R v Sheather [2011] NSWSC 1239 (21 October 2011)

Last Updated: 9 January 2012

Supreme Court New South Wales

Case Title:	R v Sheather
Medium Neutral Citation:	[2011] NSWSC 1239
Hearing Date(s):	20 June 2011
Decision Date:	21 October 2011
Jurisdiction:
Before:	Hoeben J
Decision:	For the crime of murdering Brett Donald Jones, Ricky John Sheather is sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years with a non-parole period of 15 years. The non-parole period is to commence on 6 December 2009 and is to expire on 5 December 2024 and the balance of term of five years is to expire on 5 December 2029. The earliest date on which Ricky John Sheather will be eligible for release on parole will be 5 December 2024.
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing - murder - intention to inflict grievous bodily harm - significant level of intoxication - whether personality disorder contributed to offence - guilty plea - standard non-parole period not applicable
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Cases Cited:	Maxwell v R [2007] NSWCCA 304; 177 A Crim R 498 R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228
Texts Cited:	---
Category:	Sentence
Parties:	Regina (Crown) Ricky John Sheather (Offender)
Representation
- Counsel:	Mr PJ Barnett SC (Crown) Mr TJ Golding (Offender)
- Solicitors:	Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales (Offender)
File number(s):	2009/274905
Publication Restriction:	---

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

1. HOEBEN J : The Offender, Ricky John Sheather, is sentenced for the offence of murder. He pleaded guilty to that offence on 20 June 2011 which was the first day of his trial. The Offender has been in custody since his arrest on 6 December 2009. This was the date on which the offence occurred.

Factual Background to Offence

2. The Offender was born in October 1967 and is now 44. He was aged 42 at the time of the offence.

3. The Offender had been in a relationship with Fiona Duckett for about 15 months. She and her two sons had initially lived with the Offender in his flat in Wauchope and, for about two months before 6 December 2009, Ms Duckett and her sons lived in Flobern Street, Wauchope. The Offender was a frequent visitor to these premises, often staying overnight.

4. The deceased, Brett Donald Jones, had a son who was also known as Brett Ritchie. The son was aged 24 at the time of the offence and the deceased was aged 41. They were known as "Little Brett" and "Big Brett" respectively.

5. The Offender and the deceased had known each other since school days. It would seem that over the years, there had been instances and occasions of acrimony - even some physical conflict between them. The best description of a somewhat volatile relationship is that given by a witness, Michael Donovan:

"Ricky and Brett had their fights with each other but were good mates and would drink with each other and say hello."

6. Given the circumstances in which the offence occurred, I am not prepared to find that the Offender and deceased were enemies and that they hated each other as was suggested by the Offender in his ERISP.

7. On Sunday, 6 December 2009, the Offender awoke at Flobern Street. At about 11.00 am, he commenced to drink white wine. During the morning, he stopped drinking to assist a neighbour to move some furniture in a trailer. When he returned to Flobern Street, he resumed his drinking. He also, apparently, consumed three cones of cannabis.

8. On that same day, the deceased and Brett Ritchie were also drinking. For part of the time, they were down near the river in Wauchope and for part of the time they were at the home of Michael Donovan where they consumed some beer and some cannabis. At about 11.15 am, Mr Donovan gave the deceased and his son a lift up the road, dropping them in the shopping centre of town.

9. During the afternoon, the deceased and his son were making their way home. After walking for some time, they entered Flobern Street. As a result of the hot weather, and because of the alcohol which they had consumed they were, by this time, finding the walk somewhat difficult. They noticed the Offender drinking on his front porch and the two men crossed the road and joined him on the porch. The time was about 4.00 pm.

10. The Offender invited the deceased and Brett Ritchie in for a drink and they went to the eating area just off the kitchen where they sat at a table. They commenced to drink and talk about old times. Ms Duckett was cooking in the kitchen. One of her children was in the lounge room playing and the other was with a friend at the rear of the house.

11. Whilst they were talking, the men commenced to get loud and Ms Duckett told them to quieten down, which they did. After some time, she sat on the lap of the Offender and then stood up. Immediately after she did so, the Offender got up, went to the kitchen bench and picked up two large knives.

12. At the committal proceedings, Ms Duckett described the deceased as "heavily intoxicated" and the Offender as a little bit more intoxicated than the deceased. She described Brett Ritchie as "mid-range intoxicated" .

13. Having picked up the two knives, the Offender turned back to where the deceased and Brett Ritchie were sitting at the table. Ms Duckett tried to push the Offender back telling him to stop and put the knives down. She tried to grab the knives but the Offender swung them about and she received cuts to both her hands. She called to Brett Ritchie to grab the knives from the Offender.

14. She was joined by the deceased who stood to one side of her and Brett Ritchie on the other side. The Offender then lunged at the deceased, striking him in the chest with one of the knives. This caused an open wound in the chest. The deceased stood for a short time before collapsing on the floor, bleeding profusely. Brett Ritchie went to his assistance.

15. The Offender walked out the front door of the house still carrying the knives. Ms Duckett followed him screaming for help. In the front yard, the Offender verbally threatened her and came towards her. She picked up a piece of timber and swung it at the Offender, striking him around the ankles. The Offender then dropped the knives. When he first emerged from the house, the Offender was heard yelling threats and shouting at the neighbours.

16. The screaming and yelling of Ms Duckett alerted various neighbours who made "000" calls. Police responded and two constables arrived at 5.02 pm. Immediately upon arrival, the Offender was arrested and handcuffed.

17. One of the police officers commenced to perform CPR upon the deceased, but was unsuccessful in reviving him. When ambulance officers arrived, they examined the deceased and pronounced him dead.

18. A post-mortem examination of the deceased identified the cause of death as a stab wound 8.5 cm long and 3.5 cm wide to the left side of the chest. The wound had damaged the second and third ribs and passed through the left ventricle of the heart, slitting the left front coronary artery. The deceased had a blood-alcohol level of .308.

19. When interviewed following his arrest, the Offender was unable to remember the details of what happened. Specifically, he was unable to identify what it was that caused him to go into the kitchen and pick up two knives. Similarly, Ms Duckett in her statement, was unable to identify anything which was said, or any action which had taken place which would account for the Offender's conduct.

20. I find beyond reasonable doubt that neither the deceased nor Brett Ritchie offered or inflicted any violence on the Offender, nor did either one of them do anything to provoke him other than being present at the time.

Objective Seriousness

21. Section 19A Crimes Act 1900 specifies the maximum penalty for murder as imprisonment for life.

22. Section 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ("the Sentencing Act") provides for the imposition of the maximum penalty where the Court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme as to require that that sentence be imposed.

23. The offence of murder is, however, an offence for which a standard non-parole period of 20 years is prescribed, pursuant to the provisions of Division 1A of Part 4 of the Sentencing Act. This non-parole period is to be imposed after trial for offending which is in the mid-range of objective seriousness. Aggravating and mitigating factors justifying a greater or lesser sentence also need to be considered ( Maxwell v R [2007] NSWCCA 304; 177 A Crim R 498 at [18]).

24. In this case, there was no trial. Nevertheless the authorities make clear that the standard non-parole period remains relevant as a guidepost or reference point. Accordingly, it is necessary to assess the objective seriousness of this offence. On the facts of this case, the Crown submitted that the offence fell below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this kind. In my opinion, that was a concession properly made by the Crown.

25. The circumstances of the offence, together with the very intoxicated state of the Offender, make it clear that the offence was unplanned and unpremeditated and occurred as a spur-of-the-moment act. Nevertheless, by resisting the efforts of Ms Duckett to restrain him, it was also clear that the Offender had a determination to use the knives against the deceased. That having been said, it is significant that having struck the blow to the chest of the deceased, the Offender ceased his attack on the deceased.

26. I am satisfied that the intention of the Offender at the time, was not to kill, but was an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. The actions of the Offender, both at the time of the offence and in the front yard thereafter, are demonstrative of the onset of his inexplicable rage, but not of an intention to kill.

27. An analysis of the facts of the offence, by reference to the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in s.21A of the Sentencing Act, confirms my conclusion that the objective seriousness of this offence falls below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this kind.

28. The fact that a weapon was used is clearly an aggravating factor (s.21A(2)(c)). However, the effect of that aggravating factor is reduced in that the Offender taking up a weapon was unplanned and spontaneous.

29. That the offence was committed in the presence of a child and at Ms Duckett's home are also aggravating factors (s.21A(2)(ea), (eb)). Whilst those are important matters, their seriousness is reduced by the circumstances in which the offence occurred. The onset of the Offender's rage was spontaneous and inexplicable. It is clear that the Offender had little, if any, awareness of where he was and who else was present when pursuing his single-minded intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm on the deceased.

30. By way of mitigation, the Crown accepted that the Offender did not have any significant record of previous convictions (s.21A(3)(e)). Whilst the Offender did have a relatively minor record of criminal offences consisting of the misuse of a motor vehicle on occasions and convictions for assault and damage to property more than 10 years before, these were not the sort of matters which would prevent him from gaining the benefit of this subsection.

31. Although the Offender did not give evidence in the sentencing proceedings, I am prepared to find that he has shown remorse for the offence. I do so because of his plea of guilty and because of his expressions of remorse in the ERISP and to the forensic psychologist, Ms Robilliard. In his ERISP, he said:

"I feel bad that Brett's passed away, you know. We went to school together, we played football together. Yeah I feel bad." (Q150)

In her report of 22 August 2011, Ms Robilliard recorded the Offender as saying "I regret he is dead - we had some good times" and "I regret his kids are going to grow up without him" .

32. His prospects of successful rehabilitation (s.21A(3)(h)) and the likelihood of him not reoffending (s.21A(3)(g)) are less clear. He clearly has strong family support and family members were present during the sentencing hearing. Whilst he has problems with his temper, his capacity to control it and therefore to not reoffend would appear to be closely linked to his regular abuse of alcohol in the 10 years leading up to the offence. If those matters could be addressed, his prospects of rehabilitation would improve and the likelihood of him reoffending would be less.

33. On the state of the evidence before me, I cannot reach any conclusion one way or the other on this issue. No doubt, he will have the opportunity while in prison to attend courses which will address these matters, but the evidence before me was largely silent on these questions. In the Offender's favour is the fact that despite his alcohol issues, his contact with the criminal law over the years has been comparatively minor.

34. The Offender's level of intoxication is not a matter which can be properly taken into account by way of mitigation. It provides an explanation, but not an excuse, for his otherwise irrational behaviour. To the extent that the Offender can gain some benefit from his state of intoxication, he has done so in my finding that the offence was unplanned, unpremeditated and spontaneous.

Subjective Features

35. In the Offender's case, a comprehensive report from Ms Robilliard, forensic psychologist, was placed before the Court. In order to prepare that report, Ms Robilliard spent over three-and-a-half hours with the Offender and conducted a number of tests. Her report provided valuable information as to the Offender's background.

36. The Offender was the eldest in a family of two boys and a girl. His younger brother is in stable employment and his sister and her husband live in Wauchope as do his parents. He came from a caring and stable family. He left school at the end of Year 10 in order to obtain work at the local sawmill. The Offender was in steady employment in essentially labouring jobs from that date until approximately 10 years before the offence when he was forced to give up work as a result of a back injury and what he said was agoraphobia. He received a disability pension for those conditions and had been in receipt of that pension for 10 years until the date of the offence.

37. The Offender's IQ was found to be in the average range. Personality tests "evidenced symptoms which could attract a diagnosis of Schizotypal Personality Disorder and he evidenced characteristic avoidant depressive and self-defeating behavioural attributes at an entrenched and characteristic level . This combination of significant scores describes an individual who would experience significant interpersonal difficulties because of deficits in his ability to comprehend the meaning and significance of interpersonal behaviour and marked reluctance to form close emotional ties" .

38. In relation to his period of unemployment, Ms Robilliard said:

"Without the structure of employment the client described a slow pace of life and he acknowledged developing an entrenched pattern of binge drinking and cannabis use. According to the scores he achieved on the personality test administered he barely saw his use of alcohol and illegal drugs as problematic. However, during our interview Mr Sheather acknowledged regularly experiencing consequent blackouts associated with his binges. This apparent anomaly suggests that Mr Sheather's attitude to his substance use is unrealistic and defensive."

39. Ms Robilliard recorded an episode of the Offender being sexually molested from the age of five to nine years, but there was no connection made between that and his offending behaviour. There was certainly nothing in his history which would suggest that this sexual molestation was relevant to these sentencing remarks.

40. Ms Robilliard's conclusion was:

"From the personality test results obtained from the client during our meeting symptoms of Schizotypal Personality Disorder were described which contributed to interpersonal difficulties because of deficits in the individual's ability to comprehend and interpret the meaning of interpersonal behaviours. An intelligence test administered showed the client's overall IQ score placed him into the Average range. He demonstrated an unusual deficit on the Verbal subtest which does not necessarily equate to deficits in verbal comprehension as higher order executory skills may also be relevant. Neuropsychological testing would be required to elucidate the aetiology and clinical significance of the client's spread of scores."

41. Earlier in the report, Ms Robilliard defined the behaviour of schizotypal individuals as follows:

"Schizotypal individuals lead socially isolated lives and exhibit eccentricities such as odd mannerisms, expressions and clothing. They often drift to and from various locations and sources of employment, and generally function on the fringes of society with very few, if any, enduring emotional attachment. Their thought processes are scattered and their capacity to comprehend the meaning of interpersonal behaviour is typically limited."

42. While it is clear that the Offender had a personality disorder, the relationship between that disorder and the offence is not clear. The difficulty for the Court is to determine what, if any, weight should be given to the Offender's personality disorder in the sentencing process.

43. In R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228, Sperling J set out the principles that should be considered when an offender who suffers from a mental illness is to be sentenced. The issue here, of course, is whether in fact the Offender suffers from such a mental illness. The matters to be considered as set out in R v Hemsley are:

"[33] Mental illness may be relevant ... in three ways. First , where mental illness contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, the offender's moral culpability may be reduced; there may not then be the same call for denunciation and the punishment warranted may accordingly be reduced: Henry at [254]; Jiminez [1999] NSWCCA 7 at [23]; Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 at 400; Lauritsen [2000] WASCA 203; (2000) 114 A Crim R 333 at [51]; Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [23]; Pearson [2004] NSWCCA 129 at [43].

[34] Secondly , mental illness may render the offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence and moderate that consideration: Pearce (NSW CCA, 1 November 1996, unreported); Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 71 per Gleeson CJ; Letteri (NSW CCA, 18 March 1992, unreported); Israil at [22]; Pearson at [42].

[35] Thirdly , a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on a mentally ill person: Tsiaras at 400; Jiminez at [25]; Israil at [26]."

44. There is no real explanation in the evidence for why the Offender became so upset and reacted so violently at the time of the offence. One can speculate and surmise that he may have misunderstood what was being said by the deceased and his son and that the reason for this was the personality disorder identified by Ms Robilliard. To make a finding to that effect, however, would involve exactly that - speculation. That is not an exercise which the Court should engage in.

45. There is no clear evidence either of a direct or inferential kind, which would indicate that the Offender's personality disorder contributed to the commission of the offence. Similarly, there is no evidence capable of establishing that this Offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence. Similarly, there is no evidence that a custodial sentence might weigh more heavily on the Offender than a person without his personality disorder.

46. As a result, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me, that the Offender's personality disorder should be taken into account in any significant way in moderating the sentence which should be imposed.

Victim Impact Statements

47. I have received victim impact statements from the deceased's wife, his son, Brett, his daughter, Stacey, and his mother. Those statements eloquently describe the love which the deceased brought to his family, in particular his wife and children. The statements set out clearly the terrible loss that all of the family have suffered by the deceased's death.

48. The deceased's son, Brett, has set out in detail the significant effect which seeing his father's murder has had upon him and his family. He now suffers problems with sleeping and it has adversely affected his relationship with his friends and family. The loss of his father continues to cause in him a serious grief reaction.

49. The deceased's mother, daughter and wife have described their continuing sorrow at his loss and the great gap that his absence has brought into their lives. They all continue to feel great grief and loss because of his death.

50. I accept fully that the circumstances of the deceased's death have affected each member of the deceased's family and those close to him. Whilst the family may expect to see their loss and pain reflected in the sentence to be imposed, that is not the reason I have received their statements in these proceedings. I do, however, take into account their statements in the way permitted by the law and I note that no sentence of imprisonment can compensate for the loss of a loved one. I extend to them my sympathy for their loss.

Conclusion

51. The Offender's plea of guilty was entered late. Nevertheless, it still had utilitarian value in that the cost of a two-week trial was avoided including the necessity of Ms Duckett's sons giving evidence in circumstances which would have undoubtedly been traumatic for them. In the circumstances, the Offender is entitled to a discount for his plea of guilty of 10%.

52. Murder has always been the most serious crime in the criminal calendar. Absent extraordinary circumstances, it calls for a substantial sentence by way of imprisonment to serve the interests of punishment, including denunciation and general deterrence. However, as I have already indicated, the objective seriousness of offences of murder need to be assessed within the appropriate range.

53. I have been referred to a number of sentencing decisions where attacks occurred similar to (but not identical with) the offence which occurred here. Some of these involved sentencing after trial, some after pleas of guilty and some preceding and post-dating the standard non-parole period provisions to which I have referred. I have examined the sentencing remarks in those cases, including those to which both the Crown and the defence drew my attention, making due allowance for their individual facts and circumstances.

54. The purposes of punishment include, in addition to general and specific deterrence, the rehabilitation of an offender, protection of the community and retribution. In view of my finding that the Offender's personality disorder had little influence on the commission of this offence, deterrence both general and specific, is important. In relation to this offence, I have had regard to factors in mitigation and factors of aggravation. What cannot be avoided, however, are the specific circumstances of the case. The offence involved a violent and unprovoked attack, the trigger for which has not been identified.

55. At the heart of the offence of murder is the taking of a human life. The infliction of violence upon a person is always serious. Where the act of violence causes the death of that person, the Courts must denounce such conduct by the imposition of appropriate sentences. A significant sentence of imprisonment is required in this case to punish the Offender and to deter others who may engage in similar conduct.

56. Contrary to the submissions made by senior counsel for the Offender, I do not propose to make a finding of special circumstances. The length of the term during which the Offender is under supervision will be sufficiently long to allow for the Offender's reintegration into the community. Any lengthier period would be of little utility.

57. The Offender's plea of guilty, my finding that the offence was below the middle of the range of objective seriousness for offences of murder and my review of all relevant facts are reasons for departing from the standard non-parole period.

58. Ricky John Sheather, for the crime of murdering Brett Donald Jones, I sentence you to imprisonment for 20 years with a non-parole period of 15 years. The non-parole period is to commence on 6 December 2009 and is to expire on 5 December 2024 and the balance of term of five years is to expire on 5 December 2029. The earliest date on which you will be eligible for release on parole will be 5 December 2024.

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