Haining v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [1999] NSWADT 6 (2 March 1999)

Last Updated: 10 March 1999

NEW SOUTH WALES ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL

CITATION: Haining v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [1999] NSWADT 6

REVISION DATE:

DIVISION: General

APPLICANT:

Alan Mark Haining

RESPONDENT:

Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service

FILE NUMBERS: 983003

HEARING DATES: 17/12/98

SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 02/03/1999

DECISION DATE: 02/03/1999

JUDICIAL MEMBER: K P O'Connor DCJ President

LAY MEMBER:

LAY MEMBER:

APPLICANT KEYWORDS:

MATTER FOR DECISION: Principal matter

PRIMARY LEGISLATION CITED: Security Industry Act 1997

APPLICANT REPRESENTATIVE: B Niven of Counsel

RESPONDENT REPRESENTATIVE: G Doherty, Solicitor, Commissoner of Police

ORDERS: 1. Set aside the decisions made by the delegate of the Commissioner of Police dated 29 October 1998 refusing the applicant's application for a Master Licence and for a Class 1 Licence under the Security Industry Act 1997; and

2. Substitute the Tribunal's decision that a Master Licence and a Class 1 Licence be granted to the applicant effective from the date of refusal;

and in relation to s. 88 of the Tribunal Act:

3. No order as to costs is made.

DECISION:

1 This is an appeal against a decision by the Commissioner of Police (`the administrator') refusing a security industry licence application made under the Security Industry Act 1997 (`the Act') by Alan Mark Haining (`the applicant'). The appeal is brought pursuant to s.29 of the Act. The powers exerciseable by this Tribunal in relation to the appeal are set out in Chapter 5, Part 3 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (`the Tribunal Act').

2 Security Industry Licensing: The Act provides for the grant of three classes of licence: a master licence, a class 1 licence and a class 2 licence. Licences are valid for five years or for such shorter period as may be prescribed: s.24. At the time of the applicant's applications (21 August 1998), a five year period applied in respect of both the master licence and the class 1 licence. (Regulations which took effect on 20 November 1998 limit the period of operation of class 1 and class 2 licences to one year: see Security Industry Regulation 1998 (`the Regulation') cl.6A.)

3 Section 10 deals with the master licence. Section 11 deals with class 1 licences. The relevant provisions follow:

" 10 Master licences

(1) A master licence authorises the licensee to employ or provide persons to carry on security activities.

(2) The authority conferred by a master licence allows only the employment or provision of persons who are the holders of a licence.

(3) A master licence does not authorise the licensee to enter into any arrangement, by contract, franchise or otherwise, with another person for the purpose of employing or providing persons to carry on security activities unless the other person is the holder of a master licence.

11 Class 1 licences

(1) Class 1 licences are to be classified into subclasses. Those subclasses, and the authority they confer, are as follows:

(a) class 1A authorises the licensee to patrol, guard, watch or protect property (including the guarding of cash in transit) or to carry on such other activities as may be prescribed by the regulations,

(b) class 1B authorises the licensee to act as a bodyguard,

(c) class 1C authorises the licensee to act as a crowd controller or bouncer.

(2) The relevant subclass is to be endorsed on each class 1 licence. More than one such subclass may be endorsed on a class 1 licence."

4 Application for Licences: The applicant owns and operates a security business, Ulladulla Nightwatch Pty Ltd ACN 073 598 759. He held a licence in respect of his business and an individual licence under the old licensing scheme. The new scheme found in the Act came into effect on 1 July 1998. His old licences were due to expire on 31 August 1998. Consequently on 21 August 1998 he applied for a master licence in respect of his business, and for a class 1 licence to enable him to work for his business.

5 Section 14 of the Act deals with the application procedure. In the present case the applicant was required by s.14 to supply in support of his application for the class 1 licence two written references from persons belonging to prescribed categories who can attest that he is a "fit and proper person to work in the security industry". The applicant supplied references from Mr DA Hunter JP, Administration Manager, Mollymook Country Club Ltd and Mr Doug Provost, Secretary Manager, Milton-Ulladulla Bowling Club Co-op Ltd.

6 In his master licence application under the heading `nominated licence holder' he gave his name, and described himself as director of the company. The class 1 licence application covered all three categories being category A - "patrol, guard, watch or protect property (including the guarding of cash in transit)"; category B - "bodyguard", and category C - "crowd controller or bouncer".

7 Notices of Refusal: By separate notices dated 29 October 1997 issued by Kay Smith as delegate, the Commissioner notified the applicant that his applications for a Master Licence and for a Class 1 Licence were refused. In each case under the heading `reason for refusal' the notice stated that `pursuant to s.15(1)(a) of the Act, [the Commissioner] is satisfied that you are not a fit and proper person to hold the class of licence sought'.

8 In support of the reason for refusal given in the notice, the delegate referred to the finding made by the Milton Local Court on 14 August 1997 that the applicant had committed the offence of assault. The Court pursuant to s.556A of the Crimes Act 1900 did not record a conviction and required the applicant to enter into a recognisance of $2000 to be of good behaviour for two years.

9 Application to Tribunal: On 11 November 1998 the applicant lodged with this Tribunal an application for review of the decision. The application was made pursuant to s.29 of the Act, which provides:

" 29 Right to seek review from Administrative Decisions Tribunal

(1) A person may apply to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for a review of the following decisions:

(a) the refusal or failure by the Commissioner to grant a licence to the person,

(b) a condition imposed by the Commissioner on a licence granted to the person,

(c) the revocation or suspension of a licence granted to the person.

(2) For the purposes of this section, an application for the grant of a licence is taken to have been refused if the licence is not granted within 60 days after the application is made in accordance with this Act.

Note. Under the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, if the ADT has reviewed a "reviewable decision" (such as a decision referred to in the above section), a party to the proceedings may appeal to an Appeal Panel of the ADT. An appeal on a question of law may then lie to the Supreme Court."

10 Pre-Conditions for Application: When an administrator makes a decision that is reviewable it must give the person affected notice, in writing, of the decision and of the right of the person to have the decision reviewed: Tribunal Act, s.48. The person has the right to have the decision reviewed in two ways: by internal review by the administrator upon request: Tribunal Act, s.53(1); or, generally following internal review, by the Tribunal: Act, s.29 and Tribunal Act, s.47, s.55.

11 The notice procedure followed by the administrator in this case was as follows. The administrator instructed its local area commander to serve the notice of refusal on the applicant, and to advise the applicant of his right to review under the Act. Its instructions also noted that `It is the responsibility of the applicant to contact the ADT, if s/he wishes to seek a review of the Commissioner's decision". There is no reference to internal review. This perspective in relation to the requirement of s.48(1) is also reflected in the letter given to the applicant setting out the decision. It states "Should you desire to have the decision of the Commissioner ... reviewed, you should contact the Administrative Decisions Tribunal ...". This practice does not adequately convey to the person affected the extent of their rights to seek review, though it is perhaps based on an interpretation of the word "review" as used in s.48(1) as referring only to external review.

12 Section 55 provides:

" 55 When can an application for a review be made?

(1) A person may apply to the Tribunal for a review of a reviewable decision only if:

(a) the application is made by an interested person, and

(b) an internal review is taken to have been finalised under section 53 (9), and

(c) the application is made in the manner prescribed by the rules of the Tribunal, and

(d) the application is made within such period as may be prescribed by the rules of the Tribunal following the date on which the internal review is taken to have been finalised under section 53 (9).

Note. Section 4 defines interested person to mean a person who is entitled under an enactment to make an application to the Tribunal for an original decision or a review of a reviewable decision (as the case may be).

(2) However, subsection (1) (b) or (d) does not prevent a person from making an application in respect of a reviewable decision that has not been the subject of an internal review under section 53 if the Tribunal is satisfied that:

(a) the person was not at any time entitled to apply for an internal review of the decision, or

(b) the person made a late application for an internal review in circumstances where the person dealing with the application unreasonably refused to consider the application and the application to the Tribunal was made within a reasonable time following the decision of the administrator concerned, or

(c) it is necessary for the Tribunal to deal with the application in order to protect the person's interests and the application to the Tribunal was made within a reasonable time following the decision of the administrator concerned.

(3) In determining whether a late application for internal review was unreasonably refused or whether an application to the Tribunal was made within a reasonable time for the purposes of subsection (2), the Tribunal is to have regard to:

(a) the time when the applicant became aware of the making of the decision, and

(b) in a case to which subsection (2) (b) applies the period prescribed by or under section 53 for the lodging of an application for an internal review, and

(c) such other matters as it considers relevant."

13 Absence of Internal Review: In the present case there was no internal review of the decisions in issue. There is a question as to whether in these circumstances the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been properly invoked. The statutory scheme, as reflected in ss.53 and 55 of the Tribunal Act, is to make internal review a usual pre-condition to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal.

14 That pre-condition may be waived by the Tribunal in three situations, enumerated in s.55(2), of which only paragraph (c) is relevant to the present case. It is important for the successful implementation of the goals of the Tribunal Act in New South Wales government administration that internal review occur before an application is made to the Tribunal for reconsideration of a decision. Consequently the Tribunal should not readily dispense with compliance with the requirement that an internal review first be sought and undertaken before an application is lodged.

15 But in the present case there are several factors which warrant, I consider, dispensing with the usual requirement on the ground referred to in para (c) of s.55(2), that "it is necessary for the Tribunal to deal with the application in order to protect the person's interests".

16 The applicant was not informed by the administrator of any right of internal review. The applicant lodged his application with the Tribunal 13 days after the date on which the notice of refusal was issued by the administrator. This enabled the applicant to have addressed promptly the important matter of whether the operation of the administrator's decision might be stayed pending a full hearing. The Act does not confer on the administrator any power to delay the operation of a decision. The applicant's livelihood depends on his business being licensed. Section 60 of the Tribunal Act confers on the Tribunal power to grant a stay, having regard to criteria that take account of the public interest. In these circumstances the applicant's interests are served by being able to apply quickly to the Tribunal for a stay and reconsideration of the decision. In the present case a stay was given at the directions hearing and continued pending this determination.

17 Material Filed with Tribunal: The administrator filed various documents in these proceedings. At the directions hearing on 17 November 1998 it filed bundles of documents relating to each refusal which included an undated document headed `Statement of Reasons', the text of which follows:

"1. On 14 August, 1997 the applicant appeared at Milton Local Court for an offence of assault. A plea of guilty was entered. The offence was found proved and dismissed. The applicant entered a recognizance under section 556A of the Crimes Act 1900 to be of good behaviour for two years.

2. Under section 15(1)(a) of the Security Industry Act 1997 the Commissioner must refuse to grant an application for a licence if the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold the class of licence sought by the applicant.

3. The Commissioner is of the view that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence under the Security Industry Act 1997 on the grounds that an offence of assault was found proved against him."

18 It will be seen (from paragraph 3) that the sole ground for concluding that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence was that an offence of assault was proven against him.

19 The accompanying documents from the Security Industry Registry, NSW Police Service in the case of the class 1 licence refusal were:

· the notice of refusal of a Class 1 Licence dated 29 October 1998,

· a covering letter from the administrator to the Local Area Commander dated 29 October 1998 requesting service of the notice of refusal, and on its reverse side an affidavit of service of the notice of refusal,

· a document headed `Adjudication Sheet, Class One and Two Licences',

· a document headed `NSW Police Service Criminal History - Bail Report',

· a copy of the applicant's application for the class 1 licence to which was attached the two written references previously referred to.

20 A similar collection of documents was supplied to the Tribunal in respect of the refusal of the application for the master licence, the only differences being the inclusion of a copy of the `Certificate of Registration of a Company' and the absence of any references.

21 At the hearing on 17 December 1998 the administrator tendered a copy of the summons to the applicant to attend the Milton Local Court for the hearing of a charge of common assault, a copy of the prosecutor's record sheet in relation to the outcome of the hearing, the police report containing a statement from the applicant in relation to the incident giving rise to the charge, a statement from the police officer who attended the scene.

22 The Applicant's Case: At the hearing the applicant's evidence comprised his oral testimony and oral testimony from one of his referees, Mr Doug Provost of the Milton-Ulladulla Bowling Club. The administrator cross-examined the applicant and Mr Provost. Two further character references were tendered attesting to his being a fit and proper person, one from Mr Graham Limbrick, General Manager, Mollymook Golf Club, the other from Mr Russell Rogers, owner/manager, Milton Motors. The administrator did not lead any evidence, relying only on the filed material.

23 The applicant gave evidence as to the circumstances of the incident that led to the charge of common assault. He also gave evidence as to his prior employment and community involvement. The applicant had from the age of 19 for twenty-three years been a member of the Police Service. He had been stationed initially for four years at Petersham and after that at Milton, where he attained the rank of sergeant and was in charge of licensing matters. He said that he had an unblemished record in the Police Service and had not been the subject of a complaint. He also referred to his long career in local football, having played more than 200 games for the Milton rugby club. He said that he had decided to resign from the Police Service in 1994 rather than accept a transfer back to Sydney, because of the disruption it would cause to he and his family. He obtained employment in the security industry and approximately two and half years ago bought the business, Ulladulla Nightwatch Pty Ltd. He said that he had borrowed about $75,000 for that purpose. He said that the business had a number of clients including the Mollymook Golf Club, the Milton-Ulladulla Bowling Club and the Marlin Hotel in Ulladulla.

24 The incident that gave rise to the charge of assault occurred on the evening of 24 August 1996. His business had been engaged to provide door control for an 18th birthday party being held at the Golf Club. One of his employees was assigned to control entry. Later in the evening he visited the venue. While standing at the door with his employee he heard the sound of smashing glass in the distance in the dark. He walked away from the clubhouse across the carpark and beyond some trees and saw a young man throw a brick through a window of a house being built near the boundary of the golf course. He approached the young man and spoke with him briefly before accusing him of throwing the brick. The applicant assserted that the young man was then extremely abusive. He said he gave the person a `clip under the ear' which he described further in evidence as his hitting with his right `open hand, straight under the ear ... from behind'. That person was also charged with assault. The records filed do not indicate what the outcome of that charge was. The records do indicate, and this was acknowledged by the applicant in his evidence, that the person that he hit had a broken nose after the incident. He said that while he had admitted to striking, he had not admitted that his blow caused the broken nose, which he believed had been incurred by the person in a football match three weeks before the incident.

25 The administrator in cross-examination did not contest the applicant's account of the incident, concentrating instead on the significance of the conduct in light of the nature of the applicant's current work and past service and experience as a police officer. In regard to these concerns, the applicant stated that he regretted the incident. He indicated that he had often been confronted with hostile people in his work as a police officer and had been trained not to react in the way that he did on that evening. He felt that his conduct on that night may have been affected by his health at the time. He had cardiac problems and on 16 August 1996, 8 days before the incident, had had an operation inserting a pacemaker. He was on a course of medication at the time of the incident.

26 Factors taken into Account by the Administrator: The original notice of refusal and the later statement of reasons refer to two factors taken into account by the administrator in deciding that the applicant was not a `fit and proper' person. They are the decision of the court to place him on a recognizance without recording a conviction (referred to in both documents) and the plea of guilty (referred to in the undated document headed statement of reasons).

27 A perusal of the material filed suggests that there may have been a third factor, the applicant's status as a former police officer.

28 The Act has special provisions in relation to applicants who are former police officers. Section 19 requires that the application must be referred to the Internal Affairs Branch of the Police Service. The Act is not clear as to what the Branch is then to do, and what role it plays, except for providing that it may seek advice from the Police Integrity Commission as to the suitability of the applicant to hold a licence. (See further as to the process envisaged involving referral of all applications from former police officers to the Internal Affairs Branch, Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 19 November 1997, 2090, Hon P Whelan, Minister for Police.)

29 The material filed includes the work sheet used by the Security Industry Registry headed `adjudication sheet'. In the `adjudication sheets' for both applications there is an area headed `Action Taken' which includes a box confirming whether or not the matter was referred to Internal Affairs. In both cases the box has been ticked then the tick has been crossed, and the words `OK' inserted. In the section headed `Comments' there is a handwritten note `Declared on appln form'. I infer from this collection of notations that the applicant's application was referred to the Internal Affairs Branch and no adverse report emanated. But the matter is less than clear, which is unsatisfactory.

30 The Tribunal also infers from these documents that the administrator initially only had regard to the record from the Milton Court in forming a view adverse to the applicant; that there was no scrutiny by the administrator of the circumstances that gave rise to the adverse finding by the Court; and that originally the administrator was not aware that the applicant had pleaded guilty.

31 Submissions for Applicant: Mr Nevin, counsel for the applicant, contended that the single factor of a proven offence of assault was not sufficient in the circumstances to warrant the conclusion that his client was not a fit and proper person to be issued with either licence. He referred to the applicant's otherwise good record in relation to violence. The applicant's uncontested evidence was that in a long football career he had never been reported or sent from the field; nor had he been the subject of any complaint during 23 years' service as a police officer. His written references referred to his conscientiousness, trustworthiness and honesty. Mr Provost's oral evidence included reference to him having observed the applicant dealing with persons who have been significantly affected by alcohol, have been quarrelsome, argumentative or resorted to physical contact or violence. Mr Provost's view was that he had handled these situations in a `very professional, sympathetic, understanding manner'.

32 Administrator's Statement of Reasons: Adequacy: A significant feature of the Tribunal Act is its emphasis on the need for administrators to provide structured reasons for decision to individuals. The Tribunal Act provides for three points at which this step may occur. In response to a reviewable decision, an individual may request the administrator to provide within 28 days after notice of the decision a written statement of reasons for decision (s.49). Alternatively the individual can ask for internal review by the administrator, and as part of that process written reasons are required to be supplied (s.53(6)). If neither of those events has occurred then after an appeal is lodged with the Tribunal, the administrator is required to file with the Tribunal material which includes written reasons. The last alternative was employed in this case. Consequently, as noted earlier, a document headed `statement of reasons' was provided by the administrator pursuant to s.58(1) of the Tribunal Act. That sub-section provides that a statement of reasons is to conform to the requirements set out in the primary provision relating to statements of reasons which is s.49(3).

33 Section 49(3) provides:

" The statement of reasons is to set out the following:

(a) the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based;

(b) the administrator's understanding of the applicable law;

(c) the reasoning processes that led the administrator to the conclusions the administrator made."

34 It is plain that the statement of reasons filed in these proceedings did not meet these requirements.

35 It does not specify expressly what facts the administrator regarded as material. It can be inferred that two facts were regarded as material - the plea of guilty to a charge of common assault, and the disposition of the charge pursuant to s.556A of the Crimes Act.

36 The statement contains no information as to the administrator's understanding of the applicable law; and it is not possible to infer what that understanding might be. It would seem that the administrator regarded it as conclusive as to character that a charge relating to violent conduct had been found proven.

37 No attempt is made to spell out how a `fitness and character' requirement might be interpreted in this statutory scheme, and to what extent general observations by the courts in other fields of regulation containing this requirement might be applicable. No reasoning process is explained linking the applicable law to the conclusion reached in the particular case.

38 Reasons as discerned at hearing: Unfortunately, it was not until the hearing that a clearer picture of the administrator's reasons was obtained. Leaving clarification until that stage is inconsistent with the scheme of the Tribunal Act and prejudices the ability of applicants to put their case. (I note that in this case no objections along these lines were taken by the applicant.)

39 It emerged in submissions at hearing that the administrator's reasoning process had the following elements. A person who has a criminal record with an offence involving violence is, by that fact alone, not of fit and proper character to be licensed to operate in this industry, at least to the extent of being issued with a master licence or a class 1 licence in any of the three categories of that licence. If the person has been a police officer that is a further factor weighing against him or her.

40 I consider that this approach to the question of fitness and character is too circumscribed.

41 The Question of "Fit and Proper" Character: Whether a person is "fit and proper" to hold a licence in a regulated industry will be affected by general considerations relating to the character of the person, special considerations that take account of the nature of the industry in issue and the public policy objectives leading the legislature to regulate the industry.

42 Clearly the Act reflects a stricter approach on the part of Government and the Parliament to regulation of this industry than had been the case previously. Under the scheme the administrator is bound to refuse a licence to any applicant who has been convicted within the last ten years of a prescribed offence as defined, or been found guilty of such an offence within the last five years with no conviction being entered, no matter how trivial the circumstances. The prescribed offences divide essentially into ones of violence, ones involving prohibited drugs and ones involving fraud or dishonesty. There are special provisions dealing with police officers who have been discharged from the police force for adverse reasons.

43 In the present case the applicant's offence, one of violence, falls outside the scope of a prescribed offence in relation to which the administrator is bound to refuse a licence. In addition to the offence being one of assault, it must also be one where the penalty imposed involves at least a fine of $200 or imprisonment: Act, s.16(1); Regulation, cl.11(c).

44 On behalf of the administrator, it was submitted that an offence of violence was sufficient to justify exclusion from the industry on grounds of character. The administrator appears to have applied a general policy to the applicant's case; and not to have taken account of any specific information in relation to the offence and its circumstances, or the applicant's antecedents or the references supplied as required that related to his character.

45 As de Smith, Woolf & Jowell (Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed.1995) note, at para. 11-006: " [a] factor that may properly be taken into account in exercising a discretion may become an unlawful fetter upon discretion if it is elevated to the status of a general rule that results in the pursuit of consistency at the expense of the merits of individual cases".

46 There are many cases that refer to the commonplace requirement in licensing schemes that a licensee be a person of "fit and proper" character. The applicant cited two cases in this regard - Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No.2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127 and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond & Others [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321.

47 In ABT v Bond Mason CJ dealt at some length with the wide array of factors that might be taken into account in deciding whether a person (in that case a company) was a "fit and proper" person to hold a licence. His Honour referred to the breadth that should be attached to the content of the concept having regard to the social importance of the industry regulated, in that instance commercial broadcasting. A similarly wide approach should, the Tribunal considers, be adopted in relation to the security industry. This industry has a special role in ensuring that public order is maintained, in safeguarding community assets and private property and in ensuring that the public and public venues are safe.

48 The legislature has demonstrated, through the provisions for mandatory refusal, its concern to ensure that people who have been found guilty or convicted of certain offences of violence should not be licensed. However offences of violence where a very minor penalty has been imposed have not been made the subject of mandatory refusal. It appears that the administrator has in effect introduced a mandatory policy of refusal below that threshold. This approach tends to pervert the statutory scheme. In cases that fall below the line, the scheme requires that the matter be resolved on general fitness grounds. A record of one minor offence for assault leading to the offender being placed on a recognizance, without more, would not, in the Tribunal's opinion, ordinarily be sufficient to justify the administrator in forming a view adverse to an applicant.

49 In relation to the grant of a recognizance, I note that s.556A of the Crimes Act 1900 permits a court to discharge an offender on recognizance where it considers it "inexpedient to inflict any punishment" after "having regard to the character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the person charged, or to the trivial nature of the offence, or to the extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed." While the findings made against the applicant are adverse as to his character, the conclusion reached by the court on the question of penalty should be regarded as marginally positive.

50 There may be instances where an offence which falls outside the category of a prescribed offence may be sufficient on its own to supply the entire justification for a refusal on grounds of fitness and character. An example might be an offence which is more than ten years' old involving a very serious crime, such as murder, kidnapping or armed robbery. Or, possibly, there may be a situation where an applicant has a series of offences which suggest lack of fitness but they all happen to fall outside the categories of offences that are prescribed.

51 The Tribunal's duty is to decide what `the correct and preferable decision' is: see s.63(1), Tribunal Act. The reasons given by the administrator at the time of the refusal, in the statement of reasons filed in these proceedings, and as developed at hearing do not satisfy me that the decision was correct.

52 At the hearing I raised the question of whether character and fitness considerations might operate differently according to the activities connected to the class of licence under consideration. In the current instance I gave some consideration to the possibility of not restricting the applicant's access to a master licence, thereby enabling him to continue to conduct his business, but restricting the applicant's access to the category B (bodyguard) and category C (crowd control) types of class 1 licence. Category A appeared less problematic in that it deals with protection of property where routine contact with the public is not usual.

53 I have decided not to explore this question any further in this case, as I am reasonably satisfied, based on the explanation of the circumstances of the offence given by the applicant and on his presentation at hearing, that his conduct is not sufficient to justify a restricted reinstatement.

54 Accordingly, the Tribunal's determination pursuant to s.63 of the Tribunal Act is to:

1. Set aside the decisions made by the delegate of the Commissioner of Police dated 29 October 1998 refusing the applicant's application for a Master Licence and for a Class 1 Licence under the Security Industry Act 1997; and

2. Substitute the Tribunal's decision that a Master Licence and a Class 1 Licence be granted to the applicant effective from the date of refusal;

and in relation to s. 88 of the Tribunal Act:

3. No order as to costs is made.