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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 17 May 2005
REFERENCE: 0074-2003
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
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Number of Scheme:
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12003
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Name of Scheme:
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Glen Idle Court
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Address of Scheme:
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52 Union Street NUNDAH QLD 4012
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Karen JOHNSON, the owner of Lot 3,
To review the decision of the body corporate secretary refusing to reverse Professional Collection Service’s charges of $166.10 from my account after the debt was paid in full and final settlement, is dismissed.
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STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0074-2003
"Glen Idle Court" CTS 12003
The applicant, Karen Johnson of Lot 3, has sought the following order of
an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997
("the Act") -
"To review the decision of the body corporate secretary refusing to reverse Professional Collection Service’s charges of $166.10 from my account after the debt was paid in full and final settlement."
JURISDICTION:
This is a
dispute between an owner (the applicant Johnson) and the body corporate (the
respondent), concerning the reimbursement to
the body corporate of the service
fee paid to a Collection Agent for collecting the applicant’s outstanding
contributions.
This is a matter which falls within the disputes resolution
provisions of the legislation (see sections 227, 228 and 276, and Schedule 5, of
the Act).
General powers of an Adjudicator in making an
order:
Section 276(1) provides that an adjudicator may make an order that
is just and equitable in the circumstances (including a declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles scheme, about
–
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about –
(i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or
(ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section 276(2) of
the Act).
An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or consequential
provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate
(section 284(1) of
the Act).
APPLICATION AND SUBMISSIONS:
Under section 243 of
the Act, a copy of the application was provided to the respondent body corporate
(committee) and to all other owners, with an
invitation
to each to respond to
the disputed matter raised in the application. The body corporate secretary,
Chris Fabila, has
made a submission
on behalf of the respondent, presumably on
the authority of the committee, and two owners have also made submissions.
The
applicant
Johnson viewed the submissions and subsequently lodged a written reply
(see sections 246 and 244 of the Act respectively).
The brief facts of
the matter are as follows.
The applicant admits that she had not paid
contributions levied on her by the body corporate amounting to $940. She states
that she
had deliberately not paid the contributions because of perceived
inaction by the body corporate in carrying out necessary maintenance
and repair
tasks.
The secretary states that she (again presumably on the
authority of the committee) referred the debt to a collection agent,
Professional
Collection Services, who subsequently served a notice of demand on
Johnson for the amount. The applicant says she spoke to Harold
Neal of the
collection agency, who said that, after purportedly seeking instructions from
the secretary, if she did not pay the amount
then she would be liable for the
costs of collection. On 11 October 2002 she paid $840, being the outstanding
amount less $100 owing
to her for having personally purchased some irrigation
supplies for the body corporate (the body corporate accepts this reimbursement).
In her December levy notice, the collection agent’s fee of $166.10 was
included as an outstanding debt. The applicant relies
on the statement by
Harold Neal that he had received instructions from the secretary that she would
only be liable for the collection
costs if she did not pay the outstanding
amount promptly in full. She now makes application to be relieved from paying
that cost.
The secretary (Fabila) states that she had telephoned the
applicant regarding payment of the outstanding debt but had been told that
there
would be no payment until the body corporate, started doing its job. She
states that she did not discuss the collection fees with the applicant, though
makes no response to the statement the applicant
attributes to Harold Neal. She
states that the fee was a result of the applicant’s refusal to pay her
contributions and also,
other owners all agree that she should pay it; in any
case, section 99 of the Standard Module requires that the applicant pays the
fee.
DETERMINATION:
"Glen Idle Court"
was registered as a building unit plan (now termed a building format
plan) on 20 December 1978, and comprises 7 residential lots.
The
dispute has arisen out of a perception by the applicant that the body corporate
was not properly discharging its duty to maintain
the common property. She
names those matters as including gardening, the cleaning of gutters and the
replacement of the television
antenna.
The obligation of an owner to pay
contributions once struck and levied, cannot be ignored by an owner because of a
belief that the
body corporate is not carrying out its duties. The course open
to the applicant at the time was to have made an application against
the body
corporate for it to carry out its statutory responsibilities to maintain the
common property, including the relevant gardening,
gutter cleaning and antenna
replacement. The applicant did not take this course of action and instead opted
not to pay levies until
she was satisfied that proper maintenance, in her view,
was carried out.
The legislation, of course, makes no provision for an
action on the part of an owner to withhold levy moneys. A contribution levied
must be paid regardless of the views of an owner – there may be a case in
respect of a set-off of moneys owed to an owner by
the body corporate (as with
the $100 for irrigation equipment here) but there can be no exemption in respect
of a valid contribution
levied. The applicant failed to separate the issues of
liability and duties.
Neither can the applicant rely on the advice of a
collection agent as to her liability or exemption from paying a fee. The
secretary
has not commented on the applicant’s allegation that Neal only
relayed her advice to the applicant that she would avoid the
fee if she paid the
amount in full (promptly presumably). Had she not made this statement then it
would have been a simple matter
for her to have said so, but she hasn’t.
However, I do not intend to see further evidence on the point because if she did
say it then she had no authority to do so – it would require the
authorisation of either the body corporate in general meeting
or the committee
and that does not appear to be the case. That is, the applicant can not rely on
an unauthorised promise of the
secretary and would still have to pay the fee
(though she could seek private legal advice as to any civil right of action in
the
matter).
In regard to the reliance by the secretary (and committee
presumably) on section 99 for the fee, I assume this is a reference to the
general term or other amount payable, as the fee is not a
contribution, instalment or penalty within the meaning of the
section. However, the general term is really a reference to fees such as an
annual fee attaching to an
exclusive use by-law, a lease payment, or
reimbursement under a section 119 arrangement, etc. That is, it is not a
catchall but refers to payments the relevant owner is a party to that arises
under the legislation.
Bodies corporate often have a by-law (not being in the
statutory by-laws) that specifically provides for the recovery of such
fees.
However, I have no hesitation in determining that the just and
equitable resolution of the dispute in the circumstances, is that the
applicant should pay the fee. The alternative where the body corporate
is
responsible, would result in other owners being penalised financially for an
owner’s failure to pay contributions on time
(given that there are no
proper circumstances for exemption – see my previous comments on
this).
Accordingly, my order is that the application is dismissed.
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