R v Keli LANE [No 22] [2010] NSWSC 1549 (24 November 2010)

Last Updated: 15 March 2011

NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT

CITATION:
R v Keli LANE [No 22] [2010] NSWSC 1549


JURISDICTION:


FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/256171

HEARING DATE(S):
09/08/2010 - 13/12/2010

JUDGMENT DATE:
24 November 2010

PARTIES:
Regina (Crown)
Keli LANE (Accused)

JUDGMENT OF:
Whealy J

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):


LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:




COUNSEL:
M Tedeschi QC / H Baker (Crown)
K Chapple SC / S Sloane (Accused)

SOLICITORS:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
K Laurie, Archbold Legal Solutions (Accused)


CATCHWORDS:


LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900 ss 327, 330
Adoption of Children Act 1965

CATEGORY:
Procedural and other rulings

CASES CITED:


TEXTS CITED:


DECISION:




JUDGMENT:

- 1 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES

COMMON LAW DIVISION

CRIMINAL LIST

WHEALY J

WEDNESDAY 24 NOVEMBER 2010

2009/256171 REGINA v Keli LANE

JUDGMENT: see page 3012 of transcript

1 HIS HONOUR: The accused is charged with three counts of perjury, each count relates to a statement made in an affidavit filed in court, the first two affidavits relating to the adoption of the accused's daughter Tahlia and the third related to the adoption of another child Aaron. It is necessary for the Court to determine whether each of these three statements alleged to have been made by the accused in the affidavits was material to the proceedings, that is, practically relevant to the issues in the proceedings.

2 This is an essential ingredient in each of the perjury charges, but its existence must be determined by the trial judge and not by the jury (see section 327 of the Crimes Act).

3 I have been addressed at considerable length by each side on the issue of materiality. Having regard to the terms of the Adoption Act, the terms of the other legislation that has been referred to during the arguments and the facts as outlined to me during the arguments, I am not satisfied that the Crown has established materiality in relation to any of the three perjury charges.

4 The consequence is that the jury will be directed to acquit the accused of each perjury charge but invited as an alternative to consider whether the accused should be convicted in each case of making a false statement on oath (see sections 329 and 330 of the Crimes Act). I will in due course publish my reasons for reaching this decision.

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LAST UPDATED:
22 February 2011