State of New South Wales v Hill (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 1139 (28 October 2009)

Last Updated: 30 October 2009

NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT

CITATION:
State of New South Wales v Hill (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 1139


JURISDICTION:
Common Law

FILE NUMBER(S):
11422/2009

HEARING DATE(S):
22 June 2006, 23 June 2006, 24 June 2006, 26 June 2006.

JUDGMENT DATE:
28 October 2009

PARTIES:
State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Allan Troy Hill (Defendant)

JUDGMENT OF:
Rothman J

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Not Applicable

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
Not Applicable

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Not Applicable



COUNSEL:
C Adamson SC / D T Kell (Plaintiff)
P Strickland SC (Defendant)

SOLICITORS:
Crown Solicitor's Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)


CATCHWORDS:
SERIOUS SEX OFFENDER – application for extended supervision order – statutory requirement is satisfied – no issue of principle – extended supervision order made for 3 years with restrictions on electronic monitoring

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605
Tillman v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 327

TEXTS CITED:


DECISION:




JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES

COMMON LAW DIVISION

ROTHMAN J

28 OCTOBER 2009

11422/2009 State of New South Wales v Allan Troy Hill (No 3)

JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: The State of New South Wales applied for an extended supervision order against Allan Troy Hill. The Court granted Interim Supervision Orders against Mr Hill, firstly, on 26 March 2009, and the Court had continued Interim Supervision Orders from that date until 26 June 2009, when an Extended Supervision Order issued. These are the reasons for the grant of the Extended Supervision Order and for the conditions imposed therein.

2 The originating process was filed on or about 13 March 2009 and an amended summons was filed, in Court, on 22 June 2009. The Extended Supervision Order issued under s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (“the Act”) and, pursuant to s 11 of the Act, the Court ordered that the defendant be directed to comply with certain conditions.

3 Mr Hill did not oppose the making of an Extended Supervision Order, but did oppose some of the conditions sought by the State of New South Wales.

Facts

4 The offences upon which the State of New South Wales relies to found the Extended Supervision Order were committed in 1998 in Dubbo. The victim was an adult female and Mr Hill was convicted of five offences of aggravated sexual assault, in contravention of s 61J of the Crimes Act 1900 for which Mr Hill was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 10 years, with a 7 year non-parole period. The circumstance that gave rise to aggravation was the threatened infliction of actual bodily harm by the use of a knife. At the time of the offences, Mr Hill was 32 years of age.

5 The 1998 offences were committed while Mr Hill was on parole for a sentence imposed in respect of other sexual offences that were committed in 1993, and for which Mr Hill was convicted in 1994. These earlier offences were committed in Wellington, NSW. Again, the victim was an adult female.

6 Mr Hill was released on parole on 2 September 2008. This parole was in relation to the 1998 offences. Mr Hill relapsed into the use of drugs and alcohol and otherwise failed to comply with some other conditions of his parole (namely, obey reasonable directions) and the State Parole Authority revoked his parole on 6 February 2009, whereupon Mr Hill returned into custody. As recorded in the ex tempore judgment of 26 March 2009, Mr Hill’s sentence expired at midnight at the conclusion of 26 March 2009.

7 Abuse of alcohol was a significant factor in each of the sexual offences with which Mr Hill has been charged over the years. It is generally accepted that, in the absence of alcohol or alcohol abuse, Mr Hill does not pose a significant threat of the kind with which the Act seeks to deal. Nevertheless, Mr Hill does pose a significant and dangerous threat, if and when Mr Hill imbibes alcohol. Fundamentally, the issue in these proceedings is whether there is, overall, a high degree of probability that Mr Hill is likely to commit a further serious sex offence, if he were not kept under supervision: see s 9(1)(a) of the Act. Necessarily, that depends upon the risk, if any, that Mr Hill will drink alcohol.

8 As earlier stated, Mr Hill’s last day in prison was 26 March 2009, from which time, with one exception to which I will shortly refer, he was complying with the terms of an Interim Supervision Order to which he was subject. During that time, on 12 April 2009, Mr Hill supplied one of many random urine samples. However, this sample displayed a very small amount of cocaine metabolites. There is a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence in relation to the presence of cocaine metabolites in Mr Hill’s urine. The small amount involved may have been the result of an accidental or incidental indigestion of the drug, when another person was using it, or an innocent ingestion from the consumption of contaminated legal substances. Each of the foregoing possibilities is available on the evidence before the Court in these proceedings. On the other hand, Mr Hill may have used the cocaine.

9 While I accept that the mere presence of the metabolites in such small amounts may not be sufficient, because there is a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, to convict Mr Hill of a criminal offence, or, if separately actionable, a breach of the conditions of the Interim Supervision Order, I also accept that, on the balance of probabilities, Mr Hill used cocaine. In other words, I accept that, even though the ingestion of cocaine was in small quantities, it is more likely than not that it was taken knowingly. As such, it is a fact to which consideration may be given in determining the risk that Mr Hill will re-offend in the relevant sense. It is also a factor that the Court may take into account in determining the conditions that it ought to impose upon Mr Hill.

10 On the other hand, if the consumption of cocaine were, as submitted on Mr Hill’s behalf, wholly innocent, then there are significant issues relating to the persons with whom he keeps company. Each scenario, whether or not innocent, arising from the urine sample and the necessary inferences that arise therefrom, raises issues of concern that must be considered in determining the questions that are before the Court on this application. Apart from the relevance of each scenario to the question of the likelihood of re-offending, each is relevant to the determination of whether Mr Hill requires supervision that identifies his whereabouts at any particular time.

Legislation

11 The legislative requirements for the making of an extended supervision order are prescribed by ss 9, 10 and 11 of the Act, and, relevantly, are in the following terms:

“9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

(1) The Supreme Court may determine an application for an extended supervision order:

(a) by making an extended supervision order, or

(b) by dismissing the application.

(2) An extended supervision order may be made if and only if the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender is likely to commit a further serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision.

(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant:

(a) the safety of the community,

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious sex offence,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(f) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will in future commit offences of a sexual nature.”

“10 Term of extended supervision order

(1) An extended supervision order:

(a) commences when it is made, or when the offender’s current custody or supervision expires, whichever is the later, and

(b) expires at the end of such period (not exceeding 5 years from the day on which it commences) as is specified in the order.

(2) An offender’s obligations under an extended supervision order are suspended while the offender is in lawful custody, whether under this or any other Act or law, but that suspension does not affect the expiry date of the order.

(3) Nothing in this section prevents the Supreme Court from making a second or subsequent extended supervision order against the same offender.”

“11 Conditions that may be imposed on supervision order

An extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate, including (but not limited to) directions requiring the offender:

(a) to permit any corrective services officer to visit the offender at the offender’s residential address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address, or

(b) to make periodic reports to a corrective services officer, or

(c) to notify a corrective services officer of any change in his or her address, or

(d) to participate in treatment and rehabilitation programs, or

(e) to wear electronic monitoring equipment, or

(ea) to reside at an address approved by the Commissioner of Corrective Services, or

(f) not to reside in or resort to specified locations or classes of locations, or

(g) not to associate or make contact with specified persons or classes of persons, or

(h) not to engage in specified conduct or classes of conduct, or

(i) not to engage in specified employment or classes of employment, or

(j) not to change his or her name.”

12 Further to the above, a supervision order may be varied or revoked on application by the State of New South Wales or by Mr Hill. Non-compliance with the terms of a supervision order is a criminal offence for which an offender is liable to a fine and imprisonment.

13 The Court has, in other judgments, had an opportunity to comment on the interpretation of the key words in s 9(2) of the Act and has determined that “a high degree of probability”, which constitutes the statutory standard of proof, is higher than the civil standard, but lower than the criminal onus (Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 at [27] per Bell J).

14 On appeal, the Court of Appeal in Tillman v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 327 confirmed the approach of Bell J, to which reference is made above. Further, the Court of Appeal determined that the word “likely”, “denotes a degree of probability at the upper end of the scale, but not necessarily exceeding 50 per cent”: Tillman, supra, at [89]. The majority, in contra distinction to Mason P, took the view that “likely” does not mean “more probable than not”. While the Court of Appeal was dealing with the provisions of s 17(3) of the Act (which provision deals with continuing detention orders, as distinct from continuing supervision orders), the relevant terms and purpose of the two provisions, with the necessary changes, are identical, and an identical interpretation is appropriate. The interpretation is not relevantly distinguishable and is binding.

15 Lastly, while dealing with legislative provisions, the Court considers it necessary to repeat the terms of s 61J of the Crimes Act, the terms of which self-evidently satisfy the definition of “serious sex offence” in s 5 of the Act. Section 61J of the Crimes Act is an offence under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act and is in the following terms:

“61J Aggravated sexual assault

(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person and in circumstances of aggravation and who knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse is liable to imprisonment for 20 years.

(2) In this section, ‘circumstances of aggravation’ means circumstances in which:

...

(b) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument.”

As earlier stated, the circumstances of aggravation in the offences committed by Mr Hill were the threat of actual bodily harm with a knife.

Evidence

16 The State of New South Wales relies on affidavits of Ms Milne, Mr Sheehan, Mr Rowan, Ms Stevens, Dr Samuels and Dr Roberts. Mr Hill relies on his own evidence and the evidence of Dr Westmore. It is unnecessary to detail all of the evidence and facts to which the witnesses attest. It is sufficient, for present purposes, particularly in light of the position of Mr Hill not to oppose the making of an Extended Supervision Order, to note that the evidence establishes that the defendant is a sex offender, as defined in s 4(1) of the Act, because he has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment following his conviction for a serious sex offence that he committed whilst he was an adult: see s 6 of the Act.

17 Further at the time that the application for a supervision order was filed, Mr Hill was serving a sentence for imprisonment for a serious sex offence, as earlier noted. An Interim Supervision Order issued while Mr Hill was still serving his sentence. That application was also brought in the last six months of the custody that Mr Hill was required to serve. As a consequence of the foregoing, the statutory preconditions to the grant of an Extended Supervision Order have been satisfied.

18 In order to issue an Extended Supervision Order, the Court needs to be satisfied that the test prescribed by s 9(2) of the Act have also been satisfied. As is clear from the foregoing statutory provisions, and the comments already made, the Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that Mr Hill is likely to commit a further serious sex offence if he is not kept under supervision. In particular, the evidence of Dr Samuels (Exhibit A, Report 20 April 2009, page 20) includes the following:

“I note the definition of ‘serious sex offence’ in section 5 of the Crimes (Serious Offenders) Act 2006 and I note that this can involve an offence against an adult or a child and that the offence is punishable by imprisonment for seven years or more. I note that there were circumstances of aggravation in both the offences of 1993 and 1999 and I note that in both these instances Mr Hill was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of greater than seven years. I note that Mr Hill continues to deny all responsibility for the offence which occurred on 23/4/1999 and continues to state that the evidence linking him to that offence was ‘circumstantial’.

I think it is likely with ‘a degree of probability at the upper end of the scale but not necessary [sic] exceeding 50%’ that Mr Hill could reoffend in a similar manner.”

19 Notwithstanding that Dr Samuels refers to whether Mr Hill “could” re-offend, the import of his opinion, and of the other evidence, satisfies the court to a high degree of probability that Mr Hill is likely to re-offend. Dr Roberts opined that Mr Hill “represents a high risk of offending both violently and sexually.” Even Dr Westmore, qualified by Mr Hill, does not recommend the absence of a supervision order. The major issues related to the duration of the Extended Supervision Order and some of the conditions, particularly the requirement to wear a satellite navigation amulet and the reporting conditions associated therewith. Even if the term “likely” meant “more probable than not”, the Court would be satisfied of the requirement.

20 In relation to the matters that are truly in issue, the most relevant evidence, in the exercise of the discretion of the Court, is the evidence of Mr Rowan, the evidence of Mr Hill and the evidence of Dr Westmore. I shall deal briefly with that evidence. Before doing so, I note that Dr Roberts, uncontrovertedly, opined that

“Mr Hill’s acts of sexual violence are driven not only by a desire for sexual gratification, but by a desire to dominate, control and instil fear as a means of demonstrating masculinity. Whilst antilibidinal medication is expected to reduce libido and potentially mitigate aspects of his [Mr Hill’s] offending behaviour related to his sex drive, it would not be expected that other aspects, which drive his violent offending, would be significantly altered.” (Exhibits C, Report 4 May 2009, page 40.)

21 As noted during the course of the proceedings, Mr Hill was an impressive person, who gave the impression that he genuinely desired to cease (or continue the cessation of) his abuse of alcohol and was remorseful for his past abuse of women. However, as also noted, the Court was observing Mr Hill, when he was sober. Moreover, his description of his past offending glossed over a number of the aspects of the offences, to the extent of a misrepresentation of them. Mr Hill was an honest witness. Indeed, he gave answers honestly and not necessarily answers that were in his interests. Mr Hill was particularly opposed to the electronic monitoring equipment that pinpointed his whereabouts at any particular time. He described it as “like an invisible prison bar” by which he would “feel trapped”, if he were required to wear it.

22 His attitude to alcohol was somewhat ambivalent. He acknowledged that alcohol presented a significant problem for him, but, somewhat candidly, remarked that part of the programs in which he has been enrolled seemed to encourage the view that offenders could blame the alcohol. More importantly, he informed Dr Roberts, at a session organised to assess Mr Hill for the purposes of these proceedings, that he [Mr Hill] “could safely use both alcohol and cannabis” (Transcript, page 101). The unanimous view of the expert witnesses, who have given evidence on this subject, is that Mr Hill could never safely use alcohol, and any use of alcohol by him would render him an immediate risk of relevant re-offending.

23 Mr Rowan was an extremely impressive witness, who, from the perspective of the Court, reassured the Court that those persons to whom responsibility is devolved by the Act held the expertise necessary to exercise the functions, and understood the need to balance the protection of society, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the need for sufficient flexibility to allow rehabilitation to be completed. Obviously, the best way to protect society is to ensure the rehabilitation of the offender. However, the difficulty is always that rehabilitation may not be likely, or may not be certain, and the purpose of the legislature is that society must be protected from the risk identified by the Act.

24 Mr Rowan testified that the Department continued to monitor the progress of persons under its supervision, and, to the extent that such persons displayed the kind of discipline that satisfied the Department of their continuing rehabilitation, the Department relaxed the strictures that it originally imposed, and that it was entitled to impose. The prime example, given by Mr Rowan, was that some of the less risky offenders (in which category Mr Hill would fall) were relieved of the necessity to wear GPS monitoring equipment, sometimes as early as six months into the term of the Extended Supervision Order. Given Mr Hill’s continuing rehabilitation, he anticipated that, if Mr Hill were to display the necessary discipline, Mr Hill may be able to be excused from wearing such monitoring equipment after a period of that kind. Nevertheless, Mr Rowan maintained the necessity to have the Department able to continue the monitoring, should Mr Hill not display the appropriate discipline.

25 Apart from the obvious advantage that the equipment allowed the Department to place an offender within a particular area, the electronic monitoring equipment allows the Department a greater capacity to obtain more random breath and urine tests for drugs and alcohol. The six-monthly review, which is undertaken by the Department, involves consultation with other service providers including the offender’s maintenance psychologist. In order for the GPS style electronic monitoring equipment to function appropriately, it is necessary for the offender to notify the Department, in advance, of the offender’s movements.

26 Dr Westmore, who was qualified by Mr Hill, agreed that an Extended Supervision Order was appropriate and should be imposed. However he disagreed with the proposed duration of that order, and suggested that the duration of such an order be between 12 and 24 months. The basis of that suggestion was the need for a review within that period, and an Extended Supervision Order of that duration would impose such a review. It is clear from the evidence of Mr Rowan that a review of Mr Hill would occur, it seems, every six months.

27 In dealing with Mr Hill’s alcohol abuse, Dr Westmore referred to the desirability of setting a timeframe that would enable Mr Hill to continue to modify his behaviour and maintain the conditions. In the process of his evidence, Dr Westmore said:

“People don’t go from problematic drinking psychologically to non-drinking psychologically overnight, it’s a process. And he’s already describing that process; they move towards sobriety. You can influence behavioural changes in them by saying you mustn’t drink and that happens. But the most important changes, the psychological changes, he’s already describing that process.” (Transcript, page 126.)

28 Dr Westmore was asked, by counsel appearing for Mr Hill, about whether Mr Hill would be able to comply, practically, with the conditions of reporting and electronic monitoring, to which Dr Westmore replied, in part:

“All I can say about this is that restrictions of this type will obviously impact significantly on his life-style particularly in terms of preventing or reducing any spontaneity in his life-style. I think it could be quite difficult to organise your life 48 hours in advance, not for all things but obviously for some things particularly activities of spontaneity. So there would be those restrictions. But that’s really I think all I can say about that. It would impact on his life-style to a degree.”

In cross-examination, Dr Westmore conceded that the foregoing opinion as to difficulty was ameliorated by the availability of an officer to approve any proposed changes to Mr Hill’s regime on a seven day a week 24-hour a day basis. He also agreed that Mr Hill would benefit from and needed structure in his life. And, if Mr Hill were able to obtain approval for changing his schedule immediately, or fairly soon thereafter, such a condition would be appropriate. Dr Westmore’s qualification, in those circumstances, to that agreement was that such restrictions should be in place for only 12 to 18 months. (See Transcript, pages 129-130.)

29 Dr Westmore was also cross-examined about the proposed condition relating to the need for any potential sexual partner of Mr Hill to be informed of his prior history. In the course of that cross-examination, Dr Westmore expressed the following view:

“First of all I’d say I think it’s essential that Mr Hill – any sexual relationship of an intense type that he was describing that the partners are aware of his history. I believe they need to be informed and the Department should have the capacity to do that. Mr Hill would be wise and should be counselled about the need to do that himself as well.”

He explained that by “as well” he meant earlier than the Department, and explained:

“Because he is going to need to tell the Department once he is in such a relationship and it would be wise because I would then anticipate the Department will contact his partner and ask them directly ‘Has he told you about X, Y and Z?’ and that would be appropriate.” (See Transcript, page 131.)

30 On the issue of the duration of the Extended Supervision Order, Dr Westmore specified that proposed condition, as a condition that Mr Hill would probably breach. Dr Westmore said:

“If the bar is set too high for [every] person they will hit the bar. He has this five years of very strict conditions without any option or chance of modification and that is a very high bar. And my opinion’s fairly simple about this: I think as I said right at the outset it is a behavioural modification program and without having any potential positive reinforcements within it, his chances of failing are high.

If I see a patient who’s got a problem I don’t send them away and give them a set of instructions that they must comply and come back in five years and all will be well. I want to see them every week, every fortnight, to monitor them, to see how they are going; to see if I need to modify my treatment, modify my rehabilitation plan, and I think as I said before, if it’s so far away without him having any hope of having some modification such as possibly going into an RSL, if he has been able to demonstrate sobriety, attendance at therapy and AOD, if there is no chance of any changes, as I say, the history of behavioural modification programs they fail if you don’t introduce positive reinforcement.” (See Transcript, page 132.)

Dr Westmore eventually agreed that the provision of a schedule might go some way to reducing impulsive activity and providing structure in Mr Hill’s life: Transcript, page 135. Without repeating the Transcript, Dr Westmore ultimately conceded that the provision of a schedule and an electronic monitoring device would be appropriate and helpful if it were for a shorter period than was suggested by the Department and, particularly, that it is likely, even with the best intentions in the world, that Mr Hill, in his progress towards sobriety, will, from time to time, relapse, and the conditions imposed upon him ought be such as to encourage his move towards sobriety: Transcript, page 136.

Conditions and Conclusions

31 As has already been noted, the Court is satisfied of the statutory preconditions for the making of an Extended Supervision Order. The major issues concern the duration of such an order, the requirement, if any, for an electronic monitoring equipment to be worn (and the requirement to submit a schedule 48 hours in advance), and the notice, if any, to be given to any prospective person with whom Mr Hill anticipates having a relationship.

32 Some of the cases in this area relate to the competing goals of rehabilitation of the offender, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, protection of the community. In this case, there is no tension between the two goals. As has been stated in other proceedings, the rehabilitation of the offender is, if it could be assured, the best means of protecting the community. The difficulty is always that evidence of rehabilitation is no guarantee that rehabilitation will be effective or continuing. As earlier stated, Mr Hill is an unusual, if not exceptional, example of an offender against whom an order is sought and/or against whom an order is to be made. Firstly, except in the most general sense, Mr Hill’s offences do not relate to a particular class of person, from whose vicinity Mr Hill should be restricted. A typical example of the last mentioned type of offender would be paedophiles, who make up something in the order of 85% of those persons against whom an Extended Supervision Order has been made.

33 The Court is satisfied that, if Mr Hill were to remain sober and/or abstemious, he would not re-offend. As Dr Westmore has attested, the difficulty (and the risk) is that there is a likelihood that he will not remain abstemious, and, in order to protect the community, an Extended Supervision Order is required that would provide the structure to ensure the continuation of his current attitude and cement the alterations to his lifestyle. I also accept Dr Westmore’s opinion that a finite period during which Mr Hill is required to answer to the Department (and be monitored in that compliance) would assist. If, as even the Department would not expect, Mr Hill were not able to maintain his current attitude to alcohol, it would be open to the Department to apply for a variation of the order beyond its initial short-term duration.

34 The Court is comforted in its approach by the obvious competence of Mr Rowan and his attitude. I accept the submissions of Mr Strickland SC, on behalf of Mr Hill, that, given the absence of resources available to Mr Hill, it is, in this case, appropriate to require the Department to apply for alteration, rather than Mr Hill. The duration of the order will be for a period of 3 years from the date that the order is first made (i.e. 26 June 2009) and that the defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment, as directed by the Department, including GPS type equipment for a period of 12 months. After the initial period of 12 months the defendant will be required to wear a device that monitors compliance with the curfew (i.e. allows the Department to know whether Mr Hill is home or not). That second period will also expire at the end of a further 12 months.

35 Coupled with that monitoring will be a requirement that Mr Hill advise the Department, no later than 48 hours in advance, of his movements. That information will be advised by the provision of a schedule. Further, Mr Hill is required to notify the Department of any proposed change to the schedule, as soon as the change becomes known. By this order, the Court is seeking to impose the structure of which Dr Westmore spoke, but building in a flexibility that allows notification of last minute changes. That last-minute advice does not require approval, but the alteration may be vetoed, if the Department were, on a reasonable basis, to consider it problematic.

36 The Court has also accepted, and seeks to implement, the advice of Dr Westmore as to the information to be provided concerning relationships with women. The requirement to notify the Department shall arise only when Mr Hill anticipates or hopes to enter into a relationship that will develop into an ongoing relationship involving sexual or intimate contact. Further, the Department must give Mr Hill an opportunity to disclose to the person, with whom the relationship is intended, the history that gave rise to his status as a serious sexual offender. Some flexibility is given to the Department, if it were of the view that it is necessary to disclose that history to other persons.

37 Most of the other matters are agreed, but the Court notes that Mr Hill must accept medical treatment for his alcohol and/or drug dependence as prescribed by the authorities. Likewise, Mr Hill must accept psychological intervention directed by the Department.

38 Lastly, the Court has made it a condition of the Extended Supervision Order that the Department, to the extent that it considers it appropriate so to do, may, for the purpose of investigating whether employment to be undertaken should be approved, provide any prospective or actual employer of Mr Hill information that Mr Hill is subject to a supervision order and the terms of the order, and make enquiries of the employer sufficient to satisfy the Department that the employment is appropriate.

39 The foregoing are the reasons that the Extended Supervision Order was made on 26 June 2009, and the reason for the conditions that were part of that Extended Supervision Order.

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LAST UPDATED:
29 October 2009