|
|
[Home]
[Databases]
[WorldLII]
[Search]
[Feedback]
High Court of Australia |
GREUTNER v. EVERARD [1960] HCA 33; (1960) 103 CLR 177
Constitutional Law (Cth)
High Court of Australia
Dixon C.J.(1), McTiernan(2), Fullagar(3), Kitto(4), Taylor(5), Menzies(6) and
Windeyer(7) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Constitutional Law (Cth) - Freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse - Limitations on height and length of motor vehicles used on highways - The Constitution (63 & 64 Vict. c. 12), s. 92 - Motor Car Act 1951 (No. 5616) (Vict.), s. 32 (1) (b) (d) - Motor Car Act 1958 (No. 6325) (Vict.), s. 33 (1) (b) (d).
HEARING
Melbourne, 1960, February 16, 17; June 6. 6:6:1960DECISION
June 6.2. In the case of Greutner the charge was under what is now s. 33 (1) (d) which provides that a motor car shall not, except in accordance with a special permit granted under Div. 2, be used on the highway in any of the following cases: (a) . . . (b) . . . (c) . . . (d) if, in the case of an articulated motor car, the overall length of the motor car exceeds forty-five feet. By a definition contained in s. 3 (1) overall length comprises the total length of the motor car and the trailer including the load, as well as the space (if any) between the motor car and the trailer. Section 33 (1) (d) provides an alternative limitation in the measurement of the rear portion of the load and also contains a proviso, but it is unnecessary to refer to that part of the paragraph. (at p182)
3. On 28th January 1959, the defendant, without a special permit, drove a semi-trailer motor truck carrying seven motor car bodies through Victoria on a journey from Adelaide to Sydney. The vehicle was stopped near Bendigo by the respondent, an officer of the Country Roads Board. It was found that the overall length of the vehicle and load amounted to fifty-two feet. A conviction was obtained in the Bendigo Court of Petty Sessions for an offence against s. 33 (1) (d). The defendant appeals upon the ground that in its operation upon inter-State traffic the restriction to forty-five feet amounts to an interference with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between the States. (at p182)
4. In the case of Rowarth the charge was laid under par. (b) of s. 33 (1) which brings under the same prohibition vehicles in which the height of the motor car together with the load (if any) carried thereon exceeds twelve feet six inches. On 19th April 1959 the defendant without a permit drove a six-ton tray-top Bedford motor truck on a journey from Adelaide through Victoria and New South Wales to Brisbane. He was driving for his employers and the truck was loaded with four cases of motor body parts and, above the cases, three motor car bodies. At Dimboola the respondent, an officer of police, measured the height of the load and the vehicle. The height from the ground to the top of the load was found to be fourteen feet and four inches. The defendant was convicted before the Court of Petty Sessions at Dimboola for an offence against s. 33 (1) (b). The appeal is from that conviction. (at p182)
5. There is of course no doubt that the respective defendants were at the time of the offences engaged in inter-State trade and were entitled to enjoy that freedom of trade and commerce between the States which s. 92 assures. The question is whether the restriction or regulation of the overall length of the articulated vehicle imposed by s. 31 (1) (d) and of the height of the vehicle and its load imposed by s. 31 (1) (b) means an impairment of that freedom. In Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (1955) AC 241, at p 297; [1954] HCA 61; (1954) 93 CLR 1, at p 23 the Privy Council in the judgment delivered by Lord Morton of Henryton expressed approval of a passage in the dissenting judgment of Fullagar J. in McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 CLR 432, at p 495 . The passage discusses, in its application to the use of roads in the carriage of goods between the States, the conception or principle upon which these appeals turn. Restated in somewhat different terms, the conception is that the enjoyment of the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse upon the highway is consistent with, if not dependent upon, the imposition upon the users of the highway of conditions with which they must conform governing the dimensions, weight, equipment, loading, lighting and general safety of vehicles, the rules of the road including limitations of speed, and whatever else may go to the safe and orderly use by vehicles of public roads and affect the reasonable and proper maintenance and preservation of the highways. The passage which is set out in extenso in the judgment of the Privy Council (1955) AC, at pp 297-301; (1954) 93 CLR, at pp 23-28 contains many examples taken from the very legislation now before us. For the purposes of the present case it seems desirable to repeat again two paragraphs. Having given examples his Honour said: "Such examples might be multiplied indefinitely. Nobody would doubt that the application of such rules to an inter-State trader will not infringe s. 92. And clearly in such matters of regulation a very wide range of discretion must be allowed to the legislative body. When we ask why such rules do not infringe s. 92, I think that commonsense suggests a fairly clear and satisfactory answer. The reason is that they cannot fairly be said to impose a burden on a trader or deter him from trading: it would be foolish, for example, to suggest that my freedom to trade between Melbourne and Albury is impaired or hindered by laws which require me to keep to the left of the road and not drive in a manner dangerous to the public. Of course, even rules of the kind which I have taken as examples could be made to operate as a burden or deterrent in a high degree" (1950) 80 CLR, at p 496 . Fullagar J. then gave an example of an incapacitating limitation of speed. His Honour went on to say: "We should instantly say that such a law interfered with the freedom of inter-State trade. It would operate as a burden and a deterrent to the trader by making the journey economically impossible. The examples which I have taken seem clear. On which side of the line a particular case falls will, of course, be a question of fact. It may be a difficult question in some cases, but it does not seem to me likely that any very difficult question will arise within the sphere of practical politics. The real, and truly baffling, difficulties of s. 92 seem to me to lie outside the field of transportation. Within that field the very nature of the subject matter seems to lend itself to the application of a quite simple test, which will rarely, if ever, be productive of any real difficulty. When difficulty does arise, it will be the kind of difficulty with which lawyers are constantly called upon to deal in a great variety of cases" (1950) 80 CLR, at pp 496, 497 . In Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (No. 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127 Fullagar J. referred to the use of the words "regulate", "regulation" and "regulatory" in this connexion and spoke of the misunderstanding to which they appeared to have given rise particularly as possibly allowing resort for some purposes to licensing according to a discretionary judgment (1955) 93 CLR, at pp 204, 205 . His Honour then said: "It should be clearly understood that the word 'regulatory' does not mean 'consistent with the freedom given by s. 92'. If that were the meaning of the word, it would be a mere question-begging epithet. It should also be clearly understood that its use by their Lordships does not involve the implication of a proviso in s. 92. Section 92 does not say, and does not mean, that inter-State commerce shall be absolutely free, provided that it may be regulated even though, its regulation interferes with its freedom. The word 'regulatory' is in truth no more than a conveniently descriptive word denoting a kind of law which will generally, though not necessarily, be found to be consistent with freedom under s. 92. But the question, whenever a person engaged in inter-State commerce claims immunity from a law and invokes s. 92, will always be whether that law interferes with or impairs the freedom of that commerce. Can it be fairly said, as a matter of commonsense, that it impedes or restricts him or places a burden upon him in respect of the commercial activity in which he is engaged?" (1955) 93 CLR, at p 205 . A little later his Honour says: "I would, however, repeat, and emphasize, that the reason why such laws as I instanced do not contravene s. 92 is that no sensible person would say that any of them impeded or restricted or burdened the carrying on of trade or commerce by the person affected. As a matter of commonsense, one immediately says that they leave his trade and commerce as free as it was before they were enacted. They fulfil the ultimate test propounded by Dixon J. in Gilpin's Case [1935] HCA 8; (1935) 52 CLR 189 because they do not interfere with any activity which itself constitutes trade or commerce or intercourse. Although they are, of course, in a sense 'regulatory' of trade or commerce, their essential characteristic is that they control not a trading or commercial activity itself as such, but the manner of doing something which is merely incidental to the actual trading or commercial activity. I pointed out that even controls of this kind can, of course, be used to impede or restrict or burden the trading or commercial activity itself : see McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 CLR, at pp 496, 497 . If they are so used s. 92 is transgressed" (1955) 93 CLR, at pp 205, 206 . (at p185)
6. The foregoing supplies an adequate exposition of the principles to be applied in deciding the cases before us. (at p185)
7. It is apparent of course that the kind of restriction contained in par. (b) and (d) of s. 33 (1) forms part of the subject which one might expect to be governed or regulated according to those principles without necessarily impairing or derogating from the freedom of inter-State carriage by motor vehicle. Upon the face of the provisions there seems nothing unreasonable in limiting the height from the ground of a load to be carried over Victorian roads to twelve feet six inches or the length of an articulated vehicle and its load to forty-five feet. There is nothing to suggest that the limitations form an unnecessary restriction operating to repress the movement in inter-State trade of goods or vehicles which may travel with safety but nevertheless will be driven off the roads by the restriction. One would think that prima facie both provisions represented a discretionary judgment by the Victorian legislature of what constituted safe and practicable limits of height for loaded vehicles and of length for articulated vehicles. It might be assumed that not a few roads in mountain country might not be practicable for an articulated vehicle forty-five feet in length but that the maximum was adopted as that which it would generally be unwise to exceed. So doubtless a load more than twelve feet six inches high, at all events if top heavy, would be unsafe in many places that could be found on public highways in Victoria. But again it might be assumed that the limit was arrived at by a general judgment. In point of fact the limitation of height was first adopted in Victoria in 1924 by Act No. 3379, s. 17 (1) (b), though then twelve feet not twelve feet six inches was fixed. That of length was enacted first in 1927 by Act No. 3575, s. 5 (d). The argument against the valid application of the paragraphs to inter-State transportation rested in no small degree upon the undiscriminating and unexplained universality of the restrictions and the impossibility of forming any conclusion on the materials within judicial notice concerning the alleged operation of the provisions as real but unnecessary detractions from the freedom of certain classes of inter-State trade. It was pointed out that the restriction of length applied equally upon a twisting country road with an uneven metalled surface or worse and upon a modern highway with a completely smooth surface and no bend for many miles. It operated equally upon a vehicle carrying a load composed of an aggregate of separate things and a load of girders exceeding forty-five feet which could not be got to their destination any other way. The weight, the construction of the vehicle, its stability, the route and the necessity of the case and every other incidental or accidental feature were disregarded ; one rule was laid down in the case of maximum height and, in the case of articulated vehicles, one rule of maximum length. Within the limits of judicial notice it cannot be said, so it was argued, that the effect of the provisions is not to prevent or interfere with operations of inter-State carriage which in a business sense are necessary and are legitimate and may be safely carried out. It was urged that we are not dealing with a fixed and unalterable subject matter but one governed by developments and improvements in all the elements upon which the determination depends of what amounts to an actual interference with the true freedom of inter-State commerce. In this view the very fact that the limits were adopted so long ago counted against their valid application to inter-State traffic. Doubtless it was intended by the State legislature that exceptional lengths and heights that were unavoidable and other exceptional cases should be dealt with by special permits under s. 35. But that would give, so it was said, an uncontrolled discretion to the Country Roads Board or the municipal council as the case might be. (at p186)
8. In Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (No. 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127 in the reasons of McTiernan J., Webb J. and myself this passage occurs : "Clearly enough the fact that a particular transaction takes place in the course of inter-State trade or forms part of inter-State trade is not enough to exclude the persons engaging in it from the operation of the provisions of public and private law which otherwise would apply. The point at which such laws must stop is when they involve a prohibition, restriction, impediment or burden which prevents, obstructs or prejudices the dealing across the border, or the inter-State passage interchange or whatever it may be. The burden or obstruction must be real : it will not be enough to discover some theoretical or speculative transgression over a metaphysical boundary of an area of immunity plotted from logic independently of reality. But no real detraction from the freedom of inter-State trade can be suffered by submitting to directions for the orderly and proper conduct of commercial dealings or other transactions or activities, at all events if the directions are both relevant and reasonable and place inter-State transactions under no greater disadvantage than that borne by transactions confined to the State" (1955) 93 CLR, at p 160 . To this general statement I adhere. There is of course no doubt that the provisions now in question place inter-State transactions under no greater disadvantage than that borne by transactions confined to the State. Nor can there be any doubt that the directions given by s. 33 (1) (b) and (d) are relevant to the proper conduct of the carriage of goods on the roads, that is to say the convenience and safety of the traffic generally, including the carrier. What is really impugned is the reasonableness of the provision. If it be correct that no maxima of height and length can be prescribed of general application throughout Victoria without infringing upon the freedom of trade between the States unless the maxima be reasonable for the best road and the safest environment, it is hardly necessary to say that little support might be found for the view that the restrictions did conform to such a standard. But the question of regulating heights and lengths of vehicles without infringing the freedom of inter-State carriage of goods is not to be solved in that piece-meal fashion. It must be a question to be settled legislatively or under legislative authority. For what is presupposed is a law in the interests of general safety. It must be regarded as something operating over long journeys and over many routes chosen by the drivers of vehicles. So long as the general law is not shown in its operation to be truly prohibitory or restrictive of a description of inter-State traffic and at the same time to lack the justification found in the considerations appearing in the foregoing citations then no invasion of s. 92 is established. (at p187)
9. That is true of the cases before us. (at p187)
10. The appeals should be dismissed. (at p187)
McTIERNAN J. In my opinion these appeals should be dismissed. I agree in the reasons of the Chief Justice in each of these cases. (at p187)
FULLAGAR J. I agree that these appeals must be dismissed. I do not desire to add anything to what has been said by the Chief Justice. (at p187)
KITTO J. The provisions which we have to consider in these cases fall, I think, quite clearly into the class of laws which, though placing restrictions or other burdens upon individuals engaged in inter-State trade, commerce or intercourse, yet do not detract from the freedom of the individuals' inter-State trade, commerce or intercourse itself. The class is distinguished not by the lightness of the burdens imposed, but by the nature of the laws that impose them. When s. 92 speaks, as it does, of trade, commerce and intercourse as activities among organized communities, it quite evidently speaks of them as carried on not amidst anarchy, but in conformity with rules. In whatever terms it may be right to define the class of rules which is postulated, because of the very nature of the communities the definition must at least be wide enough to include a law of general application limiting the permissible dimensions of the units of traffic on the roads and wearing no other aspect than that of a law directed to the obviating of physical damage to persons or property. For the purpose of determining whether a law is of such a description, considerations of the need for it or of its reasonableness may conceivably be relevant in some circumstances. But once the description is found to apply, it cannot matter, in my view, whether the restriction appears necessary or reasonable, large or small, regarded either generally or in relation to the circumstances of a particular case. For in any event the law, because of its character, must be conceded a place as part of the legal framework within which s. 92 contemplates inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse as being freely carried on. There is, I think, no room for doubt that the laws here in question belong to this class. (at p188)
2. I agree that the appeals should be dismissed. (at p188)
TAYLOR J.
On 28th January 1959, the appellant drove an articulated motor vehicle on
the Midland Highway near Bendigo in breach of the provisions
of s. 32 (1) (d)
of the Motor Car Act 1951 (Vict.). That provision, which is now contained in
s. 33 (1) (d) of the consolidated Act
of 1958, provided that a motor car
should not, except under and in accordance with a special permit granted under
the Act, be used
on any highway "(d) If, in the case of an articulated motor
car, the overall length of the motor car exceeds forty-five feet . .
.". The
vehicle itself was forty-five feet in length but the total length of the
vehicle and load was fifty-two feet and so the "overall
length" of the
vehicle, as defined by s. 3, was fifty-two feet. It is not disputed that the
appellant used the vehicle on the occasion
in question in breach of the terms
of the statutory provision but the vehicle was then being operated in the
course of inter-State
trade and the contention is advanced that the
conditional prohibition now to be found in s. 33 (1) (d) impairs the freedom
of inter-State
trade and commerce guaranteed by s. 92 and, accordingly, that
the statutory provision must be taken to have been invalid. (at p189)
2. The attack made upon the sub-section may be simply stated. It is asserted that it was calculated, directly, to impede inter-State trade in that to the extent to which it purported to prescribe a limit with respect to the length of articulated vehicles and their loads, it circumscribed the loads which might be carried. And no such limit, it is said, can be regarded as legitimate unless it can be said to be a necessary prescription to enable the inter-State carriage of goods by road to continue. Whilst counsel for the appellant stressed that it was for the respondent to establish the necessity for the limit in question he also relied upon the evidence of a witness called on behalf of the appellant in the course of the proceedings in the magistrate's court. This witness, a consulting engineer who had had some experience of local government engineering, had taken the trouble to follow a similar vehicle with an overall length of fifty to fifty-one feet from Adelaide to Sydney. He made this journey about a fortnight after the date of the alleged offence and followed the route which had been taken by the offending vehicle. The load on this occasion consisted of a double tier of assembled motor cars and the total height of the vehicle and load was fourteen feet six inches. He followed the vehicle so loaded, he said, in order to form an opinion as to its safety upon the roads and, with some little qualification, his opinion was that it was completely safe. But, in my view, whether it was or was not is of no consequence in the case, for the validity of the provision cannot be made to turn upon the objective fact that the vehicle which he followed was "safe" in the sense in which he used that word, or, whether, in any wider sense in which that expression may be used, it travelled safely over those roads in Victoria which formed part of the journey from Adelaide to Sydney. Nor, in my view, is it of any consequence whether his opinion that the limit prescribed by the provision in question was or was not necessary. In the circumstances of the case the only inquiry which seems to me to be relevant is one which is concerned with the essential character of the provision for if it clearly appears as one reasonably designed to ensure safety on the roads it matters nothing that a professed expert witness should form the opinion that, consonant with safety on the roads, more liberal limits might have been prescribed. That some limits may be prescribed in the interests of safety is beyond question and the legality of limits when prescribed cannot be made to turn merely upon the fact a witness may be found whose view as to what is necessary or appropriate is at variance with that entertained by the legislature. (at p190)
3. Nor, as it was pointed out during argument, is it possible to consider the question of the validity of s. 32 (1) (d) alone ; it is but one provision of a section which purports to prescribe limits with respect to the width, height, weight and distribution of loads, the speed limits to be observed by vehicles of specified types and limitations upon the time during which any person may continuously drive a motor vehicle which is used for the carriage of passengers or goods for hire or reward in the course of trade. (at p190)
4. A perusal of the section indicates quite clearly that it does not purport to deal with inter-State trade and commerce as such. At the most it prescribes conditions which must be observed by those using the roads of the State whether in the course of inter-State trade or not. Moreover, the conditions themselves on their face are concerned with matters clearly and directly relevant to the safe use of the roads of the State. This being so they do not in any way burden or impede inter-State trade (cf. Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (No. 2) (1955) 93 CLR, at pp 163, 205, 241 ). (at p190)
5. This conclusion is not based upon the apparent character of the provisions
alone. It takes into account the fact that there is
nothing in the case to
suggest that the requirement that these conditions shall be observed operates
to create any burden on the
inter-State haulage of goods. On its face the
section does no more than prescribe conditions clearly directed to the safety
of road
traffic, there is nothing in the case to suggest that the conditions
are otherwise than reasonable and there is no reason for supposing
that the
section can have an operation extending beyond its obvious end. Moreover there
is power to relax the conditions in appropriate
circumstances. It is, of
course, possible to conceive circumstances in which the prescription of
unreasonable conditions would be
taken to constitute the imposition of a
burden on inter-State trade. But there is nothing in the circumstances of this
case to suggest
that this is the effect of the section in question. That being
so the appeal should, in my opinion, be dismissed.
Sloman v. Rowarth (at p190)
6. There is no ground upon which this appeal can be distinguished from Greutner v. Everard and, accordingly, it must be dismissed. (at p190)
MENZIES J.Greutner v. Everard
2. The charge against the defendant was that he was the driver of an articulated motor vehicle which was used on the Midland Highway, the overall length of which exceeded forty-five feet. It was not in dispute that the overall length of the vehicle and load was fifty-two feet. The only defence was that because the defendant was driving the vehicle in the course of inter-State trade, he was by virtue of s. 92 of the Constitution free from the restriction imposed by the sub-section. This is the only matter in issue upon the appeal. (at p191)
3. I consider that the sub-section did apply to the defendant, because what it prohibits is prohibited, prima facie at least, because it is contrary to the public interest, including that of all road users, and not because it is trade or commerce or intercourse or is interState in character; and because, this being the case, it has not been shown that the prohibition is of a character other than it bears upon its face. Notwithstanding that the sub-section does prevent the defendant from carrying upon his vehicle upon a journey across Victoria as large a load of cargo as he for business reasons desires, and could no doubt on many occasions carry with safety to himself and, perhaps, without inconvenience to others, and so in one sense may be said to be burdensome to him, the truth is that what the law does is to control his use of roads, as part of the common use of the roads, for the common good including his own good. It is not my understanding of the constitutional freedom which s. 92 gives that an inter-State carrier is free from the operation of any law that he can show interferes with his using the roads as he likes in the course of his business, or even that the only controls that can affect him are those which can be shown to be necessary to safeguard his business. (at p191)
4. Evidence was called for the defence that the route taken by the defendant could be travelled with safety by a vehicle such as that driven by the defendant and loaded so that the overall length was fifty-two feet, but, as the magistrate properly concluded, this evidence afforded no basis for a conclusion that the law challenged was something more than a reasonable regulation of driving in the public interest. It is not the mark of such a law that safety cannot be achieved except by strict compliance with its terms in every particular case; a law which limits speed to thirty miles per hour in built-up areas is obviously a law for the orderly use of roads, notwithstanding that on many occasions that limit could be exceeded without any danger. Section 32 (1) (d) was criticized on the ground that it is a law applying uniformly to motor vehicles upon all Victorian roads. Provided that it is borne in mind that it applies to one type of vehicle only, it is true that it is of general application but the fact that the length limit provided is uniform throughout Victoria is itself no objection to its validity; indeed, so long as the limit prima facie relates to the orderly use of the roads, its uniformity would seem to be a consideration in favour of its validity rather than against it. Section 142 (1) (b) of the Road Traffic Act (S.A.), which fixes the maximum overall length of vehicle and load at sixty-six feet, was also relied upon to establish invalidity, but this provision seems to me to be without any significance in the circumstances of the case. It is not implicit in s. 92 that one State cannot validly impose traffic controls that are more stringent than those imposed by another State; nor does the existence of a higher limit in one State warrant the conclusion that a lower limit in another State is something more than legitimate traffic control. The significance of showing that a State maintains controls that are very much more restrictive than those generally accepted is a different problem that does not arise here. (at p192)
5. I regard the conclusion that I have stated as being nothing but an application of what was said by Fullagar J. in McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 CLR, at pp 495-498 (quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. The State of New South Wales (1955) AC, at pp 296-299; (1954) 93 CLR, at pp 23-26 ; by all the members of this Court in Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (No. 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127, at pp 159, 160, 163, 186, 188, 205, 206, 217, 218, 239, 241. and by Dixon C.J., McTiernan and Webb JJ. in Armstrong v. State of Victoria [1955] HCA 26; (1955) 93 CLR 264, at pp 275, 276 ). From these statements, I content myself with citing a passage from Kitto J. in Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (No. 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127 where, after referring to laws clearly falling within the category of traffic regulations, his Honour said: "Yet it would be generally agreed that laws such as I have mentioned, notwithstanding the burden they involve, afford clear illustrations of the kind of regulation which s. 92 not only allows but pre-supposes. Laws fall within this category which are of the kind by which an individual's latitude of conduct is circumscribed in the interests of fitting him into a neighbourhood - a society, membership of which entails, because of its nature, acts and forbearances on the part of each by which room is allowed for the reasonable enjoyment by each other of his own position in the same society. There is no difficulty in seeing that the existence of laws of that kind is assumed by s. 92" (1955) 93 CLR, at p 218 ). (at p193)
6. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.
Sloman v. Rowarth (at p192)
7. For the reasons I have given in Greutner v. Everard, I consider that s. 32 (1) (d) of the Motor Car Act 1951 (Vict.), which, without special permit, limits the height of a motor vehicle and load which can be used on any highway to twelve feet six inches, validly applies to the use of a vehicle in the course of inter-State trade. Accordingly, the appellant was corrrctly convicted of an offence under the sub-section and his appeal against that conviction should be dismissed. (at p193)
WINDEYER J. Proper rules for the safety of traffic on roads do not impair freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. They merely make trade, commerce and intercourse by road possible as part of the normal life of a community governed by law. The States make the traffic rules; and, because there is no absolute standard for limits of speed, size, weight, lights, loads and so forth for vehicles on roads, differing requirements in different States may seem to impede traffic moving across State borders. But limits that are reasonable for the regulation of road traffic - and there is no ground for thinking that those in question here are not - do not contravene s. 92 merely because in other parts of Australia somewhat different limits are prescribed. The matter has been fully dealt with in the judgments of the Chief Justice and the other members of the Court and I agree that these appeals should be dismissed. (at p193)
ORDER
Order in each appeal: -Appeal dismissed with costs.
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1960/33.html