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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
P J HanlyREFERENCE: 0630-2000
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 10 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
| Number of Scheme: | 4827 |
| Name of Scheme: | Spinnaker Seas |
| Address of Scheme: | 64 Edmund Steet Kings Beach CALOUNDRA QLD 4551 |
TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by
Tony and Susan NESTEROWICH, the co-owners of Lot
6
P J
HanlyI hereby order that the application by Tony NESTEROWICH and Susan
NESTEROWICH, the co-owners of Lot 6 for an order 2nto keep a dog on the lot, is
dismissed.
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0630-2000
“Spinnaker Seas” CTS
4827
The applicants, Tony and Susan Nesterowich of Lot 6 have sought an order
of an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act
1997 (“the Act”) to take a pet dog to Lot 6.
Section
223(1) of the Act provides that an adjudicator may make an order that is just
and equitable in the circumstances (including
a declaratory order) to resolve a
dispute, in the context of a community titles scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; orb) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or
c) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the terms, or the termination of, or the exercise of rights or powers under the terms of, or the performance of duties under the terms of an engagement contract or an authorisation contract.
An order may require a person to act, or prohibit a
person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section 223(2)). An
adjudicator’s
order may contain ancillary or consequential provisions the
adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate (section 230(1)).
In the
supporting grounds, the applicants included a copy of a letter addressed to the
body corporate manager dated 23 October 2000
where they requested body corporate
permission to take the dog when they stay at the scheme. By letter dated 30
October 2000, the
body corporate manager informed the applicants that the
committee has denied their request.
A copy of the application was
forwarded to the secretary for distribution to all owners (excluding the
applicants). Four lot owners
made written submissions stating their opposition
to the application.
The applicable by-laws for this scheme are those
contained in the Third Schedule of the Building Units and Group Titles Act
1980. The relevant by-law concerning animals is By-law 11 which
states-
11. Keeping of animals.Subject to section 30(12), a proprietor or occupier of a lot shall not, without the approval in writing of the body corporate, keep any animal upon his lot or the common property.
My order is to dismiss the
application for the following reasons.
Firstly, I would like set out what
has been the general approach of adjudicators, and previously the Referee,
regarding disputes involving
animal by-laws.
Most bodies corporate have
by-laws preventing the keeping of animals except with the consent of the
committee. Adjudicators are continuously
being approached with requests for
orders seeking either that an animal be removed, or alternatively, that the
refusal of a body
corporate (committee) for an owner to keep an animal, be
overturned. Often these owners claim there are "special circumstances"
why they
should be allowed to keep an animal. The view of adjudicator’s, as with
the Referee, is that the by-law regarding
animals, like all other by-laws, is
there to be observed. It should not be afforded any special significance simply
because it is
often the subject of much emotion.
General practice is
therefore to either order compliance with the by-law (where removal is sought by
the committee) or to dismiss
the application (where an owner wants the
committee's refusal overturned), except where the owner can establish one of two
things
to the satisfaction of the adjudicator -
• Firstly, that there has been acquiescence on the part of the body corporate in not taking steps to remove the animal for a reasonable period of time. For example, the body corporate has failed to act on the matter for some time causing the owner to assume implicit approval for keeping the animal. The basis for this exception is that it would be harsh and inequitable for an owner to have to remove an animal that they have been allowed to keep over a period of time.
• Secondly, that the body corporate is acting in a discriminatory manner in seeking to remove the animal. Discrimination in this context can take various forms. The clearest example is where the committee refuses the request of one owner to keep an animal but grants approval to another, and there is no logical or reasonable basis for the distinction to be made. An alternative example is where the body corporate seeks an order against one owner keeping an animal when there are one or more other owners who are also keeping animals on the scheme, again with no logical or reasonable basis for the different treatment. The basis for this exception is obviously that bodies corporate must treat all owners equally.
In this instance the applicants have
recently obtained a small dog which they seek to take to the scheme when they
stay at their unit.
The applicants unsuccessfully sought body corporate
approval to keep the dog on Lot 6. The applicants have not shown that the dog
has been kept on Lot 6 with the knowledge of the body corporate, nor have they
established that the body corporate has acted in a
discriminatory manner in
refusing its consent to keep the dog on Lot 6. Further, four of the nine lot
owners have expressed their
opposition to the keeping of the dog. For these
reasons, I have dismissed the application.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QBCCMCmr/2001/50.html