Coleman & Wridgways Limited [2003] NSWIRComm 1086 (21 November 2003)

Last Updated: 7 April 2004

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Coram: TABBAA, C.

21 November, 2003

Matter No. IRC 1146 of 2003

SANDRA COLEMAN and WRIDGWAYS LIMITED

Application by S. Coleman re: unfair dismissal pursuant to section 84 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1996.

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D E C I S I O N

Ms Sandra Coleman filed a claim under Section 84 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1996 on 04 March, 2003 alleging that she had been unfairly dismissed by the respondent on 03 February, 2003. Ms Coleman contended that she had been employed from 1997/1998 until her dismissal as a Carton Packer.

The matter was listed for conciliation and directions hearing on 09 May, 2003 at which time three threshold issues were identified - Firstly, the claim had been filed out-of-time. Secondly, the applicant had been engaged as a casual employee and, thirdly, it was alleged that no dismissal had taken place.

Conciliation attempts failed to resolve the claim and a filing schedule was directed. At the commencement of the arbitration proceedings into the threshold issues held on 27 June, 2003, Mr. G. Voll, Industrial Advocate, entered an appearance on behalf of the Applicant with Ms Coleman. Mr. S. Crowle, State Manager - Victoria & Tasmania, entered an appearance of behalf of the Respondent.

OUT OF TIME THRESHOLD ISSUE

The Applicant tendered a statement in the proceedings relating to the reason(s) for the claim being filed out of time (Exhibit V1).

Ms Coleman contended that she had been employed as a long term casual pre-packer since late in 1997. The work was, by its nature, seasonal and not continuous but it was regular and, over a year, had averaged out at about 20 hours per week. Over the period of her employment, she had become experienced and competent at her job and, for a majority of that time, was one of two pre-packers employed at the Albury branch.

She had been in employment for at least a year when another pre-packer, Aileen Lieshke, was employed. The applicant alleged that shortly after her engagement, Ms Lieshke had commenced to harass and intimidate employees although she appeared to be the main target. That behaviour had continued for nearly four (4) years before the Applicant finally lodged a complaint with the Branch Manager, Annette Walters. Despite allegedly being spoken to about her behaviour a number of times, Ms Lieshke did not alter her behaviour and was eventually dismissed about mid 2002.

Ms Walters was later dismissed on 03 February, 2003 and, on the same day, Ms Lieshke was re-employed. The applicant stated that she became concerned for the security of her employment as she had been friendly with Ms Walters and she had not been called in to work on 04 February, 2003, a day she would normally work a full day. During cross-examination and re-examination, she stated that staff had access to the work book and she had noticed the week before that there was work available on 04 February and that was why she expected that she would be rostered in on that day as she was at the top of the casual list. Although the Respondent contended that there had been no casuals rostered to pre-pack on 04- 07 February, 2003 inclusive, she insisted that she had seen two names in the book rostered for work on 04 February but she was only aware of one who had worked. The book was an operational book and was located at the business premises. Ms Lieshke had been responsible for organising work on that day. Ms Coleman heard through the grapevine that Mr. Steve Crowle, the State Manager who had dismissed Ms Walters, had issued instructions that none of her friends were to be employed by the Respondent. During examination from the Bench, the Applicant testified that she had approached Neil Witt, who had told her that he had been promoted to Operations Manager, on 04 February, and he had confirmed that she had been dismissed and further confirmed what she heard on the grapevine that "Annie’s friends weren’t to be employed and that was the reason why I’d been terminated". Ms Coleman stated that she heard that a new manager was to be appointed shortly and decided to wait and make approaches about her employment to that new manager:

CROWLE: Q. If you were told, allegedly by Neil Witt, on 4 February that your services were no longer required and you were terminated ... therefore your claim would be out of date....?

A.... That was the day that I was told that ... Annie’s friends weren’t to be employed...but I actually thought at that stage, because of the new management that ... was being brought in, I’d been told that she wasn’t to start her job until 16th of the month and she assured me that once she had started her work that I could go in and see her and that there wouldn’t be a problem, but it didn’t happen like that.

Q. So, you didn’t believe on 4 February that your employment was terminated?

A. At that stage I wasn’t sure, because there was too much hearsay going around. I had to wait to see. I’d spoken to the manager and she assured me that things were going to be fine and which they weren’t.

In her statement, Ms Coleman stated that once she heard about Ms Paula Harding's appointment, which was to commence on 16 February, 2003, she had made a number of approaches to her, including a visit to her home, to discuss her continuing employment. Ms Harding had basically advised that she did not want to involve herself with Ms Coleman's apparent dismissal.

However, in response to questions put from the Bench, she stated that when she visited Ms Harding at her home, Ms Harding had stated that she was not yet aware of what was actually happening at the workplace as she was not starting employment until 16 February but "that things would be okay and that I would be employed. And which, 16th came and nothing happened."

Ms Coleman then called into the branch office on 18 February, 2003 to speak to her about the issue. Although Mr. Crowle was in the office on that day, Ms Harding refused to discuss the matter with him, thus confirming to Ms Coleman that she had been dismissed.

She sought legal advice and her unfair dismissal claim was lodged on 04 March, 2003, within 21 days of when she was convinced that she had been dismissed.

Up to the time of the hearing, she had only been able to secure one day's casual employment and contended, therefore, that failure by the Commission to accept her claim would cause her further financial hardship.

Mr. Steven Crowle tendered a statement in the proceedings in relation to the out of time claim (Exhibit C1).

In his response, Mr. Crowle stated that Ms Lieshke had never been dismissed from her duties as a casual labourer. In addition, the Branch Manager had not been dismissed. He was adamant that he had never given an instruction, either verbally or in writing, that friends of Ms Walters would not be employed by the Respondent firm. He had been responsible for allocating work on 04 February, 2003 and there had not been any appropriate work for casual carton packing labour. Neither he, nor any other officer of the respondent company, had indicated at any stage that a new Branch Manager would be employed soon.

Nevertheless, he had discussed labour requirements on a daily basis with the newly appointed Branch Manager, Ms Paula Harding, from 17 - 27 February, 2003 giving priority always to permanent staff in relation to all tasks. Ms Coleman had remained in the labour pool under consideration.

He pointed out that casual work had been offered to Ms Coleman prior to the first conciliation conference held on 09 May. Ms Coleman remained either unavailable or did not respond to messages in relation to work on 25 March, 26 March, 14 April, 24 April and 27 April, 2003.

Mr. Crowle gave evidence that the business was unpredictable by nature and the volume of work was inconsistent and significantly reduced. Tendered in the proceedings were documents titled "Weekly Reporting System" as at the end of January 2003 (Exhibit C3) and for the same period ending January 2002 (Exhibit C2). Those exhibits indicated that the Albury firm traded poorly in the 12-month period to January 2003 to the extent that revenues were down by 32 per cent and wages paid to the Respondent's operational staff were also down by 23 per cent from the previous corresponding year. Wages, as a percentage of revenue, were up by 2.2 per cent. As at the end of January 2003, it had traded half a million dollars and made a gross profit of $3000.

Also tendered was the work record of the Applicant from 03 June, 2001 until 26 January, 2003 (Exhibit C4) which, in Mr. Crowle's view, confirmed that the nature of her employment had been casual. The document was generated from the payroll system and detailed the pay weeks during which the applicant had worked since the beginning of June 2001 through to the end of June 2003. That document indicated that there had been regular, significant periods during which Ms Coleman had not been required to work for one reason or another. It further indicated that during the periods when she had worked, there were occasions when the work had been 'very, very patchy to the extent of perhaps one day here and there'.

Despite the fact that she had been the longest serving casual pre-packer and, by his own admission, a very competent worker, he refused to give her precedence over other casuals as it would not be prudent business practice to do so if the company wanted to maintain a viable pool of casuals to draw on. The policy of the respondent firm was to distribute the work as evenly as it could, "longevity of employment as a casual doesn’t come into the calculation."

He insisted that he was not aware of Ms Lunnon, a casual with less longevity of employment than the applicant, working on 04 February, 2003, but pointed out that if she had, it would have been in accordance with the policy to rotate casuals so as to spread available hours evenly. He insisted that it had nothing to do with either the termination of the Branch Manager or Ms Coleman personally.

Although Ms Coleman was a good packer, he acknowledged that she had not been offered work from late January to late March citing the reason as being downturn in the business. During that time, there had been a couple of casuals employed to do carton picking.

During a short adjournment, Mr. Crowle obtained records of casual work undertaken during the period 28 February - 25 March

28 January T. Corrigan and S. Coleman

29 January T. Corrigan and S. Coleman

30 January S. Coleman

31 January S. Coleman

03 February C. Kelly

10 February C. Kelly, M. Lunnon, and A. Lieschke

19 February A. Lieschke

There was no further casual work available from 20 February until 25 March. Casual work available from 25 March had been offered to the Applicant and rejected before taken up by Ms Lieschke.

He emphasised that there were no records indicating that Ms Lieschke had ever been terminated. She had remained on the approved pool of eleven (11) casuals. He insisted that it was Ms C. Kelly who had worked as a casual packer on 03 February and, according to the records, no casual pre-packer had been engaged on 04 February.

He agreed that Ms Coleman had not been provided with casual hours from 31 January to 25 March explaining that it was the result of rotation of casuals and low business levels as demonstrated by the profit and loss statements tendered.

SUBMISSIONS RELATING TO THE OUT-OF-TIME ISSUE

It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that there were two issues involved - firstly, was Ms Coleman dismissed and, if so, approximately when had that taken place? It had been verified, both in the respondent’s documentation and oral evidence, that Ms Coleman was a regular worker and, in particular during January 2003, was quite regularly employed.

On or about 3 February, 2003 a change occurred. Ms Coleman alleged that she was told by an employee of the company that as a result of the alleged dismissal of Ms Walters, the then branch manager, she was no longer required. She had not taken that advice seriously as that person did not have the authority to fire staff. She next expected to work on 04 February, 2003 but was not offered any hours. After 04 February she inquired about her employment status, to the extent that she had visited the soon to be appointed manager at her home as she knew her personally because that person had worked with the respondent on a previous occasion as a secretary.

It did not become clear to her what her employment status was until at least two days after the new manager commenced employment. Ms Coleman visited the company on a day when Mr. Crowle was present and asked the new manager about her employment status and sought work. Ms Coleman gave evidence that the new manager essentially refused to enter into the debate and did not approach Mr. Crowle on her behalf. It was then that she became convinced, quite logically, that she had been terminated.

It was concluded that the applicant had established that there was at least doubt in her mind about her status on 04 February and she had persisted until it was confirmed to her on 18 February that she had been dismissed.

Mr. Voll relied on precedents set in two matters involving similar circumstances. In Capezio v. Tredeve Pty. Ltd. & Evalaw Facilities Pty. Ltd.^[1] an out-of-time claim was granted because the actual date of the dismissal was unclear and emotional stress and lack of knowledge of procedures had contributed to the delay.

In Health v. Quick Fit Car Radios and Alarms Pty. Ltd.^[2] an out-of-time application was granted because the applicant had needed to seek legal advice and was involved in on-going discussions with the respondent.

In relation to financial hardship, Ms Coleman obtained only one casual day's employment up until her statement was prepared in late May 2003. She had therefore suffered financial hardship in addition to psychological trauma.

It was pointed out, on behalf of the Respondent, that Ms Coleman gave evidence to the effect that she believed that she was terminated on 04 February, even though it was said to her by somebody who had no authority to advise her as such. On that basis, if that was her belief, then her claim was out of time.

In relation to hardship, it was submitted that the Respondent had incurred costs in relation to both the time spent by Mr. Crowle in defending the claim and fares in travelling to Sydney from Melbourne on two occasions. In addition, changes had occurred within the business because of its poor trading and, although the Respondent had maintained its casual pool, there was less work to share between them.

CASUAL EMPLOYMENT THRESHOLD ISSUE

The Applicant tendered a statement in the proceedings relating to the casual employment threshold issue (Exhibit V2). She stated that she had been employed from December 1997 until February 2003 as one of only two regular pre-packers. She acknowledged that the work was, by its very nature, "seasonal and not continuous" albeit it was regular and averaged at approximately 20 hours a week when considered over a 12-month period.

She had been on call throughout the period of her employment save when she decided that she wanted time out to take leave - whether holidays or sick leave. She had received Workers' Compensation benefits in July 2002 for a work-related injury. She therefore expected to receive on-going work so long as she made herself available.

She submitted that it took her by complete surprise when, despite repeated requests, she had not been offered any further hours from early February 2003 and no explanation had been forthcoming in relation to that omission. It had become evident to her that she had been dismissed on 03 February, 2003 - co-inciding with the dismissal of the Manager of the Albury depot.

She concluded that she had been a long serving and regular employee of the respondent firm and not an "employee engaged on a casual basis for a short period" and was therefore eligible to seek redress under the relevant section of the Act.

Mr. Crowle tendered a statement in relation to that threshold issue (Exhibit C5) in which it was argued on behalf of the Respondent that the business was seasonal and not continuous or consistent in its volume. The Respondent had eleven (11) approved casuals on its books, eight (8) of whom were capable of performing carton picking and had done so in the past. It was not denied that the applicant had been proficient in the performance of her duties.

What was denied, however, was the allegation that the applicant had averaged 20 hours per week. It was contended that she had averaged significantly less. The requirement to utilise casual labour depended on business activity at any given time. As had been conceded by the Applicant, sometimes she declined the offer of casual hours, sometimes there were no casual hours on offer for lengthy periods and sometimes that work would be offered to other casuals.

It was further argued that the availability of casual work had not been regular. The applicant had not supplied her labour for periods of seven (7) days or more at a stretch. In addition, there were many weeks during which she had not worked more than one (1) day.

For the above reasons, it was contended that her employment had not been terminated. She had been employed on a strictly casual basis.

SUBMISSIONS RELATING TO CASUAL EMPLOYMENT

It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that she had been employed as a long term casual employee who worked regularly, if not continuously, with the Respondent and was therefore covered by the unfair dismissal provisions of the Act.

In support of that contention, the Applicant relied on the decision in Elaine Atkins and Box Hill High School, School Council.^[3] Ms Atkins had been engaged as a casual relief teacher in a Victorian High School to supplement the teaching workforce on an "as needed" basis when regular teachers were absent.

The Australian Commission found that, despite her working arrangements clearly characterising her status as a casual employee, the occasions on which she had taught at the school under that engagement occurred over a period of more than twelve (12) months and, accordingly, her application was within the jurisdiction of the AIRC.

The clear point made in that decision was that long term casual employment did not necessary involve weekly or continuous employment but, rather, regular employment with the same company for a period of at least a minimum of 12 months.

It was contended on behalf of the Respondent that Ms Coleman's employment had been irregular. Mr. Crowle pointed out that he was not in a position to comment on the authorities cited without being provided with the details of those cases. It was stressed that in Ms Coleman's case, she had been a casual who had been called upon by the company to carry out tasks when firstly, the tasks suited her skills, secondly, when the tasks were required by the company and, thirdly, on a rotating basis with other casuals on an equitable basis. There was never any promise made to the applicant to provide her with continuous work. In other words, it was one day at a time.

CONSIDERATION

Casual Employment

Section 83 (2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 provides that relief from unfair dismissals is not available to, inter alia, employees engaged on a casual basis for a short period.

The Applicant commenced employment in 1997/1998 and was offered casual hours on a "needs" basis until February 2003. On the Respondent's own admission, she had been part of a pool of casuals between whom available casual work was shared on an equitable basis.

Having considered the nature of her employment, the evidence and the submissions of the parties, I find that she was not one of the categories exempted from making application for relief under the relevant section.

Out of Time Claim

Section 85 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 requires applications made under Chapter 2, Part 6 of that Act to be made not later than 21 days after the dismissal of the employee.

Parliament has determined that 21 days is an appropriate time for dismissed employees to order their thoughts, gather themselves together, seek advice, consider the advice and take whatever steps they considered appropriate in relation to their termination. Both parties are entitled, after the passage of a reasonable time, to consider that their relationship has finally come to an end and order their affairs on that assumption.

It is also in recognition of the fact that timely expedition of such claims is necessary in order to preserve the intent of the Act which provides that the primary remedy for unfair dismissals is re-instatement.

The requirement to file a claim within 21 days is, nevertheless, tempered by the provisions of sub-section 85 (3) which defines the criteria which the Commission should have particular regard to when considering whether there is sufficient reason to exercise its discretion to accept an out-of-time claim:

(a) the reason for, and the length of, the delay in making the application,

and

(b) any hardship that may be caused to the applicant or the employer if

the application is or is not rejected, and

(c) the conduct of the employer relating to the dismissal.

Reason for, and length of, the delay

If a dismissal had indeed occurred on 03 February, 2003, then the claim would have been filed eight (8) days out of time. It was contended on behalf of the Applicant that the delay had been caused by the fact that she had not been told directly that she had been dismissed and by the fact that she had spent those eight (8) days attempting to seek confirmation and awaiting the commencement of the new Manager who had allegedly undertaken to set things right.

Hardship

It was contended on behalf of rhe Applicant that, as at late May 2003, she had only obtained one day's casual employment.

In relation to the Respondent, it was contended that it had incurred fares and travelling expenses as Mr. Crowle had travelled from Melbourne to Sydney to attend on two occasions. In addition, costs were incurred in relation to the time spent in travelling to, preparing for, and attendance at the proceedings in Sydney.

Conduct of the Respondent

It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that the failure of the Respondent to clearly indicate to the Applicant whether or not she was dismissed had resulted in uncertainty as to the real date upon which she had been dismissed. As soon as the applicant confirmed that she had been dismissed, that is on 18 February, 2003, she had sought legal advice and lodged her claim within 21 days of that date.

It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the applicant had not been dismissed and had remained as part of the labour pool under consideration. The lack of casual hours was a result of rotation of casuals and low business levels. She had been offered casual work on 25 March, 26 March, 14 April, 24 April and 27 April, 2003 but she had declined it either by being unavailable or by not responding to messages.

Relevant Principles

In Kent Gorrell v. Uwatec Pty. Ltd.^[4] Sams DP summarised the relevant principles as follows:

(a) The Commission's power to accept out of time applications is discretionary;

(b) The onus rests on the applicant to convince the Commission of a "sufficient

reason" to accept an out of time application;

(c) It is inappropriate to establish a rigid definition of what constitutes a "sufficient

reason". Each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances;

(d) There is a definite purpose in the power of the Commission to exercise its

discretion in extending the time limit of 21 days; just as there is a definite

purpose in the legislature establishing time limitations for filing;

(e) There is a public interest in the prompt institution and prosecution of litigation

before the Commission;

(f) The discretion to allow out of time applications is directed to ensuring that

justice is afforded to both parties;

(g) Each of the subclauses (a), (b) and (c) in s. 85 (3) should be addressed and an

explanation provided. It is only necessary to establish a sufficient reason for

the Commission's discretion to be exercised;

(h) Ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of rhe law excuses no one).

The Applicant had described her work as "by its very nature, seasonal and not continuous".

She stated that she had become concerned for the security of her employment when Ms Lieshke was re-employed and her fears had been realised when no further casual hours were given to her. Yet no attempt was made to call Ms Lieshke to give evidence. In addition, no attempt was made to call Ms Annette Walters to give evidence regarding the complaints she had lodged with her in relation to Ms Lieshke.

Finally, Mr. Voll had also not considered it necessary to call on Ms Paula Harding to give evidence to verify that the applicant had attempted to clarify her employment status and that her promises had resulted in the applicant delaying the lodgement of her claim. Although Mr. Voll was questioned as to why Ms Harding had not been called, his response had been very evasive and non-conclusive.

The applicant was adamant that work was available for two casuals on 04 February, 2003 as she had seen the entry in the operational book. That was denied by the Respondent. No attempt was made to subpoena the operational book in order to verify the applicant's contention.

Instead of the applicant providing evidence in support of her contentions, it was left to the Respondent to refute her allegations. It was incumbent upon the applicant to bring positive evidence to demonstrate her contentions.^[5] As a result of persistent cross-examination on the issue of rostering during the period 28 February - 25 March, 2003, a short adjournment was granted during which Mr. Crowle telephoned his office and obtained the relevant information which equates to the following:

Total days worked during the period

T. Corrigan 2 days

S. Coleman 4 days

A. Lieschke 2 days

C. Kelly 2 days

M. Lunnon 1 day

Clearly the applicant had received more work than the other casual employees during the said period which may be the reason why no attempt was made to call on the production of those records.

In any event, the records demonstrated that no casual pre-packer had been employed on 04 February as contended by the Applicant.

Ms Coleman had heard "on the grapevine" that Mr. Crowle intended to rid the workplace of friends of the dismissed Ms Walters. She had approached Neil Witt who had allegedly confirmed the rumour to her. There was a question mark as to his position within the company. Nevertheless, the applicant did not call him to give evidence in the proceedings. She had waited and visited the supposed new manager at her home and then waited for her to commence work on 16 February, 2003 to make further formal approaches to her two days later regarding her status. Yet there was no explanation whatsoever from the applicant as to why she had not approached Mr. Crowle directly regarding her status. There was no evidence whatsoever of any ill-feeling between them. In fact, Mr. Crowle had acknowledged her as a very competent worker.

When asked if there was any reason why Mr. Witt had not been called to give evidence and why the Operations Book had not been subpoenaed, Mr. Voll stated that he had not considered either to be crucial evidence in the proceedings.

Mr. Crowle had insisted that Neil Witt had been engaged by the Respondent as a removalist. Ms Coleman insisted that she knew him to be a leading hand who was promoted to Operations Manager and he sat at a desk in the office at Albury. His business card was tendered citing him as "Removalist, Removal Consultant, Operations Supervisor" (Exhibit V3). He had given her his card three weeks previously, which, Mr. Crowle contended, co-incided with training he had received to become a removal consultant at a time when he had no removal work to do. Mr. Crowle insisted that Mr. Witt was not an Operations Manager.

Ms Coleman gave evidence that she had made numerous attempts to be allocated work. She spoke of her inability to gain alternative employment, yet, she had rejected five (5) offers of casual shifts prior to the first conciliation hearing. The s. 84 form clearly provides on the cover page that the applicant should ".... make every effort to contact [her] employer with a view to settling the claim". There was no evidence of any contact or response being made by either the applicant or her representative.

In relation to the discussions with Ms Harding, the applicant stated in her statement that Ms Harding had basically advised, during a number of approaches to her prior to her commencement on 16 February, that she did not want to involve herself with Ms Coleman's apparent dismissal. In response to questions from the Bench, she testified that Ms Harding had stated that she was not yet aware of what was actually happening at the workplace but that after her commencement things would be okay and the applicant would be employed. On 18 February, Ms Harding had declined to broach the subject with Mr. Crowle. The applicant had not taken the opportunity to ask to see Mr. Crowle despite the fact that he had been available on that day.

The Respondent tendered evidence to the effect that the volume of work had significantly reduced during that period (Exhibits C2 and C3). Also tendered by the Respondent was the work record of the Applicant which confirmed that there were regular, significant periods (2 and 3 week periods) during which she had not been required to work (Exhibit C4). None of that evidence had been refuted by the Applicant.

I accept the submission made on behalf of the Respondent that it was prudent business practice to distribute available casual work evenly so as to maintain a viable pool to draw from.

No hardship to the Applicant was demonstrated to the Commission. Loss of wages is common to all applicants in s. 84 proceedings. No evidence was put before the Commission as to any attempts by the Applicant to mitigate her losses.

The authorities cited on behalf of the Applicant were unhelpful. Only the head notes relating to the cited cases had been tendered which left the Respondent in a position where it was unable to comment on their relevance.

I am not convinced that the Applicant was dismissed. However, even if she had, by the Applicant's own admission, both on her application and during evidence, she thought she had been dismissed on 03 February, 2003 which would make her claim out of time.

CONCLUSION

The Applicant has not, in my view, discharged the onus to show that an acceptable explanation exists for the delay and that it would be fair and equitable in the circumstances to allow the out-of-time claim. I do not regard the reasons advanced on behalf of the applicant as persuasive enough to warrant accepting the out-of-time claim. The application is therefore declined and the matter is concluded.

I. Tabbaa

COMMISSIONER

^[1] Deegan, C, Australian Industrial Relations Commission PR 924179 dated 30 October, 2002

^[2] Hingley, C. Australian Industrial Relations Commission PR 924521 dated 11 November, 2002

^[3] Lewin, C. Australian Industrial Relations Commission PR 930307 dated 28 March, 2003

^[4] IRC 1700 of 1999, 11 November, 1999

^[5] [2001] NSWIRComm 169 at p. 8 (Sams DP)