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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 19 July 2006
REFERENCE: 0614-2005
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT
1997
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Number of Scheme:
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24297
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Name of Scheme:
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Caribbean-Bilinga
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Address of Scheme:
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80 Pacific Parade BILINGA QLD 4225
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by
Nathan Jenkins & Simone Jenkins, occupiers of lot 7
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I hereby order that within 14 days of the date of this order that the body corporate pay to the applicants Nathan and Simone Jenkins the sum of $1,363.66 (one thousand, three hundred and sixty three dollars and 66 cents) in reparation for items removed unlawfully by the body corporate on or about 22nd June 2005 in contravention of the exercise of the powers of the committee ; I further order that a copy of this order and the reasons for decision be circulated to the 12 lot owners in the scheme, at the expense of the body corporate, on receipt of this order by the body corporate. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0614-2005
"Caribbean-Bilinga" CTS 24297
APPLICATION
This is an application dated 18th August
2005 and amended on 7th September 2005 by Simone and Nathan Jenkins,
tenants of Lot 7, (the applicants) against the body corporate for the
scheme (the body corporate) for an order that the body corporate
compensate the applicants for personal property removed and destroyed by the
body corporate
which removal the applicants say was unlawful. The applicants
claim the sum of $3,870 being the value of the items removed inclusive
of $500
for "administration" under which heading the applicants include their time,
phone calls and emails to the body
corporate.
JURISDICTION
"Caribbean – Bilinga" CTS
24297 is a community titles scheme under the Body Corporate and Community
Management Act 1997 (the Act) and the Body Corporate and Community
Management ( Standard Module) Regulation 1997 (the Standard Module).
There are 12 lots in the scheme created under a building unit plan of
subdivision.
Section 276(1) of the Act provides that an
adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances
(including a declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a
community titles scheme, about-
(a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or
(b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or the community management statement; or
(c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about-
(i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or
(ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles
scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from
acting, in a way stated in the order (section 276(2)). An adjudicator's
order may contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator
considers necessary or appropriate (section 284(1)).
There is no authority given in the legislation for an award of costs to an applicant, for example for time taken, or disbursements incurred, in addressing the dispute or submitting the application. The claim for "administration " in the sum of $500 therefore fails.
However, a more pertinent point is whether I have the jurisdiction to
order reimbursement to the owner of the value of property destroyed
by the body
corporate committee.
Section 276 (1)(b) of the Act entertains the
resolution of a dispute " about the exercise of rights or powers, or the
performance of duties, under the Act or the community management statement.
"
Section 94 of the Act states the body corporate must act
reasonably in anything it does in respect of administering the common property,
enforcing
the by-laws, and in carrying out the other functions given to the body
corporate under the Act and the community management scheme.
(section
94(1)(b)).
Section 281 of the Act allows an adjudicator to
order " the person who the adjudicator believes, on reasonable grounds, to be
responsible"" for a contravention of the Act or a contravention of the
community management statement which has caused damage to an applicant’s
property, to carry out repairs to the damaged property, or to pay the applicant
a sum as reimbursement for repairs carried out to
the property by the applicant
(section 281(1) (a) and (b)). The example given in the subsection is
where a waterproofing membrane in a roof which is the responsibility of the body
corporate
leaks, and incoming water damages wallpaper and carpets in an
owner’s lot. If the leak results from the body corporate’s
failure to maintain the membrane, ie. a contravention of the obligation in the
Act to
maintain common property, then an adjudicator could order the body
corporate to have the damage repaired or pay an appropriate amount
as
reimbursement to the lot owner " for amounts incurred by the owner in
repairing the property." In the example given, this would in my view,
include replacement of the carpets and wallpaper, and the word "repair" refers
to the
lot itself which must be repaired because of the water damage.
The new shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "Repair" as follows
–
" the action or process of restoring something to unimpaired condition by replacing or fixing worn or damaged parts."
" renovate or renew by compensating for loss or exhaustion;"
" remedy, put right ( loss, damage, etc.)"
" make up for, make amends, make reparation for something."
" make amends to, compensate ( a person)."
I am satisfied that if the body corporate acts unreasonably in
exercising its powers given under the Act, or the community management
statement, which in my view would include the circumstance where the body
corporate acts beyond its powers, then an aggrieved owner
or occupier has the
right to have the dispute resolved at this office. If the unreasonable
exercise of those powers causes damage
to the property of an owner or occupier,
I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to make an order that is just and
equitable in the
circumstances, including making an order for a fixed sum of
money to be paid for reparation of damaged
property.
SUBMISSIONS
The applicants say that on
27th January 2005, Body Corporate Services, the body corporate
manager for the scheme ( the body corporate manager) sent a circular
letter out to all lot owners and occupiers about the appearance of the carpark,
stairwell and foyers, pointing out
that the appearance of the building was "
less than pleasing" and that shoes and boots left outside entrance doors to
units were
a potential hazard. The circular advised all owners and occupiers
that personal items not removed from common property within 14
days would be
removed and disposed of. The circular specified common areas such as stairwell
foyers outside entrance doors to units
and the carpark, and stated " this
includes old furniture ( eg broken cupboards and wardrobes) and bric-a-brac ( eg
old vases, pictures, etc.)
A second circular headed " Final Notice"
was sent out on 2nd June 2005, stating that personal items currently
stored in the carpark must be removed within 7 days otherwise they would be
disposed
of.
On 9th June 2005, the body corporate manager sent
a letter to the owners of lot 7, C.I. and G.P. Raven, (Mr and Mrs Raven)
and the applicants, asking that the applicants’ personal items (including
tyres) in the garage be "removed immediately." The
applicants responded to this
letter on 11th June 2005 saying that they had been tenants for over
12 months, they were one of only four or five permanent tenants on site, and
they thought the requests petty and distressing. The applicants admitted that
"Nathan leaves his workboots at the door"; they said they had a few
personal items in the carpark which were tidily stored and well hidden and could
not fit in their unit;
and the items were in the car park space which had been
allocated to them by the letting agent. They asked if a compromise could
be
reached. They received no response to their email.
On
22nd June 2005 some of the applicants’ stored belongings were
taken from the carpark space. The applicants contacted their letting
agent at
the Professionals, Belinda Dinsey. (Ms Dinsey) Between 22nd
June 2005 and 1st August 2005, the applicants , Mr and Mrs Raven and
Ms Dinsey tried to ascertain the whereabouts of the removed items, believing
that
they might have been stolen.
On 1st August 2005, the
owner received an email from Peter O’Loughlin, (Mr
O’Loughlin) the Chairman of the body corporate saying that the goods
had not been stolen but "they have been taken to the tip by the removalist
acting upon the Committee’s instructions." The chairman further
warned that if any tyres remained in the carpark, they were also subject to
removal without notice.
The applicants contacted Mr
O’Loughlin to say how distressed they were to find that their property had
been destroyed. On 11th August 2005 Mr O’Loughlin wrote an
email to the applicants saying that if the body corporate had instead taken the
procedure
of issuing the applicants with a Continuing Contravention Notice of
Breach of By-Law, it would have been " a very tedious and cumbersome
process!" The Chairman stated that the body corporate committee had
authorised and approved the action which was recorded in the committee meeting
minutes.
The applicants say they have lost the following items,
described as follows –
Coffee table (extreme sentimental value, was to
be restored) valued at $2000
Sanyo Portable Surround Sound CD player
$500
Black leather Office Chair $500
Milk crate containing fixtures and
fittings for carpentry work $300
Rake $20
Car cleaning Products
$50
Submissions were invited from all lot owners in accordance with
section 243(2)(b) Act. Submissions were received only Mr
O’Loughlin, on behalf of the body corporate, and from Colin Gard of the
body corporate
manager, also on behalf of the body corporate.
On behalf
of the Committee, Mr O’Loughlin says that the body corporate was unsure
which lot owner or occupier was responsible
for which property, since items were
stored within various carpark spaces. The committee decided to send the
circular letter on
27th January 2005 instead of taking proceedings
for breach of a by-law. He says the contravention notice "requires us to
nominate specific property belonging to each resident." Since some
carspace numbers have been changed around, with different numbers painted over
the original numbers, it was difficult
to nominate specific property belonging
to each owner/ occupier.
The body corporate manager made a lengthy
submission saying that it has acted in the best interest of " all involved."
It provides
committee meeting minutes of a committee meeting held on
18th January 2005 wherein the committee passed the motion to issue of
the circular letter, and further information to show that the body
corporate
manager was acting on the body corporate’s instructions when it sent round
the " Final Notice." The body corporate
manager denies being involved with the
removal of items from the garage. Minutes of a committee meeting on
7th June 2005 show a committee resolution " that the Chairman be
authorised to engage Henry Ballance to remove all rubbish from the garage after
14th June 2005 at a cost not exceeding $300 plus GST." Although
the body corporate manager was in attendance at that meeting, when the
applicants’ property disappeared, he sought
information as to its
whereabouts from the chairman on behalf of the applicants.
In reply,
the applicants say that the items were stored in the carpark allocated to Unit
7. There is some confusion over re-numbered
spaces but this is nothing which
the applicants as occupiers can do anything about. They believe that Unit
7’s real car space
now carries the number " 4" but it was like that when
they moved in. In support they supply a letter from Ms Dinsey explaining that
the lot owners had swapped car spaces with Unit 12 in 2000 and that a chalk "7"
was marked in Unit 12. Ms Dinsey says that she
has for four years let out Unit
7 with the "chalked 7" car space and there has been no queries from the body
corporate about it.
The applicants say that there are still personal
items stored in other car park spaces, eg bicycles, furniture, electrical
equipment
and boxes, and they feel discriminated against. No other owner or
occupier has had items removed. Further, the delay in finding
out what
happened to their goods was exacerbated by the body corporate manager who was
aware or swiftly became aware that the chairman
had had their items dumped but
did not tell them so.
DETERMINATION
The substantive
facts are not in dispute in that the applicants stored certain items in a
carpark space which they rented as part
of their rent of Unit 7, which were
removed after two warnings by the body corporate. The committee authorised the
removal after
14th June 2005, at its meeting on 7th June
2005.
Whilst this aspect has not been pressed in argument, it appears
from an investigation of the community management statement, that
the garage
spaces are areas of common property over which each lot owner is granted
exclusive use.
By-law 12 states –
"The owner for the time being of each lot shall be entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the car parking spaces being that part of the common property as outlined in Schedule E of the Community Management Statement for Caribbean-Bilinga Community Title Scheme 24297".
Schedule E shows that lot 7 has exclusive use of car park space
7 on the plan registered in the titles office. This shows an area
of 16 sq m.
allocated for the exclusive use of Lot 7.
Whilst it appears that the
owner(s) of Lot 12 and the owners of Lot 7 had a private arrangement about using
each others spaces, that
agreement could not be relied upon in the event of a
sale. Lot 7 has exclusive use only of Lot 7 car space as shown on the plan.
However, it does not appear that the owner of the car space in which the
applicants stored their goods ( if not carspace 7) had
any objection to them
being stored there. Since the space in which the goods were kept was an
exclusive use area of a lot owner,
and not simply the common property of the
body corporate, the body corporate should before taking any action, have
consulted the
lot owner with the exclusive use which would have been easily
obtainable from a look at the community management statement.
An
"exclusive use" gives the occupier of a lot exclusive use to the rights and
enjoyment of, or other special rights about, common
property (section 170
Act).
In my view, there is nothing in the by-laws for the scheme
to prevent lot owners from storing goods as they see fit in their respective
exclusive use areas. Whilst the table of Schedule E is headed "Number of
exclusive use area for car parking on the plan annexed hereto", there is
nothing in the body of the by-laws to prevent parking of specific types of
vehicle in the car-parking space, and if an
owner or occupier wished to park
something other than "a car" in the car parking space, there would seem to be no
right on the part
of the body corporate to prevent him or her from doing
so.
If the body corporate wants to restrict the types of vehicle which
can be left in the car-parking space, or wants to prevent storage
of other goods
in the car parking space, it must pass such a by-law and register it in the
titles office.
The only relevant by law for the scheme concerning goods
left on common property is By law 7 which says -
" The occupier must not leave rubbish or other materials on common
property in a way or place likely to interfere with the peaceful
enjoyment of
the common property by someone else."
There is absolutely no evidence
given by the body corporate that the goods stored by the applicants were placed
" in a way likely to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the common
property by someone else." Even if there had been, the correct procedure
was to send a by-law contravention notice to the applicants asking them to
comply
with the by-law. Such a notice would not require the goods to be
itemised, but would require that By-Law 7 was set out in full,
with the details
of the contravention stated, ie. in what way the materials were likely to
interfere with others’ enjoyment.
Further, it is arguable whether
By-Law 7 refers to an exclusive use area at all, since it is not "common
property" in the normal meaning
of the words, that is, common property which all
owners and occupiers have a right to use and enjoy. Since only the holder of
the
exclusive use has a right to use and enjoy an exclusive use area, it may be
difficult to show that the manner of use by the owner
or occupier interfered
with anyone else’s rights. However, there is no need to consider this
argument since the applicants
have not been accused of breaching a by-law.
I am satisfied that the body corporate committee has acted unreasonably
in the exercise of its powers, and that it has abused its
authority in
destroying items belonging to a legitimate occupier, which items were stored in
a place (and possibly in a manner)
in which they had every right to
be.
The body corporate has failed to carry out correct procedures in
investigating the storage of items to which it took offence, and
denied the
applicants, and Mr and Mrs Raven as owners, their statutory rights, in that it
did not reply to the applicants’
email of 11th June 2005; did
not send out a notice of breach of by-law which the applicants had a right to
defend; and did not act fairly or reasonably
in administering the common
property, in all probability because it could not be bothered to go through a "
tedious and cumbersome process" required by law.
Further, it
impinged on an exclusive use area of a lot owner without any authority of that
lot owner (whoever that may be.) There
is also no evidence provided by the
body corporate that the minutes of the committee meeting of 7th June
2005 were sent to all lot owners within a period in which lot owners could have
exercised their rights under section 37 of the Standard Module.
37 Carrying out resolutions of committee meetings
(1) A notice opposing the carrying out of a resolution of the committee
(a "notice of opposition"), signed by or for the owners of at least one-half
of the lots included in the scheme, may be given to the secretary.
(2) A notice of opposition must be given to the secretary within 7 days
(the "required period") after the secretary gives a copy of the minutes
containing the resolution or, for a resolution passed other than at a meeting,
a copy of the resolution, to each owner of a lot included in the scheme as
required under section 36.
(3) The committee may carry out a resolution only if--
(a) no notice of opposition is received by the secretary within the
required period; or
(b) the resolution is necessary to deal with an emergency, and--
(i) the amount required to put the resolution into effect is
within the relevant limit for committee spending for the
scheme; or
(ii) an adjudicator acting under the dispute resolution provisions
authorises the committee to carry out the resolution; or
(c) the resolution is ratified by ordinary resolution of the body
corporate.
(4) In a proceeding involving a challenge to the right of the committee to
carry out a resolution, or a body corporate manager to carry out a decision
made in the exercise of a power of an executive member of the committee
under an authorisation given by the body corporate, the burden of proving
that action required to be taken under section 36(2) and (4) was in fact
taken lies on the person asserting the right of the committee or body
corporate manager to carry out the resolution or the decision.
(5) Subsections (1) to (4) do not apply to a resolution authorising a
committee member to carry out a stated function of the body corporate if--
(a) the cost of acting under the resolution, including the amount of
any commitment incurred, is not more than the greater of--
(i) $200; or
(ii) $5 multiplied by the number of lots included in the scheme;
or
(b) the function involves a decision of a routine, administrative
nature.
(my underlining).
The committee’s
action was high-handed and unlawful. It decided that the applicant’s
goods were "rubbish" that could
be removed by Mr Ballance. Its actions may
also be a tort (a civil wrong) and a crime. It is a matter for the applicants
if
they wish to involve the police.
In their submissions, the body
corporate did not address the values placed by the applicants on the items
destroyed, nor did the body
corporate dispute that the items listed were
removed. I have asked the applicants to provide proof of the value of the
items, which
has understandably been difficult since some of the items were
bought some time ago. They have receipts only for the carpenters’
tools
stored in the milk crate as follows –
Chalk reel and powder,
carpenter’s square - $45.90.
Extension lead $16.90
Rivet gun and
rivets $32.29
Professional organiser - $29.97
Sharpening stone -
$23.98
14 piece screwdriver set - $28.96
Socket set - $99.00
I could
find no receipt for the item " Dolphin torch".
These add up to $277.00
and were purchased between November 2004 and March 2005. I have no difficulty
in making an order that the
body corporate reimburse that sum to the
applicants.
Further, I find that a rake valued at $20 is not
unreasonable, nor car cleaning products at $50. I find that such items might
reasonably
be kept in a car parking area, outside but under cover.
However, I have some difficulty in accepting that items of significant
value, that is, the black leather office chair ($500) which
was 2 - 3 years
old; the Sanyo Portable Surround Sound CD player ($500) which was 4 years old;
and the antique coffee table ( $2000)
which was inherited by the applicant Mrs
Jenkins from her grandfather; would be items which would be stored in a car
parking area
because of lack of space in Unit 7, if they were in good condition.
Mrs Jenkins has said that the table was not in good condition and is not
replaceable. I accept that the table had sentimental value
to Mrs Jenkins and
understand her difficulty in assessing its value now that it has been destroyed.
Unfortunately, the applicants
must have evidence of their claim, and the
sentimental value attached to the table cannot be recompensed in monetary terms.
Nor has
it been possible for the applicants to find an independent valuer for
the unrestored value of the table. Taking an outsider’s
view of the value
of a 1940s coffee table which needed renovation and was kept in a carpark space,
and uninsured, I put a figure
of $350 on the table. I realise that this may
not be its actual value.
I am taking the view that the chair and the CD
player will need to be replaced by the applicants. The applicants have
provided
quotations for a replacement office chair from Harvey Norman at $679;
and a replacement Grundig home theatre at $599. I have not
asked the body
corporate to comment on these quotations even though they are in excess of the
original claim by the applicants, as
I am not satisfied that "like for like" has
been obtained in the quotations. I find no fault with the applicants in saying
that.
I am aware that fully "portable" surround sound systems and
systems which are "portable" but meant to be "shelf systems" may be purchased
from between $150 - $400, up to almost unlimited value. Leather office chairs
also vary greatly in quality and design.
In all the circumstances, on the
lack of hard evidence of value, I am discounting the original application value
of the chair and
CD ($500) player by one third. Each item will be reimbursed
to the applicants by the body corporate in the sum of $333.33.
The total
value to be paid to the applicants by the body corporate is therefore $1,363.66.
Whilst this will no doubt disappoint the
applicants, if the property had been
stolen by persons unknown, and had not been insured, in all probability, the
applicants would
not have achieved any reparation at all.
In this
dispute, the applicants as occupiers have standing only to bring a matter
against the body corporate or another lot owner
or occupier. (Section
227(1)(b) Act). The committee represents the body corporate in all matters
in which it has power to act without seeking a resolution at a general
meeting.
Section 310 of the Act states –
310 Protection of persons dealing with body corporate
If a person, honestly and without notice of an irregularity, enters into a transaction with a member of the committee for the body corporate for a community titles scheme or a person who has apparent authority to bind the body corporate, the transaction is valid and binding on the body corporate.
This section may act to protect the removalist
who was hired by the committee. However, whilst the committee represents the
body
corporate, it may be the view of the body corporate that the committee
exceeded its powers in taking the action which now results
in the body corporate
having to pay the applicants $1,363.66. The body corporate has standing to
bring an action against the committee,
or a member or members of the committee
(section 227(1)(g) Act). The body corporate may like to seek that the
committee or members of the committee repay the body corporate. The body
corporate
may also reflect its view of the committee’s actions at election
time.
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