Griffith District Hospital v Hayes [1962] HCA 18; (1962) 108 CLR 50 (9 April 1962)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GRIFFITH DISTRICT HOSPITAL v. HAYES [1962] HCA 18; (1962) 108 CLR 50

Negligence

High Court of Australia
Dixon C.J.(1), McTiernan(1), Kitto(1), Taylor(1) and Menzies(1) JJ.

CATCHWORDS

Negligence - Unexpected accident - Onus of proof - Condition of premises - Duty of employer - Damage occasioned by behaviour of inanimate object in enployer's control - No positive act of negligence - Plaintiff injured by falling blind - Sufficiency of evidence to establish prima facie case of negligence - Nature of proofs required.

HEARING

Sydney, 1962, April 6, 9. 9:4:1962
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

DECISION

April, 9.
The judgment of the COURT was delivered by DIXON C.J.: -
This is an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales

2. The case arises out of an accident which occurred to a nurse at a hospital on 24th July 1954. She was injured in a way which, at first, did not appear to be severe but as time wore on it became clear that her injuries were serious and the medical treatment she underwent did not appear to lessen them. Why it was that she did not sue before does not appear, it may be because of her injuries, but she issued her writ on 23rd July 1957 and filed her declaration on 4th October 1957. Since then two trials have taken place and two appeals to the Full Court of the Supreme Court and there is now an appeal by the defendant as of right to this Court. That means five proceedings, five hearings of a case involving some simple facts which I shall proceed to state. (at p52)

3. The plaintiff was a nurse who was requested by a patient at the hospital to adjust an outside blind that was flapping and causing some annoyance. She went out and dealt with a canvas roller blind of considerable width and some height and proceeded to adjust it. She pulled upon the cord, but the blind fell from the wall and inflicted the injuries which are complained of. (at p52)

4. At the trial she proved, by her own personal evidence, what had happened: at the first trial she had proved the same facts as upon the second. Having described what had happened, there was some additional evidence, very little, to show the character of the blind; there was a photograph put in which does not seem to speak very much for itself. The plaintiff's case rested on a basis of fact proved in evidence that amounted in substance to this, namely that the attachment of the blind to the wall must have been in a faulty condition; that it had consequently fallen down and injured her by its weight and that the manner in which it came down was through no fault of hers; that the blind formed an integral part of the plant or premises - using that word in a very general way - at which she was put to work. (at p52)

5. The judge presiding at the first trial took the view that she had not proved enough. The defendant did not go into evidence; and the judge directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal a majority of the Full Court (1961) SR (NSW) 504; 78 WN 230 , held that that view was erroneous and that the plaintiff had proved enough, that she, a servant, had been acting in an ordinary reasonable way and through a defect of the premises for which, prima facie, fault might be laid on somebody for whom her employer was responsible, this accident had occurred to her. (at p52)

6. The cause was remitted for a new trial. At the new trial the same facts as before in effect were proved and again the defendant did not go into evidence on the subject of liability, although the defendant did go into evidence on the subject of damages. It happened that medical witnesses were called by the defendant during what would otherwise be the hearing of the plaintiff's case. The situation, however, was that the defendant technically went into evidence but nevertheless called no evidence as to liability. (at p53)

7. The judge at the second trial, acting upon the view of the majority of the Full Court, refused an application to direct a verdict for the defendant and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for 12,750 pounds or thereabouts. (at p53)

8. The Full Court was again moved, this time by the defendant. The appeal was on the two grounds, first that there was no evidence fit to be submitted to a jury in support of the plaintiff's case, and alternatively on the ground that the damages were excessive, the latter being a new trial point considered independently of the first ground. (at p53)

9. The Full Court having decided that the motion must be refused on both grounds, this appeal by the defendant is brought to us. (at p53)

10. The first matter to be quite clear about is the duty which the defendant was under. The defendant is a corporate body incorporated under the Public Hospitals Act, 1929-1943 (N.S.W.), s. 4, sched. 2. It is a country district hospital and it is sued in its corporate capacity. (at p53)

11. What is complained of is negligence through which a servant was injured. The negligence is alleged in relation to the condition of what I may very generally describe as a portion of the premises. As an employer the corporate body was of course under a duty to all its servants. The duty was to take reasonable care by its servants and agents for the safety of the employees. The duty was to be fulfilled by taking care to provide proper and adequate means for carrying out their work without unnecessary risk to them, to warn them of unusual or unexpected risks, to give proper instructions in the work they were to do and to exercise reasonable care to see that the parts of the premises they would use, the tools they would employ, the equipment they would handle and so on, would not be likely to expose them to any unusual risks or dangers. (at p53)

12. The evidence discloses, it may be said, nothing more than the happening of an accident, but it was an accident which could arise only from a defect in the attachment of the blind which the plaintiff was expected to handle. It was through no fault of hers, and it was a thing which you do not expect to occur. (at p53)

13. When you look at the case as it stands before us, the question is only whether the circumstances amounted to sufficient evidence to go to the jury. It is not a question of what the jury ought to do, or what inference a judge would draw, but what is sufficient for a jury to act upon. Now when you have some event or accident which you would not expect to happen except as the result of some failure in material things which ought not to occur if full precautions are taken and if it arises out of the behaviour of what may be called inanimate things which are under the control of the defendant without any positive act of negligence, little or nothing more is required in the first instance to support a case made against the party depending upon want of due care. It is enough to support that case unless and until further facts appear which tend to displace what otherwise might be the prima facie inference. It is enough to show that such an event occurred. It only carries the party who proves the fact to the point of awaiting some explanation and subject to such an explanation carries him to the jury; it does not impose a burden of legal disproof but it carries the plaintiff's case forward. Now in the present case the fault in the blind by reason of which it fell must have been attributable to some fault in its attachment or structure. It was a very heavy thing requiring proper mounting and proper fixing. It does not of course follow, so to speak, as night follows day that the fault in the blind is attributable to a fault in the party. But we have a hospital with a staff and the general obligation exists of exercising due care to see that things are in order. Is not that enough to carry the case forward? The answer is given that the negligence if it existed may have arisen from the fault of any of a number of different sorts of people; some of them may have been servants, and some of them may not have been servants but agents, and, in particular, it is said that it is likely or possible that the blind was fitted by an independent contractor. It is argued that there would be no responsibility in the hospital if the cause of the injury was traced to an independent contractor. The argument is not one that we need pursue. The defendant chose not to go into evidence and the cause of the blind's falling was not in fact traced to an independent contractor. If it had been shown to be due to the fault of an independent contractor a question of law might have arisen as to whether the responsibility of the hospital for his neglect laid the defendant open to an action by the plaintiff. The whole thing was left unexplained and the capacity for explaining it may be presumed to have existed in the defendant hospital. Whether lapse of time deprived the hospital of the information of course we do not know. But no information about the matter was placed by the defendant before the Court and the jury. It was simply left that by a defect in the attachment or condition of the blind that ought not to have existed an employee was seriously injured and that was left unexplained. In those circumstances we think that it was right to leave the case to the jury, and in the absence of any further information the verdict they found was open to them. It can be supported as a rational inference on their part that the fault lay somewhere within the control of the hospital, its servants or agents, and in those circumstances we think that the decision of the Supreme Court was right, that to direct a verdict for the defendant was not a correct course. (at p55)

14. As to the question of damages, it is said that the damages were excessive, so excessive that there must be a new trial. Curiously enough this question was not argued at length before the Supreme Court but the point was not abandoned and it has been discussed in some degree before us. The injuries which this lady received proved to be very important and serious, although at first that might not have been thought likely. Having heard what they were and having heard what the special damages were, we do not think it is a case in which the Court should interfere. General damages for pain and suffering and loss of capacity vary a very great deal. Unfortunately it is a very familiar subject of discussion. But in this case, applying the simple test of whether the amount awarded was unreasonable, we do not think that it was. (at p55)

15. For those reasons we think the appeal should be dismissed with costs. (at p55)

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.