Hutchings v Rodriguez [1964] HCA 19; (1964) 110 CLR 513 (23 March 1964)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HUTCHINGS v. RODRIGUEZ [1964] HCA 19; (1964) 110 CLR 513

Vehicles and Traffic

High Court of Australia
Kitto(1), Taylor(1) and Owen(1) JJ.

CATCHWORDS

Vehicles and Traffic - Regulation of traffic - Driver of vehicle drawing it out of boundary of carriageway - Vehicle to stand if danger of collision - Scope of regulation - Motor Traffic Act, 1909 (N.S.W.) - Motor Traffic Regulations, re. 74*.

HEARING

Sydney, 1964, March 20, 23. 23:3:1964
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

DECISION

March 23.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by KITTO J.: -
The appellant was the plaintiff and the respondent was the defendant in an collision which took place between a utility driven by the plaintiff and a semi-trailer driven by the defendant on the Hume Highway. (at p514)

2. In the vicinity of the place where the collision occurred the highway runs east and west. At the time of the collision some preparatory work had been done along the centre line of the highway for the purpose of installing a median strip. The plaintiff was travelling westwards. The highway on his side of the centre line was approximately twenty-three feet wide. On the northern side of the centre line it was approximately twenty-five feet wide. (at p515)

3. On the north side of the highway was a petrol station. The defendant drove his semi-trailer from the petrol station onto the northern half of the carriageway and across it at an angle of forty-five degrees or so in a south-westerly direction. The prime mover and a portion of the semi-trailer had crossed the centre line and moved onto the southern half of the carriageway when the collision occurred. At the point of time at which the prime mover crossed the centre line the rest of the semi-trailer extended over the entire northern half of the carriageway, and for something like fifteen feet beyond it in the direction of the petrol station. (at p515)

4. The appellant's case was that the collision was caused by negligence on the part of the respondent. The jury returned a verdict for the respondent. The appellant appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court, seeking a new trial on the ground that the trial judge had erroneously rejected two regulations under the Motor Traffic Act, 1909 (N.S.W.), namely regs. 65 and 74, which had been tendered as evidence in the appellant's case. The Full Court held that the regulations had been rightly rejected. (at p515)

5. The appellant does not press his contention with respect to reg. 65, but he seeks a reversal of the Full Court's decision as regards reg. 74. The ground of rejection was that the regulation was irrelevant to the case. So far as material it provides that: "Notwithstanding any provision of Regulation 68A, the driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street, when he is about to draw it out or is drawing it out from any boundary of the carriageway, shall, if there is any danger of a collision between his vehicle and any other vehicle, cause his vehicle to stand until it may be so drawn out with safety". (at p515)

6. The admissibility of the regulation depended upon its being relevant to the issue of negligence which the jury had to try. The appellant's case had necessarily to be considered as one of carelessness of the respondent in driving his semi-trailer across the centre line and on the portion of the carriageway south of the centre line. The appellant's argument must go as far as to say that as the respondent entered the southern portion of the carriageway the regulation applied to the situation and obliged him to stop, for the reason that the rear of the semi-trailer was still being drawn out from the northern boundary. We may assume, without deciding, that it is correct to describe the respondent as still, at that point of time, engaged in drawing his vehicle out from the northern boundary. The question is whether, on that assumption, the regulation obliged the respondent to stop when the danger of a collision with the appellant's vehicle arose. The answer, in our opinion, is that the regulation has to do only with a danger of collision arising from the special quality which the movement of a vehicle possesses when and because the point of departure is the boundary of a carriageway. The common case is that in which a vehicle which has been stationary at the boundary is being moved out so as to be in the way of traffic which could have passed it safely if it had stayed where it was. There may well be other cases. But the regulation plainly intends only to provide against the special dangers which may be due to a vehicle at the boundary of a carriageway being driven out from the boundary into road space which its position at the boundary may have led drivers of other vehicles to suppose was open for their use. It follows that in our opinion the regulation had no relevance in the present case. The danger which the appellant encountered was not of the kind referred to. Because of the width of the carriageway and the clear line of demarcation between the portions available for east-bound and west-bound traffic respectively a driver in the position of the appellant could not possibly be placed in any special danger from the respondent's vehicle by the fact that the latter had crossed the northern boundary. His complaint was of the drawing out of the semi-trailer from the centre line (if the manoeuvre can be so described) and onto the southern portion of the carriageway. In our opinion the trial Judge was clearly right in rejecting the tender of the regulation, and the appeal should be dismissed. (at p516)

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.