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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 5 July 2005
REFERENCE: 0613-2004
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT
1997
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Number of Scheme:
|
13178
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Name of Scheme:
|
Fletcher
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Address of Scheme:
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738 Pacific Parade CURRUMBIN BEACH Q 4223
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by: Margaret Joy SMITH as both attorney for Ruby Ellen SMITH and co-executor with Jennifer GREENSLADE for the Estate of Collin William SMITH, the co-owners of Lot 3; and Margaret Joy SMITH, as the owner of Lot 4,
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I hereby order that in respect of the following resolutions
purported to have been passed at the extraordinary general meeting of the body
corporate
held on 15 July 2004 -–
1. The resolution appointing a replacement body corporate committee was at all times void except to the extent that Paul Brinsmead is the chairperson, and as a consequence and by this order the previous positions of secretary and treasurer held by Jennifer Greenslade and ordinary member by Allan Dale remain held by those persons, and the three persons Brinsmead, Greenslade and Dale solely comprise the current committee. 2. The resolution for the remuneration of the body corporate chairperson up to $1,200 annually, is invalid and any payments made on the authority of the resolution must be reimbursed by the recipient to the body corporate. 3. The resolution for the Administrative Fund budget of $18,000 and a contribution of $3,000 per lot entitlement, is reduced to the amount of $13,580 and a contribution of $2,263, by the removal of the line item "Contract Cleaning & Gardening" at a cost of $4,420 which is invalid, and any contributions based on the purported budget levied on owners must be adjusted accordingly and any adverse action taken against an owner, whether financial or in respect to voting eligibility, must be remedied as if the situation giving rise to the adverse action never existed. I further order that the body corporate must within two (2) months of the date of this order engage a structural engineer to inspect and give a written report as to the nature and source, and recommendations as to how best to rectify, any defect or fault found, including those instances identified by Solutions IE Pty Ltd in its report to the body corporate dated 19 August 2004 (a copy of which must be provided to the structural engineer), in regard to – • concrete corrosion or spalling in the scheme; and and to facilitate the inspection I order that lot owners must
provide reasonable access for the structural engineer to inspect their
respective lots.
I further order that the body corporate must consider the structural engineer’s report in general meeting and determine how the problems identified may be best rectified by the body corporate in respect to common property, and owners in respect to their lots, in order that the body corporate and owners properly discharge their respective maintenance duties under the legislation. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0613-2004
"Fletcher" CTS 13178
The applicants, Ruby Smith and the Estate of Collin Smith of Lot 3, and
Margaret Smith of Lot 4, have sought the following order of
an adjudicator under
the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 ("the Act")
-
1. "An order that the following resolutions passed at the EGM held on 15th July 2004, be declared invalid:
a) Resolution 6 (Removal of Committee Members from Office).
b) Resolution 7 (Appointment of Committee Members).
c) Resolution 8 (Remuneration of Chairman).
2.An order that Resolution 11 (Administrative Fund Budget & Contributions) passed at the EGM held on 15th July 2004, be overturned on the basis that the amount proposed to be raised is unreasonable and does not reflect the requirements of the building, and further that a new budget be set of $700 per lot excluding insurance.
3. An order that the following motions that were not passed at the EGM held on 15th July 2004, be overturned on the basis that the body corporate has a legal obligation to repair and maintain the common property:
a) Resolution 2 (Stairwell Repair).
b) Resolution 3 (Concrete Corrosion)".
JURISDICTION:
This
is a dispute between owners (the applicants representing Lots 3 and 4) and the
body corporate (the respondent) concerning the
following matters: the validity
of resolutions to remove and replace committee members and to remunerate the
chairperson; to reduce
the Administrative Fund Budget; and to give effect to two
rejected motions for the necessary repair of common property structures.
These
are matters that fall within the dispute resolution provisions of the
legislation (see sections 227, 228 and 276 of the Act) and may be
determined by a departmental adjudicator.
General powers of an
Adjudicator in making an order:
Section 276(1) of the Act provides
that an adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the
circumstances (including a declaratory
order) to
resolve a dispute, in the
context of a community titles scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about – (i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or (ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section
276(2) of the Act). An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or
consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary
or appropriate
(section 284(1) of the Act).
APPLICATION AND
SUBMISSIONS:
In accordance with section 243 of the Act, a copy of
the application was provided to the respondent body corporate (committee) and
the only other owner, Resort
Corporation
(No.2) Pty Ltd (the owner of Lots 1, 2,
5 and 6) with an invitation to each to respond to the matters of dispute raised
in the application.
A submission was received from Hickey Lawyers (Sean
Whittle) with advice it acted for the body corporate in
the matter. The
applicants
viewed the submission and subsequently lodged a reply (see
sections 244 and 246 of the Act).
The brief facts of the matters
are as follows.
The scheme was developed by the original owners of the
land, Collin and Ruby Smith, and the applicants Margaret Smith and Jennifer
Greenslade are their daughters. It is near 30 years old but occupies a prime
waterfront position on Pacific Parade, Currumbin Beach.
The scheme was
self-managed by various family members with no properly functioning body
corporate until, by Order 565-1999 dated
23 September 1999, Margaret Smith was
appointed administrator of the body corporate for the purposes of calling a
general meeting
to re-establish the body corporate as a functioning body
operating in accordance with the legislation. A meeting to that purpose
was
held on 7 November 1999.
Since then, Resort Corporation (No.2) Pty Ltd
("Resort") has purchased four of the six lots. The applicants state that Resort
has
also purchased adjoining property. At the annual general meeting held on 29
January 2004, Jamie Bolic of Hickey Lawyers exercised
the vote for Resort as its
notified company nominee. By motion proposed by Resort and by its majority
vote, Stewart Silver King
and Burns (Gold Coast) Pty Ltd ("SSKB") was engaged as
the replacement Body Corporate Manager. Motion 14 submitted by Resort was
to
set the Administrative Fund contribution at $3,000 per lot entitlement/owner
(equal lot entitlements) and the Sinking Fund contribution
at $5,000 per lot
entitlement/owner (ditto). This was ruled out of order as there were no budgets
supporting the motion. The alternative
budgets proposed by the then committee
were rejected on the majority vote of Resort. Nominations by Resort for three
executive and
four ordinary member committee positions were declared invalid as
the nominator had not signed the multiple nomination form.
By notice
dated 28 May 2004, Resort (through Hickey Lawyers then acting for Resort) sought
a "requested extraordinary general meeting" ("the meeting") under
section 61(1) of the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard
Module) Regulation 1997 ("Standard Module"). The request included the
following motions: the ouster of all three members of the committee and their
replacement
by 6 persons associated with Resort; a contribution of $3,000 and
$5,000 per lot entitlement/owner for the Administrative and Sinking
Funds
respectively; and a motion for the refurbishment of the common property for a
quoted price of $687,000 plus GST. The applicants
submitted two motions which
were also included in the agenda for the meeting, being for repair of the
stairwell and rectification
of concrete corrosion.
The requested meeting
was held on 15 July 2004. The outcomes relevant to this application are as
follows:
1. The committee comprising Margaret Smith (chairperson), Jenny Greenslade (secretary & treasurer) and Allan Dale (ordinary member) were ousted on the majority vote of Resort and the members nominated by it declared appointed, being Paul Brinsmead (chairperson), Peter Madrers (secretary), John Lea (treasurer), and Heidi Brinsmead, Sally Madrers and Brian Usher (ordinary members).
2. A Resort motion for the chairperson to be remunerated $1,200 annually was passed.
3. A Resort motion for an Administrative Fund budget contribution of $3,000 per lot entitlement/owner was passed.
4. Motions for the stairwell repair and concrete rectification were rejected by Resort.
5. A motion by Resort for refurbishment of the common property as per attached quote for $687,000 excluding GST, was withdrawn by Brinsmead for Resort.
I shall address each of these dispute issues under
"Determination" when I shall take into consideration both the
applicant’s grounds to the application and their reply to the submission
of
the respondent body corporate, and the submission of the body corporate,
DETERMINATION:
"Fletcher" was registered as a
building units plan (now termed a building format plan) on 12 December
1975 and comprises 6 lots. It is regulated by the Body Corporate and
Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 1997 ("the Standard
Module").
I shall determine each of the orders sought by the applicants
under separate heading, assessing the evidence of the parties against
the
applicable legislative provisions.
1. Ouster and replacement of
Committee.
Section 25B of the Standard Module provides that a
committee member may be removed from office by ordinary resolution of the body
corporate, and
may be replaced at that same meeting by the appointment of a
person eligible to be a member of the committee. At the meeting, the
three members then constituting the committee were removed and six replacement
members appointed, presumably
in reliance on this provision.
The
"required numbers of members for committee’ for this scheme is 6
members (see definition in the Dictionary Schedule and section 22(4)
of the Standard Module) which is the number of appointments made at the
meeting, presumably made in reliance on this provision.
The
removal and replacement of the committee is unlawful for a number of reasons;
the relevant legislative provisions have been in
force since 1 December 2003 and
should be well known to committees and professionals.
The means for
choosing a committee with a number of members in excess of those who initially
nominated, is set out in section 22(4) which refers specifically to the
annual election of members. The provisions relating to the filling of vacant
committee positions
(see Division 5A of Part 1 of the Standard Module)
does not similarly provide that additional members may be sought and appointed;
it only provides that persons
may be appointed to vacant positions. That is,
where the number of positions filled at the annual election meets the minimum
required
number of members criteria then the membership number is fixed for that
year. One might argue, in a general way, that the benefit
of wider membership
being the basis for section 22(4) would also be of benefit during the
term of a committee, particularly where a complete ouster of a committee (for
whatever reason)
requires a completely new committee be chosen. However, this
argument has little merit against the language and purpose of Division 5A
which is quite clear; certainly it is not supported by anything given in the
explanatory notes to the relevant amending legislation,
Body Corporate and
Community Management Legislation Amendment Regulation (No.1) 2003 ("the
explanatory notes").
In any case the appointment of the new
committee is invalid on other grounds as well. Section 25E of the
Standard Module makes specific provision regarding the nomination of persons to
fill vacant committee positions, in stating
–
25E Election of committee member at general meeting.
(6) A lot owner may nominate not more than 1 person for election to any of the following--
(a) a vacant executive member position;
(b) all vacant ordinary member positions.
This provision mirrors the
restriction imposed on nominations by lot owners under sections 13(2) and
13A of the Standard Module relating to nominations for annual elections,
specifically that a lot owner may only nominate one person (whether
themself,
another lot owner or a person eligible under section 10) whether to one
or more positions (see 13A(2)(b)). It would be incongruous if an owner
had a wider nominating power in filling vacancies than for the annual election
of committee.
Accordingly, in section 25E the term "to any of
the following" refers to the ability to nominate a particular person for
different positions, and not multiple persons to a different position each.
In both instances lot owners are limited to one nomination: for
individuals, themself or another lot owner or a person who may be
nominated by a
lot owner; and for persons other than an individual (such as Resort), a lot
owner or a person who may be nominated
by a lot owner under section 10(b)(ii)
or (iii) of the Standard Module.
The person a lot owner may nominate
for a vacancy must be eligible to be a member of the committee (see
section 25E(1) of the Standard Module). Eligibility for a person where
the nominating entity is a corporation, such as Resort, is defined in section
10(1)(b)(ii) of the Standard Module as, apart from a member of the body
corporate, a director, secretary or other nominee of the corporation.
That is, Resort is a lot owner and like any lot owner can only nominate
one person for one position, or one position and alternative
positions. The
fact that it owns 4 lots does not allow it to nominate more than 1
person.
The reason for limiting the nominating power of multiple lot
owners is explained in the explanatory notes at page 83 -
Clause 131--This clause provides in section 13(2) that a lot owner may, in response to a notice inviting nominations for election of the committee, nominate only one individual. If the nominating owner is an individual, the individual nominated could be the owner themselves, another lot owner, or a member of the owner’s family or a person acting under a power of attorney given by the owner. If the owner is a corporation, the owner may nominate one individual who is a director, secretary or other nominee of the corporation. If the lot owner is a body corporate for a subsidiary scheme in a layered arrangement of community titles schemes, the owner may nominate a representative of the subsidiary scheme. This amendment, and the amendment in clause 128, limits the possibility of a committee being stacked by owners nominating multiple other people for election to the committee. The amendment does not restrict an owner from nominating the individual for more than one committee position.
The provisions relating to nominations by
multiple lot owners is analogous to the provisions relating to a quorum in that
a multiple
lot owner is still only counted as 1 person for the purposes of
determining whether a quorum exists or not.
In viewing the removal and
replacement appointment motions, the appointment resolution is lawful and
effective for the first appointment,
that of Paul Brinsmead as chairperson, but
the following five appointments are unlawful. In my order I have severed the
appointment
of Brinsmead from an otherwise unlawful nomination of persons and
his appointment in lieu of Margaret Smith stands.
While the removal
resolution for all three members could stand, it seems to me that the just
and equitable solution in the circumstances (see section 276 of the
Act) is for the balance of the removal motion to be dispensed with in that it
was based on the false belief that Resort could
make appointments
to the other
two positions as well (and more), and for the former holders of the positions of
secretary & treasurer
(Jennifer
Greenslade) and ordinary member (Alan Dale)
retain their positions.
The resulting committee will in fact reflect
the highly probable composition of the committee in the future when all three
owners
(or their individual nominees) will comprise a committee of
three.
Accordingly, I have included in my order a declaration that the
committee comprises in total Brinsmead as chairperson, Greenslade
as secretary
& treasurer, and Dale as ordinary member.
2. A motion by
Resort for refurbishment of the common property as per attached quote for
$687,000 excluding GST was withdrawn by Brinsmead
for Resort.
While this
motion was withdrawn by the proposer, Resort and is not directly part of an
order sought, it has importance in providing
background and reasons for the
events relevant to the remainder of the orders sought.
Resort put the
same motion, though differently worded, to the annual general meeting on 29
January 2004 and the meeting on 15 July
2004, namely –
"That the body corporate resolves to carry out improvements to the common property in accordance with the plans and schedule of costs annexed."
And later as –
"The Body Corporate common property be refurbished as per the attached quote."
The attached tender in the first instance was for $616,000 and
the sketch plans show that the whole of the building was to be remodelled.
It
was ruled out of order by the chairperson. In the second instance only one of
the two tenders provided by Resort to SSKB were
submitted – Resort
withdrew the motion. However, the tender submitted and served on owners with
the notice of meeting is from
Eastview (Australia) Pty Ltd for $687,000
(excluding GST).
The immense cost of the proposed renovations, probably
near $.75m with GST included, for a six lot building, and the sketch plans,
reveal that Resort is desirous of the building and environs being completely
renovated to approximate the appearance of a contemporary
building.
The
original motion was wrongly put as requiring only an ordinary resolution,
however this error was corrected at the more recent
meeting. Section 113
of the Standard Module provides that improvements by the body corporate to
common property that form a single project (as in this
case) require
authorisation by special resolution, unless the cost is below the
"improvement limit" for the scheme (6 lots x $300 = $1,800). Section
106 of the Act provides that a special resolution is obtained when at least
2/3rds of the votes cast are in favour of the motion and the
votes counted
against the motion are not more than 25% of the number of lots in the scheme.
That is, with the applicants holding
2 of the 6 votes
they constitute more than
25% of the 6 lots and therefore a special resolution will not pass provided they
both
vote and both remain
eligible to vote (eg are financial).
Presumably
Resort is aware that the major renovations can only be achieved with the
cooperation of at least one of the two other owners,
and from the comments in
this application that may be a difficult task.
The applicants have stated
that a representative of SSKB offered to negotiate the sale of their lots to
Resort, and that is of course
an alternative means for Resort achieving its
goal. Whether the representative actually said this or not (if so it would put
SSKB
in a position of conflict which it would have to resolve), is not known and
I have no need to know in determining the orders sought.
However what I will
say is that the situation may well be one where this office needs to take care
in both ensuring the rights of
the minority applicant owners are protected but
at the same time not be used as a means for their being placed in a position of
commercial
advantage in the possible sale of their lots. In other words this is
not the first time a dispute has been brought for adjudication
where a developer
or other party has acquired a majority of lots and/or the voting power, and
wishes to buy out the remaining owners
to achieve some purpose whether
re-development, a total refurbishment, student accommodation etc.
3. Motions for the stairwell repair and concrete rectification
were lost on Resort’s opposition.
These motions were proposed by
the applicants on the basis of an inspection and report by Solutions IE Pty Ltd
("the report") as a
sinking fund analysis incorporating estimated costs for
repairs and replacements for the next 9 years.
The applicants have
submitted that when Motion 2 (stairwell repairs) was tabled, Brinsmead said that
he would vote against the motion
"as this work should be co-ordinated with a
major renovation". Presumably, if this was actually said, the reference was
to the renovations discussed in "2" above; also Resort’s vote against
Motion 3 might well have been for the same reason.
In regard to Motion
3 (concrete corrosion), at page 12 of the report (along with two photographs of
damaged areas), it states that
"concrete spalling was evident in several
locations... we recommend a report from a structural engineer...to best advise
on any remedial
action required" and later (with the report’s
emphasis) "Several steps were showing signs of significant deterioration on
the first flight up from the first floor, these should be repaired/replaced
as soon as possible"
Section 109 of the Standard Module
imposes a duty on the body corporate to maintain the common property in good
condition and in a structurally
sound condition. Accordingly, if the stairs are
not in good condition or structurally sound, then the body corporate has an
obligation
to repair them as soon as possible.
However, the advice by
Solutions IE Pty Ltd for the engagement of a structural engineer was not
followed and I am loath to order the
body corporate carry out repairs before
that advice is acted upon. Accordingly my order is for the body corporate to
engage a structural
engineer to carry out the inspection suggested, and report
to the body corporate on its findings. The body corporate should act
if it is
clear from the report that it has a duty to do so.
Motion 2 is an unusual
mixture of proposed owner and body corporate obligations, and explanatory notes
placed within the wording of
the motion itself. There is clearly a problem with
water penetration into the stairwell walls that needs to be remedied. The
suggestion
by the body corporate at paragraph 69 in its submission to the
application (through Sean Whittle of Hickey Lawyers) that these repairs
should
form part of the major renovations to the building, is not a viable alternative
as it seems unlikely from the comments of
the applicants that they will agree to
a special resolution to authorise Resort’s proposal.
It seems to me
that this problem might also be investigated by the structural engineer engaged
in respect to Motion 3. I understand
that the applicants and Dale, as the
former committee, have had tradesperson inspections carried out, however an
engineer’s
determination of the source and recommended remedial action,
will provide a fresh and independent view of the problem and I have
so
ordered.
4. A Resort motion for the chairperson to be
remunerated $1,200 annually was passed.
The appointed chairperson, Paul
Brinsmead, is a principal of Resort and it was Resort that proposed the motion
for the chairperson
to be remunerated and it was Resort’s sole voting
power that passed the motion. Doubtless Resort would have considered its
voting
power would see Brinsmead appointed and the recipient of the
remuneration.
It is my experience as a referee for Building Units and
Group Titles and as an adjudicator for community title schemes for over 10
years, that it is rare for a chairperson or other committee member to be
remunerated. It is not a commercial position but one, like
the instant one, of
serving on a body overseeing the rights of owners regarding their homes.
Membership is almost invariably voluntary
even in larger schemes but especially
in smaller ones of only 6 residential lots such as this.
Apart from this,
the amount of up to $1,200 annually is far beyond what would be reasonable for
the small amount of work the position
involves. The amount is even more
unreasonable when it is considered that the body corporate has engaged a
professional Body Corporate
Manager to do what secretarial and treasury duties
there are, and to advise on the legislation. Also, the duties of a chairperson
under the legislation are solely concerned with only the conduct of both
committee and general meetings; no "presidential" or unilateral
powers attach to
the position.
Apart from these points, the major consideration for
striking down this resolution is that Resort as the majority voter has, by
advantage
of that voting power, given one of its director/principals a financial
benefit. Put another way, Resort has exercised its voting
power for the benefit
of a principal rather than in the interests of the body corporate. I shall
explain this further.
The legislation does not expressly confer
equitable jurisdiction on an adjudicator, however section 276 of the Act
does impose on an adjudicator the overarching duty to make an order that is
"just and equitable in the circumstances" to resolve a dispute. An
adjudicator has jurisdiction to declare a resolution void if it is unreasonable,
or to give effect to a
motion if opposition to the motion is unreasonable (see
section 276 and Items 8 and 10 of Schedule 5 "Adjudicator’s
Orders" to the Act), and "unreasonableness" can arise from the application
of equitable principles.
In the present matter, it is my view that the
remuneration resolution attracts the application of the equitable doctrine of a
fraud on a power, or more particularly, a fraud on a minority.
This was recently addressed in an order (Order 521-2004) by an adjudicator
colleague dealing with the situation of a majority corporate
owner voting itself
a service contract with the body corporate for a sum that was unreasonable. A
relevant extract from the statement
of reasons for the order reads
–
It is a well accepted principle of equity that a majority shareholder in a company cannot alter the rules by which the company is governed in a way that is oppressive to a minority shareholder or group of shareholders.[1] More generally, courts in equity have established the doctrine of ‘fraud on a power’ stating "a person having a power, must exercise it bone fide for the end designed, otherwise it is corrupt and void"[2] and establishing that the doctrine of fraud on a power "authorises intervention where the power is exercised in bad faith or for purposes foreign to the power"[3]. The New South Wales Court of Appeal has recognised this doctrine of fraud on a power as being of general application and, specifically, as applicable to bodies corporate under the Strata Titles Act of New South Wales.[4]
And
later-
The respondents are correct in submitting that members of a company may generally vote in their own interests.[5] However, the courts of equity have consistently invalidated the exercise of voting power by a majority of members in a company where the vote is a means of securing some personal gain rather than for purposes of the proper management of the company.[6]
I
have already set out my reasons why I consider the remuneration decision was an
exercise of Resort’s majority voting power
in the interests of its
principal rather than for the benefit of the body corporate. I would also point
out that the term "fraud" here does not have its common connotation of
criminality, as the relevant conduct does not need to be dishonest or immoral
to constitute a fraud on a power. In that regard, the sum of $1,200 is not
a princely sum but in the context of a payment to a chairperson at
"Fletcher" it is an unreasonable amount.
For the above reasons I
have declared by order the resolution passed in respect of Motion 8 to
remunerate the chairperson, void.
5. A Resort motion for an
Administrative Fund budget contribution of $3,000 per lot entitlement/owner was
passed.
Under the wide powers granted by section 276 of the Act,
an adjudicator has power to reduce or increase budget contributions where those
decided are unreasonable (see Item 11 of Schedule 5 to the
Act).
The body corporate committee compiled an Administrative Fund budget
and proposed it to the January annual general meeting where it
was rejected by
the majority vote of Resort. The budget was for a gross amount of $4,000 with a
$667 contribution for each lot entitlement/owner
(equal lot entitlements).
Resort proposed an alternative budget of $18,000 gross or $3,000 per owner.
This motion was ruled out
of order as no supporting budget was presented.
At the (July) meeting, the committee proposed a revised Administrative
Fund budget for a gross amount of $2,978 and a contribution
of $500; its budget
was again rejected by Resort. Resort resubmitted its Administrative Fund budget
for the same amount but with
an itemised supporting budget.
By including
the Body Corporate Management fee of $2,000 omitted by the committee, the
budgets stand at $5,000 for the committee and
$18,000 for Resort, a significant
difference of $13,000 in the year’s costs.
It is not an
adjudicator’s role to question budget decisions and choices by bodies
corporate, except where there are conflicts
with the legislation or exceptional
circumstances.
The applicants have always carried out some of the lawn
and garden maintenance themselves, but have paid $20 for mowing/weeding every
2-3 weeks as necessary (approximately $500 annually). Resort can require, by
its majority vote, that the maintenance be carried
out professionally and to
professional standards. It cannot go beyond that to improvements without
requiring the authorisation I
have referred to earlier in these reasons.
However, even where no improvements are involved, it will depend on the amount
as to
whether a service may be merely included in the budget or must meet other
legislative requirements. For instance, the item "Contract Cleaning &
Gardening" for $4,420 cannot be merely included in a budget without meeting
the Major Spending requirements of section 104 of the Standard
Module (cost exceeds threshold of 6 lots x $250 = $1,500).
That is, at
least two tenders for the contract must be provided to owners by way of an
alternative motion for owners to decide. A
reading of sections 103(3) and
104 shows that owners cannot relinquish this choice to the committee let
alone authorise it as a line item in a budget.
The applicants have
submitted that the common property lawn is less than 5 metres by 15 metres in
area and the estimated cost of $4,420
for cleaning and gardening is grossly
excessive. It is a difficult task for me to decide a reasonable cost, though
here because
of the error I have only to strike out the item as being in
contravention of the legislation and leave it for the body corporate
to meet and
determine the matter in the proper manner, and for a cost that is reasonable in
terms of market cost. The tenders obtained
by the committee should be
independent and at market value.
I do not intend to examine each of the
budget items except to say that while the $1,750 cost for "R & M Garden
& Grounds" is an improvement (which the accompanying notation
"rejuvenation" identifies as such) within the limit for an ordinary
resolution (and I accept that its description and separation here is sufficient
in meeting legislation requirements) the service provider must still be chosen
it according to the Major Spending requirements. The committee should
review the budget items and their reasonableness of cost with the above
information in mind.
Accordingly, my order is to reduce the budget from
$18,000 to $13,580 by the removal of the $4,420 item. It may be that there are
other budget items that are excessive as the applicant’s contend however
without any evidence in support of the contention
no excess is obvious and, as I
have stated, I am loath to intervene in budget choices. The committee should
review them, and owners
may of course monitor the selection of service
providers, the services performed and the costs expended or proposed to be
expended
in comparison to market costs.
In
summary, the meetings have not followed the legislation in quite a number of
areas and, for the reasons given, I have made orders to remedy
those
contraventions and omissions. Resort should also be aware that while it has a
majority vote, both the legislation and the
common law provide protection to the
applicant minority owners.
[1] Gambotto v WCP Ltd [1995] HCA 12; (1995) 182
CLR 432.
[2] Aleyn v Belchier
(1758) 28 ER 634.
[3] LGSS Pty Ltd
v Egan, [2002] NSWSC 1171.
[4]
Houghton & Anor v Immer (No. 155) Pty Ltd (1997) 44 NSWLR 46, referring to
Free Church of Scotland v Overtoun [1904] AC 515 at
695.
[5] East Pont Du United Lead
Mining Co v Merryweather (1864) 2 H&M
254.
[6] Peters American Delicacy
Co Ltd v Heath [1939] HCA 2; (1939) 61 CLR 457
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