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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 17 May 2005
REFERENCE: 0061-2003
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
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Number of Scheme:
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6058
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Name of Scheme:
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Kerri Court
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Address of Scheme:
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52 West Burleigh Road BURLEIGH HEADS QLD 4220
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Lorraine MACKENZIE, as a co-owner of Lot 1,
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I hereby order that the applicant Lorraine
MACKENZIE, a co-owner of Lot 1, and the respondent Joan Elizabeth FREEMAN, the
owner of Lot 2, and an
affected party Bruce Robert MACKENZIE, the other co-owner
of Lot 1, having on 11 July 2003 reached a mediated settlement of the disputes
between them subject of the application, and having signed an agreement setting
out the terms of settlement and requesting that a
consent order be made for
those settlement terms by an Adjudicator pursuant to section 276(5) of the
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 ("the Act"), must abide
by those agreed terms which are set out below –
1. That an independent professional Body Corporate Manager is employed by the end of August 2003. 9. We agree to notify CT that we would like the file closed, and no further action be taken by CT. We agree to refer this agreement to an adjudicator appointed under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997, as a consent order pursuant to section 199 of the Act (section 276(5) of the Act). I further order that the carrying out of the above terms must be in accordance with the Act and the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 1997 ("the Standard Module"), particularly in regard to – 1. The calling and conduct of the meeting required to engage a Body Corporate Manager. I further order that the timings set out in the terms may be varied by joint consent of the parties, to enable matters to be properly carried out in accordance with the legislation. |
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0061-2003
"Kerri Court" CTS 6058
The applicant, Lorraine MacKenzie of Lot 1, has sought the following
orders of an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community Management
Act 1997 ("the Act") -
The order is sought that Mrs Freeman pays outstanding and future sinking fund levies, and that Mrs Freeman participates in future body corporate meetings, and a Body Corporate Manager be appointed. We are also seeking an order that Mrs Wendy Steadman be appointed as Administrator for the purpose of holding a meeting of the body corporate.
JURISDICTION:
This is a dispute between an
owner (the applicant MacKenzie) and another owner (the respondent Joan Elizabeth
FREEMAN, the owner of
Lot 2), concerning the failure by an owner (Freeman) to
pay body corporate fund contributions, and that a Body Corporate
Manager/Administrator
be appointed to overcome the failure of the body corporate
to properly administer itself in compliance with the legislation. These
are
matters falling within the disputes resolution provisions of the legislation
(see sections 227, 228 and 276 of the Act).
General powers of an
Adjudicator in making an order:
Section 276(1) provides that an adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances (including a declaratory order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about – (i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or (ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section 276(2) of
the Act).
An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or consequential
provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate
(section 284(1) of
the Act).
APPLICATION AND SUBMISSIONS:
Under section 243 of
the Act, a copy of the application was provided to the respondent Freeman with
an invitation to respond to the matter of dispute
raised in
the application.
The respondent made a written submission. The applicant body corporate viewed
the submission and subsequently
lodged a written reply (see sections 246 and 244
of the Act respectively).
In consideration of the orders sought and that
the parties constituted the whole of the body corporate, it was considered that
the
most appropriate manner of resolving the dispute would be mediation. The
parties were advised on 19 May 2003 that the matter had
been referred to the
Dispute Resolution Centre of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General (see
section 248 of the Act). The parties subsequently participated in a mediation
session with a mediator on 11 July 2003 and reached agreement
on a number
of
matters in dispute. These matters went beyond the particular orders sought,
encompassing a range of problems most
of which were
raised in the
respondent’s submission to the application.
Had this matter been
referred for an adjudication of the dispute rather than mediation, I would have
set out here a brief summary
of the facts of the matter. However, as the matter
has been mediated and there are some comments I need to make regarding the terms
of settlement, I shall in any case be referring to the facts but shall do so
along with relevant comments under separate headings
in my
"Determination" which follows.
DETERMINATION:
The
scheme "Kerri Court" was registered as a building units plan (now termed a
building format plan) on 24 May 1989, and comprises two residential lots.
Having been established under the Building Units and Group Titles Act
1980, under the transitional provisions of the (new) Act the scheme was
immediately subject to the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard
Module) Regulation 1997 ("the Standard Module"). As no new community
management statement has been lodged since to alter that regulatory status, the
scheme
continues to be regulated by the Standard Module.
As foreshadowed,
I shall deal separately with those matters and terms which raise legislative
issues not addressed in mediation.
That is, while parties in mediation may
agree to certain terms to resolve a particular matter in dispute, it may be that
the settlement
term agreed to may in fact contravene a legislative provision or
a body corporate by-law. Where that occurs, an adjudicator cannot
give a
consent order giving effect to such a term. This "review" role by an
adjudicator is set out in section 276(5) of the Act,
which states
–
276 Orders of Adjudicators
(5) If the adjudicator makes an order in a form agreed to by the parties to the application following mediation or conciliation, the order –
(a) may include only matters that may be dealt with under this Act; and
(b) must not include matters that are inconsistent with this Act or another Act.
The review role is necessary because of the
present system of referring matters for mediation to the Dispute Resolution
Centre. Mediators
with the Centre are generalist mediators who do not have a
specialist knowledge of the Act and therefore are not competent to determine
when the terms of a settlement are likely to contravene the Act or, as in this
case, leave the parties open to a contravention by
omission of any necessary
legislative steps or information for
the parties to properly carry out a term.
Where matters involve merely
social issues such as noise, harassment, behaviour,
even
the parking of vehicles, there is usually no bar to issuing a consent order
for the terms of settlement. However, where matters
concern, for example, the
engagement of persons in defined roles for which the
legislation prescribes
engagement procedures, or the
installation of an improvement for the benefit of
a lot, then the terms must
be scrutinised for compliance and, also, any
instances
of ambiguity or omission of legislative steps or information which, in
the
opinion of the adjudicator, may lead the parties into
error. I shall deal
separately with each of those instances that arise out
of the settlement terms
reached between the parties,
Freeman and the MacKenzies.
I would mention
first that a review is not merely an exercise in setting the law right for a
settlement agreement, but it prevents
future repercussions for the parties. For
example, depending on the extent of encroachment, the nature of the use, and
other considerations,
a use of the common property may require an ordinary
resolution, a special resolution, a resolution without dissent, or a by-law.
If
a lot building has a small pergola added jutting onto common property, then if
authorisation was by other than an exclusive-use
by-law recorded with the
Registrar of Titles, a future purchaser may have a right of redress against a
present owner for misrepresenting
in a sale of their lot that the pergola was
"authorised".
Terms 1 to 4 regarding engagement of a Body
Corporate Manager:
1. That an independent professional Body Corporate Manager is employed by the end of August 2003.
2. Joan (Freeman) will meet the proposed Manager and inform Lorraine (Mackenzie) about acceptance by the 7th August 2003.
3. If the Manager is not acceptable to Joan, Joan will offer an alternative Manager for consideration.
4. Following the appointment of the Body Corporate Manager, Joan agrees to pay outstanding fees and participate in meetings.
There
are a number of points to make concerning this issue. Firstly, the terms give
the impression that the engagement of a Body
Corporate Manager merely requires
informal acceptance by both parties. The legislation actually requires the
following: the engagement
must be in writing; an engagement can only be
concluded in general meeting: the engagement terms and conditions must be set
out and
must be known to the parties before voting; the engagement can only be
for three years; and an alternative choice must be available
if the major
spending limit is exceeded (see sections 78, 87 and 104 of the Standard Module).
I might add that a reputable and knowledgeable Body Corporate Manager would
alert the body corporate (ie
the parties) to these requirements, however as this
is not a regulated or licensed occupation, there are persons holding themselves
out as Body Corporate Managers who are neither reputable nor knowledgeable.
This comment should not in any way be construed as a
comment concerning the
person nominated by the applicant for consideration, Wendy Steadman of Body
Corporate Choice, who is wholly
unknown to me.
Secondly, the timings
set for acceptance by 7 August, followed by an alternative if unacceptable, then
engagement by the end of August,
may not be able to be met. The legislation
requires minimum notice of three weeks for a general meeting, and that would
follow the
time taken for the parties to first agree on a suitable person (as
they wish to do and assuming the major spending limit is not exceeded)
and the
notice of meeting (agenda, documentation, etc) to be prepared and sent out.
Thirdly, as a general comment to Term 4, the participation of owners in
meetings is at the discretion of each owner; they may participate
by attendance,
by voting using the voting paper that must accompany each notice of meeting, or
by appointment of a proxy –
they may also choose not to participate or
vote at all, though must accept the consequences of not voting. However, I
think this
term is more an expression of intent by Joan Freeman than an
obligation.
To accommodate the risk in the first point I have included an
order that the legislation must be complied with in discharging the
relevant
terms; and for the second point I have included an order to enable the parties
to vary the timings.
Terms 5 and 6 concerning repairs,
improvements and structural changes, and public liability insurance.
5. Both agree that any repairs, attachments, or structural changes, to the common area (common property) be discussed for approval before work is done.
6. Bruce (Mackenzie) and Lorraine will seek Council advice regarding public liability with regard to the garden edging, and agree to remove the garden at their cost back to the fence line if it is a public liability problem. If the garden is not a liability, the independent advice will be made to Joan for follow up.
I have already mentioned the various levels of
authorisation necessary for different type of uses of the common property,
whether,
as examples, for a building improvement on common property, siting of
an air-conditioner through a window over common property, or
having use of an
area of common property for a personal vegetable garden. The legislation also
has a complex structure of responsibility
for various repairs and replacements,
including in regard to particular structural repairs. Any proposed use or
repair of the common
property must be authorised in some manner by the body
corporate – mere discussion is insufficient.
In regard to the
MacKenzie’s garden, apart from the body corporate authorisation issue,
public liability insurance by the body
corporate (for a specified minimum cover)
is a requirement of legislation and any query must be considered against that
requirement.
Also, public liability cover for personal or property injury
within a lot is a different matter.
The additional order for the parties
to comply with the legislation in carrying out the settlement terms is also
relevant here.
Terms 7, 8 and 9 concern parking, privacy and
respect, and the request for a consent order.
7. Bruce and Lorraine will ask that delivery vehicles park on their side of the driveway.
8. Both agree to give each other space, and treat each other with respect.
9. We agree to notify CT that we would like the file closed, and no further action be taken by CT. We agree to refer this agreement to an adjudicator appointed under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997, as a consent order pursuant to section 199 of the Act (section 276(5) of the Act).
I do not see any problem in the unqualified
inclusion of these terms. The agreement in Term 7 for delivery vehicles to park
so as
not to inconvenience the other occupier is the common sense solution; no
owner should have their garage blocked by another’s
vehicle – the
by-laws themselves prohibit this practice as well as the Act which provides that
an occupier cannot create a
nuisance for others in the scheme.
In regard
to the request for a consent order, as well as the comments made previously, I
would reinforce the comments that would have
been made by the mediator, namely
that a consent order incorporating mediated settlement terms (as modified by the
adjudicator if
necessary) cannot be appealed as can a normal order, but that the
order can be enforced by each party against the other in the Courts
(see
sections 287 and 289(1)(b) of the Act).
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