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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
Last Updated: 17 May 2005
REFERENCE: 0454-2003
INTERIM ORDER OF AN
ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER PART 9 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT
1997
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Number of Scheme:
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14477
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Name of Scheme:
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The Dees
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Address of Scheme:
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12 Murlong Crescent PALM BEACH QLD 4221
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TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by Michael William Lockhart & Dorothy Joy Lloyd, the co-owners of lot 1
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0454-2003
"The Dees" CTS 14477
The applicants, Michael William Lockhart & Dorothy Joy Lloyd, the
co-owners of lot 1, have sought an order of an Adjudicator under
the Body
Corporate and Community Management Act (the Act) quote -
We request an overturning of the decisions made at the AGM of the body corporate 16.6.2001 under the headings "by-laws" (c) "add new exclusive use by-law 20" and under "Community Management Statement". ... We also request that this by-law be declared invalid and subsequently removed from registration at the Titles Office.
The applicant has also sought an
interim order, quote –
... for the body corporate to cease spending any more money on the carport at "The Dees", 12 Murlong Crescent, Palm Beach either for maintenance or in seeking to have it approved by the council until the matters requested in the above orders are resolved.
Section 279(1) of the Act
allows an adjudicator to make an interim order if satisfied, on reasonable
grounds, that an interim order is necessary
because of the nature or urgency of
the circumstances of the application. An adjudicator’s order may contain
ancillary or consequential
provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or
appropriate (section 284(1)).
In any consideration of an application
which seeks the making of an interim order, it is necessary to determine at the
outset whether,
because of the nature or urgency of the circumstances relating
to the application, an interim order is in fact necessary or appropriate.
The
examples included in the Act under section 279(1) are suggestive of the usual
circumstances where an interim order might be made.
Both examples are in the
nature of injunctive relief.
Whilst the range of matters which might be the
subject of an interim order
is not capable of definition, the applicant does
need
to establish that the circumstances of the application warrant the making
of
an interim order.
An interim order will not be made, or will be
refused, in circumstances where the only urgency relates to the
applicant’s desire
to resolve or expedite the matters in dispute, or where
the nature of the circumstances are such that the matter is not capable of
being
dealt with in the context of an interim order. Again, it is not possible to
define these circumstances. However, given that
an interim order may be made ex
parte (ie. without reference to, or submission from the respondent named in the
matter), then as
a guide, where the circumstances or matters in dispute include
matters or allegations not capable of objective consideration, or
ready
determination, or relate to issues of credibility or character, for example,
where an interim order would be inappropriate,
then the request for an interim
order will be dismissed. It is a matter for an adjudicator to determine in
respect of each application.
In my view there is no aspect of urgency
requiring the requested interim order be made. The fact that the applicant has
waited some
two years to make the application suggests that the matter is not
urgent. Moreover, there is no suggestion that unreasonable costs
are being
incurred at the present time. The question of any apportionment of costs (if
necessary) will be considered in the context
of the final order.
Of
greater significance to my consideration of this matter is the time it has taken
for the application to be made. It is noted that
this application seeks to
invalidate motions resolved at a general meeting of the body corporate in excess
of 2 years ago. The Act
provides for time limits on certain applications.
Section 242 provides –
242 Time limit on certain
applications
(1) This section applies to an application for an
order declaring void--
(a) a meeting of the committee for the body corporate,
or a general meeting of the body corporate; or
(b) a resolution of the
committee or body corporate; or
(c) the election of an executive or other
member of the committee.
(2) The application must be made within 3
months after--
(a) if subsection (1)(a) applies--the meeting; or
(b) if
subsection (1)(b) applies--the meeting at which the resolution was passed or
purported to be passed; or
(c) if subsection (1)(c) applies--the meeting at
which the executive or other member was elected.
(3) However, if the
making of the application does not comply with subsection (2)--
(a) the
commissioner must deal with the application (including making a dispute
resolution recommendation for the application) as
if the making of the
application complied with subsection (2); and
(b) an adjudicator to whom the
application is referred for specialist or department adjudication may, for good
reason, waive the non-compliance.
It is clear from this section that the
application is substantially out of time, and the question arises whether there
is "good reason"
to waive the non-compliance. Whilst the applicants have address
this in their grounds, I intend to invite the submission of owners
to this
question, before considering it in the context of my final order. However, all
parties should be aware that it is a very
real issue given the length of time
which has elapsed relative to the time limit specified in the
section.
This matter will now be investigated in accordance with the
usual processes undertaken by this office. A final order regarding the
application will be made in due course.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QBCCMCmr/2003/12.html