Manning v NSW Sugar Milling Co-Op Ltd [1997] NSWCC 29; (1997) 14 NSWCCR 612 (30 June 1997)

[1997] NSWCC 29; (1997) 14 NSWCCR 612

MANNING v. NSW SUGAR MILLING CO-OP LTD

Compensation Court of New South Wales: Burke J

30 JUNE 1997

ASSESSMENT AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION - SPECIAL PAYMENTS - MEDICAL OR RELATED TREATMENT - THERAPEUTIC TREATMENT, NURSING CARE AND GENERAL CARE PROVIDED BY THE INJURED WORKER'S WIFE AND FAMILY AT HOME - LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER TO PAY THE COST OF SUCH SERVICES - CATEGORISATION OF THE SERVICES RENDERED - METHOD OF ASSESSING SUCH COST - WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 1987, SECTIONS 59, 60 AND 61

WORDS, PHRASES AND MAXIMS - "COST" - WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 1987, SECTION 60(1)

WORDS, PHRASES AND MAXIMS - "DIRECTION OF" - WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 1987, SECTION 59

WORDS, PHRASES AND MAXIMS - "DIRECTED BY" - WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 1987, SECTION 59

R.I. HARRINGTON, for the applicant

P.M. HALL QC AND A.E. GALASSO, for the respondent

CUR ADV VULT

BURKE J: The applicant seeks to recover from the respondent, INTER ALIA, amounts representing the value of the services rendered to him by his wife and family, which, in another jurisdiction, would fall within the ambit of GRIFFITHS v. KERKEMEYER [1977] HCA 45; (1977) 139 CLR 161.

Mr Hall QC for the respondent has emphasised time and again that the Court is constrained to observe the legislative precepts of a statute, is not free to apply common law principle and may award benefits only so far as such are specifically authorised by the Act. Much of the submissions of the parties have been made in the context of a prior decision of mine in a matter of EBERT v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (NSW) [1991] NSWCC 2; (1991) 14 NSWCCR 626 and, at appropriate points, portions of the judgment in that matter will be referred to in these reasons.

There is really little, if any, dispute about the detail of the services rendered to the applicant, particularly by his wife, Barbara, apparently more often referred to by her other given name of Ruth, and such will be but tersely indicated herein.

BACKGROUND

On 7 October 1979, as the result of a motor vehicle accident, the applicant sustained serious injury resulting in a C5 quadriplegia. He was treated at Royal North Shore Hospital, subsequently at Lismore Base Hospital and discharged home to Coraki on 1 April 1980. Prior to this discharge his wife spent a fortnight at Royal North Shore Hospital being instructed in the care of her quadriplegic husband. She was an exceedingly receptive pupil. Subsequent events have revealed her exceptional competence, persistence and efficiency in administering to the needs of her husband.

Dr Yeo has assessed Donald Manning's losses as far as his limbs are concerned as 100 per cent of each leg and 85 per cent of each arm. On the evidence, the assessment of the degree of loss as far as the arms are concerned was not generous. The practical utility of Donald Manning's arms is very little. If he wishes to read a newspaper someone must hold it for him. He can read a book if suitably propped up before him but cannot turn the pages. His major practical achievement is the operation of an electric wheelchair. Ruth Manning did say that if a spoon is affixed to a splint which is affixed to Donald's right arm, he can feed himself though it seems such is not often essayed. It appears that it is more efficient if Donald is fed by someone else.

Donald Manning is dependent upon others for virtually every conceivable activity including bowel and bladder function, adjusting a pillow or blanket, having a drink of water, bathing, eating, moving around. His every minor need depends for satisfaction upon the assistance of others.

With the passing years the initial complications have increased and new ones developed. Donald requires Ventolin for an asthma condition; he suffers sleep apnoea and a machine is used to combat this; pulmonary congestion has always been a problem and routinely phlegm will be evacuated several times each day. The need for such may not await the next routine procedure. He has developed cardiac problems.

In 1988 complete renal failure ensued requiring hospitalisation. Ruth did another two-week course in peritoneal dialysis and after Donald was discharged home he underwent dialysis, administered by Ruth, for about 12 hours on six nights per week. The details of the procedure are set forth in the evidence. It was a not uncomplicated procedure, there was a major emphasis on the need for complete sterility since the absence of asepsis could induce potentially fatal peritonitis, there would be intermittent alarms through the night requiring adjustment of the machine. After this regime had been observed for about six months, Ruth Manning became "sick", as she put it. This was probably in late 1988 or early 1989. Donald Manning described her problem as a "breakdown". The evidence generally makes it clear that she was hospitalised for psychiatric treatment. She agreed in evidence that the dialysis procedure had really got too much for her. Dr Mahony suggests much the same.

By about April 1989 peritoneal dialysis could no longer be maintained. There followed an admission to Royal North Shore for a couple of months and then a regime of haemodialysis administered at Lismore Base Hospital each Monday, Wednesday and Friday. That involved the transport of Donald to and from the hospital.

In September 1992 home dialysis was commenced, the necessary dialysis equipment having been installed in the Manning home and a specialised nurse attends for six hours per day on Monday, Wednesday and Friday to administer that treatment.

CARE PROVIDED BY OTHER THAN FAMILY

While there are intermittent variations from time to time, the care of the applicant can be broadly dealt with in four distinct periods in each of which the basic care provided was essentially the same throughout.

[HIS HONOUR THEN SET OUT IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE CARE PROVIDED DURING THOSE FOUR PERIODS AND CONTINUED - ED]

THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM

As framed in the application for determination, it is suggested the applicant would like something in excess of $500,000 as representing the value of his wife's services on the basis of 60 hours per week--about eight and a half hours per day, seven days per week--for the past 15 years or thereabouts. Harrington, for the applicant, purports to have been disconcerted by my terse request at the commencement of his address: "What is your problem, Mr Harrington. What do you want in terms of dollars, cents and periods; and why should I give it to Mr Manning?". So disconcerted it appears that he never did quite get around to formulating in concrete terms the precise relief that his client sought. However the general nature of what was sought was clear enough.

What are the relevant provisions of the Act which impinge upon the question of Mr Manning's entitlement or otherwise to recover a sum representing the value of the services provided by the family in general but substantially by the wife in particular? Quite a number of these matters were traversed in EBERT v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION.

THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION

The fundamental provision is section 60(1) providing that where treatment falling within the ambit of medical and related treatment as defined in section 59 is provided:

"... the worker's employer is liable to pay, in addition to any other compensation under this Act, the COST of that treatment or service ..."

The emphasis is added to identify what is regarded as a critical element of the provision.

The relevant elements of the definition of medical and related treatment in section 59 are:

"(b) therapeutic treatment given by DIRECTION OF a medical practitioner.

...

(e) any nursing ... supplied or provided for the worker otherwise than as hospital treatment.

(f) care (other than nursing care) of a worker in the worker's home DIRECTED BY a medical practitioner having regard to the nature of the worker's incapacity."

Hall QC has adopted a position different to that adopted by the respondent in EBERT. In the latter matter there was a fundamental attack on the services of the spouse even falling within the above paragraphs of the definition of medical and related treatment. Here it is not so suggested. It is accepted that the services of Mrs Manning are within the ambit of the definition--indeed in relation to the initial period reviewed briefly above Hall QC, not a subscriber to the Noel Coward aphorism "They also serve who only stand and wait", after a meticulous time and motion study of just how long Mrs Manning was engaged in evacuating her husband's bowels or tapping his bladder and such like thought that it could be found that she was rendering three and a half hours of nursing service per day within paragraph (e) of the definition. The attack of the respondent in this matter is that whatever the service provided there was no "cost" within section 60(1). Mrs Manning provided the services gratuitously and made no charge upon her husband for these services. Therefore there was no cost and the applicant can recover nothing. The odd consequence of such a submission seems to be that had Mrs Manning sat down each Friday evening and produced an invoice for 60 hours services at $10 per hour = $600, it could be otherwise. Seems a little incongruous that a change in form but none in substance could have such an effect.

This lack of a "cost" was a matter that I traversed in EBERT at 633-634. I am content to abide by what I then thought. Indeed I feel there are other matters that could tend to suggest that the conclusion was correct even if the reasoning was considered deficient.

I could regale you with an account of my travels and tell you that the cost of petrol in Ireland is about $1.80 per litre and that a pint of Guinness costs about double that amount. Parenthetically I might indicate that it could be deduced from this irrelevant bit of trivia that in Ireland it would cost about the same to drive all day as to drink all day. However, for present purposes my interest is to convey that the word "cost" is used in this context to connote more a market value, a going price or a customary charge rather than any particular charge or expenditure.

Other provisions of the Act suggest that "cost" in section 60(1) doesn't necessarily signify a definite charge or expenditure. In section 61(1) it is clear that the "cost" for which an employer is liable is not the actual charge or expenditure unless such is equivalent to the "customary charge in the community for treatment to persons other than workers". Patently if the charge made exceeds this customary charge, then the employer is not obliged to pay it.

Much the same suggestion is apparent in section 61(5). Whatever the charge levied upon or expenditure incurred by a worker for particular services, in evaluating the liability of the employer to meet the cost of such, it is clear that such can be abated if it be thought that all or elements of such services "might be expected to be provided by the worker's spouse or other persons residing with the worker".

The meaning of the word "cost" in section 60(1) is not limited to a charge, a bill, an invoice or a cheque. It is more ambivalent that that. Mr Justice Kirby in a short article entitled INTERNATIONAL LAW COMES DOWN TO EARTH in the June 1997 issue of the JUDICIAL OFFICERS' BULLETIN advances a concept of resort to international law to assist in the resolution of ambivalences, gaps and ambiguities in local law. That may be controversial. However, there seems much less controversy concerning this Court resorting to common law concepts in giving meaning to concepts embodied in the Act. In MORRIS v. GEORGE [1977] 2 NSWLR 552, Glass JA suggested the equivalence of common law concepts of causation with those embodied in the statutory formula of "results from" in the Act. GRIFFITHS v. KERKEMEYER and the wealth of authority that it spawned could be a straw in the wind assisting in the present context to give substance to the content of the word "cost" in section 60(1).

I am therefore of the view that the applicant is entitled to recover the reasonable value of such services necessarily provided to him as the consequence of the relevant injury as fall within the ambit of the definition of relevant services in section 59.

This raises a number of problems. There is necessarily a classification problem because of the different pre-conditions to different types of service. "Therapeutic treatment" and "care (other than nursing care) in the worker's home" are required to have been DIRECTED BY or given at the DIRECTION OF a medical practitioner. Nursing care requires no such direction.

Hall QC clearly limits nursing care to hands-on paramedical operations. In EBERT, I cited some authority suggesting that the concept of nursing care would be much wider and encompass a range of services which, in other circumstances, might be considered as domestic. It is a view to which I adhere.

In this matter Hall QC suggests that there is no evidence of any such direction in so far as it might be required. He patently takes a view of the content of "directed" or "direction" that I initially assumed and expressed to Harrington in the course of his address. I suggested that it had connotations of order or command which did not, superficially, appear to be present in evidence.

It is true that order or command is given as the sixth definition of "direction" in the Macquarie dictionary. It is, in retrospect, clear that Harrington, without ever expressly saying so, had in mind alternatives that appear earlier. The definition immediately preceding that mentioned suggests a meaning of guidance or instruction. The SOED makes it even clearer with definitions of "the action or function of directing; guidance, instruction; an instruction on what to do, how to proceed or where to go".

An order or command is available in a superior-subordinate relationship. Like the centurion in the Bible. When he tells one of his men to come, he cometh; to go, he goeth. King Canute unhappily lacked such a relationship with the tides so his command to recede was ignored. A doctor really cannot command a patient, or his spouse, to do anything. He can advise or urge but, effectively, not order. He really can't order a radiologist to take a particular x-ray.

In the relevant paragraphs of section 59 it seems that direction is used in the more usual sense encountered in day-to-day living. Someone may ask you to direct them to the GPO. You are being asked to guide, lay out a path, provide the information necessary to attain a particular end. And you courteously direct them how to do so.

Ironically, in regard to nursing treatment in its narrowest concept, it is fairly clear that this is exactly what Dr Yeo and his associates at Royal North Shore did for Mrs Manning. It is a circumstance in which no such direction is required by the Act. Mrs Manning was instructed in the detail of the care of a quadriplegic patient and, subsequently, in the more specialised area of peritoneal dialysis.

The ambit of this instruction is not detailed in evidence. It clearly involved skin, bowel, bladder, dietary and mobilising care. The first three are clearly deposed to in the evidence. The manner of doing these things, fortunately, does not form part of the everyday experience of the great majority of people and relies upon knowledge of particular techniques for efficient performance. There is reference to dietary restriction and, initially, for the intake of three litres of water per day, the need to measure it etc., the need to check Mr Manning's weight regularly. It is a reasonable inference that she was familiarised with the various equipment used in quadriplegic care and even with its maintenance. Mrs Manning has deposed to her involvement in oiling and greasing beds, chairs, jacks, hoists and cranes. She has deposed to the "rehabilitation" treatment she administered to Mr Manning's arms and legs.

It is also clear on the face of the evidence that Dr Yeo and his team, and later Dr Mahony, not only instructed Mrs Manning in how a wide variety of matters necessary to the care of a quadriplegic patient were carried out but expected that she would essay the execution of such tasks. To a degree they have even supervised her capacity to maintain the level of service. It is clear that when Manning was initially admitted to Royal North Shore there was Mrs Manning bedded down beside him and reluctant to leave him even briefly. It was the same at the time of the renal failure. Dr Mahony has expressed concern for the welfare of Mrs Manning, the strong desirability that she have "time-off". Dr Yeo, for his part, having considered the synopsis prepared by Sister Temblett of the services provided to Mr Manning by his wife and asked to categorise such said "the majority of Mrs Manning's care provided over these many years is in the category of nursing and/or therapeutic care".

I am of the view that most of what Mrs Manning has done for her husband is nursing within the definition in section 59 and the bulk of what might be classified otherwise would fall within the ambit of therapeutic care and in so far as it is the latter it is performed at the direction of a medical practitioner, or rather a number of medical practitioners.

GENERAL MATTERS

Hall QC has been at pains to establish several matters. Firstly, that at any particular time over the years both Mr and Mrs Manning have been content with the level of services provided by the insurer. Secondly, that upon request and after discussion the insurer have responded adequately to requests for increased assistance. Thirdly, that this particular application to the Court was provoked by matters completely unrelated to services provided to Manning by his wife. That such matters were so at the appropriate times is established. Having so found, just what impact that has on any matter now falling to be decided has not been explicated.

It seems to be the third matter that particularly galls the insurer. There is little doubt that the Mannings sought legal advice because of a demand by Beverley Gollan, a sometime carer of Mr Manning, for substantial sums for overtime, annual leave etc. arising as a consequence of her alleged employment by the Mannings, or one of them, and the provisions of the relevant award. Indeed those sums form a generic part of this present claim.

In my view the subsequent sequence of events is an example of a truism known to every attorney who acts for workers. Often enough the most substantial claims arise because of a worker's claim for some trivial item. A worker complains that the insurer will not meet a claim for $40 worth of chemist's expenses to which he feels himself entitled. In the ensuing discussions it eventuates that while incapacitated the worker has been working for some years in suitable work but at a rate of about $150 per week less than his probable earnings uninjured and he has never conceived that he had an entitlement and never sought to claim such. The attorney will, of course, advise his client appropriately. What else could he do? The subsequent claim is not tainted by any element of greed or malice. The worker either has an entitlement or hasn't. If he has, he is entitled to claim it when he is aware that he is, or maybe, so entitled, even though, his minor chemist account apart, he was perfectly satisfied otherwise with his treatment by the employer and insurer.

The other background matter that had temporarily puzzled me was why would the employer take the dogmatic stance that was in fact taken? That nothing, or at best very little, should be allowed in respect of the substantial services provided by Mrs Manning. It seemed odd that WorkCover would wish to communicate a message to the spouses and families of grossly incapacitated workers that they should do no more than was incumbent upon them and that WorkCover would provide all else. Of course, the solution was that WorkCover would probably be horrified to think that such a message was being communicated. It, or its predecessor, did not come into existence till some years after Manning's injury and are uninvolved in this particular matter. The defence of this matter is conducted by the Insurance Guarantee Fund on behalf of an extinct insurer who has no exposure to future similar type accidents and injuries. Any saving here is a saving. If the message is wrong then it is WorkCover's problem. This matter from the underwriter's viewpoint is a "oncer", not a matter of principle for future cases.

THE SERVICES OF MRS MANNING AND THEIR VALUE

In the initial three years from 1980 to 1983 her exertions on her husband's behalf were enormous. Dialysis apart, Mr Manning needed all the same care that he now receives. For the part of that which is not still rendered by Mrs Manning the insurer presently pays something of the order of $2,500 per week--excepting from the overall cost the costs associated with dialysis. It was a remarkable effort on Mrs Manning's part. She, or in her transient absence one of the sons, was tied virtually 24 hours a day, 52 weeks a year to providing or being available to provide such treatment and assistance as Mr Manning might need. In a sense it almost seems obscene to attempt to value such commitment and devotion in money terms. Indeed, the insurer would probably subscribe to the proposition that it was and is undoubtedly so.

Section 61(5) ordains that I have regard to the extent to which the treatment might be expected to be provided by the family. Prior to Mr Manning's injury his wife was an active participant in the work of the farm as were the sons. Following the injury she must have forsaken most of that participation to care for her husband, notwithstanding that her husband's services had also been withdrawn from work on the farm. The boys must have been fairly busy. As a farmer's wife Mrs Manning would have been no stranger to hard work. She detailed in evidence some of the activities in which she had previously been engaged--and they didn't include the book work. Additionally, Mrs Manning performed the domestic duties that are the lot of any wife and mother.

After the injury, by and large, during this particular period, it appears that Mrs Manning substituted care of her husband for her farm involvement and maintained her domestic role as mother, wife and housekeeper. It was an onerous regime. Dr Yeo makes it clear that bowel and bladder mishaps are a familiar facet of quadriplegic care. Mrs Manning attended to this--with family assistance. It has been explained that to change the sheets on the bed it was necessary to raise Mr Manning on the hoist and this was a two-person job. At any time, particularly through the night, there could be a need to add or remove a blanket, provide a drink, deal with accumulated phlegm, massage his hands. Mr Manning (and his wife confirmed the result) explained that while the motor nerves in his hands were dead the sensory nerves weren't and his hands would tend to ache quite severely. This could be abated by massage and a liniment type preparation, Metsal. Even through the night Mrs Manning was quite active in caring for her husband.

Hall QC has been rather niggardly in assessing the nursing component of Mrs Manning's activities as about three and a half hours per day. After all, the night carer presently provided is on-duty for 10 hours per shift even if only required to actively assist the applicant for a half or quarter of that period and the insurer is content to accept that 10-hour shift as reasonably necessary medical treatment within the definition in section 59. In so far as any component of that is not categorised as nursing, the insurer is content to accept that it is therapeutic treatment or care (other than nursing care) in the home of the worker directed by a medical practitioner. The ministrations provided through the night are, in my view, nursing care. Preserving the health, welfare and comfort of a grievously injured patient in line with the concepts discussed in EBERT. If it is now so for the night carer, what was different when Mrs Manning was doing it? The only relevant difference, as I see it, would be in terms of section 61(5).

For the remaining 14 hours of the day Mrs Manning was on duty providing, or available to provide, care to her husband. I guess that the insurer would say that there was nothing new in this--Mrs Manning had always been available to provide assistance, perhaps of a radically different sort but nonetheless assistance, to her husband in his farming endeavours as well as in the ordinary day-to-day things of washing, cooking, ironing and such like.

On a general appreciation of everyday living, particularly in the country, one would tend to think that, prior to injury, Mrs Manning like a good percentage of wives, mothers and partners was actively engaged in support and assistance of the family and family activities for about 10 hours per day on average, had six to eight hours of what could be seen as leisure and the balance as rest. Perhaps therefore one could "expect" some similar allocation of time, 10 hours, to "medical or related treatment" after the injury. At least, if you discount the routine chores of washing, ironing, cooking, cleaning and general housekeeping which would necessarily still go on, it could be so.

Overall, in this period, I think that Mrs Manning was engaged in nursing or therapeutic treatment for about half of a 24-hour day over and above any expectation of the family contribution. In any conceivable situation it is difficult to contemplate even partially adequate care of a quadriplegic patient in anything less than 12 man-hours per day.

From 1983 to 1989, assistance was provided over a span of eight hours each day leaving Mrs Manning as the sole carer for three-quarters of the day. Actually the relief afforded to Mrs Manning, or the family, appears to be greater than the mere proportion of time would suggest. During a substantial part of the daylight hours she had one or two carers upon whom to call for assistance for her husband. This had to constitute a substantial relief of the demands upon the wife and the family. True, it is a long stretch from mid-afternoon to the following morning but the added hands during the main daylight hours would be a major relief. Substantially she, and other members of the family, were relieved of the morning ablutions and breakfast and lunch which were for the greater part attended to by the carers.

I tend to regard Mrs Manning's contribution as reduced from the prior 12 hours per day to about six hours. While I accept that Mrs Manning still contributed to her husband's treatment during the hours that the carers were present and that the night hours still made demands upon her and that she provided the evening meal and attended alone to the multiplicity of needs of her husband over the greater part of the day, looking at what was reasonably necessary and discounting for expectation of family involvement and also having regard to what appears a fair and reasonable burden to impose upon the insurer it seems that such an allocation balances the competing claims.

For the period from 1989 to the present time there was the addition of the overnight carer. There was assistance available in the home for all but six hours per day during the week and nine hours per day at week-ends. By much the same approach as adopted in respect of the last considered period I would think that the relevant contribution to the care of her husband would be reduced to about three hours per day. There was always a substratum of activity that Mrs Manning did. She arranged the drugs, obtained the prescriptions, communicated with the insurer, paid the carers, exercised a fairly detailed supervision over the care afforded even when she was not directly involved herself and appears to have been directly involved in all outings undertaken by Mr Manning. It seems that her contribution should abate in some relationship to the extra care provided, notwithstanding that I wouldn't doubt that her actual involvement was much more substantial.

In making the above assessments I have departed somewhat from the approach adopted by Sister Temblett and have tended to assess a greater contribution of the family during the periods when they were virtually unassisted. In the latter periods, particularly that pertaining at present, I have assessed a fairly minimal contribution. This is not so much because Ruth Manning is doing that much less but rather accepting that the carers provided by the insurer undertake a wide range of activity that would be the normal lot of a housewife. In a sense I have adopted an approach that the availability of carers to do what would be fairly normal domestic work allows Ruth to choose that which she prefers to do and I believe that, given such option, she basically chooses to care for Don. In a not insubstantial degree that care is effectively underwritten by the insurer in providing the carers who do other things.

With Dr Yeo and Sister Temblett, I tend to feel that basically the care rendered is nursing care or, at least, therapeutic care. As previously indicated, I don't doubt that such, as far as relevantly necessary, is provided at the direction of a medical practitioner.

At what rate should the services of Ruth Manning be valued? The rates applicable to a registered nurse are substantial. The rates being paid to the carers is moderate. The rates cited by Sister Temblett for Home Care in the Lismore area are surprisingly high at $25 per hour. At the present time, with nurses around $20 to $40 per hour, carers at $12 per hour and Home Care as stated, and allowing that Ruth Manning is in her own home or with her own husband and, notwithstanding her extreme competence in this particular facet of nursing, I would feel her services should attract $15 per hour.

Over the 15 years that such services in varying degrees have been provided, there would necessarily have been some escalation in rates. Not having a CPI index or some such guide readily available it seems to me that the parties could well agree upon acceptable rates over that time span.

There were necessary interruptions in the provision of such services. Quite a number are noted in the affidavit of Raymond King. Such were brought about by the admission of one or other of Don or Ruth to hospitals and such like. Rather than do the fine analysis of these periods that is a matter to which the parties could well attend. After all, I had sought that information from Mr Harrington at the outset of his address.

For clarity I formally find:

1. Between 1 April 1980 and 31 May 1983, Barbara Ruth Manning provided 12 hours per day nursing and/or therapeutic care to the applicant.

2. Between 1 June 1983 and 15 November 1989, Barbara Ruth Manning provided six hours per day nursing and/or therapeutic care to the applicant.

3. From 16 November 1989 to date Barbara Ruth Manning provided three hours per day nursing and/or therapeutic care to the applicant.

4. During all such periods there were occasional intermissions in the provision of such services.

[HIS HONOUR THEN CONSIDERED SOME SUBSIDIARY ISSUES AND MADE ORDERS NOT CALLING FOR REPORT - ED]

ORDERS ACCORDINGLY

Solicitors for the applicant: MITCHELL PLAYFORD & RADBURN

Solicitors for the respondent: HUNT & HUNT