Lucia Court [2002] QBCCMCmr 6 (8 January 2002)

RA MeekREFERENCE: 0732-2001

INTERIM ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR

MADE UNDER PART 10 OF CHAPTER 6

BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACT 1997

Number of Scheme:	28371
Name of Scheme:	Lucia Court
Address of Scheme:	3 - 5 Deakin Street BRONDALE QLD 4500

TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by David Paul Shelley and Hazel Gaye Shelley, the company nominees of Kurwongbah Pty Ltd, the owners of lot 9

RA MeekI hereby order that the application by David Paul Shelley and Hazel Gaye Shelley, the company nominees of Kurwongbah Pty Ltd, the owners of lot 9, for an interim order that the offending barricade – not a safety fence – be removed to enable our company to conduct business as was described to Mr Pires before the sale of the above property, is dismissed.
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF 0732-2001

“Lucia Court” CMS 28371

The applicants, David Paul Shelley and Hazel Gaye Shelley, the company nominees of Kurwongbah Pty Ltd, the owners of lot 9, have sought the following order of an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (the Act), quote -

Remove barricade to allow delivery trucks access to our loading area.

The applicants have also sought an interim order, quote -

We wish the offending barricade – not a safety fence – be removed to enable our company to conduct business as was described to Mr Pires before the sale of the above property.

Section 225(1) provides that an adjudicator may make an interim order if satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that an interim order is necessary because of the nature or urgency of the circumstances to which the application relates. An adjudicator’s order may contain ancillary or consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate (section 230(1)).

In any consideration of an application which seeks the making of an interim order, it is necessary to determine at the outset whether, because of the nature or urgency of the circumstances relating to the application, an interim order is in fact necessary or appropriate. The examples included in the Act under section 225(1) are suggestive of the usual circumstances where an interim order might be made. Both examples are in the nature of injunctive relief. Whilst the range of matters which might be the subject of an interim order is not capable of definition, the applicant does need to establish that the circumstances of the application warrant the making of an interim order.

An interim order will not be made, or will be dismissed, in circumstances where the only urgency relates to the applicant’s desire to resolve or expedite the matters in dispute, or where the nature of the circumstances are such that the matter is not capable of being dealt with in the context of an interim order. Again, it is not possible to define these circumstances. However, given that an interim order may be made ex parte (ie. without reference to, or submission from the respondent named in the matter), then as a guide, where the circumstances or matters in dispute include matters or allegations not capable of objective consideration, or ready determination, or relate to issues of credibility or character, for example, where an interim order would be inappropriate, then the request for an interim order will be dismissed. It is a matter for an adjudicator to determine in respect of each application.

The nature of the matters raised in this application are not such that they can be effectively addressed or dealt with by way of an interim order. Rather, they require full investigation, including submissions from other parties to the dispute, before any order can be made. Accordingly, this application for an interim order is dismissed.

This matter will now be investigated in accordance with the usual processes undertaken by this office. A final order regarding the application will be made in due course. n