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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 30 September 2005
REFERENCE: 0772-2003
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
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Number of Scheme:
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27751
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Name of Scheme:
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Jade Court – Maroochydore
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Address of Scheme:
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20 Fourth Avenue COTTON TREE QLD 4558
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Brian John PETER and Maureen Ann PETER, as the co-owners of Lot 1,
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I hereby order that the application for the following order
–
is
dismissed.
I further order that the body corporate must consent to the tinting of the various windows of Lots 1, 2 and 3 as tinting has been applied and is currently in place at the date of this order. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0772-2003
"Jade Court - Maroochydore" CTS
27751
The applicants, Brian and Maureen Peter of Lot 1, have sought the
following order of an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community
Management Act 1997 ("the Act") -
3. "The outcome we seek to resolve this dispute is for Mr & Mrs Auld to comply with the by-laws that govern our unit block, and remove the rotary clothes hoist from the roof.
4. Also, remove the mirror effect window tinting to units 2 & 3, due to the detrimental effect it has on the look of the building"
JURISDICTION:
This
is a dispute between an owner (the applicants Peter) and the other owner (the
respondents Robin AULD and Patricia Ann AULD, the
co-owners of Lots 2 and 3),
concerning the mirror-effect tinting applied by the respondents to a number of
windows in both lots and
the presence of a rotary clothes hoist on the rooftop
of Lot 3, both of which allegedly detract from the appearance of the scheme
and
have not been authorised by the body corporate. These are matters that fall
within the dispute resolution provisions of the
legislation (see sections
227, 228 and 276 of the Act) and therefore may be determined by an
adjudicator.
General powers of an Adjudicator in making an
order:
Section 276(1) of the Act provides that an adjudicator may
make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances (including a
declaratory
order) to
resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles
scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about – (i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or (ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section
276(2) of the Act). An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or
consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary
or appropriate
(section 284(1) of the Act).
APPLICATION AND
SUBMISSIONS:
Under section 243 of the Act, a copy of the
application was provided to the respondent owners with an invitation to respond
to the matter of dispute
raised in
the application. The respondents made a
submission opposing the application. The applicants viewed the submission and
subsequently
lodged a reply (see sections 244 and 246 of the Act).
The Commissioner initially referred the parties to the Dispute
Resolution Centre of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General
for the
dispute matters to be mediated. The parties did participate in a mediation
session and evidently resolved a number of other
issues but did not attempt to
mediate the two subject of this application. After some misunderstanding as top
what had been resolved
the matters has been referred back for adjudication. I
would only say that both were capable of mediation and I hope they were not
avoided through any misunderstanding of the dispute process.
The brief
facts of the matters are as follows.
Though the building was not
established as a community titles scheme until February 2000 by Stephen and Tina
Carey (who appear as
the original owners on the titling documents), it seems
that it was previously in use as a private dwelling since 1991.
The Aulds
purchased Lot 2 around mid-2000 and took up residence. The Peters purchased Lot
1 in December 2000, renting it until August
2001 when they took up residence.
The Aulds then purchased Lot 3 in early 2003 and moved into that lot around May
2003, renting
out Lot 2.
Window Tinting:
In regard to the
mirror-effect tinting, the Aulds had the tinting of Lot 2 done with the mirror
effect sometime between December 2000
and March 2001. The Peters had their
windows tinted with normal grey tint around November 2001. The tinting of Lot 3
in mirror
effect by the Aulds was done soon after they moved into Lot 3 in May
2003.
The applicant Peters complain that, firstly, the Aulds did not seek
proper authorisation of the body corporate for the window tinting
of either lot,
and secondly that the mirror effect detracts from the appearance with "strong
sun reflections and distortional look of the glass panels from the streets,
which causes the whole building to look ugly",
and elsewhere "In our
opinion it’s not a good look, and devalues the property."
The
respondent Aulds submit that the difference in appearance between a reflective
and non-reflective tint is a matter of personal
opinion. They chose mirror
effect for privacy and heat resistance. Further, they say that the Peters did
not seek or obtain proper
body corporate authorisation for their own window
tinting.
Clothes Hoist:
In regard to the clothes hoist
located on the roof of Lot 3, the Peters say that the Aulds erected it some two
weeks after taking
up residence when it first became visible. The Aulds say
that the hoist was put in place by the Careys and was there at the time
the
building was open for buyer’s inspection prior to auction of the lots in
December 2000.
The applicant’s complaint that the sight of the
hoist adversely affected the presentation of the building was supported by a
photograph showing the hoist filled with washing. The Aulds say that the
photograph must have been taken from somewhere in the nearby
Maroochydore Tennis
Club as it shows the court’s mesh fence which is around 4 metres high, as
the hoist is not visible from
surrounding footpaths. They have submitted three
photographs taken from different footpath positions that do not show the hoist.
In their reply, the Peters state the Auld’s photographs must have been
taken within 30 metres of the building when it is not
visible; also perhaps the
hoist was wound down. They state their photograph had been taken at ground
level through the mesh fence
at a distance of 60-80
metres.
DETERMINATION:
"Jade Court - Maroochydore" was
registered as a building format plan on 14 February 2000 and comprises
three residential lots. It is regulated by the Body Corporate and Community
Management (Standard Module) Regulation 1997 ("the Standard
Module").
Window Tinting:
By-law 8(1) of the body corporate
by-laws provides as follows –
8 Appearance of lot
(1) The occupier of a lot must not, without the body corporate’s written approval, make a change to the external appearance of the lot unless the change is minor and does not detract from the amenity of the lot and its surrounds.
Although tinting is applied on the inside of
the windows and therefore within a lot’s boundaries, it is still caught by
the
above by-law as the tinting has an effect on the external appearance of the
lot and the building generally. Accordingly, in the
case of both parties having
tinting applied to their windows they should have complied with the express
provision requiring prior
written body corporate approval. That can take the
form of a committee approval or an approval by the body corporate in general
meeting as approval by ordinary resolution is not specified in the
by-law.
Both parties are in breach of the by-law in not having sought the
prior approval of the body corporate for the tinting of their respective
windows. The order I have been asked to make is for the removal of the
Auld’s mirror effect tinting, not because it has not
been approved but
because of the alleged detrimental effect it has on the building’s
appearance.
There is no doubt that mirror effect tinting is more
noticeable than ordinary tinting of the type fitted by the Peters. However,
the
question as to whether it makes the building look less attractive, even ugly, is
a subjective matter of personal taste. I imagine
that the Aulds may well
disapprove of the Peter’s application for approval on the same grounds
that the Peters will lay against
their tinting.
In any case, there are
questions of equity that arise in resolving some disputes and one of those
equitable principles arises here,
namely that of acquiescence. The Aulds
first applied their mirror tint to the windows of Lot 2 between December 2000
and March 2001, and to Lot 3 soon after
purchase of that lot in May 2003. This
application was lodged in December 2003, around 3 years after Lot 2 was tinted
and 6 months
after Lot 3 was tinted.
The principle of acquiescence is
essentially to deny a person the right to later object to something that has in
fact been in place
for some time without any action or complaint having been
taken by them, giving rise to an inference of assent. Here the delay by
the
Peters of 3 years in the first instance and then 6 months when the tinting was
extended to other windows is such that it would
be unreasonable to now allow an
action for its removal to be contemplated. Had there been a serious impediment
or hazard involved,
then acquiescence might not have been applied however that
is not the case here. I would point out that the point raised by the
Peters
that they were earlier unaware of their rights to object to the tinting has no
merit – they are presumed to know the
law and their relevant rights under
the law.
Accordingly, for the above reasons I make no order against the
respondents for removal of the mirror effect tinting from the windows
of their
lots. My order includes a provision that the body corporate consent to the
tinting of all lots (both the Auld’s and
the Peter’s lots) as it is
now in place; in effect this order will act as that consent and is part of the
body corporate records.
Clothes Hoist:
Both parties
have given conflicting evidence as to whether the clothes hoist was in place
from the outset or whether it was installed
by the Aulds after purchase. The
Aulds claim that it was in place at the time of the buyer’s inspection.
Their reference
to the original owners as the Careys is correct and they could
perhaps have been located and asked the truth of the matter –
it would
have not only been silly for the Aulds to lie in this respect but also unlawful
being in breach of section 297 of the Act which provides for the
imposition of a penalty by the courts for a false or misleading statement being
given to an adjudicator.
Also, the argument by the Aulds that the roof hoist
gives the lots a hoist each and was planned that way, has some merit. The
Peters
have not produced any evidence to refute what is the more probable state
of affairs, that is that the roof hoist was there
originally.
Accordingly, I have made no order that the hoist be removed.
Also as the balance of probabilities is that it was an original fixture,
there
is no need for me to order that it should be treated as being approved by the
body corporate as for the tinting.
Having made that decision, I would
comment that the Peters have said in their reply that if they had had some say
in the hoist matter
then they would have agreed to it being on the roof but
would have asked that it be positioned in the south-west corner of the roof
where it would be less visible. The Aulds, in the interests of harmony, may
wish to consider this relocation of the hoist.
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