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Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales |
Last Updated: 23 June 2011
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Medium Neutral Citation:
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Decision Date:
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Decision:
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1) Each of the defendants is found guilty of each of
the offences as charged and convicted accordingly.
2) I impose a penalty upon Stephensons Cranes Pty Ltd in the sum of $140,000 in matter no IRC 939 of 2010 and of $140,000 in matter no IRC 940 of 2010 with a moiety to the prosecutor in each case. 3) I impose a penalty upon Stephen John Gauci in the sum of $8,500 in matter no IRC 937 of 2010 and of $8,500 in matter no IRC 938 of 2010 with a moiety to the prosecutor in each case. 4) The defendants are to pay the costs of the prosecutor as agreed or assessed under the Legal Profession Act in the proportion that each of the penalties bears to the aggregate of all penalties imposed in these proceedings. |
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Catchwords:
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY - breach of s 8(1)
& s 8(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 by the corporate
defendant -personal defendant deemed guilty of the same offence by virtue of s
26(1) - guilty pleas - objective seriousness - general and specific deterrence -
commitment to occupational health and safety obligations
- cooperation with the
WorkCover Authority - contrition and remorse - good corporate citizen - prior
conviction for corporate defendant
- principle of totality - orders made
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Legislation Cited:
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Cases Cited:
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Inspector Waterhouse v Stephensons Cranes Pty Ltd
[2005] NSWIRComm 103
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Representation
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- Solicitors:
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Publication Restriction:
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8 Duties of employers
(1) Employees
An employer must ensure the health, safety
and welfare at work of all the employees of the employer.
That duty extends (without limitation) to the following:
(a) ensuring that any premises controlled by the employer where the employees work (and the means of access to or exit from the premises) are safe and without risks to health,
(b) ensuring that any plant or substance provided for use by the employees at work is safe and without risks to health when properly used,
(c) ensuring that systems of work and the working environment of the employees are safe and without risks to health,
(d) providing such information, instruction, training and supervision as may be necessary to ensure the employees' health and safety at work,
(e) (e) providing adequate facilities for the welfare of the employees at work.
(2) Others at workplace
An employer must ensure that
people (other than the employees of the employer) are not exposed to risks to
their health or safety
arising from the conduct of the employer's undertaking
while they are at the employer's place of work.
26 Offences by corporations-liability of directors and managers
(1) If a corporation contravenes, whether by act or omission, any provision of this Act or the regulations, each director of the corporation, and each person concerned in the management of the corporation, is taken to have contravened the same provision unless the director or person satisfies the court that:
(a) he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to its contravention of the provision, or
(b) he or she, being in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the contravention by the corporation.
(2) A person may be proceeded against and convicted under a provision pursuant to subsection (1) whether or not the corporation has been proceeded against or been convicted under that provision.
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) prejudices or affects any liability imposed by a provision of this Act or the regulations on any corporation by which an offence against the provision is actually committed.
(4) In the case of a corporation that is a local council, a member of the council (in his or her capacity as such a member) is not to be regarded as a director or person concerned in the management of the council for the purposes of this section.
(1) The defendant failed to ensure a system of operating mobile cranes, in particular a Tadano TL-250M-5 hydraulic mobile crane (the crane) that was safe and without risks to health, in that the defendant should have, but did not, ensure that the employees complied with a prohibition against operating the crane when the weight of a load for the required lift and movement exceeds the capacity of the crane (the prohibition). The defendant should have, but did not, ensure such compliance by:
(a) regularly reiterating and reinforcing the prohibition to employees such as at tool box meetings;
(b) providing employees with a crane which has a lifting capacity for the required lift and movement that exceeds the load to be lifted;
(c) not providing a crane that is required to operate at or beyond its maximum lifting capacity for the load to be lifted; and/or
(d) conducting regular site audits to ensure that crane operators do not operate overloaded cranes and otherwise comply with an appropriate Safe Work Method Statement.
(2) The defendant failed to ensure that the crane provided for use by the employees at work was safe and without risks to health, in that the defendant should have, but did not:
(a) accurately measure and/or verify the weight of a load, namely a packaged spa pool (the load), and/or ensure that the required working radius of the crane (the working radius) was accurately measured and/or verified by the crane operator and/or dogman, for the purpose of selecting, providing and/or ensuring the use of a crane with sufficient capacity to perform the required lift and movement of the load;
(b) apply an appropriate load chart for the crane using an accurate load weight for the purpose of ensuring that the crane had sufficient capacity to perform the required lift and movement of the load;
(c) otherwise provide the employees with a crane which had sufficient capacity to lift and move the load according to the working radius;
(d) ensure that the safety device on the crane known as the "Automatic Moment Limiter" (AML), and in particular the "Load Moment Limiter", was accurately calibrated and/or functioning correctly; and/or
(e) otherwise regularly and adequately maintain the crane to ensure (d), including by carrying out and recording monthly inspections, and/or periodic inspections at intervals of no more than one year, and/or external inspections conducted by a third-party at intervals of no more than one (or, in the alternative, two) years, in which the AML device is inspected, tested and calibrated by: (i) using known weights to check the accuracy of the AML computer read-out as to load weight, (ii) extending and measuring the boom in several different positions to check the accuracy of the AML computer read-out as to the length of the boom, and (iii) lowering the boom in several different positions, and checking the gauge on the side of the boom (or another gauge that can measure the angle of the boom) to check the accuracy of the AML computer read-out as to the angle of the boom.
(3) The defendant failed to ensure a system of operating the crane near overhead power lines that was safe and without risks to health, in that the defendant should have, but did not:
(a) consult with and obtain the written approval of the electricity network operator to operate the crane in the 'no go zone' directly above power lines, and comply with any conditions imposed by the network operator for the work;
(b) make arrangements with the electricity network operator for the overhead power lines to be de-energised, isolated or re-routed away from the work activity during the lift; and/or
(c) provide effective insulation on the overhead powerlines such as a sheath.
(4) The defendant failed to provide such information and instruction to the employees as was necessary to ensure their health and safety at work, in that the defendant should not have provided the employees with inaccurate information about the safe configuration of the crane for the required radius.
(5) As a result of the defendant's failures the employees were placed at risk to their health and safety, namely, the risk of electric shock and/or being struck or thrown by the crane, its load and/or falling debris as a result of the crane tipping over during the lifting and moving of the load.
(6) The defendant failed to provide such information and instruction to the employees as was necessary to ensure that the occupants were not exposed to risks to their health or safety, in that the defendant should not have provided the employees with inaccurate information about the safe configuration of the crane for the required radius.
(1) At all material times the Prosecutor was an Inspector duly appointed under Division 1 of Part 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 ( the Act ) and empowered under Section 106(1)(c) of the Act to institute these proceedings.
(2) The proceedings relate to the investigation of an incident involving Ian McCue ( Mr McCue ) and Blake Gauci on 1 September 2008 while undertaking work as employees of Stephensons Cranes Pty Ltd ( Stephensons ) at or around a residential property at [details omitted] Miranda, in the state of New South Wales ( the premises ) occupied by Graham Stewart Leech and Jacqueline Francoise Antoinette Leech ( the occupants ).
Background
(3) At all material times, Stephensons:
(a) had a sole director, Ms Christine Adair, who was Mr Stephen John Gauci's ( Mr Gauci ) mother-in-law;
(b) was an employer and employed, inter alia, Mr McCue (as a crane operator) and Mr Blake Gauci (as a dogman);
(c) conducted a mobile crane hire business;
(d) leased a fleet of 14 cranes, 6 trucks and 10 cars for use in the conduct of its business ( the fleet ), including a Tadano TL250M-5-20101 (serial number 340786, and registration number YFW 995) hydraulic mobile crane ( the crane ); and
(e) leased the fleet from S.P. Gauci Holdings Pty Ltd ( SP Gauci ), the directors of which were Mr Gauci and his wife Ms Patricia Gauci.
(4) At all material times, Mr Gauci was a person concerned in the management of Stephensons in that he performed duties as, and occupied the position of, General Manager of Stephensons. Mr Gauci was solely responsible for the day-to-day running of the Stephensons' business, including responsibility for buying and selling assets, employment of staff and occupational health and safety.
(5) As at 1 September 2008, Stephensons had continuously employed Mr McCue as a crane operator for a period of about 7 years. Mr McCue was 52 years of age and had approximately 26 years of experience as a crane operator. He operated the crane on a daily basis. Mr McCue had a construction induction card, a heavy vehicle driver licence and a national certificate of competency. Mr McCue had completed a course titled 'Powerline Awareness for Non-Electrical Workers' a component of which was titled 'Guide for Operating Cranes and Plant near Power Lines' dated 26 August 2004.
(6) As at 1 September 2008, Stephensons had employed Mr Blake Gauci (who was Mr Gauci's son) for a period of about 18 months. Blake Gauci had been employed by Stephensons as a dogman for about 6 months prior to 1 September 2008. Blake Gauci was 17 years old at the time of the incident, and was completing a logbook and had a General Induction ticket for Construction Work (dated 27 September 2006). Blake Gauci did not, as at 1 September 2008, have a dogging ticket, basic rigging ticket or powerline risk management training. Blake Gauci was not aware of the existence or requirements of the WorkCover 'Work Near Overhead Power Lines' Code of Practice 2006 ( the Code of Practice ).
The incident
(7) [Details omitted] in Miranda is and was at all material times, approximately 7.5 metres wide from gutter to gutter. The occupants' house was located on a steep block which fell away and downwards from the road.
(8) Overhead powerlines were situated between the kerb and the premises.
(9) On or about 27 August 2008 the occupants of the premises, Mr Graham Leech and Ms Jacqueline Leech ( the occupants ), engaged Stephensons to lift and move a spa bath ( the load ) onto a deck at the rear of their house situated at the premises. Stephensons subsequently agreed to perform the work at a cost of $800.
(10) Mr Gauci instructed Mr McCue to attend the premises to lift the load on 1 September 2008 pursuant to the aforesaid arrangement between Stephensons and the occupants.
(11) At about 10am on 1 September 2008, Mr McCue and Blake Gauci arrived at the premises to undertake the task of lifting the spa bath over the premises and onto the rear patio using the crane. Mr McCue and Blake Gauci spoke with the occupants, "stepped out" the distance between the location of the crane and the landing area to estimate the working radius of the crane (which Mr McCue estimated at between 28 to 29 metres), set up the crane, including attaching the 'fly' jib to the boom, extended and supported the outriggers or stabilisers, and conducted a test lift to ascertain the weight of the load as being between 700 to 800 kilograms (including the packaging and the hook and slings).
(12) The fly-jib attached to the boom of the crane was 8.7 metres in length. Mr McCue attached the jib at a 5 degree angle to the boom. The boom was elevated and fully extended to 33 metres, giving an overall length of 41.7 metres, with the fly-jib attached. This was the configuration of the crane at the time of the incident.
(13) Mr McCue and Blake Gauci slung, lifted and slewed the load towards the house. The boom was lowered, or 'jibbed down', to reach the required landing spot and in doing so, it passed over power lines. Once the load was over the residence, Blake Gauci returned to the rear of the residence with Mrs Leech.
(14) Blake Gauci and the occupants were standing on the deck at the rear of the house as the load approached that area. The load was intended to be placed on the deck.
(15) Blake Gauci was guiding Mr McCue via two-way radio contact. Immediately prior to the incident, Blake Gauci advised Mr McCue to stop. Blake Gauci then noticed that the load continued to move beyond the house and further advised Mr McCue to stop. When the load continued to move away from the house, Blake Gauci realised that Mr McCue was not in control of the load and that the load was falling.
(16) The crane tipped over.
(17) As the crane tipped over and the load fell:
(a) Blake Gauci states that he was nearly standing underneath the load.
(b) Graham Leech states that he was approximately 4 metres from the load; and
(c) Jacqueline Leech states that she was 2 to 2.5 metres from the load (although Blake Gauci states that she was 10 to 15 metres away).
(18) Blake Gauci and the occupants ran out of the way. The load then fell in an area below and beyond the patio-deck. The boom of the crane then fell through the roof of the house and onto the rear second storey balcony. The boom of the crane also fell onto the overhead power lines.
(19) The collapse of the crane's boom onto the power lines caused the fuses of the power line to rupture resulting in an electrical power outage to approximately 27 houses within the area for about 15 hours.
(20) Immediately after the boom fell, Blake Gauci ran to check that one of the occupants, Mrs Leech, was safe, and then ran to the front of the house to check the condition of Mr McCue. The occupants also ran to the front of the house.
(21) Mr McCue was situated within the cabin of the crane when it tipped over.
(22) Blake Gauci used an extension ladder provided by the occupants to assist Mr McCue to get out of the crane. Blake Gauci did not take any steps to ensure that the crane was not live as a result of the broken power lines.
(23) Mr McCue was at risk of electric shock and/or being struck or thrown by the crane as a result of the crane tipping over during the lifting and moving of the load.
(24) Blake Gauci was at risk of being struck by the load and/or falling debris as a result of the crane tipping over during the lifting and moving of the load.
(25) The occupants were at risk of being struck by the load and/or falling debris as a result of the crane tipping over during the lifting and moving of the load.
(26) Police notified the electricity distributor, Energy Australia, at 10.55am via the Energy Australia Outage Management System. Emergency services, which included the Police, Fire Brigade and Paramedics from the Ambulance Service arrived and proceeded to control the situation and to treat Mr McCue who had grazed his hand during the crane tipping over.
The systems failures
(27) Mr McCue has stated that he had been previously permitted to proceed with lifts despite loads reaching the maximum capacity of a crane, and that he had not been given an option whether or not to perform lifting jobs that had been so allocated to him.
(28) There was a computerised safety device on the crane known as the "Automatic Moment Limiter" ( AML ) that had recorded about 50 prior incidents of lifting overloads over the life of the crane. The AML does not record the reason for any instance of lifting overload.
(29) Stephensons had a generic Safe Work Method Statement that contained a prohibition against using a crane to lift while "overload" ( the prohibition ).
(30) Stephensons should have, but did not, ensure compliance with the prohibition by:
(a) regularly reiterating and reinforcing the prohibition to employees such as at tool box meetings;
(b) not providing a crane that is required to operate at or beyond its maximum lifting capacity for the load to be lifted; and/or
(c) conducting regular site audits to ensure that crane operators do not operate overloaded cranes and otherwise comply with an appropriate Safe Work Method Statement.
The plant failures
(31) The weight of the load, excluding the weight of the hook, slings and all load handling devices, was about 780 kilograms. The working radius of the crane at the premises was about 32 metres ( the working radius ).
(32) The load chart for the crane indicates the maximum weight loads (including the weight of the hook, slings and all load handling devices) for various working radii at which there arises a likelihood that the crane will become unstable and tip over: ( the load chart ). The point at which a risk of the crane tipping over arises at a working radius of 31.2 metres with a jib attached to the boom at a 5 degree angle is a load weight of 250 kilograms.
(33) The load chart thus demonstrated that the crane was incapable of safely lifting the load according to the working radius.
(34) Mr Gauci attended the premises and prepared a site inspection report on or about 29 August 2008. This report incorrectly noted the weight of the load as being 450-500 kilograms, with a total load weight (including the hook, slings and chains) of 600 kilograms. The weight of the load was provided by Mr Leech.
(35) Mr Gauci's site inspection report also noted that the working radius was 32 metres, and that a jib offset angle of 40 degrees would be required.
(36) According to the load chart, a working radius of 31.5 metres and a 45 degree jib offset angle (the jib of the crane could only be set at 5 degrees, 25 degrees or 45 degrees) indicated that the maximum safe load weight was 350 kilograms. [However, the site inspection report had instructed a fly and needle set up which if adhered to would have given a safe load weight of approximately 445 kilograms in accordance with the Australia Standard. The Australian Standard provides an additional further weight tolerance of 25 per centum.]
(37) Blake Gauci was given a copy of this site inspection report prior to performing the lift on 1 September 2008. Prior to attending the premises that morning, Mr Gauci told both Blake Gauci and Mr McCue that they would need to use a fly and needle.
(38) Mr McCue and Blake Gauci, in their assessment, were unable to erect the needle to the jib for the purpose of moving the load over the working radius, as instructed by Mr Gauci referred to in paragraphs 36 and 37 above, because the presence of overhead electrical wires running across the road resulted in insufficient room to do so.
(39) Prior to attending the premises on 1 September 2008, Mr McCue was told that the weight of the load was either about 350 or 450 kilograms.
(40) Pursuant to an inspection of the crane after the incident by CraneSafe Australia in January 2009, it was discovered that the AML device, and in particular the "Load Moment Limiter", was not calibrated in conformity with the load chart, such that the AML mechanism would not operate to stop the motion of the crane when it reached a dangerous point of overload or "tipping point". When functioning properly, the AML device would automatically stop the motion of the crane when it reached a dangerous point of overload or "tipping point"
(41) In addition, at the time of the incident on 1 September 2008 the AML device was overridden by the emergency AML switch.
(42) Stephensons did not maintain complete maintenance records for the crane. Stephensons did not have any records of periodic/annual inspections of the crane, as required under Australian Standard 2550.1 - 2002, Section 7.3.1(c) and 7.3.4.1. Stephensons did have monthly inspection reports, but not for the life of the crane.
(43) Stephensons failed to ensure that the crane provided for use by the employees at work was safe and without risks to health, in that Stephensons should have, but did not:
(a) accurately measure and/or verify the weight of the load, and/or ensure that the required working radius of the crane ( the working radius ) was accurately measured and/or verified by the crane operator and/or dogman, for the purpose of selecting, providing and/or ensuring the use of a crane with sufficient capacity to perform the required lift and movement of the load;
(b) apply an appropriate load chart for the crane using an accurate load weight for the purpose of ensuring that the crane had sufficient capacity to perform the required lift and movement of the load;
(c) otherwise provide the employees with a crane which had sufficient capacity to lift and move the load according to the working radius;
(d) ensure that the AML device on the crane, and in particular the "Load Moment Limiter", was accurately calibrated and/or functioning correctly; and/or
(e) otherwise regularly and adequately maintain the crane to ensure (d), including by carrying out and recording monthly inspections, and/or periodic inspections at intervals of no more than one year, and/or external inspections conducted by a third-party at intervals of no more than one (or, in the alternative, two) years, in which the AML device is inspected, tested and calibrated by:
(i) using known weights to check the accuracy of the AML computer read-out as to load weight,
(ii) (extending and measuring the boom in several different positions to check the accuracy of the AML computer read-out as to the length of the boom, and
(iii) lowering the boom in several different positions, and checking the gauge on the side of the boom (or another gauge that can measure the angle of the boom) to check the accuracy of the AML computer read-out as to the angle of the boom.
The power lines failures
(44) The Code of Practice and various Australian Standards, such as "Cranes, hoists and winches - Safe use (Part 5: Mobile cranes) AS 2550.5-2002" ( the Australian Standard ), requires, inter alia, crane operators to obtain prior written permission from the electricity distributor to operate a crane above power lines, comply with any conditions specified by the electricity distributor, and to observe a hierarchy of safety controls including making arrangements to isolate or de-energise power lines before commencing work near them.
(45) Stephensons did not comply with the Code of Practice or the Australian Standard on 1 September 2008.
(46) Stephensons should have, but did not:
(a) consult with and obtain the written approval of the electricity network operator to operate the crane in the 'no go zone' directly above the power lines, and comply with any conditions imposed by the network operator for the work;
(b) make arrangements with the electricity network operator for the overhead power lines to be de-energised or isolated during the lift or re-routed away from the work activity during the lift; and/or
(c) provide effective insulation on the overhead powerlines such as a sheath.
The information, instruction and training failures
(47) As noted above, Mr Gauci's site inspection report on or about 29 August 2008 incorrectly recorded the weight of the load as being 600 kilograms. The report also noted that a jib offset angle of 40 degrees would be required. According to the load chart, a working radius of 31.5 metres and a 45 degree jib offset angle (the jib of the crane could only be set at 5 degrees, 25 degrees or 45 degrees) indicated that the maximum safe load weight was 350 kilograms.
(48) Stephensons, through Mr Gauci, provided Mr McCue and Blake Gauci with inaccurate information as to the load weight and the safe configuration of the crane for moving the load over the working radius on 1 September 2008.
(49) Mr McCue did not himself apply the load chart at the premises, and could not recall how to use one as at July 2009.
(50) Mr McCue and Blake Gauci were not provided with site specific Safe Work Method Statement.
(51) As a result of Stephensons' failures the occupants were placed at risk to their health and safety, namely, the risk of being struck by the load and/or falling debris as a result of the crane tipping over during the lifting and moving of the load.
The exclusion failure
(52) Stephensons' failed to prevent or otherwise prohibit the occupants from being near or in the vicinity of the crane and/or the landing area for the load during the process of lifting and moving the load.
System of work after the incident
(53) Following the incident on 1 September 2008, Stephensons engaged an Occupational Health and Safety Officer, Mr Andrew Westwood, and has instituted a system of recording tool box meetings and conducting regular site audits.
Orders
1) Each of the defendants is found
guilty of each of the offences as charged and convicted accordingly.
2) I
impose a penalty upon Stephensons Cranes Pty Ltd in the sum of $140,000 in
matter no IRC 939 of 2010 and of $140,000 in matter
no IRC 940 of 2010 with a
moiety to the prosecutor in each case.
3) I impose a penalty upon Stephen
John Gauci in the sum of $8,500 in matter no IRC 937 of 2010 and of $8,500 in
matter no IRC 938
of 2010 with a moiety to the prosecutor in each case.
4)
The defendants are to pay the costs of the prosecutor as agreed or assessed
under the Legal Profession Act in the proportion that each of the
penalties bears to the aggregate of all penalties imposed in these proceedings.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWIRComm/2011/79.html