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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 30 September 2005
REFERENCE: 0777-2003
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
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Number of Scheme:
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12171
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Name of Scheme:
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Centre Court
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Address of Scheme:
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32 - 34 Musgrave Street KIRRA QLD 4225
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Donald James BEARD and Yvonne Annette BEARD, as the co-owners of Lot 25,
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I hereby order that –
(a) the annual general meeting held on 28 November 2003 is void and the body corporate must convene a further general meeting of the body corporate as soon as possible to be deemed to be the annual general meeting; and (b) the body corporate committee comprises those persons who were members of the previous committee, provided they are currently eligible to be an executive or ordinary member of the committee as the case may be. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0777-2003
"Centre Court" CTS 12171
The applicants, Donald and Yvonne Beard of Lot 25, have sought the
following order of an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community
Management Act 1997 ("the Act") -
"To invalidate the Annual General Meeting of Centre Court on 28/11/03. New A.G.M. to be held."
The applicant has also made
application for the following interim order of an adjudicator –
"To invalidate Annual General Meeting 2003 "Centre Court".
JURISDICTION:
This is a dispute
between an owner (the applicants Beard) and the body corporate (the respondent),
concerning the validity of an annual
general meeting. This is a matter falling
within the disputes resolution provisions of the legislation (see sections
227(1)(b), 228(1) and 276 of the Act).
While section 279(1)
of the Act provides that an adjudicator may make an interim order if satisfied
on reasonable grounds that an interim order is warranted
because
of the nature
or urgency of the circumstances, there is nothing in the legislation to prevent
an adjudicator, in appropriate
circumstances,
from making a final determination
of the dispute by proceeding directly to a final order.
I consider this
course is appropriate in this instance because: the facts of the matter are
relatively simple and clear; the relevant
parties (see later under heading
"Application and Submissions" following) have been given the
opportunity to respond to the disputed matter; sufficient information is
available to determine the
matter; and, in particular, a prompt resolution of
the dispute is in the interests of all owners.
Accordingly, this
order will be the only order made in respect of the application. The parties,
of course, retain their appeal rights
against the order made, and my having
dispensed with the making of an interim order does not diminish those rights.
General powers of an Adjudicator in making an order:
Section
276(1) provides that an adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable
in the circumstances (including a declaratory order) to
resolve a dispute, in
the context of a community titles scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about – (i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or (ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section 276(2) of
the Act).
An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or consequential
provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate
(section 284(1) of
the Act).
APPLICATION AND SUBMISSIONS:
In accordance with
section 243 of the Act, a copy of the application was provided to the respondent
body corporate (committee), the Body Corporate Manager purported
to have
been
engaged by resolution of the meeting, Strata Title Management (Tweed Heads) Pty
Ltd (hereafter "STM"), and to all other
lot
owners, with an invitation to each
to respond in writing to the matter of dispute raised in the
application.
Submissions were lodged by the following: Garcia of Lot 7; W
Forsyth of Lot 12; L Gollop-Finn & J Ryniker of Lot 13; B & D
Easton of
Lot 19; Jack of Lot 23; G & G Wigg of Lot 26; and R & K Rutter of Lot
29. Four of the submissions were in favour
of the application and three opposed
it.
No submissions were lodged by either the respondent body
corporate (committee) or STM.
By failing to respond to the application
the committee loses the opportunity to rebut the allegations made by the
applicants concerning
the conduct of the meeting. Also, because of the
prominent part it played in the convening and conduct of the meeting, it was in
the interests of STM to make a response both as to its conduct and, as the
purported Body Corporate Manager, in respect of whatever
advice it may have
given to the body corporate.
The relevant facts of the dispute
concern the convening and conduct of the meeting and are better disclosed in
conjunction with the
determination of the particular point the facts relate
to.
DETERMINATION:
"Centre Court" was registered as a
building units plan (now termed a building format plan) in 1978
and comprises 30 lots. It is regulated by the Body Corporate and Community
Management (Standard Module) Regulation 1997 ("the Standard
Module").
The breaches of the legislation alleged by the applicants are
as follows. As the meeting was held on 28 November before major amendments
to
the Standard Module took effect on 1 December 2003, I shall refer to the law as
it stood at the time but in the present tense.
Firstly, the
principal of the body corporate management company STM, Raymond Jones, assumed
the chair for the annual general meeting without
seeking the approval of the
voters present.
Section 46 of the Standard Module provides that
where the elected chairperson is absent from a meeting then those persons
present and having
the right to vote must elect a consenting chairperson.
Subsection (3) specifically provides that a Body Corporate Manager with
the delegated powers of chairperson must not chair a meeting
unless elected by those present (except in particular circumstances at an
adjourned meeting which is not the case here. This provision
is unnecessary
except to emphasise that Body Corporate Managers have no right to exercise their
delegated power except where the
chairperson is absent and then with the express
consent of the meeting.
The applicants, supported by four owners in their
submissions, say that no vote of consent was given to Jones by the meeting. In
one submission opposing the application, the Rutters say, "Mr R Jones , the
General Manager of Strata Title Management, was asked by the... committee to
chair the AGM...At the commencement
of the meeting, Mr Jones introduced himself
and announced that he would be chairing the meeting in the absence of Mr Hawton
(The
minutes incorrectly refer to Mr Kemp as our chairman) No person at the
meeting raised any objection to Mr Jones being in the chair." This
statement, though supporting Jones generally, confirms that Jones merely assumed
the chair without complying with section 46.
Further, the
minutes compiled by STM state opposite the heading "Chairman" the words
–
"In the absence of the Chairman, Mr C Kemp (sic), Mr R Jones conducted the meeting under delegated authority". (NOTE: Adjudicator’s underlining).
This comment is wrong in two ways, (a)
at the outset of the meeting STM held no engagement with the body corporate and
therefore had
no "delegated authority", and (b) invoking the delegation
of the powers of chairperson is in direct conflict with the procedure emphasised
by section 46(3) referred to above. Such a comment and action was not
unusual in the past but the practice of a Body Corporate Manager chairing a
meeting as of right was legislated against near 7 years ago. STM should note
this in respect of other bodies corporate it manages.
Secondly,
the applicants (see their point 8) and others say that the chairperson
(Jones) did not inform the meeting of the vote count for each
motion put.
Again, in their submission the Rutters say in respect of this allegation that,
"Mr Jones, as Chairman, told the meeting after each motion, whether the
motion under discussion had been passed, or lost, without providing
the voting
numbers. When questioned about this practice, he said that the actual voting
numbers would appear in the minutes."
I accept from the evidence,
including the Rutters opposing the application, that a vote count was not
declared in respect of each
motion put. This is conflict with the provisions of
section 56 of the Standard Module which states –
Declaration of voting results on motions.
56.(1) The person chairing a general meeting must declare the result of voting on motions at the meeting.
(2) When declaring the result of voting, the person chairing the meeting must state –
(a) the number of votes cast for the motion; and
(b) the number of votes cast against the motion; and
(c) the number of abstentions from voting on the motion.
Clearly, the votes for and against a
motion, and those who abstained, must be declared to the meeting. This is
nothing peculiar to
the legislation but common practice for meetings of all
kind. It has been part of the new legislation since July 1997 and remains
unchanged in the 1 December amendments. I am more than surprised that a
professional Body Corporate Manager either does not know
such a basic procedure
or, at least on this occasion, ignored it.
The purpose of this
requirement is at the heart of a meeting’s integrity; its immediate
disclosure provides an opportunity for
those present to verify, either
accurately or roughly depending on the numbers and circumstances, the vote for
themselves. It is
no accident that this provision follows the requirement under
section 55 for the body corporate roll, a list of persons having the
right to vote at the meeting, and all proxy forms and voting papers, to
be
available for inspection by voters at the meeting.
Both the availability of
the names those eligible to vote (eg excluding unfinancial owners for certain
motions), proxy forms and voting
papers, coupled with the declaration of the
vote on a motion, allow a check to be made.
Thirdly,
the applicants claim that voting papers for Lots 6, 7 and 25 are not
recorded in the minutes. Certainly these are not included in
the "Postal
Votes" list, but whether they were included in the vote, assuming they were
eligible to vote, cannot be known from the minutes which do
not show the vote
count – presumably a Voting-Tally Sheet was used and the vote is recorded
there as the alternative to recording
in the minutes (see section 56(3)
of the Standard Module). Had either the committee or STM responded they may
have been able to explain the absence of the 3 voting
papers in the minute list.
They should have been listed even if later rejected. Viewing this error in
conjunction with the previous
failure to declare the vote count for motions,
raises doubt as to the accuracy of the vote.
Fourthly, the
applicants claim that despite there being no nomination for the positions of
secretary and treasurer, there wasn’t any invitation
by chairperson Jones
for nominations from the floor of the meeting. Again, the Rutters (who were the
only one of the three opposing
the application that addressed the substantial
issues raised in the application) says in respect of this, "Our recollection
is that the chairman called for nominations from the floor for the positions of
both Secretary, and Treasurer, and
none were forthcoming".
What the
legislation requires in these circumstances is set out in section 21(2)
of the Standard Module. It requires the chairperson to call for nominations
from the floor and for those nominating to be elected
by ballot of those persons
present and able to vote. The legislation requires each body corporate to have
a chairperson, secretary
and treasurer.
The applicant’s (and
other’s) recollection is that no call was made for nominations for either
position; Rutter’s
is that a call was made but none nominated. However,
in contrast to both statements, the minutes show that Roderick Gibb was chosen
for both positions, as well as chairperson. As neither the committee, STM or
Gibb has made a response to the application (and it
would have been helpful for
Gibb to have given his evidence on the point), it appears at least that the
proceedings at the meeting
were not clear and obvious to those present. Whether
Gibb validly holds the positions of secretary and treasurer is in doubt.
Fifthly, I note that the notice of meeting was signed by Jones as
General Manager, Strata Title Management. Apart from the fact that STM
had engagement with the body corporate at that time, the legislation is specific
as to who is empowered
to call meetings.
Section 40 of the
Standard Module provides that a meeting may only be called by the secretary,
another committee member authorised to do so by
the committee, or a person
required to call a meeting by order of an adjudicator. Mr Jones has no such
capacity at the time and
should not have signed the notice of meeting. Again,
this is a basic procedural point that should be well known by him and
STM.
Sixthly, I note from the minutes that only one quotation, by
Andersens for the sum of $6,385, was put to the meeting in conflict with the
requirements
for major spending under section 104 of the Standard
Module. As the replacement of multiple level carpeting must be regarded as a
single project under section 103(2) of the Standard Module, and
the cost exceeds the threshold for major spending ($200 times 30 lots =
$6,000 for "Centre Point"- see Dictionary Schedule), there should have
been at least two competitive quotes put to owners for their choice. Apart from
being a legislative requirement,
this is normal prudent commercial practice
reflecting a common sense approach to spending moneys over a certain limit. It
is also
a protection for the committee against unfair accusations of
favouritism.
I would point out that since the new amendments on 1 December
2003, the threshold multiple has been increased and is now $250 times the
number of lots (ie $7,500) so when the matter is put again it will not need a
competitive quote under the legislation.
However, that does not mean owners
should not be given a choice and the committee may, regardless of the value now
not exceeding
the threshold, choose to put at least another quotation to owners.
Seventhly, the applicant and others have complained of motions
being improperly ruled out of order by the chairperson. I am not going to
review
each of the decisions as these matters can be put again by the proposer
of the motions with additional information as necessary.
Also, I am not in
possession of all the facts, for example, in regard to the Roof Area
motion, why isn’t the roof area now used by owners? Is it the subject of
an exclusive use by-law?. Why would it be only used
by a minority of owners?
What "variance to the use of common property" requires a special
resolution?
In summary, while it is always preferable to
preserve a meeting despite various lapses in matters of procedure, in this
instance the convening
and conduct of the meeting include multiple errors
including those that bear directly on the integrity of the voting and committee
composition. It is my view that the meeting therefore must be taken as being
void for irregularity and a further annual general
meeting held (see section
7 of Schedule 5 of the Act).
I realise that this will be an
inconvenience to some owners and that most motions at the last November meeting
appear to have been
passed with a sizeable majority, however it is important
that the integrity of the voting and committee system is, and is seen to
be, in
compliance with the relevant legislative provisions.
I have also included
as an order the consequence invalidation of the meeting has on the committee
under section 25(1) of the Standard Module, which is that the previous
committee resumes office.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QBCCMCmr/2004/86.html