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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 2 August 2005
REFERENCE: 0150-2005
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT
1997
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Number of Scheme:
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20973
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Name of Scheme:
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Sailfish Point
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Address of Scheme:
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300 Cottesloe Drive MERMAID WATERS QLD 4218
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Russell Ellis, the owner of Lot 32
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I hereby order that the application for an order by Russell Ellis,
the owner of Lot 32 seeking the following outcome under the Body Corporate
and Community Management Act 1997 (Act), quote:
is dismissed. I further order that within three months of the date of this order, Russell Ellis, the owner of Lot 32 must remove from the common property for the scheme that part of the wooden deck adjacent to the northern boundary of Lot 32 that is constructed on the common property. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0150-2005
"Sailfish Point" CTS 20973
APPLICATION
This application is by Russell Ellis, the owner of
Lot 32 (applicant) against the body corporate (respondent) seeking
the following outcome under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act
1997 (Act), quote:
That The Body Corporate Commissioner order that the Sailfish Point Body Corporate has not acted legally in instructing Hynes Lawyers to prepare a recommendation to all owners in respect to Motion 17 on the Annual General Meeting Agenda and accordingly that appropriate action be taken by The Body Corporate Commissioner.
A Final order that this application be supported on such further or other grounds, namely that the voting on Motion 17, at the Annual General Meeting on 25 February, 2005, was prejudiced by the letter dated 07/02/2005 from Hynes Lawyers to all owners, and further supported by the history of the complex and by the fact that the structure on lot 32 has been in existence for more than five years, that it was built with the knowledge and tacit consent of the body corporate and accordingly that the Body Corporate Commissioner order The Sailfish Point Body Corporate to approve "the improvement on common property" on the basis of the facts presented in this application and that it would be inequitable not to do so.
JURISDICTION
"Sailfish Point" Community
Titles Scheme 20973 is a scheme under the Body Corporate and Community
Management Act 1997 (Act) and the Body Corporate and Community
Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 1997 (Accommodation
Module).
Section 276(1) of the Act provides that an
adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances
(including a declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a
community titles scheme, about:
(a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or
(b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or the community management statement; or
(c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about: (i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or (ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section
276(2)). An adjudicator's order may contain ancillary and consequential
provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate (section
284(1)).
SUBMISSIONS
In accordance with the Act,
submissions were called and a copy of the application was provided to the body
corporate manager for distribution
to the owner of each lot (excluding the
applicant) and the committee. A submission was received from the committee and
a number
of lot owners. The applicant made a written reply to submissions under
section 244 of the Act.
DETERMINATION
The
applicant had also sought an interim order to prevent the body corporate from
taking action to remove the improvement on common
property and Lot 32. On 24
March 2005, I made the following Interim Order, quote:
I hereby order that pending a final determination of this
application, the Body Corporate for Sailfish Point Community Titles Scheme 20973
(including
through its Committee) shall not proceed with, implement or otherwise
act upon any resolution or take any steps to require the dismantling
of, or
removal of the timber decking constructed on Lot 32 and on the common property
adjoining the northern boundary of Lot 32.
Although it is evident
that the committee has resolved to proceed against the owners of other lots in
the scheme who have made additions
or improvements, there is no suggestion that
the body corporate has to date initiated similar action against the applicant.
The
current action by the committee is based on a view that these lot owners
have contravened a provision of the body corporate by-laws.
While there
are a number of lots affected by improvements or additions which do not appear
to have been approved by the body corporate,
this order only relates to the
wooden deck constructed by the applicant which extends onto the common property
adjacent to the northern
boundary of Lot 32.
The deck was constructed in
January 2000 and based on the report from Marendy and Associates, Consulting
Surveyors dated April 2003,
extends onto the common property by 1.05 metres.
The records held for this scheme by the Department of Natural Resources and
Mines
indicate that at the time of construction, the body corporate only had a
general "Appearance of lot" by-law. This by-law did not
apply to the
construction of the deck. Therefore, if the deck had been erected wholly within
Lot 32, it would not have been in contravention
of a body corporate by-law.
However, the construction of a part of the deck on the common property is an
improvement to common property,
and as the deck is for the benefit of the lot
owner, the owner could only make that improvement in accordance with the
applicable
legislative provision. At the time of construction, section
114 of the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module)
Regulation 1997 was applicable. This provision is similar to section
113 of the Accommodation Module which currently applies to this scheme and
which states, quote:
113 Improvements to common property by lot owner--Act, s 159
[SM, s 114]
(1) The body corporate may, if asked by the owner of a lot, authorise the owner to make an improvement to the common property for the benefit of the owner’s lot.
(2) The improvement must be authorised by special resolution of the body corporate unless--
(a) the improvement is a minor improvement; and
(b) the improvement does not detract from the appearance of any lot included in, or common property for, the scheme; and
(c) the body corporate is satisfied that use and enjoyment of the authorised improvement is not likely to promote a breach of the owner’s duties as an occupier.
(3) An authorisation may be given under this section on conditions the body corporate considers appropriate.
(4) The owner of a lot who is given an authority under this section41--
(a) must comply with conditions of the authority; and
(b) must maintain the improvement made under the authority in good
condition, unless excused by the body corporate.
The applicant had
not sought body corporate approval in accordance with section 114 of the
Standard Module before the deck was constructed. The applicant submitted that
he had relied on the advice of the then resident
manager and some committee
members, and that he was not aware of the requirement for body corporate
approval until on or about August
2001. It was at this time that the committee,
or some of its members seemed to have been investigating the issues relating to
the
improvements or additions made to lots and common property.
The
applicant has stated that in June 2000, the committee started to investigate the
problems relating to lot boundaries and the various
additions or improvements
made by lot owners. He submits that legal advice was sought and that during
2001 some committee members
did attempt to address the problems relating to
these additions or improvements. The applicant and the body corporate have
detailed
other actions which have been taken since 2002. In 2002, the body
corporate contracted a boundary survey and engaged Coastwide Home
Inspection
Services Pty Ltd (Coastwide) to inspect the scheme to establish
encroachments onto the common property and the non-original structures. Legal
advice was sought
in January 2003. In February 2003, a letter from the body
corporate manager addressed to all committee members related to an instruction
to take action about the unauthorised improvements to the common property. A
letter was also distributed to all lot owners at this
time which included legal
advice, letters from insurers and the Coastwide report. In April 2003, a survey
was conducted of the waterfront
properties and all affected owners were provided
with a copy of the report as applied to their property. The body corporate
submitted
that discussions also took place with the Gold Coast City Council
during 2003, and that in September 2003, the body corporate manager
was
instructed to proceed with action against the lot owners with encroachments and
unauthorised structures. The body corporate
also submits that it was
subsequently discovered that the manager did not proceed as instructed and after
some time, the body corporate
instructed Hynes Lawyers (Hynes) in this
matter and that contravention notices were then issued to lot owners.
The
body corporate has submitted that the committee was not prepared to decide on
the structures until such time as it was in possession
with proper information
as to the boundaries of lots and the position of improvements or additions with
respect to the boundaries.
The information relative to Lot 32 was available in
the form of survey information in April 2003. The body corporate then gave
the
applicant a "Notice of Continuing Contravention of a Body Corporate By-Law" in
July 2003 citing a breach of By-Law 9(b) relating
to erecting a structure on
common property. The applicant sought body corporate approval at the Annual
General Meeting dated 25
March 2004. The relevant motion was incorrectly ruled
out of order by the person chairing the meeting, and the applicant
unsuccessfully
sought approval at the Annual General Meeting dated 25 February
2005.
"Sailfish Point" was established by the registration of Group
Titles Plan 1763. This Plan was subsequently re-subdivided to create
additional
lots. Lot 32 was created by the registration of the Group Titles Plan of
Resubdivision 1797. With the commencement of
the Act in July 1997, a group
titles plan is taken to be a standard format plan. The boundaries of lots in a
standard format plan
of subdivision is specified in the Land Title Act
1994 to effectively mean that the land is defined by references to marks on
the ground such as survey pegs (section 48B). Generally, a lot owner
owns the land on which the building or unit is located and the owner’s lot
is defined by survey markings
in a similar fashion to commonly accepted private
land ownership.
However, the way an owner in a community titles scheme
deals with his or her lot and the adjacent common property is regulated by
the
Act.
Section 169 of the Act provides that the body corporate may
make by-laws regulating the use and enjoyment of lots and the common property.
The
body corporate’s initial by-laws were recorded by the Registrar of
Titles on 5 February 1988. It was not until the Registrar
recorded additional
by-law changes on 29 July 1991 that the body corporate had a specific by-law
relating to the appearance of buildings
on the lots in the scheme. The existing
by-law titled "Alteration to Lots" appears to have been part of the new
community management
statement recorded in 2000. This by-law relates to the
style and colour of buildings on lots and to making an alteration or addition
to
the external part of a lot in the scheme. Generally, the by-law requires that
such alterations can only be made with the written
consent of the committee. In
addition, By-Law 9 relates to "Damage to Common Property" and signals that a
structure can only be
erected on the common property with body corporate
approval in accordance with the Act.
The Act and the Accommodation Module
provide a number of provisions regulating the use of a lot and improvements to
common property
by a lot owner for the benefit of an owner’s lot. I have
referred to section 113 of the Accommodation Module relating to
improvements to common property by a lot owner.
Section 167 of the
Act can also be applicable and provides the basic rule governing an
occupier’s use of their lot and the common property
and provides,
quote:
Nuisances
The occupier of a lot included in a community titles scheme must not use, or permit the use of, the lot or the common property in a way that--
(a) causes a nuisance or hazard; or
(b) interferes unreasonably with the use or enjoyment of another lot included in the scheme; or
(c) interferes unreasonably with the use or enjoyment of the common property by a person who is lawfully on the common property.
The
first claim by the applicant is that the body corporate did not act legally in
instructing Hynes to prepare a recommendation to
all owners with respect to
Motion 17 on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting dated 25 February
2005.
The applicant contends that the actions of the committee were
prejudicial to the outcome of the motion, denying him from presenting
his
position in the best light as suggested by the Adjudicator in the Order on ref.
No. 0256-2004. The applicant states that rather
than provide explanatory
material to owners with the notice of the AGM, the committee instructed Hynes to
distribute a letter to
all owners. The applicant claims that the instruction to
Hynes was not properly authorised and that the contents of the letter influenced
the outcome of the motion. He adds that he could not rebut the recommendation
in the letter as he was denied access to the body
corporate roll by the body
corporate manager due to privacy laws.
The committee has relied on a
decision made at its meeting dated 8 November 2004 to provide an explanatory
note as authority to instruct
Hynes. The committee submit that the letter from
Hynes outlined the committee’s concerns, did not misstate the facts and
did
not prejudice the vote.
The applicant responded to this submission to
the effect that the body corporate has not shown that the committee authorised
Hynes
to write to owners, and that the explanatory note should have been on the
meeting agenda. He did respond to the Hynes letter by
letter dated 10 February
2005 but only had limited access to owners.
Section 40C of the
Accommodation Module makes provision for explanatory material accompanying the
voting paper for a general meeting. Neither
this section, nor any other
provision of the Act or the Accommodation Module restricts giving explanatory
material to owners by a
method other than in the notice of the general meeting.
While the applicant may consider that the decision made on Ref. No. 0256-2004
required all explanatory material regarding the motion to be included with the
notice of the Annual General Meeting, I do not consider
that this is the effect
of this decision. In my view, the Adjudicator required the motion and the
accompanying explanation from
the motion’s submitter (the applicant) to be
included on the agenda to protect the right of that person to have the matter
put before lot owners.
It is correct that the committee have not
explained the authority to engage Hynes. I consider that the decision at the
meeting dated
8 November 2004 is not authority and that the committee should
have specifically resolved to engage Hynes for this purpose. However,
in my
view any order in relation to this point is inconsequential to the resolution of
this dispute.
The Hynes letter contained a number of statements which the
applicant considers confused and scared owners, and prejudiced the outcome
of
the motion. However, the applicant has not provided any basis for this claim,
other commenting on the veracity of the statements
in the letter. While the
applicant has personal views on these statements, he has not shown that other
lot owners were sufficiently
influenced to change how they voted on Motion 17.
Certainly, there has not been any submission from lot owners to this effect even
though all lot owners were given an opportunity to respond to the application.
The application contains sufficient detail about
the dispute for owners to form
a view regarding the merits of the Hynes letter and the merits of the
applicant’s arguments.
In addition, it is clear that the issue of
encroachments onto the common property have been the subject of body corporate
consideration
and correspondence for a number of years, so the issues relating
to this dispute should have been well known to many lot owners.
In the absence
of corroboration from a significant number of owners who voted on Motion 17, I
cannot accept the applicant’s
argument.
Section 113 of the
Accommodation Module requires that the improvement must be consented to by the
body corporate by special resolution, and a
sizeable number of lot owners have
opposed the motion. I consider that in the absence of any extenuating factors,
the decision of
the body corporate at the AGM must be accepted.
The
applicant has also sought deemed body corporate consent on the basis "that
the structure on lot 32 has been in existence for more than five years, that it
was built with the knowledge and tacit consent
of the body corporate". In
my view, the basis of this argument is that the body corporate has unreasonably
refused to consent to the improvement to the
common property. There are
questions of equity that arise in resolving some disputes and one of those
equitable principles arises
here, namely that of acquiescence. The principle of
acquiescence is essentially to deny a person the right to later object to
something
that has in fact been in place for some time without any action or
complaint having been taken by them, giving rise to an inference
of assent. The
question is whether the body corporate has acquiesced to the disputed
structure.
The deck was constructed in January 2000. In June 2000, the
committee started to investigate issues relating to improvements on or
adjacent
to lots in the scheme. Around this time, the body corporate also developed and
established by-laws relating to alterations
to lots and to common property.
Subsequently, the body corporate took steps through the engagement of qualified
persons to determine
issues such as the boundaries of lots, the condition of the
improvements and the legal options open to the body corporate. The body
corporate has submitted that it could not decide how to deal with the
encroachments until it had received survey information about
the location of the
additions or improvements, i.e. whether an improvement was wholly on a lot or
partly on the common property.
The body corporate received this information in
April 2003.
In my view, the essential element for acquiescence in
relation to the disputed structure is the time taken from when the body
corporate
should reasonably have known that the structure was in breach of a
by-law or the legislation. The deck is substantially built on
land owned by the
applicant and given the final determination as to its exact location; it does
not extend onto common property to
a significant extent. Therefore, without a
proper determination, the body corporate could not reasonably claim that the
deck was
on common property. While there may have been earlier reports and
earlier requests for approval from the applicant, I consider that
the body
corporate had this knowledge when it received the survey information in April
2003. At this time, the committee could make
a reasonable decision about the
application of the by-law or the Act to the deck. It was at this time that it
was clear that the
deck was on common property and that body corporate approval
was required under section 113 of the Accommodation Module. As the body
corporate initiated processes in July 2003 and September 2003 seeking action
against owners
with encroachments and unauthorised structures, I do not consider
that it acquiesced to the deck from the time that it had notice
that the deck
was on common property.
There have been delays in determining the matters
associated with the disputed structure. However, the delays are understandable
and reasonable given that there are many unapproved additions on lots and on the
common property and the body corporate started the
process without knowledge of
the boundaries between some lots and the common property. In addition, the
applicant did not seek to
compel a body corporate decision until the Annual
General Meeting held in 2004, and it is unfortunate that the matter was not
determined
at this time. However, I believe that the applicant was not entitled
to simply do nothing before the body corporate sought removal
of the structure.
He constructed the deck and it would seem that he was uncertain as to whether
the structure was on common property.
He had an obligation to ensure that the
deck was built on his property and in accordance with not only the body
corporate legislation,
but in compliance with other regulations such as those of
the local authority. He did not have a right to extend the deck onto the
common
property which is owned by all lot owners as tenants in common (section
35, Act) without their approval. He did not seek this approval until the
2004 AGM. While the body corporate may not have had an applicable
by-law at the
time of construction, the applicant nevertheless had a duty to comply with the
relevant legislative requirement which
at that time was section 114 of
the Standard Module. In the circumstances, I do not consider that the time
delay in the body corporate taking action is unreasonable.
In my opinion,
the actions of the body corporate clearly indicate that it has reasonably sought
to manage this issue in accordance
with its legislative obligation and that it
has not acquiesced to the disputed structure. Further, there is no evidence
that the
body corporate has discriminated against any particular lot owner. I
consider that the body corporate has consistently and reasonably
sought the
removal of the disputed structure from the common property. For the reason that
this matter has been ongoing for some
time, and that if the applicant refuses to
remove that part of the structure on the common property as a consequence of the
decision
made at the Annual General Meeting, it could result in a further
application to this office from the body corporate, I have also
ordered that the
applicant must remove that part of the structure situated on the common
property. I have not ordered that the applicant
must reinstate the common
property to its previous condition as there has been five years since the
construction, and it is a matter
for the body corporate to determine how this
part of the common property is to be maintained in accordance with its
legislative obligation.
While I have not made a determination on the
issue relating to exclusive use, it should be noted that the making of an
improvement
to common property for the benefit of an owner’s lot such as
the construction of a deck could give rise to exclusive use.
The general
approach to this issue was considered by Adjudicator CG Young in the matter of
the Mandalay Port Douglas community titles
scheme, Ref.No. 0824-2003 dated 28
July 2004 where he stated, quote:
Each owner’s right to use the common property is governed by the legislation (the Act and the relevant regulations, here the Accommodation Module regulations) and the body corporate by-laws. The basic rule governing an owner’s use of common property is contained in section 167 which prohibits an owner from using, or permitting another from using, their lot or the common property in such a way that it interferes unreasonably with another’s use or enjoyment of their lot or the common property.
On the authority of a special resolution under section 113 of the Accommodation Module an owner can effect an improvement on common property for the benefit of the owner’s lot, however there are limits to the use of common property under such authority. Where for example an owner wishes to install an air-conditioner by positioning it in a window where it overhangs common property, this is a valid use of the "improvement" provision as the encroachment onto common property is incidental, not of significant size, and is unlikely to interfere with another’s use of the common property.
Alternatively, where for example an owner wishes to use part of the common property by extending their lot building by constructing a carport or an additional room over common property, then this action is beyond a mere improvement and is in effect an alienation of the relevant area of common property for personal use, not being incidental, not insignificant and may or may not interfere with another’s use of the common property.
This difference was addressed in the matter of Platt v Ciriello (1997) QCA 33 (14 March 1997), where the Court of Appeal found that the primary test for determining an owner’s use of common property is that of "unreasonable interference" (see earlier reference to section 167 of the Act). That is, an owner may exercise his general proprietary right to use common property so long as it does not interfere unreasonably with another’s use of their lot or the common property. This interference may not just be physical, it may, for example, include a consideration of the effect the use has on the appearance and aesthetics of the scheme generally. However, even where the use may not be causing an unreasonable interference, an "exclusive use" test may apply in the circumstances to require the owner to only hold that use under an exclusive use by-law. That use was characterised by Ambrose J as being "the sort of exclusive use which a proprietor makes of his lot". Pincus JA gave as an example of a unilateral claim by an owner amounting to exclusive use, which therefore required an exclusive use by-law, an annexe from the owner’s lot being built out onto common property.
While this is only a brief overview of the case, it is sufficient to show
that the construction of the deck, even if it does not interfere
unreasonably
with another’s use of the relevant area of common property (though I do
not say this) or does not adversely effect
the appearance or aesthetics of the
scheme, is such a use of common property that requires the authority of an
exclusive use by-law.
That is, the use of the area of common property by the
respondent owners of Lot 10 by building a deck adjoining the lot verandah,
is a
use that comes within the sort of use that a proprietor makes of his lot and
therefore requires an exclusive use by-law. Like
an annexe to an owner’s
lot building, a deck similarly gives the owner exclusive use of a permanent or
semi permanent nature,
to the owner.
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