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Queensland Body Corporate and Community Management Commissioner - Adjudicators Orders |
ORDER OF AN ADJUDICATOR
MADE UNDER
PART 10 OF CHAPTER 6
BODY CORPORATE AND COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT ACT 1997
| Number of Scheme: | 20309 |
| Name of Scheme: | MacGregor Court |
| Address of Scheme: | 19 Delfin Drive MACGREGOR QLD 4109 |
TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an application made under the abovementioned Act by
William James Gibson and Averil Adele Gibson, the owners of lot 4
RA MeekI hereby order that the application by William James
Gibson and Averil Adele Gibson, the owners of lot 4, for an order to invalidate
a reolution
carried by ordinary resolution at the AGM of the body corporate held
on 5 August 1999 to the effect that the body corporate was authorised
to proceed
with the erection of a Colorbond fence, is dismissed
I further
order that the body corporate of Macgregor Court is entitled to implement
the terms of the resolution numbered 7 (headed “Boundary
Fence
Replacement) as carried at the AGM of the body coprorate held on 5 August 2000.
STATEMENT OF ADJUDICATOR’S REASONS FOR DECISION - REF
0609-2000
“MacGregor Court” CTS
20309
The applicants William James Gibson and Averil Adele Gibson, the owners
of lot 4, have sought an order of an adjudicator under the
Body Corporate and
Community Management Act 1997 (the Act), to invalidate a reolution carried by
ordinary resolution at the AGM of
the body corporate held on 5 August 1999 to
the effect that the body corporate was authorised to proceed with the erection
of a Colorbond
fence.
Section 223(1) provides that an adjudicator may
make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances (including a
declaratory
order) to resolve a dispute, in the context of a community titles
scheme, about –
a) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the community management statement; orb) the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under this Act or the community management statement; or
c) a claimed or anticipated contravention of the terms, or the termination of, or the exercise of rights or powers under the terms of, or the performance of duties under the terms of an engagement contract or an authorisation contract.
An order may require a person to act, or prohibit a
person from acting, in a way stated in the order (section 223(2)). An
adjudicator’s
order may contain ancillary or consequential provisions the
adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate (section 230(1)).
On
Wednesday 28 February 2001, I undertook a site inspection and met with 8 of the
14 owners, and the body corporate manager.
In the supporting grounds,
the applicants state that –
The accompanying letter dated 6/10/00 confirms that it constitutes an improvement which requires a special resolution to comply with section 113 of the Act and more than 25% of owners voted against this improvement. ...
At no time did the body corporate consider whether replacement of the brushwood fence constitutes maintenance or improvement until the body corporate manager at the AGM 5.8.00 asserted it to be maintenance in response to a request that the motion be determined by special resolution.
Since a fence replacement constituting maintenance is where an existing defective fence is replaced with materials of similar quality and characteristics it could therefore be replaced by timber or a naturally grown hedge which would be closer to the original content and more sympathetic to the environment.
A replacement by Colorbond costing in excess of $10,000 would be considered to be an improvement requiring a special resolution.
The correspondence to which the applicants refer is a circular
letter to owners by the body corporate manager which states in part
that
–
At the last general meeting the majority decision was to proceed with a metal fence which was determined by the majority as an “improvement” and ...
The resolution in question (numbered 7 at the AGM
held on 5 August 2000) is as follows –
It was resolved that the fence replacement be carried out without further delay in accordance with the decision of Motion 2, Agenda Item 4 of the EGM of 8 April 2000 subject to a variation in cost to the current time of $10373 plus GST. (Yes 7, No 5, Abstain 0)
There was a further motion considered at the meeting (motion 8)
that the existing brushwood fence be replaced by one of material which
complies
with the building guidelines for Macgregor Court. This motion was put to the
meeting and lost, with five in favour and seven
against.
In a submission,
the body corporate manager has sought to clarify the use of the term
“improvement” in his correspondence
to owners. He states that
–
The letter contains an error ... it should have read “a maintenance matter”.
An argument over semantics will not be
determinative of this application. The erection of a new fence is either an
improvement requiring
a special resolution under section 113 of the standard
module, or alternatively, is maintenance required of the body corporate under
section 109, which requires only an ordinary resolution, or majority vote of the
owners in general meeting.
I consider there is no dispute that the
existing brush fence is in need of replacement. It is rotting at the bottom, and
this is causing
it to drop below its former height. As well, it is becoming thin
in places, and the roll at the top has now disappeared. The existing
fence is of
brushwood, and the proposed fence is “manufactured from Colorbond
pre-painted steel or zincalume steel (with) steel
lattice ... powder coated to
match the colorbond colour” to quote from the brochure supplied to me at
the inspection.
Owners who are opposed to the order sought by the
applicants have indicated that the choice of wording in the minutes should not
be
construed literally. I have already indicated that the application will not
be determined on semantics.
Another owner states –
... the fence we intend building is not an additional item but only a replacement for what already exists. In my opinion, it does not require a special resolution.
A number of owners have suggested
that a precedent has already been established regarding the matter in question.
Some time ago the
body corporate apparently resolved by ordinary resolution to
replace a former wooden fence with power coated metal fencing along
the front
entrance to the complex.
I consider that the motion to replace the
existing brushwood fence with a colorbond steel fence required only an ordinary
resolution.
I consider that the matter is one of maintenance only, and not
improvement of the common property, as alleged by the applicants.
“Improvement” normally denotes something which is new, or not
formerly existing. Where is it the replacement of something
which is already in
existence, then I suggest that the issue is most likely one of maintenance, and
the onus is very much on the
person alleging improvement to make out a case for
this. I do not consider that applicants have evidenced such a case.
It
would be an unintended restriction on the body corporate’s obligation to
maintain the common property under section 109 to
require the body corporate to
only maintain common property in the existing or original manner, method or
product. In my view, a
body corporate is entitled to determine, at the point in
time when maintenance is required, the preferred method of maintenance.
In this
case, the body corporate has elected to replace the existing fence with a
different style of fencing. Notwithstanding this,
the end result is a fence,
which serves the same purpose.
As well, this body corporate has at least
five different styles of fencing on its various boundaries. These various
fencing styles
are -
• Brick and concrete insert;• Brick and timber insert;
• Chain and barbed wire;
• Tubular metal;
• Brushwood fence.
This fact also evidences to me that
this is maintenance only. I suggest that there is no definite or even
predominant style of fencing
within this body corporate. Rather the fencing
appears to be quite ad hoc. Given this, for the body corporate to now select a
different
style of fencing is not a departure from an existing predominant style
of fencing, since I consider there is none.
I now turn to consider a
secondary matter which arose at the time of the inspection. It seems that one
owner, though not opposed to
the proposed style of fencing per se, nevertheless
considers that along the length of the tennis court adjoining the common
property,
the height of the fence should equal that of the timber paling fence
which has been erected by the adjoining owner.
I acknowledge that this
is not part of the application proper. However I want to indicate some thoughts
on the issue with the view
to avoiding any potential future dispute.
At
the inspection, when this issue was discussed, it seems that there were two
proposed solutions. The first was to increase the height
of the proposed fence
along the entire length of the boundary. This proposal was almost universally
rejected by those present, particularly
for the reason of cost. The second
proposal was to “step up” the proposed fence along the length of the
tennis court.
Whilst it was difficult to get a clear indication, it seemed to me
that of those owners available at the inspection, the clear majority
did not
support this proposal either.
Whilst I am not deciding this matter,
since it was not raised in the application proper, I have formed the view that
the detriment
to the owner of the lot in question if the proposed fence were to
be erected slightly lower in height than the adjoining timber paling
fence is
not signficant. I would not consider the aesthetic impact of a small part of the
adjoining fence line being visible to be
so detrimental to the owner in
question, that the owner might reasonably be entitled to relief by way of a
favourable order of this
office. Additionally, that owner would also have to
consider the provisions of section 193 of the Act which impose certain time
limitations
on applications, should he now seek to make application regarding
this aspect.
y
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QBCCMCmr/2001/129.html