Hadfields Steel Works Ltd v Meyer [1962] HCA 34; (1962) 108 CLR 171 (26 July 1962)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HADFIELDS STEEL WORKS LTD. v. MEYER [1962] HCA 34; (1962) 108 CLR 171

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)

High Court of Australia
Dixon C.J.(1), Taylor(1), Menzies(1), Windeyer(1) and Owen(1) JJ.

CATCHWORDS

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.) - Injury to worker - Judgment independently of Act - Death of worker - Dependants' rights to compensation - Workers' Compensation Act, 1926-1953 (N.S.W.), ss. 6 (2)*, 63 (2)**.

HEARING

Sydney, 1962, July 25, 26. 26:7:1962
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

DECISION

THE COURT delivered the following written judgment : -
In March 1952 the respondent's husband sustained an injury within the his employment with the appellant. Thereafter he commenced proceedings in a District Court against the appellant alleging that his injuries had resulted from the latter's negligence and on 19th February 1954 he obtained judgment for 656 pounds. However, nearly two years later he died as the result of the injuries which he had received and thereupon his widow, for herself and an infant child of the marriage, as dependants of the deceased, made an application to the Workers' Compensation Commission for compensation pursuant to s. 8 (1) of the Workers' Compensation Act. She was successful in this application and obtained an award of 2,075 pounds. (at p174)

2. Upon the hearing of the application it was contended that the dependants of the deceased were not entitled to compensation pursuant to s. 8 because, in his lifetime, the deceased worker had obtained judgment against his employer independently of the Act. The contention was rejected as it was also in the Full Court of the Supreme Court where it was raised upon a case stated by the Commission. This appeal is now brought from the order of the Supreme Court which answered the relevant question in favour of the respondent. (at p175)

3. The contention was based upon the provisions of s. 63 (2) of the Act read in the light of s. 6 (2). This latter sub-section provides that : "Any reference to a worker who has been injured shall, where the worker is dead, include a reference . . . to his dependants". Section 63 (2) was amended after the deceased worker received his injuries. It does not appear to us that the amendments were of any significance in the case but, whether or not, it should be observed that the deceased did not obtain his judgment until after the amending Act of 1953 came into operation. Moreover the sub-section as amended was expressed to apply to and in respect of workers who had received an injury before the commencement of the amending Act and who had not signed a notice of election pursuant to s. 63A of the Workers' Compensation Acts, 1926-1951. There is no suggestion that the deceased had signed any such notice and we have, therefore, considered the question before us on the basis that s. 63 as amended by Act No. 21 of 1953, is the provision to which we must have regard. (at p175)

4. According to the appellant's argument the deceased worker was at liberty, in his lifetime, to pursue his remedies both under the Act and independently of the Act but it is said that once he had obtained judgment against his employer independently of the Act he lost any right to compensation under the Act. This, of course, is clearly right. But the argument goes further and asserts that thereupon any rights to compensation to which his dependants might otherwise become entitled were also destroyed. This is said to be the result of taking the provisions of s. 6 (2) into account when considering the extent to which s. 63 (2) operates. The legislative provisions are difficult but we do not agree with the contention. Section 63 (2) is but one of several provisions contained in s. 63 which are directed against double recovery by a worker in respect of compensable injuries and when the section is read as a whole it is clear enough that the stipulation in sub-s. (2) that a worker "may proceed under this Act and independently of this Act" speaks, primarily, of proceedings to enforce his rights in the circumstances contemplated by sub-s. (1). But the rights of his dependants under the Act where death results from his injuries are separate and distinct rights and it seems to us that when it becomes necessary to consider how far and to what extent dependants of a deceased worker are affected by the provisions of sub-s. (2) the result of the application of the provisions of s. 6 (2) is, in effect, to accord to s. 63 (2) a distributive operation. That is to say, it is intended to apply to a worker in his lifetime in relation to his rights and, in circumstances where after his death his dependants have both a right to compensation and a right to damages under the Compensation to Relatives Act, to his dependants in respect of those rights. Accordingly the judgment which the deceased worker obtained in his lifetime is not a bar to the recovery by the appellant of compensation under the Act. This conclusion is, we think, consistent with and, indeed, the result of the views expressed in the Full Court. We agree substantially with those views and in the result the appeal should be dismissed. (at p176)

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.