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Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales |
Last Updated: 3 March 2011
NEW SOUTH WALES INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION :
Inspector Morgenthal v Houghton [2010] NSWIRComm 192
FILE
NUMBER(S):
IRC 59 and 63
HEARING DATE(S):
16 December
2010
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30 December 2010
PARTIES:
Inspector Mark Morgenthal (Prosecutor)
Paul Houghton (First
Defendant)
P & D Transport NSW Pty Ltd (Second Defendant)
CORAM:
Staff J
CATCHWORDS: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY -
prosecution under s 8(1) and s 26(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
2000 - trucking industry - transporting of heavy machinery - demolition industry
- mechanical failure - hydraulics failed to support loading
ramp - failure of
pin in mounting bracket - fatality - third party contributors - obligations of
the defendants not diminished because
of error or negligence of an employee -
changes in circumstances of personal defendant after the accident - capacity to
pay - personal
defendant impecunious - total fine and costs order must be
"acceptable total" - principles - remorse and contrition - conviction
- penalty
imposed - proportion of costs for personal defendant - Occupational Health and
Safety Act 2000, s 8(1), s 26(1)
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
Mr M Cahill of
counsel (Prosecutor)
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales
Mr M Klooster
of counsel (Defendants)
Nationwide Lawyers
CASES CITED:
Cahill v
State of New South Wales (Department of Community Services) (No 4) [2008]
NSWIRComm 201; (2008) 182 IR 231
Department of Mineral Resources (Chief
Inspector McKensey) v Berrima Coal Pty Ltd [2001] NSWIRComm 130; (2001) 105 IR
348
Environment Protection Authority v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust)
Pty Ltd; [2003] NSWLEC 156; (2003) 128 LGERA 287
Inspector Beacham v J &
L Marble Pty Ltd [2009] NSWIRComm 100
Inspector Jelley v Albright &
Wilson (Australia) Limited [2007] NSWIRComm 148; (2007) 164 IR 456
Inspector
Melissa Chaston v Sacco Builders Pty Ltd [2008] NSWIRComm 152
Inspector
Stephen Cooper v Franklin Alden Coveney [2008] NSWIRComm 80
Inspector Yeung v
Donald Edwin Wilson t/as Wilson's Tree Service [2005] NSWIRComm 158; (2005) 143
IR 187
Morrison v Coal Operations Australia Ltd (No 2) [2005] nswircOMM 96
[2005] NSWIRComm 96; (2005) 141 IR 465
Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2005] NSWIRComm 61;
(2005) 147 IR 117
Nelmac Pty Ltd v Franke (Inspector) [2006] NSWIRComm 100;
(2006) 151 IR 63
R v Northallerton Magistrates' Court; Ex Parte Christopher
John Dove [2000] 1 Cr App Rep (S) 136
R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 29
NSWLR 383
WorkCover Authority (NSW) (Inspector Ankucic) v Lyndhurst Trading
Co Pty Ltd (2000) 95 IR 462
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector
Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Limited [2000] NSWIRComm 277; (2000) 95 IR
383
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Farrell) v David Carl
Schrader [2002] NSWIRComm 25; (2002) 112 IR 284
WorkCover Authority (NSW)
(Inspector Mason) v Wild Geese Building and Maintenance Group Pty Ltd [2006]
NSWIRComm 350; (2006) 157 IR 313
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales
(Inspector Mulder) v Arbor Products International (Australia) Pty Ltd [2001]
NSWIRComm 50
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Page) v Walco
Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 39; (2000) 99 IR 163
WorkCover
Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Robert Mayell) v D J Gleeson Pty Ltd
[2006] NSWIRComm 363
LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure)
Act 1999
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Industrial Relations Act
1996
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000
TEXTS CITED:
JUDGMENT:
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES
CORAM: STAFF J
Thursday 30 December 2010
Matter No IRC 59 of 2010
INSPECTOR MARK MORGENTHAL v
PAUL HOUGHTON
Prosecution under section 8(1) by virtue of section
26(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
2000
Matter No IRC 63 of 2010
INSPECTOR MARK
MORGENTHAL v P & D TRANSPORT NSW PTY LTD
Prosecution under
section 8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
2000
JUDGMENT
[2010] NSWIRComm 192
1 P & D Transport NSW Pty Ltd ("the corporate defendant"), carried on
a contract trucking business transporting oversize plant
and equipment to and
from demolition sites.
2 On 29 January 2008, Mr Ronald Scott, an employee of the corporate
defendant, was directed to attend a demolition site known as 49
Camden Street,
Fairfield in the State of New South Wales ("the incident site") to transport an
excavator from the incident site to
another work site.
3 Mr Scott reversed the corporate defendant's Mack truck, registration
number VZB 777 and its Brentwood lowloader ("the trailer")
registration number
M21255, into position to load an excavator. Mr Scott lowered the loading ramps
attached to the rear of the trailer
to the ground using the controls for the
hydraulic ram system located under the deck of the trailer on the near-side and
towards
the rear of the trailer, but in front of the rear axle. Mr Scott drove
the excavator up the ramps and onto the deck of the trailer.
Mr Scott was seen
to dismount from the excavator and then to also dismount from the trailer,
before going to the controls for the
hydraulic ram system.
4 Some time later, Mr Antoun Abou Antoun, who was working at the site,
observed the near-side loading ramp to be in its raised position
whilst the
off-side ramp was in a lowered position, but raised a little off the ground.
Each ramp weighed approximately 448kg.
5 Mr Antoun approached the off-side ramp and when he looked under the
ramp, he saw Mr Scott lying on the ground. Mr Scott did not
respond to Mr
Antoun's calls. As a result of a mechanical failure, the hydraulic ram failed
to support the off-side loading ramp,
which fell under the influence of gravity,
causing Mr Scott to suffer fatal injuries. The incident was caused by the
failure of
the pin in the sliding mounting bracket that supported the hydraulic
cylinder that operated to raise and lower the driver's side
of the inclined
ramp.
The charges
6 The corporate defendant, in an amended application for order, was
charged with a breach of s 8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
2000 ("OHS Act"), by failing to ensure that on 27 January 2008, at
approximately 11.00am at premises known as 49 Camden Street, Fairfield Heights
in the State of New South Wales, the health, safety and welfare at work of all
of its employees, and in particular, Mr Ronald Scott.
The particulars of the
charge were:
The particulars of the risk are that:
(a) The health and safety of the defendant’s employee was put at risk of injury from being struck by a loading ramp attached to a low-loader trailer, whilst undertaking the task of raising and/or lowering the loading ramps.
The particulars of the acts or omissions in failing to eliminate the risk are that:
(b) The defendant failed to ensure that plant, namely the Brentwood low-loader trailer registration number M21255 Vin or chassis number TR31596017 (“the trailer”), which was supplied by the defendant for use at work by its employee, Ronald Scott, was safe and without risks to health in that the pin which secured the base of the off-side hydraulic ram to the base pivot point bracket or mounting on off-side of the trailer, and/or the welds that secured that pin in place in its bracket or mounting, failed allowing the ramp to fall under the force of gravity.
(c) The defendant failed to ensure that the trailer, supplied for use at work by its employee, Ronald Scott, was safe and without risks to health in that the defendant failed to replace the pin which secured the base of the off-side hydraulic ram to the base pivot point [or plate] on off-side of the trailer with a pin with an oversized head designed, such as the pin fitted to the base of the near-side ram as at the date of the subject incident, to prevent that pin from being dislodged from its bracket or mounting by the forces associated with the normal operation of the hydraulic ram used to raise and lower that ramp.
(d) The defendant failed to provide and/or maintain a safe system of work with respect to the use and/or operation of the loading ramps (“the loading ramps”) attached to the trailer, including:
i. the operation of the hydraulic rams fitted to the trailer and used to raise and lower the lifting ramps; and/or
ii. the securing of the loading ramps in the travel position.
(e) The defendant failed to ensure that Ronald Scott remained clear of the area beneath the loading ramps when in a raised position;
(f) The defendant failed to provide Ronald Scott with information and training sufficient to ensure his safety at work of and, in particular, sufficient information and training regarding the risks associated with the use and/or operation of the hydraulic lifting rams and the need to remain clear of the loading ramps when in a raised position;
(g) The defendant failed to undertake any or any adequate risk assessment so as to identify and guard against the risk of injury to Ronald Scott associated with the raising and lowering of the loading ramps from the failure of the pivot points and/or the pins used to secure the hydraulic rams to the trailer and to each of the loading ramps when in a raised position;
(h) The defendant failed to undertake any or any sufficient routine inspections of the trailer and/or the loading ramps and in particular, any or any sufficient inspection of the hydraulic lifting system used to raise and lower the loading ramps on the trailer including inspection of the pivot points and pivot pins used to secure the hydraulic rams to the trailer and to each of the loading ramps for the purpose of identifying damage to the pivot points and/or the securing pins, including identification of wear and tear, fatigue and/or weld failure.
As a consequence of the failures and omissions set out above Ronald Scott whilst in the course of his employment with the defendant, was exposed to risk to his health and safety. Further, and as a consequence of the failures set out above, Ronald Scott sustained fatal injuries.
7 Mr Paul Anthony Houghton ("the personal
defendant"), was charged by virtue of s 26(1) of the OHS Act of a breach
of s 8(1) of the OHS Act in the same terms as the corporate defendant.
The personal defendant is the sole director of the corporate defendant. The
particulars
relied upon were identical to those relied upon in respect of the
corporate defendant, with the addition of a particular that the
personal
defendant was a director of the corporation.
8 Each of the defendants pleaded guilty to the offences charged in the
amended applications for order. I am satisfied on the evidence,
that the
defendants are guilty of the offences as charged, and that it was appropriate
for the pleas of guilty to be entered. It
follows, therefore, that this
judgment is concerned with the question of penalty.
Prosecutor's evidence
9 Mr M Cahill of counsel, who appeared for the prosecutor,
tendered an agreed statement of facts, which provided:
Background
5. At all material times Mr Paul Houghton was the sole director, the company secretary and sole shareholder of the defendant.
6. At all material times the defendant was the registered owner of a Mack prime mover, model CHR 92A, registered number VZB 777.
7. At all material times the defendant was the registered owner of a Brentwood triple axle low loader, registered number M 21255.
8. At all material times the defendant conducted a contract trucking business transporting oversize plant and equipment using its Mack prime mover and its Brentwood low loader trailer (“the trailer”), bearing registration number M21255.
9. At all material times the defendant was an employer.
10. At all material times the defendant employed Mr Ronald Scott (“Mr Scott”). Mr Scott commenced employment with the company as truck driver on 27 November 2007, on a 3-month trial basis.
11. Mr Scott was employed to drive the company’s heavy combination vehicle consisting of the Mack truck registered number VZB 777 and the Brentwood low loader registered number M 21255 (‘the heavy combination’).
The Incident
12. Between about 27 January 2008 and 29 January 2008 AKA Demolitions and Excavations Pty Ltd were demolishing a house on a demolition site known as 49 Camden Street, Fairfield in the State of New South Wales (“the incident site”).
13. On or about 27 January 2008 Mr Antoun Abou Antoun (“Mr Antoun”) called the offices of the defendant and placed an order for the transportation of its excavator from the incident site to another work site on 29 January 2008.
14. On 29 January 2008 Mr Scott drove the defendant’s heavy combination to the incident site, arriving at the site between about 9.30 am and 10.00 am on that day.
15. When Mr Scott arrived at the site Mr Antoun, who was operating the excavator owned by AKA Demolitions and Excavations at the incident site, asked Mr Scott to park the defendant’s heavy combination in the street outside the site because he was still using the machine.
16. Subsequently, Mr Antoun finished working with the excavator and told Mr Scott that he had finished working with the excavator.
17. Mr Scott then reversed the defendant’s heavy combination into position on the site.
18. Once the heavy combination was in place on the site, Mr Scott lowered the loading ramps attached to the rear of the trailer to the ground using the controls for the hydraulic ram system located under the deck of the trailer on the near-side and towards the rear of the trailer but in front of the rear axle. Mr Scott then drove the excavator up the ramps and onto the deck of trailer. Once the excavator was in place on the deck of the trailer, Mr Scott was seen to dismount from the excavator and then to dismount from the trailer, before going to the controls for the hydraulic ram system located in front of the rear axle of the trailer.
19. Sometime later, the nearside loading ramp was observed by Mr Antoun to be in its raised position whilst the offside ramp was in a lowered position but raised a little off the ground. At that time, Mr Antoun could not see Mr Scott.
20. Mr Antoun then approached the off-side ramp and when he looked under the ramp, Mr Antoun saw Mr Scott underneath the off-side ramp.
21. Mr Antoun called out to Mr Scott. Mr Antoun observed that Mr Scott neither moved, nor responded to his call.
22. Mr Antoun then called “000” on his mobile telephone to report the incident. However, Mr Antoun had difficulty communicating with the operator.
23. Mr Antoun then crossed Camden Street and entered a pre-school to get assistance in calling the emergency services.
24. Mr Antoun remained outside the pre-school, waiting for the emergency services to arrive, until the police and an ambulance arrived at the incident site. Mr Antoun then went inside the pre-school and remained there until the police came and spoke with him.
25. When the police arrived at the site, it was observed that the dog and chain, used to secure the nearside loading ramp in its upright or travelling position, had not been engaged. The dog and chain on the near side was then engaged so as to secure the near-side loading ramp in its upright, or travelling, position whilst Mr Scott’s body was recovered from under the off-side loading ramp.
26. Mr Scott sustained fatal crush injuries as a result of the incident, including truncal injuries with crush asphyxia.
Investigation of the incident
27. On 29 January 2008, Inspector Mark Morgenthal and Inspector Scott Middleton attended the incident site and made observations contained in a Factual Inspection Report. Attached and marked with the letter “A” is a copy of the Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Morgenthal dated 30 April 2008. Attached and marked with the letter “B” is a copy of the Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Morgenthal dated 19 August 2008.
28. During the course of the inspection at the incident site, Inspector Morgenthal took a number of photographs. Attached and marked with the letter “C” is a copy of the photographs of Inspector Morgenthal dated 29 January 2008.
Inspection of the trailer
29. The trailer was inspected, in situ, on 29 January 2008 by Detective Senior Constable Cameron of the Engineering Investigation Unit of the New South Wales Police Force.
30. In the course of his examination of the trailer, Senior Constable Cameron observed the following:
· the hydraulic ram attached to the offside ramp was separated from the lower pivot point;
· the lower pivot pin was still attached within the lower inner eyelet of the hydraulic ram;
· the lower pivot pin displayed fractured welds in numerous spots around the circumference of the pivot pin at points consistent with welds intended to weld the pivot pin to the lower pivot point mount on the trailer;
· when the lower pivot pin was re-inserted into the lower pivot point mount on the trailer with the off-side end of the pin flush with the off-side of the mount, the fracture welds around the circumference of the lower pivot point pin lined up with the mount;
· the welds on the lower pivot pin were of a poor standard with minimal penetration of the pivot pin;
· the welds did not go around the circumference of the pivot pin; and
· the lower attachment mounting of the off-side hydraulic ram mounting hole was elongated, consistent with excessive play over an extended period of time.
31. Based on his observations, Senior Constable Cameron formed the view that the welding, used to fix the lower pivot pin for the off-side hydraulic ram to the lower mounting plate or bracket attached to the trailer, was of poor quality and that the weld fractured (failed) permitting the lower pivot pin, with the off-side hydraulic ram, to disengage from the lower pivot pin bracket on the trailer. Once the lower pivot pin disengaged from the bracket on the trailer, the off-side loading ramp was no longer supported by the hydraulic ram and it fell under the influence of gravity.
32. Senior Constable Cameron photographed, in situ at the incident site, the prime mover and the trailer. He also photographed his examination of the trailer, including, in particular, the hydraulic system used to lift the ramps. Attached and marked with the letter “D” is a copy of the photographs of Senior Constable Cameron dated 29 January 2008.
33. A further examination of the trailer, together with the offside hydraulic ram, the off-side pivot pin and the lower pivot point mount [or bracket] involved in the subject incident was conducted by Mr Joshua Kent, a mechanical engineer employed by TestSafe Australia.
34. At the time of the examination and testing performed at TestSafe Australia, the subject trailer had already undergone post-incident repairs. In particular:
· the off-side lower pivot point mount or bracket had been cut off the trailer and replaced with a new mount or bracket;
· the old lower pivot mount or bracket had also been partially machined;
· the off-side hydraulic ram had been replaced; and
· a new lower pivot pin had been machined, including an oversized head on the entry side of the mount designed to prevent the pin being “drawn” through the mount.
35. Mr Kent also examined the off-side hydraulic ram and the pivot pin involved in the subject incident. In the course of that examination Mr Kent observed that:
· the original pin, as delivered, had no oversized head;
· the original pin was attached to the original mount by mounting it in a through-hole and fixing it with welds on both sides of the mount; and
· the welding used to fix the original pin in its mount appeared to be of poor quality with low coalescence between the two metals.
36. Based on his examination, Mr Kent concluded that the following matters contributed to the subject incident:
· prior to and at the time of the subject incident reliance on welds to fix in place the lower off-side pivot pin;
· poor welding of the pivot pin;
· failure to detect and/or rectify the subject welding prior to its catastrophic failure on 29 January 2008; and
· the location of the driver below a heavy load that was being supported only by hydraulic pressure at the time of the failure of the welds holding the lower pivot pin in place.
37. Mr Kent also observed that the oversized head of the new off-side lower pivot pin was an improvement in design as the fixation of the off-side lower pivot pin to the trailer mount or bracket is no longer dependent on circumferential welds as was the case at the time of the subject incident. Attached and marked with the letter “E” is a copy of the report of Mr Kent dated 25 November 2008.
38. A further examination of the pivot pin and the bracket or mounting involved in the subject incident was conducted by Dr Azharul Haq PhD, a metallurgical engineer. Upon examination of the pivot pin involved in the subject incident Dr Haq observed that:
· there is clear evidence of welding on both the “entry” and “exit” sides of the pivot pin;
· there is evidence of poor quality welding on the “entry” and “exit” sides of the pivot pin;
· there is evidence of a fatigue fracture on the “entry” side of the pin which took place in a progressive manner over time; and
· following the failure of the weld on the “entry” side of the pin, due to progressive fatigue cracking, the “thin” weld on the exit side would have failed at the time of the subject incident through shear fracture with the pin then sliding out of the mount or bracket on the trailer.
39. Dr Haq also concluded that, due to the dynamic forces placed on the pin as a consequence of the location of the lifting rams on the inner edges of the loading ramps, welding was not the most appropriate choice for fixing the lower pivot pin in place in the mount or bracket on the trailer. Attached and marked with the letter “F” is a copy of the report of Dr Haq dated 28 January 2010.
Maintenance and repair of the trailer prior to the incident
40. Prior to the subject incident, the defendant did not have in place any system for the periodic inspection of the trailer and/or the performance of preventative maintenance.
41. Rather, the defendant had in place a system for the identification and repair of breakages. Those repairs identified by the defendant as the bare minimum necessary for keeping the trailer on the road were performed and no more.
Work procedures and training prior to the incident
42. The defendant provided informal, on the job training to Mr Scott, on an irregular basis, over the first two weeks of his employment.
43. The defendant did not provide Mr Scott with an operator’s manual prepared by the manufacturer of the trailer and/or the manufacturer of the hydraulic system used to move the loading ramps attached to the trailer into position.
44. The defendant did not have in place any form of pre-start or maintenance check sheet for use in conducting safety and maintenance checks of the trailer before it was placed into service each day, or at all. In particular, the defendant did not have in place any system that required a daily inspection of the pivot pins used to secure both the top and the bottom of each hydraulic ram used to raise and lower the loading ramps attached to the trailer.
Changes after the incident
45. On 30 January 2008 the defendant was issued with a Prohibition Notice (No. 150827) which required that the defendant must:
i. immediately cease operating and using the trailer hydraulic ramps; and
ii. develop, implement and maintain a system to ensure that the trailer hydraulic ramps are inspected, cleaned and maintained in a safe operating/working condition according to manufacturer’s requirements.
Attached and marked with the letter “G” is a copy of the Prohibition Notice dated 30 January 2008.
46. Initially, the trailer was delivered to JG Engineering NSW Pty Ltd (“JG Engineering “) to undergo repairs. The repairs performed included replacement of the off-side pivot pin and mounting bracket similar to that previously designed and installed on the near-side of the subject trailer by JG Engineering in about July 2006.
47. On 5 September 2008 the defendant was issued with a number of Improvement Notices (No. 7-166237, 7-166239, 7-166238) with respect to the subject trailer. Attached and marked with the letter “H” is a copy of the Improvement Notices dated 5 September 2008.
48. Subsequently, the defendant ceased to operate the subject trailer.
Prior convictions
49. The defendant has no prior criminal convictions in NSW.
10 An agreed statement of facts, in
identical terms was relied upon in respect of the charge brought against the
personal defendant.
11 The prosecutor also tendered the following documents:
A. Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Mark Morgenthal dated 30 April 2008.
B. Follow up Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Mark Morgenthal dated 19 August 2008.
C. 23 colour photographs taken by Inspector Mark Morgenthal on 29 January 2008 showing the prime mover and low loader trailer with passenger side ramp raised, the hydraulic piston, the piston ram head with through pin and the hydraulic cylinder.
D. 46 colour photographs taken by Senior Constable Cameron on 29 January 2008 showing similar images to those taken by Inspector Morgenthal.
E. Report of Mr Joshua Kent of TestSafe Australia dated 25 November 2008.
F. Report on Failure Analysis of Pivot Pin, prepared by Dr Azharul Haq of PearlStreet Pty Ltd, dated 28 January 2010.
G. Prohibition Notice (No. 150827) issued by Inspector Scott Middleton to P&D Transport Pty Limited dated 30 January.
H. Improvement Notices (No. 7-166237, 7-166238, 7-166239) issued by Inspector Morgenthal to P&D Transport Pty Limited dated 5 September 2008.
I. ASIC Company Search for P&D Transport Pty Limited.
J. JG Engineering NSW Pty Limited Tax Invoices (no. 2091, 2649, 2943) dated 19 July 2006, 4 March 2008 and 21 November 2008.
12 Counsel also tendered an Australian Securities and Investments
Commission Current and Historical Extract dated 16 December 2010,
in respect of
the corporate defendant.
13 Relevant findings by Senior Constable Cameron, Mr Joshua Kent of
TestSafe Australia and Dr Azharul Haq, a metallurgical engineer,
and their
conclusions are included in the statement of agreed facts at [30] - [39].
Defendants' evidence
14 Mr M Klooster of counsel, who appeared for the defendants, read an
affidavit of the personal defendant sworn 14 December 2010,
who was required for
cross-examination. Counsel also tendered a certificate of divorce between Paul
Anthony Houghton and Joy Doreen
Houghton dated 16 November 2007, a Centrelink
Application for payment of Newstart Allowance made by the personal defendant
dated
6 December 2010 and a character reference, undated, of Maurice K Houghton,
the father of the personal defendant.
15 The personal defendant is 38 years of age and the sole director and
shareholder of the corporate defendant. He completed his school
certificate and
in 1993 became a qualified plumber at the age of 20. The personal defendant
detailed his employment history up to
1997, when he started his own concreting
business, known as P & D Concreting Pty Ltd ("P & D Concreting"), which
was based
at Campbelltown.
16 In 1998, the company purchased a bobcat to enable it to undertake
excavation work. The company employed up to six fulltime employees
as the
business grew. While running the concreting business, the personal defendant
operated various forms of machinery, including
concrete boom pumps, backhoes,
bobcats, excavators, dozers, boom lifts, scissor lifts, water carts and graders.
That company has
not been charged with any breaches of the OHS Act.
17 In or around 2000, the personal defendant first met Mr Mal Henderson,
the owner of Brecon Builders Pty Ltd ("Brecon Builders").
They developed a good
business relationship and Mr Henderson began to provide P & D Concreting
with a lot of work.
18 By 2002, it became apparent that clients of P & D Concreting
required more excavation work as opposed to concreting. Accordingly,
P & D
Concreting purchased a 20 tonne excavator and a 15 tonne excavator. By the end
of 2004, the personal defendant was performing
more excavation work than
concreting and was advised by his accountant to form a new company, which became
the corporate defendant.
It was registered on 10 June 2005. At this time, the
personal defendant obtained his heavy vehicle driver's licence which enabled
him
to drive semi-trailers.
19 In 2004/2005, after being married for about three to four years, the
personal defendant and his wife purchased their first home
for $475,000.
20 In or around 2005/2006, P & D Concreting suffered a downturn in
business and the personal defendant's accountant advised him
to "let the company
go".
21 In or around April 2007, P & D Concreting was placed in voluntary
liquidation. Shortly before the company was placed into
liquidation, after
discussing the matter with his accountant, the personal defendant registered a
new company known as P & D
Concrete NSW Pty Ltd ("P & D Concrete"). The
personal defendant was the sole director and shareholder of this company. The
two companies employed three to four fulltime employees and up to 25
subcontractors, as required.
22 On 27 December 2007, the personal defendant was divorced. The
personal defendant stated that immediately before the accident,
approximately 80
per cent of the work of P & D Concrete was coming through Mr Henderson. The
concreting business was doing well.
The personal defendant stated that, to the
best of his ability, he envisaged the prime mover and trailer, the
subject of the incident, were properly maintained and serviced. Various
invoices were annexed to
the affidavit to demonstrate that the vehicle was
serviced and inspected.
23 The personal defendant detailed the training that Mr Scott received
when he commenced employment with the corporate defendant.
He said that during
the first couple of weeks of his employment, he went with him and they performed
around four or five jobs together.
The personal defendant showed Mr Scott how
to use the ramps and after the fifth job, Mr Scott showed the personal defendant
that
he could operate the ramps using the controls by himself after the personal
defendant had driven some heavy machinery onto the trailer.
24 The personal defendant stated that he always told Mr Scott to stay
clear of the ramp whenever they were working together. Mr Scott
would always
keep a safe distance and the personal defendant never saw him ever place himself
in "harms way" whilst they were working
together.
25 The personal defendant said that the accident had upset him greatly
and "still bothers me to this day". Mr Henderson found out
about the accident
within a week of it occurring and asked to see the personal defendant in his
office. The personal defendant got
the impression that Mr Henderson did not
want anything to do with him, or the company, until the accident had been
"sorted out".
26 The personal defendant said that neither P & D Concrete, nor the
corporate defendant ever obtained any new work from Brecon
Builders through Mr
Henderson after the accident. This had a significant impact on the business.
The volume of work that Brecon
Builders supplied to either company quickly
reduced from 80 per cent of each company's total turnover to about 30 per cent
within
approximately one month after the accident.
27 The personal defendant's manager, Mr G Norris, resigned a couple of
months after the accident after being approached by Mr Henderson.
Mr Norris
took a significant amount of work with him which further affected the business.
Within a month after the accident, each
company's fulltime staff were reduced to
two and each company let most of the subcontractors go as they could not afford
to pay them.
28 The personal defendant said that whilst he did not know Mr Scott very
well, his death had greatly upset him. The personal defendant
had engaged Mr
Scott's daughter's boyfriend as a subcontractor concreter for approximately
eight months prior to the accident. The
personal defendant was close to Mr
Scott's daughter and her boyfriend. Mr Scott's daughter had been babysitting
the personal defendant's
children for approximately six months before the
accident.
29 The personal defendant gave Mr Scott's daughter $600 shortly after the
accident and also went to see Mr Scott's widow. He attended
Mr Scott's funeral
and enquired if there was anything that he could do for Mrs Scott and her
daughter. A few days after the funeral,
the personal defendant went to Mrs
Scott's home and gave her $400.
30 In late 2008, the personal defendant returned to Melbourne as he was
not receiving any work in either the concreting or excavating
businesses. In
late 2008, the personal defendant commenced a new relationship with a woman who
he had known since school who had
three children aged 8, 15 and 17 years of age.
The 8 year old suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"),
mild
autism and mild aspergers.
31 The personal defendant said that he borrowed $70,000 from his father
to renovate the matrimonial home before it was sold in the
divorce settlement.
When it was sold, he said he did not receive any money from it as the proceeds
went to either the bank, his
ex-wife or his father.
32 In 2006, the personal defendant was diagnosed with sleep apnoea. He
was re-diagnosed in the latter part of 2010 as having one
of the most severe
cases. He annexed to his affidavit a medical certificate from the Sleep
Disorder Centre to his general practitioner
dated 3 June 2010. He is required
to sleep with an oxygen mask and said that one of the effects of severe sleep
apnoea is partial
short term memory loss. As a result of a waterskiing accident
in 2001, he cannot perform certain manual labour, for example, moving
concrete
using a wheelbarrow because of problems with his back.
33 In mid 2008, about six months after the accident, the personal
defendant suffered a mental breakdown and was hospitalised in the
Shepparton
Hospital, Victoria. He stated he saw numerous psychiatrists whilst in hospital
and was placed on suicide watch for about
two weeks. He has since made a good
recovery.
34 The personal defendant said that he moved back to Melbourne towards
the end of 2008 with the intention of starting his own concreting
business in
Melbourne. He actively sought work for the first six months, but was
unsuccessful. During this time, he lived off some
savings. At the beginning of
2010, he was forced to apply for unemployment benefits. This was the first
occasion that he received
unemployment benefits other than for a couple of
months when he was 21 years of age. He said this has caused him a great deal of
embarrassment. He remains on unemployment benefits although he did find some
concrete pumping work about six or eight months ago
and earned approximately
$15,000. He informed Centrelink of this payment.
35 The personal defendant stated that he receives $466 per fortnight from
Centrelink. His share of the rent for his current residence
is $300 per
fortnight. He spends approximately $150 per fortnight on essential expenses,
such as food and groceries. He stated
that he cannot afford to go out and his
current financial position causes him great stress. After these expenses, he
has a disposable
income of $16 per fortnight from Centrelink. He said that he
has been actively seeking work for the past eight months. He has applied
for
around eight jobs each month for the past eight months and has attended around
15 interviews. To date he has been unsuccessful
in obtaining employment. The
personal defendant stated that in addition to the money he borrowed from his
father to renovate the
former matrimonial home, he also borrowed a further
$30,000 from his father as an interest free loan in order to pay for legal fees.
He owes $60,000 to a hire purchase company for a Ford Harley Davidson motor
vehicle that he purchased five years ago. This vehicle
was repossessed in 2008.
Recently, he had to borrow $6000 from his cousin, Ms Shelly Houghton, in order
to pay his legal fees in
this matter. This was an interest free loan.
36 The personal defendant annexed to his affidavit a table setting out
his current assets and liabilities. His total assets are made
up of personal
items and household chattels with an estimated value of $5000. His liabilities
are estimated to be $166,000. These
are made up of an interest free loan from
his father of $70,000, a loan for the Ford Harley Davidson motor vehicle, a
further loan
from his father of $30,000 for legal fees and a loan from his
cousin of $6000 for legal fees. He annexed his personal tax return
for
2004/2005, which showed a gross income of $93,000. His personal tax return for
2005/2006 showed a gross income of $95,000.
He has not submitted any further
tax returns.
37 During cross-examination the personal defendant acknowledged that
there would have been a maximum 20 operations of the hydraulic
system during the
2 week period that he accompanied Mr Scott and gave him training. This assumed
that on each occasion there was
a drop off and pick up of heavy machinery. The
personal defendant accepted it could have been as low as 10 operations during
the
2 week training period.
38 The personal defendant agreed that there was a risk that welds might
fail and that from time to time welds should be inspected
because of the risk of
failure. He agreed that prior to the incident, he did not have in place any
system of inspection of the brackets,
or the pivot pins, or the hydraulic arms
that raise the ramps to check if there was evidence of weld failure. The only
system that
the defendants had in place was a visual walk around the truck. He
did not direct Mr Scott's attention to carry out such an inspection.
39 The personal defendant was unable to explain why certain repairs
suggested by a mechanic had not been carried out on the vehicle
for a period of
over five months. However, he disputed that he only carried out repairs to the
vehicle and the trailer when it broke
down, or parts did not work. He
acknowledged that after the incident, the trailer was subjected to an inspection
and found to be
in need of repair work in respect of the sub frame and the
structure because of cracking.
40 The personal defendant accepted that the absence of a system of
preventative maintenance and repair contributed to those levels
of deterioration
of the trailer.
41 The personal defendant said that the company had sold the truck and
trailer to a person in Newcastle for around $45,000. He said
these were the
only assets of the corporate defendant. He agreed that there was no
documentation to substantiate the $70,000 loan
from his father and that it was a
verbal agreement.
42 The personal defendant acknowledged that he had not
produced any financial records in respect of the corporate defendant.
43 Mr Maurice Houghton, the personal defendant's father, in a reference
relied upon by the personal defendant, stated that his son
had always
endeavoured to keep his machinery "in tip top condition". He said that he had
witnessed his son issuing strict instructions
as to the use and care of
equipment that employees were operating and if there was any doubt in respect of
their understanding, he
would spend a lot of time demonstrating what he meant.
He further stated that since the tragic accident, his son had been extremely
unwell and suffered severe financial difficulties. He said he was emotionally
fragile.
Relevant principles
44 The Full Bench in Morrison v Coal Operations Australia Ltd (No 2)
[2005] NSWIRComm 96; (2005) 141 IR 465 succinctly summarised the
principles to be applied in determining sentence for an offence under the OHS
Act. Their Honours stated at [8] - [15]:
[8] The overall approach to be followed in relation to the determination of sentence is to be found in the first instance within the statutory provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and in particular, in relation to these proceedings, ss 3A Purposes of Sentencing and 21A Aggravating, mitigating and other factors in sentencing.
[9] In R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 it was emphasised that the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act referred to above are not to be construed as representing "a departure from settled principles of sentencing practice, or an abandonment of the discretion that is essential to any system calling for individualised justice". As was said at [59]:
'[I]t is clear that the legislative policy ... so far as that can be discerned from the legislation itself, was not to create a straight jacket for judges ... but rather [was] intended to provide "further guidance and structure to judicial discretion.'
[10] The starting point for consideration as to penalty is the objective seriousness of the offence. That is a well established sentencing principle and was conclusively affirmed in the Full Bench decision in Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (NSW) (1999) 90 IR 464 at 474 as follows:
'[I]t is important to reiterate that the primary factor to be considered when a judicial officer is determining the appropriate sentence to impose is the objective seriousness of the offence charged. In case of prosecutions under the OH&S Act, this proposition has often been expressed by saying that the "true measure of penalty lies in the nature and quality of the offence' ...
[11] The principle of foreseeability as a factor in determining the objective seriousness of an offence as part of the sentencing process was considered in the Full Bench decision in Capral Aluminium Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2000] NSWIRComm 71; (2000) 49 NSWLR 610 at 646; 99 IR 29 at 62 as follows:
'The question of foreseeability is relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the offence. We consider that the appropriate approach is that of Walton J, Vice President, in Department of Mineral Resources of NSW (McKensey) v Kembla Coal and Coke Pty Ltd (1999) 92 IR 8 at 27:'
'Whilst the reasonable foreseeability of an accident may not be relevant to the question of liability under the Act (see Drake Personnel Ltd t/a Drake Industrial v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 432), the degree of foreseeability is a significant factor to be taken into account when assessing the level of culpability of the defendant. The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk to safety which is likely to result in serious injury or death is a factor which will be relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the offence.'
[12] On the issue of foreseeability, the Full Bench in Capral also stated at 646; 62 - 63:
'The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury will necessarily result in the offence being more serious in nature. However, the absence of foreseeability does not necessarily render the offence as being nominal or not serious. In this regard the relevant approach is that set out in the judgment of Wright J, President, in Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Ltd (at 209 - 210) in these terms:
'... reliance on "hindsight" must be seen in an appropriate perspective in terms of culpability. It is a relevant consideration but the very terms of s 15 impose an obligation on an employer which is not confined to the taking of precautions only when there are warnings or signals of danger or when experience indicates that a risk to safety has arisen and requires remedy. So much is clear from the structure and language of the section which is premised on the requirement to 'ensure ... health, safety and welfare at work' and the decided cases which make plain the nature of the obligation.'
[13] It is also necessary to consider the damage and injury suffered in the context of the evidence and "in light of the principles which have been laid down in relation to the relationship between the seriousness of injuries which have been suffered, or which may have been suffered, and the gravity of the offence" (Capral at 650; 66). On that point the Full Bench in Capral stated:
'We consider that the relevant principle can be stated in this way. The gravity of the consequences of an accident, such as the damage or injury, does not, of itself, dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty. However, a breach where there was every prospect of serious consequences might be assessed on a different basis to a breach unlikely to have such consequences. The occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the degree of seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety: Tyler v Sydney Electricity (1993) 47 IR 1 at 5, Inspector Hannah v Wonar Pty Ltd (1992) 34 AILR 377 at 378, Watson v Southern Asphalters Pty Ltd (1996) 83 IR 446 at 456, Wong v Melinda Group Pty Ltd (1998) 82 IR 118 at 131, WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Albury City Council (1999) 90 IR 397 at 408 - 409, Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd (at 476), WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Ltd (at 428) and WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) (at [22]).'
[14] The principles of general and specific deterrence are also relevant in sentencing. The approach to be taken on that issue was also dealt with in some detail in Capral at 643 - 645; 59 - 62. Without detailing all that the Full Bench had to say we consider the approach to deterrence in the sentencing process is encapsulated in the following passage from the Full Bench in Capral at 644; 60 as follows:
'[B]oth aspects of deterrence are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process; and although there may be exceptional cases (see, for example, Workcover Authority (NSW) v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 39; (2000) 99 IR 163 at [40]- 43]) we would expect such cases to be very rare, and where the relevant circumstances were held by the sentencing judge to be established, the judge must indicate with some precision the circumstances which had led to the exceptional course being adopted.'
[15] In the context of the above well established sentencing principles it will also be necessary to have regard to those general matters going to aggravation, mitigation and other factors identified in s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act relevant to the respondents before the Full Bench. As was said in R v Way at [56]:
'[I]t is not to be overlooked that there is a well established body of principles that have been developed by the courts over a long period of time. By providing guidance in the form of a list of aggravating and mitigating factors in s 21A, the Parliament did not intend to overrule or disturb those principles or restrict their application. In so far as those principles refer to factors, whether objective or subjective, that affect the "relative seriousness" of the offence, they are expressly preserved by s 21A(1)(c).'
Consideration
45 In accordance with the principles I have set out above, the primary
consideration in sentencing requires a determination of the
objective
seriousness of the offences. This involves examining the nature and quality of
the offences, as set out in the agreed
statement of facts and the evidence.
Without repeating what is contained in the agreed statement of facts, in
considering the seriousness
of the offences, it is relevant to set out the
important matters.
46 The available evidence clearly indicates that, sometime prior to the
subject incident, the pivot pin used to secure the off-side
hydraulic ram lower
arm to the off-side mounting on the low loader had been replaced. The evidence
further indicates that:
(i) the "replacement" pivot pin was not designed/fitted with an oversized head designed to prevent the pin from pulling through the anchor point;
(ii) the "replacement" pivot pin was fixed on both the entry and exit points by welding;
(iii) welding was an inappropriate choice for fixing the pivot pin in place; and
(iv) the welding that was performed for the purpose of fixing the pivot pin in place was of poor quality, in any event, with fatigue fracturing taking place, progressively, on the entry side of the pin and the welding on the exit side failing at the time of the incident.
47 By contrast, it is an
agreed fact that the near side pivot pin had been replaced in about July 2006 by
JG Engineering NSW Pty Ltd.
When the near side pivot pin was replaced, it was
with a pivot pin that incorporated an oversized head on the entry side of the
hydraulic arm fixing point designed to prevent the head from pulling through the
anchor point and "fixed" on the exit side with a
through bolt or pin.
48 Further, the available evidence, particularly various photographs,
indicates that the general state of repair of the trailer was
poor.
49 In these regards, it is agreed that, prior to the subject incident,
the defendants did not have in place any system for the periodic
inspection of
the trailer and did not undertake preventative maintenance. (Statement of facts
at [40]). Rather, it is agreed, the
defendants identified and repaired
breakages, with repairs kept to the bare minimum necessary to keep the trailer
on the road. (Statement
of facts at [41]).
50 Mr Cahill submitted that the subject offences were most serious.
Counsel contended that the risk of pivot pin failure was, or
should have been,
known to the defendants; that the design of the offside replacement pin and the
use of welds was inappropriate;
that the quality of the welding used to fix the
replacement pin was of poor quality and that the fracturing of the welds on the
entry
side of the pin was progressive (that is, taking place over time) and
hence, capable of being identified.
51 In addition, counsel submitted that the defendants were aware, or
should have been aware, of a number of simple steps capable of
obviating, or
reducing the risk of pin failure. These steps were the use of a different
design of replacement pin (that is, like
the one previously fitted on the near
side of the trailer); daily inspection and a proper, routine preventative
inspection and maintenance
program.
52 Mr Klooster submitted that "on balance, the objective
seriousness is moderate at best and high, but not substantially high (ie, on the
lower scale
end of high) at worst."
53 Counsel conceded that whilst the state of repair of the vehicle was
not perfect, various people, many more qualified and experienced
than the
personal defendant, inspected the vehicle and trailer and failed to notice the
inherent risk and danger caused by the faulty
welding or failure to fit an
oversize head to the pivot pin.
54 Both the vehicle and the trailer were inspected regularly, although
not thoroughly, during the three years prior to the accident,
with the last
inspection occurring five and a half months before the accident. Counsel
submitted that there was no evidence to suggest
that the personal defendant was
actually aware of any inherent risk and simply chose to ignore it. Counsel
further submitted that
the evidence demonstrates that the personal defendant was
completely unaware of any risk.
55 Mr Klooster submitted that the personal defendant had had limited
education and was diagnosed with sleep apnoea in 2005/2006.
The evidence also
discloses that the personal defendant completed Year 10 at High School and then
completed a plumbing apprenticeship.
I am not persuaded that these factors made
it difficult for the personal defendant to detect any foreseeable risk with the
trailer,
particularly in circumstances where some cracked welding was
visible.
56 Mr Klooster conceded that there was no written safe work procedure in
place prior to the accident, although he emphasised that
there was some informal
training provided to Mr Scott. I accept that there is no evidence before the
Court that the personal defendant
was aware of a serious risk to the health and
safety of Mr Scott, but took no action to eliminate the risk.
57 The evidence discloses that Mr Scott was provided with nothing more
than a casual informal training and a warning to stay away
from the ramps. It
was also restricted to four or five jobs. The evidence further discloses that
the defendants were aware of the
risk in both a theoretical sense and also a
practical sense. In my view, the introduction of a preventative maintenance
system and
a regular maintenance system would have reduced the risk, but not
eliminated it entirely.
58 The defendants did not have in place any system for the periodic
inspection of the trailer and/or the performance of preventative
maintenance in
respect of the trailer. To the extent that the defendants had any system in
place prior to the incident, it was a
system for the identification and repair
of breakages.
59 The offences occurred in circumstances where the defendants did not
have in place any form of pre start or maintenance check sheet
for use in
conducting safety and maintenance checks of the trailer before it was placed
into service each day, or at all. In particular,
the defendants did not have in
place any system that required a daily inspection of the pivot pins used to
secure both the top and
bottom of each hydraulic ram used to raise and lower the
loading ramps attached to the trailer.
60 Furthermore, the defendants did not provide Mr Scott with an
operator's manual prepared by the manufacturer of the trailer and/or
the
manufacturer of the hydraulic system used to move the loading ramps attached to
the trailer into position.
61 Demolition work is inherently dangerous and the likely consequences of
the breaches committed by the defendants were very serious.
Mr Scott suffered
fatal injuries as a result of being crushed by the ramp. In my view, the risk
to safety was readily foreseeable
and was foreseen by both the corporate and
personal defendant. In my view, the gravity of the risks to safety flowing from
the breach
was serious. However, I am prepared to take into account the health
of the personal defendant, which was advanced as mitigating,
to some extent, the
otherwise objective seriousness of the offence.
62 Mr Cahill conceded the relative culpability of the personal defendant,
in all the circumstances, was significantly less than that
of the corporate
defendant.
63 Wright J, in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector
Page) v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 39; (2000) 99 IR
163, observed at [38] - [39]:
[38] Having reached those conclusions in relation to the culpability of the first defendant it is necessary to consider that of the second defendant. The construction and implications of s 50 are relevantly these. First, the level of culpability of a personal defendant who is deemed to have committed the offence by virtue of s 50(1) cannot be greater than that of the corporation who has been convicted or otherwise assumed to be guilty for the purposes of the operation of the section. However, most pertinently for the present proceedings, it must be recognised that the culpability of the personal or individual defendant may be less than that of the corporate defendant. It is not, in my view, a question of considering their relative contribution but assuming that the purpose of the provision is to make an individual who is responsible to an extent for the management of the corporation similarly responsible and culpable for the acts or omissions of the corporation. Although the relevant consideration is not whether, or to what extent, there is a level of contribution as between the corporate and individual defendants for the particular breach of safety which arose under the Act, it is nevertheless necessary when dealing with the precise gravity of the offence committed, or deemed to have been committed by the personal defendant, to accept the possibility or, in many cases where the individual is not simply the alter ego of the corporation, the likelihood that the level of gravity of the offence attributable to the personal defendant may be less than that which has been found to have been committed by the corporate defendant – that is, in these proceedings the first defendant.
[39] In assessing the culpability of the second defendant it is, in my view, important to place particular weight upon the role of the defendant in the management of the corporation and the nature of the gravity of the offence as identified in relation to the first defendant, and to make an assessment in that context of the situation of the second defendant. Any matters of doubt should, generally speaking, be resolved in favour of the defendant: R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; (1999) 73 ALJR 1550 at 24 – 28; Camilleri’s Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698 - 699. Although the second defendant was an important and crucial part of the management of the first defendant, nevertheless he was a manager in the context of a small company which was a family company which was itself managed and run by a highly experienced manager who had many years of experience in the industry, as did those members of the family who preceded him. He was not the alter ego of the company. It would be appropriate therefore to proceed on the basis that although the second defendant would have had a significant role in decision making as to employment and the like and otherwise in the running the first defendant, it could not be assumed that he could make all crucial decisions, or changes to practices, relating to a change in employment policy as to, for example, the qualifications that would necessarily be required of all employees. Therefore, it may be appropriately assumed, and thus found for the purpose of these proceedings, that the system now in place as exemplified by paragraph 21 of the defendants’ submissions was not a matter within the authority of the second defendant. Accordingly, I consider that there is a significant qualitative difference between the culpability attaching to the first and second defendants, although I find that the gravity of all of the offences is serious.
His Honour's observations were approved and applied by Walton J, Vice-President in Department of Mineral Resources (Chief Inspector McKensey) v Berrima Coal Pty Ltd [2001] NSWIRComm 130; (2001) 105 IR 348 and the Full Bench in Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2005] NSWIRComm 61; (2005) 147 IR 117.
64 In this matter, it is apparent that the corporate defendant is to be
properly described as "the corporate alter ego of the personal
defendant".
General deterrence
65 As to general deterrence, I consider it is appropriate in the case of
both defendants to once again draw attention to the need
for employers and
contractors in the trucking, demolition, building and construction industry,
particularly small to medium sized
employers and contractors, to be constantly
vigilant of the need to ensure that employees are not exposed to risks to their
health
and safety through operating and transporting heavy machinery which is
not regularly inspected and checked for the risk of failure.
Such machinery
should be the subject of periodic inspections with preventative maintenance
systems put in place so that the risk
of serious injury and/or death is
substantially reduced. Mr Scott was part way through a probationary period. He
was exposed to
serious risk to his safety by the failure of his employer to
implement adequate and appropriate safety measures. I therefore include
an
element in the penalty for general deterrence.
Specific deterrence
66 In relation to specific deterrence, although the corporate defendant
is no longer in operation, it remains a registered corporation.
However, it has
no machinery. The personal defendant is in receipt of Centrelink benefits and
on the evidence, plays no part in
the operation of the corporation. This is
therefore not a case which calls for the imposition of some additional
punishment aimed
at deterring the defendants from further offending against the
OHS Act and/or for the purpose of compelling their attention to
occupational health and safety issues.
Subjective factors
67 Mr Cahill conceded that each defendant entered a plea at an early
stage and were therefore entitled to the 25 per cent discount
as outlined in
R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 29 NSWLR 383 for the utilitarian value of
a plea of guilty.
Remorse and contrition
68 Section 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
("CSP Act") provides that "remorse" may be taken into account as a
mitigating factor if and only if:
(i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and
(ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both)
69 In Cahill v State of New South Wales
(Department of Community Services) (No 4) [2008] NSWIRComm 201; (2008) 182
IR 231, Boland P stated at [62]:
[62] A simple expression of contrition or remorse by a representative of a corporate offender, no matter how senior the representative, is not enough to enable the Court to find that the offender is remorseful: As Cummins J said in DPP v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 263; (2001) 124 A Crim R 200, "personal expressions of remorse need to be translated into reality". See also see Regina v Heip Tan Nguyen [2004] NSWCCA 438 per Bell J (Hidden and James JJ agreeing) at [21]. There must be evidence that the offender has accepted responsibility for its actions and also that the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by its actions or that it has made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both).
70 The evidence establishes that the
personal defendant had a close relationship with the deceased's daughter and her
boyfriend prior
to the accident and gave financial and moral support to the
deceased's daughter and widow immediately after the accident. Whilst
the
financial assistance provided by the personal defendant was modest, it has to be
assessed against the personal defendant's financial
position at the time. The
personal defendant accepted responsibility for his actions as demonstrated by
the early plea of guilty
and the financial assistance provided to the deceased's
daughter and widow. I propose to take the personal defendant's remorse and
contrition into account in sentencing.
Previous offences
71 It was common ground that neither the personal defendant, nor the
corporate defendant have any prior convictions and as such are
entitled to
leniency as "first offenders" pursuant to s 21A(3)(e) of the CSP Act.
The personal defendant has been operating in the concreting industry and using a
bob cat and other heavy machinery since 1998.
He obtained a heavy duty vehicle
licence in 2002/2003. The corporate defendant was registered in May/June
2005.
72 The TestSafe report, referred to earlier in this judgment, identified
that the accident occurred due to the failure of the pin
in the sliding mount
bracket that supported the hydraulic cylinder that was operated to raise and
lower the driver's side ramp.
73 Counsel for the defendants pointed to the contributing factor that
"the location of the hydraulic cylinders on the inside of the
ramp, which
imparts a bending moment on the pin with the resulting forces being greatest at
the weld connecting the pin to the sliding
bracket" as being an inherent design
flaw and that no blame should be attributed to the defendants in this
regard.
74 The contribution of other parties to an offence is a matter to be
weighed in the consideration of the objective seriousness of
the offence:
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's
Australia Limited [2000] NSWIRComm 277; (2000) 95 IR 383 at 434 and 437 and
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Farrell) v David Carl
Schrader [2002] NSWIRComm 25; (2002) 112 IR 284 at [61]. The design flaw
may have contributed in a minor way to the risk. I accept such a contribution
gives rise to a minor mitigation
in respect of the offences.
75 Mr Klooster also submitted that the actions of the deceased in placing
himself under the ramp should result in some blame being
attributed to his
actions.
76 In WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Mulder) v
Arbor Products International (Australia) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWIRComm 50; (2001)
105 IR 81, Walton VP and Boland J, (Kavanagh J dissenting) stated at [45] -
[46]:
[45] The duty to provide a risk free work environment is a duty owed not only to the careful and observant employee but also to the hasty, careless, inadvertent, inattentive, unreasonable or disobedient employee in respect of conduct that is reasonably foreseeable: Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd v Buckley [1952] HCA 72; (1952) 87 CLR 313 at 320; McLean v Tedman [1984] HCA 60; (1984) 155 CLR 306 at 311 – 312 and WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Twynam-Perkins) v Maine Lighting Pty Limited (1995) 100 IR 248.[46] We agree with the conclusions of the Full Bench in Riley v Australian Grader Hire Pty Ltd [2001] NSWIRComm 31 [at 15] as follows:
The magistrate appears to have reached her conclusion as to the objective seriousness of the offence, having regard to the lack of common sense of the injured worker. It is reasonably clear from her decision that it was concluded that the conduct of the injured worker effectively removed or minimised the liability of the respondent in relation to the lack of training or instruction afforded the employee. This was wrong in principle. Section 15 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act requires employers to be diligent and proactive to ensure the safety of employees. Those obligations are not diminished because of the error or negligence of an employee, although such matters may reflect on the degree of culpability of the employer for the purposes of sentencing. We note the following observations of Bauer J in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Twynam-Perkins) v Maine Lighting Pty Limited (1995) 100 IR 248 at 257:
"Much of what was urged by Mr King was directed to showing that the worker who was killed knew of, and therefore ought to have avoided the exposed electrical connections. In one sense such a submission militated against the position of the defendant; the very purpose of the Act was to introduce safe working practices so that accidents are prevented. The Act was designed to protect against human errors including inadvertence, inattention, haste and even foolish disregard of personal safety as well as the foreseeable technical risks in industry."
(See also WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Hopkins) v Profab Industries Pty Ltd [2000] NSWIRComm 142; (2000) 49 NSWLR 700 at 722).
77 Applying these principles, there is no
basis to conclude that the conduct of Mr Scott minimised the liability of the
defendants.
However, as the Full Bench observed, such matters may reflect on
the degree of culpability of the employer for the purpose of sentence.
Changes in circumstances after the accident
78 Emotional problems provoking difficult circumstances are acceptable
within the sentencing process as a mitigating factor: WorkCover Authority of
New South Wales (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Limited; WorkCover
Authority (NSW) (Inspector Ankucic)
v Lyndhurst Trading Co Pty Ltd (2000)
95 IR 462; Department of Mineral Resources v Berrima Coal; Inspector
Stephen Cooper v Franklin Alden Coveney [2008] NSWIRComm 80; Inspector
Melissa Chaston v Sacco Builders Pty Ltd [2008] NSWIRComm 152.
79 As I have already observed, the personal defendant suffers from sleep
apnoea, which was diagnosed prior to the incident. This
has been exacerbated
due to the stress placed upon the personal defendant as a result of the
accident. Such stress eventually led
to the personal defendant suffering a
mental breakdown, resulting in him being institutionalised for two weeks,
approximately six
months after the accident.
80 I agree with Mr Klooster's submission that the personal defendant's
reaction to the accident is a clear indication of both his
personal knowledge of
its seriousness and his genuine remorse and contrition.
81 Equally, the significantly adverse changes to the personal, business
and professional circumstances of the defendants which arose
as an aftermath of
the incident are acceptable as mitigating factors: Department of Mineral
Resources v Berrima Coal (at [202]).
82 It is clear that the combination of the result of the accident and the
personal defendant's divorce and property settlement significantly
contributed
to the collapse of his business and personal life. The deterioration of the
personal defendant's business is demonstrated
by his earning capacity prior and
subsequent to the accident. The personal defendant was earning $94,000 gross on
average in 2005/2006
and is now unemployed and on social security benefits. The
deterioration in the personal defendant's business was directly caused
by the
accident as the business stopped receiving work from a substantial client that
used to provide up to 80 per cent of the overall
business. After the accident,
this quickly reduced to 30 per cent, forcing a reduction in staff numbers. Key
staff also left the
business as a result of the accident. The cumulative effect
was that the business ultimately folded.
Capacity to pay
83 Mr Klooster submitted that the personal defendant was impecunious. I
have already set out the personal defendant's current financial
position. He is
in receipt of Centrelink payments. Although Mr Cahill submitted that there were
no financial records of any substance
produced that informed the Court in
respect of the disposal of the company's assets, or the assets of the personal
defendant. However
Centrelink benefits are means tested. I therefore propose
to draw an inference that the personal defendant has no significant assets.
He
has had to borrow money from his family in order to defend these proceedings.
However, the corporate defendant is in a different
position. No records were
produced in respect of the corporate defendant.
84 The principles to be applied in respect of an application under s 6 of
the Fines Act 1996, were discussed by me in Inspector Beacham v J
& L Marble Pty Ltd [2009] NSWIRComm 100 at [57] - [58]. In that matter,
I referred to the judgment of Walton J, Vice-President in WorkCover Authority
of New South Wales (Inspector Farrell) v Schrader, where his Honour
observed:
[83] The financial means of the defendant was a matter that was submitted in mitigation of penalty. In this regard I would adopt what I stated in Department of Mineral Resources v A M Hoipo & Sons (at par 50):
'It is proper, nonetheless, to have regard to the financial position and means of the defendant when considering the question of penalty: see Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Ltd (1999) 94 IR 188 at 209. The purpose of a fine is primarily to punish the offender. The burden which will be imposed by virtue of a fine at a particular level will, to some extent, depend upon the financial circumstances and resources of that offender. As a result, the amount and method of payment of a fine will need to take into account, as [2002] NSWIRComm 25; (2002) 112 IR 284 at 309 far as practicable, the financial resources and income of the defendant: see R v Sgroi (1989) 40 A Crim R 197 at 200-201.'
[84] This approach was subsequently adopted in Manpac Industries where the Full Bench of this Court stated (at pars 81-82):
'... Section 6 of the Fines Act 1996 provides that in exercising a discretion to fix the amount of any fine a court is required to consider the means of the accused and such other matters as are relevant to the fixing of that amount. That statutory injunction, of course, has long been recognised as an appropriate part of the sentencing process: see, for instance, Warman International (80 IR at 339); WorkCover Authority (NSW) (Inspector Dowling) v Overtop Pty Ltd (1998) 86 IR 319 at 333; and Profab Industries (49 NSWLR at 714; 100 IR at 76).
However, and given the primacy of the objective seriousness of an offence in determining an appropriate sentence, the financial situation of a defendant, in our view, needs to be carefully scrutinised. In Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Ltd (1999) 92 IR 188 at 209 - 210, Wright J, President observed:
'... Whilst I accept that the imposition of heavy fines would be a burden on the defendant and its financial resources and that consideration should be given appropriate weight on the question of penalty, it does not necessarily result in the Court not imposing a heavy penalty. ......
When viewed in the context of the statutory mandate in s 15 the offences were
very serious and provided proper weight is given to the subjective
considerations and insofar as deterrence is
concerned some tempering thereof,
the penalty should reflect the objective seriousness of the offence.
...'
[85] I would reiterate what the Court stated in WorkCover Authority (NSW) (Inspector Ankucic) v Lyndhurst Trading Co Pty Ltd (2000) 95 IR 462 at 476:
'Where the means of the defendant to pay any fine is raised, the proper course will be to assess the appropriate amount of the fine having regard to the gravity of the offence charged and then reduce the fine to take into account the defendant's means and impecuniosity: see R v Rahme (1989) 43 A Crim R 81 at 86.'
(See also WorkCover Authority (NSW) (Inspector Hopkins) v Michael Wheritt t/a M J Wherritt Concrete Pumping Services [2002] NSWIRComm 16 at pars 59-60.)"
85 The Full Bench in WorkCover
Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Robert Mayell) v D J Gleeson Pty Ltd
[2006] NSWIRComm 363 reviewed various judgments where s 6 of the Fines
Act was considered and observed at [35]:
[35] The relevant principles in relation to the application of s 6 of the Fines Act have been collected in a number of decisions in this jurisdiction. We adopt those principles in this judgment: Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Limited (1999) 92 IR 188 at 209; Department of Mineral Resources of NSW (Chief Inspector Terrey) v A M Hoipo & sons Pty Ltd (2000) 99 IR 137 at [48] - [51]; Manpac Industries Pty Ltd (formerly t/a Pacific Concrete & Quarries Pty Ltd) v WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Glass) [2001] NSWIRComm 190; (2001) 106 IR 435 at [56] - [57], [67], [81] - [83]; Inspector Green v Camilleri Properties Pty Limited at [21]. Applying these principles, we do not consider that there is any proper basis for the application of s 6 of the Fines Act in this case.
86 Having regard
to the above authorities, the relevant means of the personal defendant and
having considered both the personal defendant's
affidavit evidence and evidence
during cross-examination, I propose to exercise the discretion conferred upon me
by s 6 of the Fines Act. I therefore shall significantly reduce the
amount of fine which would have otherwise been ordered to be paid by the
personal defendant
due to the personal defendant's impecuniosity.
87 The defendants are also entitled to some leniency in that they have no
prior convictions under the OHS Act and co-operated fully with the
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales ("WorkCover") during its
investigation.
Costs and moiety
88 Mr Cahill sought costs and a moiety. Mr Klooster referred to the
decision of the Full Bench in Inspector Yeung v Donald Edwin Wilson t/as
Wilson's Tree Service [2005] NSWIRComm 158; (2005) 143 IR 187 and submitted
that the total fine and costs order must be an "acceptable total", or "just and
reasonable".
89 In Inspector Yeung v Wilson, the Court considered the relevant
provisions of the Fines Act, s 253 of the Criminal Procedure Act
1986 (which provides that the Court may order payment of costs), s 21A of
the CSP Act and s 181 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996, which
provides this Court with power to order costs. The Full Bench observed at
[122]:
[122] Relevantly, a “fine” in the Fines Act is defined to include any costs order (including expenses or disbursements) payable by a person under an order made by a court in proceedings for an offence that were brought by a law enforcement officer.
90 After referring to the judgment of Pearlman J in Environment Protection Authority v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWLEC 156; (2003) 128 LGERA 287 at [8] and a statement by Lord Bingham CJ in R v Northallerton Magistrates' Court; Ex Parte Christopher John Dove [2000] 1 Cr App Rep (S) 136 at [4], the Full Bench stated at [131] - [133]:
[131] ...We consider the approach of Lord Bingham preferable to this approach.
[132] Section 6 of the Fines Act allows consideration of the financial situation of the respondent in the court's consideration as to the appropriate costs order. Pearlman J reasoned a costs order must be "just and reasonable". Lord Bingham CJ defined the test as an "acceptable total". While the power exists to consider the financial circumstances of a respondent in both penalty and costs the overall result must comply with the test of "just and reasonable".
[133] ...In accordance with established principle, the court must make its determination in accordance with s 6 of the Fines Act. The court must also set the appropriate penalty for the offence giving proper weight to the objective seriousness of the offence. The court must then determine the appropriate costs order. Such a consideration, in our view, may also take into account the financial situation of the defendant. In so ordering the court must then determine that the total fine and costs order be an "acceptable total" or as otherwise said "just and reasonable". If the total penalty and costs order is viewed by the court to be excessive the court must make an appropriate adjustment to the costs order. The total must not be disproportionate to the offence...
91 I propose to be guided by these principles in determining penalty and costs in respect of the personal defendant.
92 Mr Klooster drew the Court's attention to what he described as
comparative cases.
93 It has been held on a number of occasions by this Court and the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Criminal Appeal that
comparisons with
sentences passed in other cases is not helpful. In WorkCover Authority (NSW)
(Inspector Mason) v Wild Geese Building and Maintenance Group Pty Ltd [2006]
NSWIRComm 350; (2006) 157 IR 313, the Full Bench observed at [38]:
[38] Nothing in her Honour's judgment explains how this very serious offence resulted in a penalty of less than five per cent of the maximum available. While the appellant argued that the explanation must be that too much weight was given to subjective matters, that is not apparent from her Honour's judgment. We consider that there are real difficulties in comparing penalties imposed under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, even in cases where there is an essential common feature, such as a falling incident, crushing incident etc, because of the myriad of differing surrounding factual circumstances in the cases. Nevertheless, while we do not foreclose the outcome in any particular case, we find it difficult to conceive of any case involving a fall of over five metres, in the absence of any fall protection equipment, which results in serious injury or the potential for such injury, where a fine of the present magnitude could properly be the result (see, for example, Inspector Guillarte v Trustees of De La Salle Brothers [2004] NSWIRComm 49; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Insp Hopkins) v Red Lea Chickens Pty Ltd and Magg Transport and Packing Pty Limited [2003] NSWIRComm 71; Inspector Glass v B T Engineering Pty Ltd as Trustee of the Bruce Thomas Family Trust [2004] NSWIRComm 245; and Inspector Dubois v Masters Civil Pty Ltd and Anor [2006] NSWIRComm 180 - only the last of which was the subject of an appeal (which was unsuccessful: Masters Civil Pty Limited v Inspector Dubois [2006] NSWIRComm 332))
See also Nelmac Pty Ltd v Franke (Inspector) [2006] NSWIRComm 100; (2006) 151 IR 63; Inspector Jelley v Albright & Wilson (Australia) Limited [2007] NSWIRComm 148; (2007) 164 IR 456.
94 The maximum penalty in respect of the corporate defendant is $550,000.
The maximum penalty in respect of the personal defendant
is $55,000. Taking
into account the appropriate seriousness of the offences, the subjective factors
referred to earlier and the
financial position of the personal defendant, I
impose a fine of $5000 on the personal defendant. I impose a fine of $100,000
on
the corporate defendant. In respect of the question of costs, the Court is
entitled to take into account the financial situation
of the personal
defendant.
95 I have decided, noting that the purpose of costs is not a punishment,
that the personal defendant will pay 15 per cent of the prosecutor's
costs. In
my view, the total fine and costs order in respect of the personal defendant
represents a just and reasonable order.
ORDERS
96 I make the following orders:
Matter No IRC 59 of 2010
1. The offence is proven and a verdict of guilty is entered.
2. The personal defendant is convicted of the offence, as charged.
3. The personal defendant is fined an amount of $5000 with a moiety thereof to the prosecutor.
4. The personal defendant shall pay 15 per cent of the prosecutor's costs of the proceedings.
Matter No IRC 63 of 2010
1. The offence is proven and a verdict of guilty is entered.
2. The corporate defendant is convicted of the offence, as charged.
3. The corporate defendant is fined an amount of $100,000 with a moiety to the prosecutor.
4. The corporate defendant shall pay the prosecutor's costs of the proceedings in an amount as agreed, or if agreement cannot be reached, as assessed.
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LAST
UPDATED:
30 December 2010
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