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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
RA MeekREFERENCE: 0304-2001
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 10 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
| Number of Scheme: | 19101 |
| Name of Scheme: | Kenmore Views |
| Address of Scheme: | 19 Merlin Terrace KENMORE QLD 4069 |
TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by the Body Corporate of Kenmore View
RA MeekI hereby
order that the occupier of lot 36, Robert John McVey shall, within six (6)
weeks of the date of this order, remove from the lot and the
parcel generally,
the cat presently being kept by him and other occupiers of the lot, and
thereafter not keep any animal at the lot,
or at the parcel, unless permission
of the body corporate is first obtained. n
STATEMENT OF
ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0304-2001
“Kenmore Views” CTS
19101
The applicant, the Body Corporate for Kenmore Views, has sought the
following order of an adjudicator under the Body Corporate and
Community
Management Act 1997 (the Act), quote -
That Mr McVie be directed to
remove the cat from Lot 36.
Section 223(1) provides that an
adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances
(including a declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a
community titles scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; orb) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or
c) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the terms, or the termination of, or the exercise of rights or powers under the terms of, or the performance of duties under the terms of an engagement contract or an authorisation contract.
An order may require a person to act, or prohibit a
person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section 223(2)). An
adjudicator’s
order may contain ancillary or consequential provisions the
adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate (section 230(1)).
In the
supporting grounds, the applicant states that –
The keeping of pets is against the body corporate by-laws. Mr McVey, the tenant of unit 36 has been advised that this is so and asked to remove the cat from his lot.
The body corporate then attaches various
correspondence regarding this dispute, including various notices sent to the
respondent,
the occupier of unit 36, Robert John McVey.
Mr McVey has
responded to the application by way of submission. Mr McVey has raised a number
of matters in opposition to the decision
of the body corporate. Firstly, he
states that he was advised by the Real Estate Agent that “to their
knowledge pets, such
as cats, were tolerated as several other occupants had cats
and other small animals ...”.
A further point raised by Mr McVey
is that the cat “is my daughter’s pet and has been in the family for
15 years”.
Mr McVey then states other reasons related to this for not
wanting to remove the cat from the lot.
However, I consider that these
are not aspects relevant to the determination of this application. It is
irrelevant to the application
of the by-laws what agents might say to induce
persons to let or buy a lot. The body corporate is not bound by any
representations
the agent might have made. The agent does not have any authority
to make representations on behalf of the body corporate. Mr McVey
might have
some basis for claim against the letting agent, but no basis for now raising
this aspect as
As to the cat being a family pet of some 15 years, and
that a family member would be distressed if the cat was removed, again, this
is
not a concern for the body corporate. Body corporate by-laws are required to be
observed by all occupiers, whether owners or tenants.
On taking up occupation,
Mr McVey is deemed to have known of the by-laws and is required to observe them.
Mr McVey has raised one other aspect. He states that he is willing to
“cooperate” when the committee could confirm that
all other animals
had been removed from the property. Mr McVey now states that –
Until receiving your correspondence I have not had any confirmation of other animals being removed as was indicated would occur, although I had a demand in writing from the body corporate management service, which I ignored in light of the agreement I believed existed.
This is a valid
concern of the respondent. This office will not respond positively to
applications seeking the removal of animals
where it can be established that
there is either acquiescence or discrimination on the part of the body
corporate.
Acquiescence is where the body corporate is shown to have
known of the existence of an animal for a sustained period of time, but
has not
chosen to have taken any action to remove the animal earlier. A finding of
acquiescence on the part of the body corporate
will depend on the particular
facts of each case. It is impossible to state a general rule. However suffice to
say, acquiescence
has not been established here.
The second basis is
discrimination. Discrimination may take many forms. However when it exists, it
is relatively easy to identify.
The respondent has alleged that he should not be
required to remove the animal when others (owners and occupiers) are keeping
animals
at the scheme.
The difficulty I have with the respondent’s
allegation is that it is not substantiated. It is simply a general allegation
that
other animals are being kept at the scheme. It is clear to me from other
evidence available in this office that this is in fact the
case (ie. that other
animals are being kept), but this alone does not establish the
respondent’s point. The question is, does
this, in the circumstances,
amount to discrimination.
At the same time as this application was made,
the body corporate make a very similar application in respect of the occupier of
lot
39 keeping a cat. That application was withdrawn by the body corporate as
that occupier subsequently vacated the unit.
I am also aware of a
further application (0524-2000) to this office by a Susan Mellor, an owner, in
respect of which an order was
made in January 2001. That application was
somewhat complex as it involved the question of a change in the body
corporate’s
policy regarding pets, and certain approvals which had been
given to owners for animals then existing at the scheme. It is clear
from the
reasons for that order, that several lots had been given approval for existing
animals. From the terms of that order, it
seems this approval affected at least
7 lots. Moreover, from a reading of that order, it is clear that the policy of
the body corporate
is now to refuse permission for the keeping of animals.
It is perfectly legitimate for a body corporate to change its policy
regarding animals, and for example, to move from a position of
permitting
animals to prohibiting animals, provided it does so in a clear an unambiguous
manner, in accordance with proper procedures
(ie. requisite change of by-law or
at minimum, a clear indication of a change to the application of an existing
by-law). I consider
that this is what the body corporate has done here, the full
details of which are outlined in the adjudicator’s reasons for
decision in
application 0524 of 2000.
In the circumstances, whilst the
respondent’s allegation is a valid one, I consider that it is
unsubstantiated, and further,
that there is sufficient evidence to establish
that this body corporate is applying a clear and consistent policy towards the
prohibition
of animals. I intend to order that the occupier of lot 36, Robert
John McVey shall, within six (6) weeks of the date of this order,
remove from
the lot, and the parcel generally, the cat presently being kept by him and other
occupiers of the lot, and thereafter
not keep any animal at the lot, or at the
parcel, unless permission of the body corporate is first obtained. n
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