
122 Accommodation Module) but only with the consent of the owner of the
exclusive use.
General comment in this matter
I note
that emphasis is laid by the body corporate and Mr Simpson on the fact the
Applicant had 21 days’ notice in which to
query the contents of Motion 11
and a further opportunity at the 2006 AGM to speak out. That such opportunities
were not taken and
that the Applicant’s solicitors sought the withdrawal
of Motion 11 only the day before the AGM of 2006 are put forward as evidence
that the Applicant is not genuine in its complaint and/or the level of distress
suffered.
I do not agree. The Applicant could have done nothing to
prevent the motion being put to a general meeting once the notice of meeting
and
agenda had been sent out. The legislation, particularly the Accommodation
Module, is structured so that lot owners may vote
by post, and there is no
requirement for a general discussion of motions at the meeting prior to a vote
being cast. Whilst those
present at the meeting (who may be few) may try to
canvass their cause, and influence those who have not yet voted, the general
meeting
is not a forum for debate.
The Accommodation Module is silent on
the question of the withdrawal of a motion placed on the agenda, but there is a
previous order
of an adjudicator that has decided that it would be illogical and
impractical to refuse to allow the submitter of a motion to withdraw
that motion
prior to the vote being cast.[4]
There is of course no duty whatsoever on the submitter of a motion to withdraw
the motion when requested to do so by someone else,
and the body corporate has
not indicated that had it been given more notice to withdraw the motion, it
would have done so.
I am satisfied that under section 276(1) Act,
that an adjudicator could make an order that parts of a motion stand whilst
others fail, as submitted by the body corporate,
that is, that a motion could be
severed and still be valid. I find there are no flaws in the passing of
Motion 11 (a), 11(b)
and 11(g). All other parts of Motion 11 are flawed in
some respect as detailed in these reasons. Since any amendments to a community
management statement will require the lodging of a new community management
statement, I am going to order that the former community
management statement be
reinstated save only that by-law 27 may be deleted, and the new by-laws 46 and
47 may be added.
I recommend that in respect of any future motions to
amend the by-laws, that each item of amendment is put to a separate vote; that
separate motions are proposed where the amendment proposed requires a resolution
to be passed by a special resolution and a resolution
without dissent; and that
where a by-law will particularly affect one or a small group of lot owners, that
some discussion is entered
into for the lot owner(s) input prior to the
amendment being put to the body corporate.
Section 180(5) Act
requires that a by-law must not discriminate between types of occupiers.
Where the types of occupier play different roles in the scheme, there will
need
to be careful wording of the by-laws (as seen in the former community management
statement) about which by-laws relate only
to Lot 1. Such by-laws must be
reasonable and not oppressive and must be passed in accordance with the
legislation.
I note that there is some underlying concern in this matter
that Lot 1’s legitimate use of its premises puts it outside the
by-laws by
which every other lot owner must live. In a scheme such as this, there is
potential for friction between domestic and
commercial uses. The former
community management statement recognised that friction and addressed certain
issues at by-laws 40
- 43 in respect of Lot 1. The body corporate may, under
the powers given to it in the legislation, still require the owner or
occupier
of Lot 1 to maintain it properly and not to make noise or cause a nuisance,
without resorting to changing its by-laws.
Section 113 Accommodation
Module requires that an owner seeks authorisation from the body corporate to
make improvements to the common property
for the benefit of the owner’s
lot. If the body corporate is concerned that the Applicant is not restrained
by By-law 20
from making alterations to the exterior of Lot 1, then this may be
addressed in particular by a new by-law with wording relevant
to Lot 1,
following consultation with the owner of Lot 1 ( and the subsequent voting
process.)
In respect of the Coffee Club’s need to bring gas
canisters or the like onto Lot 1, if this results in an increased insurance
premium, then section 129(2)(c) Accommodation Module enables the body
corporate to seek the increase in premium from the lot owner.
Finally,
in respect of Mr Simpson’s observation that the Applicant does not come to
meetings, that is entirely the prerogative
of the Applicant as an owner.
Schemes under the Accommodation Module in particular may have a high number of
absentee or investor
owners. The legislation requires that full and accurate
minutes of both committee meetings and general meetings are sent to lot
owners
within 21 days of the meeting. This is to keep owners informed without the need
for them to attend meetings in person.
Since this application is not
dismissed, the question of costs under section 270 Act does not
arise.
[1] Dindas & Anor –v-
Body Corporate for One Park Road CTS 2114 & Ors [2006] QDC para.
34; McColl & Anor –v- Body Corporate for Lakeview Park CTS
20751 [ 2004] QCA 44 para.
25
[2] see examples of
Adjudicator’s Orders Schedule 5 Item
20
[3] [1915] A.C 372 at p.
378
[4] Calm Waters CTS
13535 – 0494-1997
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QBCCMCmr/2006/555.html