Winsor v Boaden [1953] HCA 46; (1953) 90 CLR 345 (19 August 1953)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WINSOR v. BOADEN [1953] HCA 46; (1953) 90 CLR 345

Railways (N.S.W.)

High Court of Australia
Dixon C.J.(1), Webb(1), Fullagar(1), Kitto(1) and Taylor(1) JJ.

CATCHWORDS

Railways (N.S.W.) - Employees - "Imprisonment for any term of or exceeding six months" - Vacation of office - Statutory provision destroying accrued rights - Method of construction - "Sentence" - Government Railways Act 1912-1951 (N.S.W.) (No. 30 of 1912 - No. 15 of 1951), s. 80.

HEARING

Sydney, 1953, August 19. 19:8:1953
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

DECISION

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
DIXON C.J. This appeal involves the interpretation of s. 80 of the is convicted of any felony or is sentenced to imprisonment for any term of or exceeding six months he shall be deemed to have vacated his office. It also provides for other conditions in which he would vacate his office but they are not material to this case. The respondent in this appeal was convicted before a court of petty sessions on one day in respect of three offences. The offences were alleged to have been committed at the same place and on the same day. On the first charge he was sentenced to imprisonment for three months. On the second he was also sentenced to imprisonment for three months. These sentences were to be served concurrently. On the third charge he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment in the same gaol "there to be kept to hard labour for the space of three months to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment" for the two other offences. The problem is whether in these circumstances he was, within the meaning of s. 80, sentenced to imprisonment for any term of or exceeding six months. The Supreme Court of New South Wales has decided that the provisions of the section were not satisfied, although the cumulative terms did amount to a period of six months. The construction the Supreme Court gave to s. 80 was that there must be one sentence and that the sentence must be for a term of six months or more. That appears to us to be the natural prima facie meaning of the words. The section is one which destroys accrued rights. It is a principle of construction that a provision of that kind is not to be given a wider or more ample operation than the literal, natural or grammatical meaning of the words conveys unless there is a context or a subject matter which so demands. During the argument a number of considerations was canvassed which, it was suggested, tended to support the literal meaning of the words and brought out difficulties which would ensue if the period of six months mentioned in the section were to be made up of independent sentences of smaller terms. But independently of those considerations, we think that what we take to be the literal or natural meaning of the words should be adhered to. The word "sentence" connotes a judicial judgment or pronouncement fixing a term of imprisonment. A term of imprisonment is the period fixed by the judgment as the punishment for the offence. In our opinion there is nothing in s. 80 to show that the word is used in that section in any other sense. We agree with the Supreme Court in their construction of the section, and consequently the appeal must be dismissed with costs. (at p347)

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.