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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 17 May 2005
REFERENCE: 0301-2003
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
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Number of Scheme:
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13281
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Name of Scheme:
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Beechwood Gardens
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Address of Scheme:
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9 Norwood Street TOOWONG QLD 4066
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by the Body Corporate,
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I hereby order that –
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STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0301-2003
"Beechwood Gardens" CTS 13281
The applicant body corporate has sought the following orders of an
adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997
("the Act") -
1. Reimbursement of body corporate funds of $194.37 from Barard Management.
2. Reimbursement of body corporate funds of $163.00 from Mrs Denise Stanley.
JURISDICTION:
This is
a dispute between the body corporate (the applicant) and:
(1) the Body Corporate Manager, Barard Management Pty Ltd ("Barard"), as the respondent to the first order sought above, in which the body corporate is seeking the reimbursement of $194.37 charged it by Barard for certain services which it believed were to be rendered free of charge by Barard; and (2) Denise Stanley, the secretary/treasurer at the relevant time, as the respondent to the second order sought, in which the body corporate is seeking the reimbursement of $163 charged by Barard for a budget committee meeting (including cost of minutes) convened at the request of Stanley.
These are both matters falling within
the disputes resolution provisions of the legislation (see sections 227, 228
and 276 of the Act).
General powers of an Adjudicator in making
an order:
Section 276(1) of the Act provides that an adjudicator
may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances (including a
declaratory
order) to
resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles
scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; or b) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or c) a claimed or anticipated contractual matter about – (i) the engagement of a person as a body corporate manager or service contractor for a community titles scheme; or (ii) the authorisation of a person as a letting agent for a community titles scheme.
An order may require a person to act, or
prohibit a person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section
276(2) of the Act). An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or
consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary
or appropriate
(section 284(1) of the Act).
APPLICATION AND
SUBMISSIONS:
Under section 243 of the Act, a copy of the application was
provided to the respondents Barard and Stanley with an invitation for each to
respond to
their respective
matters of dispute raised in the application. Both
respondents made a submission opposing the application so far
as it concerned
them. The applicant body corporate (committee) viewed the submissions and
subsequently lodged a reply (see sections 244 and 246 of the Act).
The disputes were initially referred to the Dispute Resolution Centre of
the Department of Justice and Attorney-General in an attempt
to have them
mediated between the parties, however the Centre advised that the matters were
"deemed unsuitable" for mediation. They were subsequently referred for
adjudication.
DETERMINATION:
"Beechwood Gardens" was
registered as a building units plan (now referred to as a building format
plan) on 20 June 1975 and comprises 20 lots. The scheme is regulated by the
Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 1997
("the Standard Module").
Order 1 – Reimbursement of $194.37
by Barard:
The body corporate is seeking reimbursement of the amount of
$194.37 charged by Barard as part of an electronic funds transfer amount
on 27
June 2001, and shown as "Outlay – Management PEGM
$194.37".
Both owners Jan Haines and Hank Kylstra had discussions
with Richard Holmes, a director of Barard, in September 2000 concerning the
possible management of the body corporate by Barard. They state that there was
no mention of costs involved in the appointment.
In a letter dated 29 March
2001 addressed to Haines, Barard states as follows –
"I have enclosed our Body Corporate Administration Agreement and confirm that our fee is $95.00 per lot per annum, which includes GST. Disbursements incurred on behalf of the body corporate are charged in addition to this fee.
An Extraordinary General Meeting held to appoint Barard Management Pty Ltd as body corporate manager will be held at our cost."
The words used do not refer to a waiver of its basic fee
or some other charge, nor is it conditional. The plain meaning of the words
underlined is that Barard will meet all costs, whether in waiver of its own fee
or some other cost otherwise normally charged, or
indeed any cost it may have to
pay another. It would be reasonable for the body corporate to regard this
concession as income foregone
by Barard in order to obtain the body
corporate’s business, or even perhaps as an incentive for the owners to
vote for its
engagement.
In response to a query from Haines (as chairperson) concerning the $194.37 charged, Barard replied as follows –
"In relation to our appointment in June 2001, we agreed in our letter dated 29 March 2001 that we would hold a general meeting to effect our appointment at our cost. However, we did not agree to absorb costs incurred on behalf of your Body Corporate which amounted to $194.37. No charge was made to you for our time and venue for conducting this meeting."
The
first point to be made here is that there was no venue (see underlining)
for the meeting as the vote on its engagement was done by flying minute, that
is, there was no meeting and the vote
was taken by a written voting paper being
returned to Barard. Hence, presumably, the term "PEGM" in the accounts
and the description "Postal Meeting" in the Grounds to the application.
The legislation only allows for flying minutes by committees; there is no
similar provision for
general meetings (there is provision in section 103(1)(b)
of the Standard Module for every owner to give written consent to allow the
committee to spend over its relevant limit, but that is not relevant
here). While it is not relevant to this application, except for explanatory
purposes, the documentation
before me shows that the engagement did not comply
with the legislation (see section 87 of the Standard Module).
There is no
explanation of what the costs were that Barard would have to
absorb, though apparently the amount does not include any fee for labour
(time).
The final explanatory document put by Barard is its
submission to the application, where it states -
"Our letter of 29 March 2001 states that an extraordinary general meeting will be held at our cost. "Our Cost" relates to our fee of $95 per lot per annum. The disbursements in this case of $194.37, are not our costs but expenses that are normal cost of a body corporate."
Prior paragraphs refer to the engagement agreement providing for a base fee of
$95 per lot per annum and for disbursements such as
"stationery, postage and
photocopying etc that are legitimate expenses of a body corporate. Postage
stamps (or similar), envelopes
and copying paper are purchased in advance for a
body corporate and photocopying equipment is leased and kept at Barard
Management
to avoid many visits to a copy shop."
If the term "Our
Cost" only referred to relief from the base fee, then, as the fee is
constant, there could only be relief if its commencement was delayed.
If what
is being suggested is that the fee did not run from when Barard first did some
work on organising the vote for its engagement,
then that is a fallacy as the
fee could not in any case start until the engagement was voted on and entered
into. The relief extended
could only relate to either labour cost (which has
been specifically excluded) or "disbursements" such as photocopying the
voting paper and notice, envelopes and postage to owners, and perhaps some other
such minor costs. I could
not see how these would reach $194.37 for 20 owners
if they were actually recovery of amounts actually
"disbursed".
Regardless, as commented previously, the plain words "at
our cost" would in my view be reasonably taken to mean that all costs
were to be borne by Barard for its engagement.
I have hesitated in
issuing the order for Barard to repay this amount because of the length of time
since the charge was made (June
2001) and the absence of complaint by the body
corporate until February this year (some 20 months). There is no time
limitation
on an application for such a claim, as these is for say the
invalidation of a meeting or resolution which is three months (which
can be
waived though), however given that there is no satisfactory explanation why the
amount was charged and the engagement was
not valid in any case, I have made the
order.
Order 2 - Reimbursement of $163 by Denise Stanley:
The body corporate contends that the committee decided not to hold a budget
meeting with Barard staff attending, to avoid the additional
fees which applied
under the engagement agreement. It states that Stanley, who was then
secretary/treasurer, called the meeting
"at her cost" for 18 February
2003 at Barard’s office. A copy of the notice for that committee meeting
has the following words at the top
–
"Cost for this meeting is being paid for by the secretary/treasurer – Denise Stanley"
The charge of $163 comprises $148.50 for
labour costs and the balance being the cost of copying minutes and motions
duplicated by
Stanley. Haines and Kylstra attended the meeting after
telephoning Nicole Meiklejohn of Barard who allegedly said there would be
no
charge for Newton’s attendance.
Barard states that it had offered
its office free of charge for the meeting provided no staff member attended.
However, it states
that the arrangement changed on the day and consequently both
Newton and Meiklejohn attended and their time was charged at $148.50.
Barard
states that Newton was asked to attend the meeting with Meiklejohn and Saxby,
but does not say whether the person making
the request was Stanley, Haines or
some other member.
Also, Newton was instructed by Barard directors to
inform those present at the meeting that an additional fee for staff presence
would
be charged; both Newton and Saxby say they told this to those
present.
In her submission, Stanley refers to comments by Barard (Holmes)
in a letter to her dated 4 June 2003 that Haines was advised that
if staff
attended then fees would apply, and they only attended at the insistence of
Haines. Stanley said she had been told by Meiklejohn
that there would be no fee
charged for either her or Newton’s attendance at the meeting. Stanley
says she knew nothing of
the charge until May 2003, and she is of the belief
that Haines deliberately set out to discredit me by advising other body
corporate members that Barard’s would charge for their staff
attendance.
There are a number of obvious conflicting statements. It
need not necessarily be the case that one of more parties are telling deliberate
lies in the matter – there are often misunderstandings in what others have
said, conclusions drawn from what is left unsaid,
and people hearing what they
want to hear.
This jurisdiction does not have the time, resources or
indeed the ability to conduct a hearing at which the evidence given can be
tested to determine, as far as possible, the truth of the matter. Nor given the
amount involved, $163, would the expense be justified.
However, it seems
to me that having given clear notice to other members that the costs of the
meeting were to be borne by her, the
onus was on Stanley to be aware of whatever
charges may arise in the conduct of the meeting. The terms of the agreement
allows for
additional charges to be made by Barard for additional meetings and
time spent by staff on various tasks. Accordingly, despite her
alleged
assurances from Meiklejohn that the presence of both Newton and her at the
meeting would not be charged, she should have
confirmed that and if she chose
not to, as appears was the case, then she must bear the consequences. As well,
Stanley’s allegation
that somehow the gratis presence of Newton and
Meiklejohn became chargeable because of something said between Haines and Barard
(Holmes?)
does not make sense – it is highly unlikely she would bring on a
charge to the body corporate just to discredit Stanley.
In the
circumstances, I consider that Stanley must honour her undertaking to be
responsible for the costs of the meeting of 18 February
20003, and my order is
to that effect. However the cost will be set at $148.50 – the duplicated
photocopying appears to be
an innocent mistake which occurred during work
undertaken for the benefit of the body corporate.
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