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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 30 September 2005
REFERENCE: 0373-2003
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
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Number of Scheme:
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5682
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Name of Scheme:
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Surfers Hawaiian
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Address of Scheme:
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2890 Gold Coast Highway SURFERS PARADISE QLD 4217
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Ken Williams, Pierre Motteroz, and Phyllis Nemeth, the Owners of lots 9, 57 and 64 respectively
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I hereby order that if two or more motions proposing alternative
ways of dealing with the same issue are submitted for consideration at a general
meeting then the body corporate committee must ensure the voting paper lists the
motions as a single motion with alternatives pursuant
to section 42B of the
Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 1997,
for as long as that provision applies to the body
corporate.
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STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0373-2003
"Surfers Hawaiian" CTS 5682
Application
Surfers Hawaiian Community Titles Scheme (Surfers Hawaiian) is a 64
lot scheme under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act
(Act) and the Act’s Standard Module Regulation
(Standard Module). The scheme is designed for residential purposes.
This application is by Kenneth Williams, Pierre Motteroz, and Phyllis
Nemeth, being owners of lots 9, 57 and 64 respectively (applicants)
seeking orders against the body corporate (respondent). The
applicants are seeking that all resolutions passed at the extraordinary general
meeting of 8 April 2003 be invalidated. The
main claim is that a resolution
setting the contribution levy amount was invalidly passed. The applicants are
seeking that owners
should be credited any overpaid amount and that those owners
in arrears should not be penalised.
Background
This dispute arose out of the setting of contribution levies at an
extraordinary general meeting held on 8 April 2003.
When the voting
papers for this meeting were first distributed the voting papers contained three
motions submitted by the committee
dealing with the setting of the
administration fund levies. These three motions were alternative motions that
allowed owners to
vote on differing levy amounts. However, the motions were put
on the voting paper as three separate motions. The first of these
motions
proposed the smallest levy with the third of these motions proposing the highest
levy.
A few days after distributing the voting papers, a replacement
voting paper was issued. This replacement voting paper contained the
same
motions but reversed the order so that the first of the levy motions proposed
the highest levy and the third motion proposed
the lowest levy.
At that
time, two owners claimed that the redistribution of voting papers was improper.
These owners brought an application before
this office seeking to invalidate
these voting papers and reschedule the extraordinary general meeting
(Application 217-2003). The adjudicator considered that there was some
merit in the application but that the meeting should be allowed to proceed.
Reasons
given included the cost and inconvenience of rescheduling the meeting at
a late stage and potential financial consequences to the
body corporate if the
meeting did not proceed and the body corporate ran out of funds.
After
determining this application, the adjudicator issued an order requiring votes
from the first voting paper to be accepted if
the owner in question did not
provide a replacement vote. In his reasons for decision the adjudicator
stated:
The applicants (they suggest other owners as well) are nonplussed as to why fresh voting papers were distributed when only the sequence of two motions has been changed. The applicants have a point here, for without any explanation having been given in the second notice or the accompanying circular, owners will rightly be confused as to the reason for the new voting paper. An explanation should have been given.
The chairperson states that the change was made so as to have the three Administration Fund contribution motions in descending order of contribution amounts, so that if the first and highest was passed then the others could be ruled out of order. This is a common fallacy; votes on all alternative motions should always be counted as it is possible that a later alternative motion can also be passed, and, though unlikely, with a higher number of positive votes.
Having given this warning, I expect the chairperson to comply, in which case I do not consider the meeting should be stopped on this ground. That is, owners may be puzzled with the body corporate’s lack of explanation, but that should not affect whether they vote or how they vote.
At
the extraordinary general meeting the chairperson did not comply with this
warning. The first resolution voted on, adopting the
highest levy, was passed.
The chairperson then ruled the alternative levy motions out of order.
The applicant claims that, by doing this, the chairperson have
deliberately refused to comply with the adjudicator’s order and
has
subverted the will of the majority. This is supported by a review of the voting
papers that indicate that more people voted
in favour of the resolution adopting
the lowest levy than in favour of the resolution adopting the highest
levy.
The chairperson, Richard Springer, claims that he acted on advice
from The Body Corporate Headquarters (the body corporate manager)
who had
obtained a legal opinion from Ros Janes, Lawyer. The chairperson also submits
that, once the highest levy was passed, a
number of owners would have changed
their votes from the floor to vote against the lowest levy. He claims that it
was according
to the will of the majority that the highest levy was passed.
Decision
Alternative Motions
Where a meeting is to vote on alternative motions dealing with the same issue
then these motions should be set out as a single motion
with a number of
alternatives rather than as separate motions. This is necessary to promote a
democratic outcome.
This can be illustrated by an example. Assume that a
body corporate of thirty owners needs to set their next levy in order to avoid
the body corporate becoming insolvent. All thirty owners are in favour of a
levy being set but twelve owners want the levy set at
$3,000, eight owners want
the levy set at $2,000, and ten owners want the levy set at $1,000.
If
owners were given an opportunity to vote on a single motion with three
alternatives then the motion as a whole would receive 30
votes in favour, the
$3,000 alternative would receive twelve votes, the $2,000 alternative would
receive eight votes and the $1,000
alternative would receive ten votes. Because
a clear majority voted to pass the motion as a whole the motion would be passed.
The
alternative selected would be $3,000 as receiving the most votes and it
would not matter that less than a clear majority have selected
this alternative
because all owners voted to pass the motion as a whole.
On the other
hand, if three separate motions were provided and all owners only voted for the
motion that stated their preferred amount
then none of the motions would be
passed and the body corporate would become insolvent. Owners who anticipated
this problem would
therefore need to vote in favour of all motions and would
lose the opportunity to demonstrate which alternative they actually prefer.
Engineering results by listing alternatives as separate motions
Listing alternatives as separate motions encourages some owners to vote in
favour of all motions to avoid the risk that the vote in
favour will be split
and all motions will be lost. These owners therefore lose the opportunity to
state their preferred alternative
and the will of the majority can be subverted.
Using the above example, twenty owners may be unable to attend the meeting and
may
decide to vote for all motions to avoid the risk that votes in favour of
setting the levy would be split between the different alternatives
and all
motions would fail. The remaining ten owners who attended the meeting would
then be able to influence the outcome.
On the other hand, providing
alternatives as separate motions can allow the chairperson to influence the
outcome. The chairperson
can arrange for a preferred alternative to be voted on
first and, provided that it is passed by a majority, refuse to allow a vote
on
any of the other alternatives.
The present application concerns the
chairperson deliberately influencing the outcome in this manner. The reason
given by the chairperson
for issuing the second voting paper was to change the
order of the motions so that if the first and highest was passed then the others
could be ruled out of order. Because of this, and the possibility that some
owners may seek to avoid all motions failing by voting
in favour of more than
just their preferred alternative, an adjudicator allowed the meeting to go ahead
but stated "votes on all alternative motions should always be counted as it
is possible that a later alternative motion can also be passed, and,
though
unlikely, with a higher number of positive votes".
Despite this, the
chairperson decided not to allow a count on the alternative motions once the
first and highest was passed. The
reason he gives for this is that he was
afraid an alternative would be passed with an equal number of votes in favour
and this would
result in no motion being considered passed. The chairperson
states "This was a difficult decision in light of the Adjudicators comments
but I considered that I had a ‘Duty of Care’ to ensure
funding for
the Body Corporate".
I have no hesitation in concluding that the
chairperson failed to conduct the meeting properly. The voting papers indicate
that the
resolution in favour of the lowest levy would have been passed with a
greater majority and this resolution should in fact have been
implemented. The
chairperson claims that he conducted the meeting in accordance with the will of
the majority because several owners
had voted yes to all motions and would have
changed their vote from the floor to ensure the resolution in favour of the
lowest levy
did not receive a greater majority. However, as the chairperson did
not allow the vote on the alternative motions to proceed there
is at least a
perception that the chairperson failed to act democratically.
In effect,
the chairperson favoured the motion adopting the highest levy by listing the
alternatives as separate motions, arranging
for the highest levy motion to be
first, and by ruling the alternative motions out of order without allowing a
count of votes on
those alternatives.
The adjudicator had brought to
the chairperson’s attention that it was possible for the first resolution
to be passed but a
subsequent resolution could also be passed with a greater
majority. The chairperson should have allowed this vote to occur. If
a greater
number of votes were for the lowest levy this alternative should have been
adopted. If a number of owners changed their
vote from the floor and the
highest levy received more affirmative votes then the highest levy should have
been adopted. If both
alternatives were passed with an equal majority then a
call for a poll may have given a different result or the applicable alternative
could have been chosen by the toss of a coin. This would have reassured owners
that the chairperson was not acting to favour his
own views over that of the
majority of owners.
Enforcement of adjudicator’s order
The applicants claim that the chairperson has contravened the adjudicators
order by refusing to allow votes on each alternative motion
to be
counted.
Technically speaking, the chairperson may argue that the
requirement to allow a count of votes on each alternative was only part of
the
adjudicator’s reasons for decisions rather than the adjudicator’s
order. However, it may be viewed as implicit in
the order that the chairperson
was required to allow a count of votes on each alternative.
Given that
the chairperson had the benefit of comments from the adjudicator relating to the
specific motions in question it seems
imprudent of the chairperson to rely
instead on advice from the body corporate manager and a solicitor. In
particular, it is surprising
that a solicitor would provide the advice given in
light of the adjudicator’s specific comments above in the reasons for
decision.
The solicitor’s advice is of a brief and general nature. It is
advice given to the body corporate manager rather than the
chairperson himself.
Further, the advice refers to a telephone conversation with the body corporate
manger without giving the content
of that conversation and it is unclear what
background information the solicitor was actually given.
Having said
this, enforcement of an adjudicator’s order is a matter for the
Magistrates Court rather than an adjudicator. I
have no power to impose any
penalties and if the applicants consider the previous adjudicator’s order
has been breached then
an appropriate application would need to be brought
before the Magistrates Court (Act, 288).
Levy motion to be invalidated
While I do not have jurisdiction to impose penalties, I am able to invalidate
the resolution setting the levy if I am satisfied that
this is just and
equitable in the circumstances.
After consideration of the matter, I am
reluctant to invalidate the resolution. Firstly, if the chairperson had allowed
the alternative
motions to be voted upon it is possible that a number of owners
who preferred the highest levy would have changed their votes from
the floor.
This would have resulted in the highest levy being adopted regardless.
Secondly, the body corporate has since passed
another resolution adopting levies
for subsequent periods. There would be additional expense and inconvenience to
all owners if
the earlier levy was invalidated, money was refunded to owners,
and an additional levy resolution was required to be passed.
I will
therefore allow the resolution to stand. On the other hand, if any owners have
suffered a penalty or lost a discount due to
arrears in an amount less than the
difference between the highest levy and the lowest levy then those owners should
apply to the
committee for waiver of this penalty or allowance of the discount
(Standard Module, 99(6)). The above circumstances would appear to
justify the committee looking favourably on any application of this type.
Other matters
The applicants have alleged a number of other irregularities in relation to
the meeting. Again, the applicants have not provided
any satisfactory evidence
of continuing inconvenience to owners that would justify overturning these
resolutions. However, it may
be of assistance to the parties to make some brief
comments.
The applicants claim that a special levy for $20,000 in legal
expenses was passed but no quotes were given identifying how the fee
was
estimated and which solicitor would be chosen. This amount exceeds the relevant
amount for major spending and two quotes should
have been provided (Standard
Module, 104).
The applicants also have complaints about the manner of
counting votes. In this respect, the body corporate should ensure it complies
with the procedures in the Standard Module. In particular, procedures related
to the appointment of a returning officer may be relevant
(Standard Module,
54).
Finally, there appears to have been a dispute about access to
body corporate records. The evidence suggests that this dispute has
been
resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.
Order
For the reasons above, I am not prepared to grant the orders sought.
However, to avoid a similar problem occurring again, the body
corporate should
ensure that any alternative motions are included on the voting paper as a single
alternative motion rather than
as separate motions. Since 1 December 2003, the
Standard Module has been amended to require the body corporate to deal with
alternative
motions in this manner.
I have therefore made an order
requiring the secretary to present any future alternative motions in the manner
now required by the
Standard Module. If the secretary fails to comply with this
order then the appropriate action for enforcement of the order is an
application
before the Magistrates Court seeking imposition of a monetary penalty (Act,
288).
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